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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the Venezuelan oil sector. The ‘oil economy’ represents the 
singular most determining variable in the political economy of Venezuela. The thesis 
challenges the view that oil, per se, has been some sort of a ‘curse’ over the country. 
Instead, this thesis aims to highlight the fact that other characteristics of the political 
system have influenced the way Venezuelans have dealt with their oil wealth. The 
thesis presents empirical evidence that the management of the oil industry and oil-
related income in the three decades following nationalisation of oil in 1975 became 
politicised. Politicisation occurred despite the fact that the political elite was aware of 
the danger that this might happen. Political elites embarked upon designing 
institutions to try to prevent this outcome. The institutions themselves were not in 
principle badly designed, and the thesis shows that there was nothing so inherently 
wrong with their design that they were unworkable. What was lacking was the 
political will to make them work, and evidence of this can be seen across two 
dimensions. One relates to the fact that all institutional forms studied – the holding 
company PDVSA, the Investment, Stabilisation and Development Funds – all ended 
up politicised. The other relates to the fact that an essentially similar pattern of 
politicisation can be seen across a whole series of different Venezuelan governments. 
In this sense the Chávez government has been an exercise in continuity and not in 
rupture. The thesis analyses two concrete aspects of the relationship between the 
Venezuelan State and oil. It scrutinises oil policy in Venezuela over the three decades 
following the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1975. The research focuses on the 
institutional arrangements (i.e. the ‘rules of the game’) concerning, first, the spending 
of the revenue which the Venezuelan State obtains from oil exports and second, the 
exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to control PDVSA 
and define its policy guidelines. This thesis facilitates a deeper understanding of the 
politicisation that has occurred in Venezuelan political economy at critical points in 
the relationship between the State and the oil sector. These insights contribute, in turn, 
to a better understanding of contemporary Venezuelan problems. 
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 Chapter 1 
 
Institutional failure and oil in Venezuela 
 
 
 
‘Fiscal abundance does not make Venezuela richer or more 
balanced…abundance of fiscal resources has been a mirage that has 
contributed to fool ourselves about the true Venezuelan society. For 
that reason I repeat, my government will administer this abundance as 
if we were administering scarcity’ 
 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, President of Venezuela, Inaugural speech on 
the 12 March 1974 
 
 
‘I wish to confirm on this historical occasion that Petróleos de 
Venezuela will not be subject to the contingencies of political life. It 
will be governed by the overall interests of the Nation, disregarding 
temporary situations or individual interests’ 
 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, President of Venezuela, Speech on the 
occasion of signing into law the Oil Nationalisation Bill on the 29 
August 1975 
 
 
Thirty years after these statements, Venezuela did not administer abundance as if it 
were administering scarcity nor did it keep Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) free 
from political meddling and removed from non-public interests. This thesis addresses 
the disappointment of Venezuelans in failing to achieve what they set out to conquer 
with nationalisation of the oil industry in the middle of an unprecedented boom in oil 
revenues in 1975.  
 
Venezuela’s failure in these two respects, set by the President who presided over the 
historic step of nationalising oil, which was certainly the national consensus of the 
time, is part of a more general legacy of economic underachievement, political 
discomposure and social unrest. Growth indicators of per capita income show a 
regression to 1950s levels (see Figure 1.1). The political system has been under severe 
stress since the late 1980s. Poverty and inequality have undermined a society formerly 
considered as relatively stable and free from the problems existing in many other 
countries of similar levels of development.  
 
Figure 1.1 
Venezuelan Real GDP per capita (1950-2005)  
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Source: IMF/ International Financial Statistics; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 
 
 
Venezuela’s travails are most puzzling since the country had been expected to 
perform better as a result of its immense oil wealth. Thinking about Venezuela has 
been dominated by the belief that oil wealth should have made Venezuela prosperous. 
Conventional wisdom dictates that Venezuela should be a rich country. The country 
has for decades been one of the most important oil provinces in the world. It has 
exploited oil for over eighty years and has reserves of over seventy seven million 
barrels. Venezuelans live above one of the largest oil reserves in the world.1 
 
Some decades later, the performance of both the economy and the political system, 
however, could not have been in starker contrast to what would have been predicted 
by those propitious conditions. The country has witnessed economic decline and 
                                                 
1 According to OPEC annual statistical bulletin 2003. If the extra-heavy oil reserves are taken 
into account, Venezuela becomes the country with the largest oil reservoirs in the world. 
political crisis instead of expected growth and democratic consolidation. Oil money 
has been squandered. Mismanagement of oil revenues, ranging from inept investment 
decisions, to poor implementation, to outright corruption, has diluted a vast external 
inflow of financial resources into the economy. 
 
Venezuelan travails and oil 
 
This thesis looks at the oil sector. The ‘oil economy’ certainly represents the singular 
most determining variable in the political economy of Venezuela. The thesis 
challenges the view that oil, per se, has been some sort of a ‘curse’ over the country. 
Instead, this thesis aims to highlight the fact that other characteristics of the political 
system have influenced the way Venezuelans have dealt with their oil wealth. The 
Venezuelan State has been highly patrimonial and politicised. Political elites, 
although perfectly aware of these characteristics, were not able to alter this state of 
affairs. The ‘oil sector’ was meant to be an exception to this trend. Elites sought to 
depoliticise the relationship between the State and the oil sector. Institutional forms 
aimed at bureaucratising this relationship have been attempted but, as this thesis will 
show, have failed to fulfil that purpose.  
 
The cases studied in this thesis all represent efforts to bureaucratise and depoliticise 
the Venezuelan State. By revealing how these efforts have been undermined by 
broader patterns of politicisation this thesis contributes to explain not only the 
persistence of that pattern but to illuminate the causes for similar failures in other 
institutional fronts.  
 
The cases studied in this thesis, and the lessons derived from them, help to elucidate a 
similar set of problems in relation to broader politicisation of the State, the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions and regulatory practices. These 
problems were of particular relevance in Latin America during the decade of the 
1990s when numerous countries in the region embarked upon a myriad of reforms 
usually advocated by multilateral organisations linked to the so-called ‘Washington 
consensus’. As the ‘reform exercise’ did not produce the expected outcome, a 
reflection about this divergence has since been in order. The cases shown in this 
thesis, although not directly related to the agenda of the reforms of 1990s, reveal 
similar lessons that can be extrapolated to understand the limitations reformers have 
encountered in advancing the ‘reform agenda’. In this sense, this thesis will validate 
the notion that even well designed institutional blueprints are not enough for reform to 
take root. 
 
1.1 Hypothesis 
 
This thesis will present empirical evidence that the management of the oil industry 
and oil-related income in the three decades following nationalisation of oil in 1975 
became politicised.2 Politicisation occurred despite the fact that the political elite was 
aware of the danger that this might happen, as Perez’s words put it unambiguously. 
Political elites embarked upon designing institutions to try to prevent this outcome. 
The institutions themselves were not in principle badly designed, and this thesis will 
show that there was nothing so inherently wrong with their design that they were 
unworkable. What was lacking was the political will to make them work, and 
evidence of this can be seen across two dimensions. One relates to the fact that all 
institutional forms studied – the holding company PDVSA, the Investment, 
Stabilisation and Development Funds – all ended up politicised. The other relates to 
the fact that an essentially similar pattern of politicisation can be seen across a whole 
series of different Venezuelan governments. In this sense the Chavez government has 
been an exercise in continuity and not in rupture.   
 
This thesis will demonstrate that there has been a pattern of politicisation that has 
persisted throughout the whole period since nationalisation. This period encompasses 
gradations in the ideological bias of policy decisions, different degrees of power 
legitimacy and functioning of checks and balances mechanisms, and different levels 
of oil dependency.3 The thesis will expose permanent mechanisms of politicisation, 
rivalling the opposite process of institutionalisation, that are retained in the conduct of 
                                                 
2 Politicisation here is understood following the definition of ‘the politicized state’ by 
Douglas Chalmers, ‘The Politicized State in Latin America’ in J. M. Malloy, 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1977).p.25. 
3 Different economic policies were attempted as well. For a summary of these policies see 
Ricardo Hausmann, ‘Quitting populism cold turkey: the “Big Bang” approach to 
macroeconomic balance’ in L.Goodman et al. (eds.), Lessons of the Venezuelan experience 
(Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.255. 
crucial public matters even beyond significant changes of relevant political actors, 
notably across both the so-called Punto Fijo and Chavista regimes.4 If the oil sector, 
as this thesis argues, serves as a crucial indicator of broader Venezuelan 
characteristics, this thesis suggests that persistent short term management of vital 
aspects of both the economic and political system has become an entrenched feature 
of both systems. 
 
This thesis builds on the abundant literature that has converged on the theme of 
institutional failure in Venezuela. It will offer, however, a detailed account of how 
political factors have stood in the way of institutionalising ‘rules of the game’ that 
were conceived to address the main concerns regarding the crucial State-oil 
relationship and that, in principle, did not exhibit any inherently flawed features that 
might have made them unfeasible.  
 
By addressing how the oil industry and the oil money were managed, this thesis will 
add to valid insights offered by contemporary scholarly analysis on recent Venezuelan 
failures. The thesis will look into the engine of the Venezuelan economy and a central 
variable influencing political outcomes: oil. This approach expands on oil-centred 
analysis that commonly takes oil as the intervening variable. This thesis will examine 
oil institutions, set against political factors, attempting to cast light on the interrelation 
between the two. The findings of the thesis will underpin a fuller understanding of the 
failings of both the economic and political systems. 
 
This thesis will focus on two key elements of the State-oil relationship: the 
governance of the state-owned oil company and the use of oil revenues. By showing 
how these two factors have operated since nationalisation of oil in 1975, up to 2005, 
the thesis aims to support the argument that ‘rules of the game’ did not inform the 
behaviour of relevant actors regarding these two matters. Successive attempts to 
regulate how to handle oil money either failed or faced distortion of their purposes. 
                                                 
4 ‘Punto Fijo’ regime refers to the political system established after dictatorship in 1958, 
called after the foundational pact signed by the main political actors (excluding the left) in a 
residence of one of the signatories named that way. ‘Chavista’ regime refers to the political 
system marked by the enactment of a new Constitution in 1999. The name derives from the 
fact that politics in this period has been dictated by the actions and decisions led by President 
Chavez.  
Rules to achieve a stable governance structure of PDVSA were constantly ignored or 
distorted creating a dysfunctional relationship between the company and its political 
masters. The thesis will show that this malfunction followed the persistence of a 
pattern of politicisation that has prevented the institutionalisation of successive rules 
introduced, during the observed period, to regulate the oil industry and oil money. 
 
 
1.2 Background 
 
This section discusses five propositions, based on existing literature on Venezuela, 
that serve as points of departure for this thesis. The empirical evidence shown in this 
thesis will complement and modify some of the observations provided by these 
existing views of the Venezuelan case.  
 
 
1) Venezuela was, in 1974, a relatively sophisticated and stable democracy, 
economically prosperous and with relatively functional institutions. 
 
Venezuela was considered an exceptional case amongst Latin American and other 
developing countries in general, its prospects being considered unparalleled decades 
ago. Venezuelan’s exceptionalism was commonly accepted.5 Using Levine’s words: 
“For most of the last 30 years, Venezuelans and many of their Latin American 
neighbours shared a sense of Venezuelan exceptionalism. Abundant natural resources, 
great wealth, mobility and rising living standards, social openness and democratic 
politics, strong political parties, political stability and a military under control 
combined with the absence of deep linguistic or ethnic divisions to reinforce the 
notion that Venezuela had either solved the problems plaguing other Latin American 
countries or was somehow exempt in the first place. When Venezuelans’ successes 
were set against regional tendencies to authoritarianism or civil war, satisfied, if not 
smug, feelings of exceptionalism became all the stronger.”6 Oil resources were 
suggested as one of the factors that explained this ‘exceptional’ status.7  
                                                 
5 Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker ‘The Venezuelan exceptionalism thesis. Separating myth 
from reality’, Latin American Perspectives 32:2, 2005, p.5. 
6 Daniel Levine ‘Goodbye to Venezuelan exceptionalism’, Journal of Interamerican studies 
 The 1973 elections consolidated a two party political system, although the excluded 
left openly participated for the first time since insurgency in the 1960s. Power had 
passed to Acción Democrática (AD) in the 1973 election, following the administration 
of its rival Social-Christian Party (Copei), which in itself was considered a test for 
Venezuelan democracy since it was the first time an incumbent (President Leoni, of 
AD, elected in 1968) had been defeated. These events put together gave the 
Venezuelan elite and analysts alike the confirmation that political institutions were 
stable. Scholars such as Levine noted the ‘soundness and solidity’ of the political 
system.8 Others such as Jacome later noted that the Venezuelan elite learnt the sour 
lessons of the politics of the Trienio9 that led to ten years of dictatorship in the 
1950s.10 On the other hand, economic growth had been sustained for years (see Figure 
1.1) mainly responding to the ‘Import Substitution Industrialisation’ (ISI) policies11 
and the constant inflow of oil revenues. The enormous prospects offered by the 
positive shock of the oil price boom in 1974 only reinforced the propitious conditions 
prevailing at the time. 
 
The starting point regarding oil institutions after nationalisation, this thesis will argue, 
was similarly auspicious. The oil industry was regulated efficiently by the Oil 
Ministry12 and rent collection was deemed to be satisfactory. These initial favourable 
conditions for the post-nationalisation period support the argument that institutional 
design was not inherently flawed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and world affairs 6 April 1994, p.149 
7 R. Briceño-León, ‘Petroleum and democracy in Venezuela’, Social Forces 84:1, 2005.  
8 D.Levine, Conflict and political change in Venezuela (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1973),p.258. 
9 ‘Trienio’ refers to the period of civilian rule from 1945 to 1948. 
10 F.Jacome, ‘Venezuela: Old successes, new constraints on learning’ in J.McCoy, ed., 
Political learning and redemocratization in Latin America: Do politicians learn from political 
crises? (Miami, North-South Center Press, 2000). 
11 Import Substitutions Industrialisation was an economic policy paradigm at the time. It 
basically advocates protection to infant industries within a country until the industrial base 
was well established. 
12 The Oil Ministry was officially called ‘Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons’. The Ministry 
was later renamed twice: first, Ministry of Energy and Mines and second, Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum. Hereafter, it is called Ministry of Energy. 
2) There was a good understanding of the positive and negative impacts of oil 
wealth on Venezuela. 
 
Oil plays a central role in much of the analysis and commentary about Venezuela. The 
effect of oil on the country’s performance is mixed. A widely agreed view is that 
whilst oil wealth generates immense opportunities to boost a country’s prospects, it 
also has the potential to bring problems. Oil wealth has been used to explain regime 
stability in Venezuela, both Gomez’s dictatorship (1908-1935) and post-1958 
democracy. 13 
 
Venezuela grew steadily until the late 1970s.14 In the first five decades of oil 
exploitation, oil wealth sustained both authoritarian and democratic rule (29 years of 
authoritarian regimes and 21 years of democracy). Until the early 1970s oil wealth 
was then considered to have had a positive net impact on Venezuela. The 1973 oil 
boom, however, resulted in a turning point in the country’s performance. 
Paradoxically, the boom, after some years of improved conditions, was followed by a 
deterioration of standards of living that was not immediately acknowledged. The 
awakening to Venezuela’s problems came only after the acute social unrest revealed 
in the Caracazo riots in February 1989.15  
 
 
Oil wealth neglects other sources of taxation and the regulative capacity of the State 
 
Oil wealth produces contradictory effects. In her seminal work, Karl identifies this as 
the ‘paradox of plenty’.16 Jorge Olavarria, a Venezuelan historian, refers to it as the 
                                                 
13 Judith Ewell, Venezuela. A century of change (London, C.Hurst & Company,1984); Daniel 
Hellinger ‘Democracy over a barrel. History through the prism of oil’, N.A.C.L.A, 
March/April 1994 
14 Venezuela is commonly referred as the fastest growing economy in the world during the 
first seven decades of the 20th Century. See ‘Oil, missions and a chat show’, The Economist, 
14 May 2005. 
15 ‘El Caracazo’ is the name given to the riots and looting that heavily afflicted Caracas and 
other parts of Venezuela for three days in February 1989, which were estimated to have 
caused several thousand deaths. 
16 Terry Karl, Paradox of plenty: oil booms and petro-states (London, University of California 
Press, 1997). 
‘Venezuela effect’.17 Oil revenues have given the State a strong financial position to 
assert its independence, extend its jurisdiction and to pursue autonomous goals. 
Dependency on oil income, however, made the Venezuelan State vulnerable to 
fluctuations in this income.  
 
Declining oil rents caused negative effects magnified by a reluctance to address the 
harmful collateral effects that oil wealth carried with it. The abundant fiscal revenues 
obtained from oil underpinned a neglect of other sources of taxation. Both Karl and 
McCoy draw attention to the fact that generous oil revenues replaced traditional 
sources of taxation, precluding the Venezuelan State from developing an 
administrative capacity. In Karl’s words, “The State was robbed of the opportunity to 
benefit from the skills and talents that arise from the penetration of public authority to 
the far corners of a territory in search of revenues.”18 McCoy alludes to the same 
dynamics when she asserts that one of the vulnerabilities of the Punto Fijo system was 
neglecting the regulative capability of the State.19  
 
When oil income became insufficient, the absence of alternative sources of income on 
which the State could rely and its inability to reformulate policy according to new 
conditions fuelled economic and political crises. Oil wealth’s capacity to sustain the 
Venezuelan economy and public spending started to plummet steadily in the early 
1980s. As Figure 1.2 shows, the per capita value of oil exports started to decline in 
1981 after a brief period of recovery. The combination of sluggish oil prices, world 
inflation and a growing Venezuelan population resulted in the diminishing ability of 
the oil export sector to sustain, on its own, growth in the economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Jorge Olavarria, El efecto Venezuela (Caracas, Panapo de Venezuela,1996). 
18 Terry Karl, ibid. p.91. 
19 Jennifer McCoy, ‘From representative to participatory democracy?’, in J.McCoy and 
D.J.Myers, The unraveling of representative democracy in Venezuela (Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), p.264. 
Figure 1.2 
Real value of Venezuelan oil exports per capita 
(1969-2005)
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Source: Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
 
Oil dependency  
 
The declining value of oil rents impacted Venezuela in many ways. First, the patron-
client20 dynamic collapsed as the Venezuelan political system was “laying on the 
material base of international oil rent distribution through a clientelistic system”.21 
“Heavy reliance on oil established a pattern of development in which the State 
became the great purveyor of employment, financial well-being and, through those 
two, political power.”22 Insufficient oil rent meant, as well, that the political system 
could not appease other important actors. As Roberts indicates, oil rent had facilitated 
“cooperation of labour forces, the Church, and the Military with the democratic 
                                                 
20 In the Venezuelan context, ‘patron-client’ is used not only following the traditional usage 
of the term (i.e. to denote ‘clientelism”) but to stress that governmental elites maintain its 
political support by means of distributing the international oil rent through a myriad of 
mechanisms such as employment in a bloated public bureaucracy, cheap-financing the private 
sectors, widespread subsidies (petrol prices is a typical example) and overvalued exchange 
rate. 
21 Daniel Hellinger, ‘Visión política general: la caída del puntofijismo y el surgimiento del 
chavismo’, in S.Ellner and D.Hellinger, La política venezolana en la época de Chávez. Clases, 
polarización y conflicto (Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 2003), p.43. 
22 Scott MacDonald and Georges Fauriol, Fast Forward. Latin America on the edge of the 21st 
century (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1997), p.181. 
regime…and stimulated the programmatic convergence of the main political 
parties”.23  
 
Second, the economic model constructed around oil rents was threatened. Lombardi 
indicates how the political and economic elite based their notion of progress on the 
unsustainable assumption that “oil wealth on its own could transform an extractive 
economy into a modern diversified economy by recycling petro dollars in State-
selected enterprises sustained by subsidies”.24  
 
Third, oil rents could no longer facilitate the consolidation of a democratic system 
where class divisions were dormant. Buxton points out, “Oil rents provided the State 
with a continuous flow of income for distribution in promoting national development 
and in satisfying social security obligations established in the 1961 Constitution.” 
With this acceptable rent distribution, Buxton continues, “Class divisions were 
dormant and free from politicisation despite efforts from the revolutionary left.”25 
 
Oil dependency meant multiple problems. The political system was vulnerable to 
declining rents in its capacity to sustain distributive politics, appease social tensions, 
and continue patron-client relationships. The economic model was dependent on its 
main motor and class conflict could no longer be avoided.  
 
 
Oil booms worsened the negative impact of oil dependency  
 
These negative outcomes were intensified by the destructive effect of the 
mismanagement of the booms in 1973-1975 and 1979-1980. There is little doubt that 
                                                 
23 K.Roberts, ‘Polarización social y resurgimiento del populismo en Venezuela’, in S.Ellner 
and D.Hellinger, La política venezolana en la época de Chávez. Clases, polarización y 
conflicto (Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 2003), p.77. 
24 J.Lombardi, ‘El permanente dilema de Venezuela: antecedentes de las transformaciones 
chavistas’, in S.Ellner and D.Hellinger, La política venezolana en la época de Chávez. Clases, 
polarización y conflicto (Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 2003), p.14. 
25 J.Buxton, ‘Política económica y ascenso de Chávez al poder’, in S.Ellner and D.Hellinger, 
La política venezolana en la época de Chávez. Clases, polarización y conflicto (Caracas, 
Nueva Sociedad, 2003), p.147. 
the boom years of the 1970s had intoxicated Venezuelans.26 The country was living 
beyond its means. The Pérez administration’s handling of the boom distorted the 
public sector in an unprecedented way.27 Public industrial conglomerates created 
fiscal commitments that were unsustainable. Public debt was then increased 
significantly to compensate for declining rents. Venezuela ended up with a bloated 
public sector, a huge public debt to service and a weaker administrative capacity to 
deal with these problems. The State hugely expanded its jurisdiction, to use Karl’s 
terms, but as she observed, “There was a striking lack of the juridical, complex, 
impersonal, and accountable bureaucracies necessary for managing its growing 
tasks.”28 The oil booms had served to exacerbate the negative consequences of fiscal 
dependency on oil rents.  
 
 
Oil distorts macroeconomic performance 
 
Macroeconomic scholars had also pointed to the negative macro effects of oil on the 
economy. This impact, felt through macroeconomic mechanisms such as the well 
known ‘Dutch disease’29 has been included in many accounts of Venezuelan 
troubles.30 Oil has condemned the Venezuelan economy to almost total dependency 
on the oil industry, preventing its diversification.  
 
                                                 
26 Jorge Olavarria, ibid; Aníbal Romero, La Miseria del populismo. Mitos y realidades de la 
democracia en Venezuela (Caracas, Centauro, 1986). 
27 Terry Karl, ibid; R. Hausmann ‘Dealing with Negative Oil Shocks: The Venezuelan 
Experience in the Eighties’ in P.Collier and Jan Willem (eds.), Trade Shocks in Developing 
Countries (Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 1999); For a detailed account of Perez’s 
economic expansion policy in the 1970s see Gumersindo Rodríguez, Era la gran Venezuela 
posible (Caracas, Ateneo de Caracas, 1986); For a defence of Perez’s neo-liberal policies, and 
implicit acknowledgment of the policy mistakes of the 1970s, see also Américo Martín, El 
Gran Viraje. Auge y caída (Capatarida, Buchivacoa, 1995). 
28 Terry Karl, ibid, p.91. 
29 Dutch disease is understood as an economic concept that refers to that an increase in 
revenues from natural resources will deindustrialise a nation's economy by raising the 
exchange rate, which makes the manufacturing sector less competitive. 
30 Terry Karl, ibid, p.81 and 234; J.C.Boue, Venezuela: The political economy of oil (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1993) p.179; Moises Naim, Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: the politics 
of Venezuela’s economic reforms (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1993), p.36; See also 
Asdrúbal Baptista, ‘Tiempos de Mengua’, in Pedro Grases (ed.), Venezuela contemporánea: 
1974-1989 (Caracas, Fundación Mendoza, 1989) for a discussion on the related mechanisms 
of currency over-valuation. 
Similarly, internationally extracted oil rents distorted typical capital accumulation, 
with negative implications for the development of the political system.31. 
Additionally, Baptista has also pointed out the low level of private capital 
accumulation over recent decades.32 Hausmann reinforced this idea when he gave an 
explanation for the collapse in private investment.33 What follows from this is that 
private capital has ceased to be an important stakeholder in the political system, and 
consequently has no ‘vested interest’ in its stability. In turn, this stability is more 
dependent on the fortunes of the public sector of the economy, which is in turn 
dominated by oil performance.  
 
 
Oil promotes rent-seeking behaviour 
 
Similarly, the ‘rentier’34 behaviour has often been stressed in political economy 
accounts of Venezuela. Karl’s insights on the nature of ‘petro-states’ have often been 
used to emphasise ‘rent-seeking’ mechanisms in policy making. This emphasis, 
among some American scholars, stems from the ‘pluralist’ view of policy making as a 
battleground of private interests competing to extract rents, generally produced by 
state regulation.35  
 
The Venezuelan case presents some differences because oil rents are more akin to the 
classic ‘ground rent’ extracted by landlords.36 While accepting that mechanisms for 
                                                 
31 Asdrúbal Baptista, Teoría económica del capitalismo rentístico. Economía petróleo y renta 
(Caracas, IESA, 1997). 
32 Asdrúbal Baptista suggested this explanation in a conference in Cambridge University 
about the new Venezuelan constitution in December 1999. 
33 Ricardo Hausmann, ‘Venezuela’s growth implosion: a neo-classical story?’, in Dani 
Rodrik,In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
34 As ‘rentier’ is understood a person who derives a subsistence level or greater level of 
income from economic rent. 
35 For a paradigmatic analysis on rent-seeking see Anne Krueger, ‘The political economy of 
the Rent-seeking Society’, The American Economic Review 64:3, 1974; see also G.Tullock, 
Rent Seeking (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993). 
36 See Bernard Mommer, Global oil and the nation state (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2002); Asdrubal Baptista and Bernard Mommer, ‘Renta petrolera y distribución factorial del 
ingreso’ in Hans-Peter Nissen, ¿Adiós a la Bonanza? Crisis de la distribución del ingreso en 
Venezuela (Caracas, Ildis-Cendes, 1989); Bernard Mommer, La cuestión petrolera (Caracas, 
Tropykos, 1988), p.19. 
capturing a share of the oil rents by organised interest groups have operated in 
Venezuela, as they commonly operate in any society with or without oil wealth, it 
appears that the main effect oil has exerted, in terms of ‘rent-seeking’ types of 
behaviour, is through generating cultural values based on the perception that 
Venezuela is enormously rich. 
 
Various analysts and scholars have, in fact, examined the ‘oil variable’ in terms of its 
cultural influence. Pérez-Alfonzo, one of the founders of Opec, highlighted in the 
mid-1970s the negative effect of abundant oil income.37 He infamously coined the 
expression “devil’s excrement”38 to describe oil. The concept of incredible wealth 
penetrated the social consciousness to such an extent that it reduced or removed the 
incentives for ensuring sustainable growth based on the productive efforts of society. 
In the same vein, other scholars, such as Coronil, support the “notion of oil as an 
independent force, as the dissolvent of morality in Venezuela”.39  
 
These cultural values, formed over the years in which Venezuela was a prime world 
oil producer, were reinforced by the boom years’ public display of overspending both 
at the collective and individual levels. The years of the so-called ‘Saudi Venezuela’ 
reinforced the ‘myth of Venezuela’s unlimited riches’.40 Consumerism triggered by 
having a large amount of easily obtained oil money installed as the prevailing social 
behaviour.41  
 
Yet once it became evident that the level of public spending was no longer 
sustainable, another cultural belief took hold: that the political system was corrupt. 
The reasoning being, as detected in public opinion surveys, that if Venezuela was 
                                                 
37 Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo and Domingo A. Rangel, El desastre (Valencia, Vadell 
Hermanos, 1976); R.Briceño-León, Los efectos perversos del petróleo (Caracas, Acta 
Científica Venezolana, 1990). 
38 Perez Alfonzo was a strident critic of public spending in the mid 1970s, he gave numerous 
interviews referring to oil as ‘the devil’s excrement’. He is frequently quoted as one of the 
first who alerted on the perils that the oil bonanza represented to the country. 
39 Fernando Coronil, The magical state. Nature, money and modernity in Venezuela (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p.354. 
40 Aníbal Romero ‘Rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The agony of democracy in 
Venezuela’ , Latin American Research Review 32:1, 1997, p.10. 
41 Luis Oropeza, Tutelary pluralism. A critical approach to Venezuelan democracy 
(Cambridge, MA, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1983), p.14. 
immensely rich, as was commonly believed, the absence of the once available 
abundant resources could have only one explanation: theft.42  
 
In fact, the efficiency of the public sector has been, and continues to be, very poor.43 
Waste of public resources went relatively unnoticed during the boom years, but when 
oil money dried up, inefficient and fraudulent use of public revenues became evident. 
The legitimacy of the system eroded progressively as corruption became the focus of 
intense media and public scrutiny, emphasised by the fact that corruption was never 
convincingly addressed by the State.44  
 
The extensive literature on the harm oil inflicts on the Venezuelan economic and 
political system has left some questions unanswered. It is yet to be explained why the 
political system has not addressed the distortions created by oil wealth in order to 
minimise them, or when it has done so why it has failed to counteract the negative 
effects alerted by micro and macroeconomic laws. 
 
The complex relationship between oil wealth and the Venezuelan State has been 
extensively analysed and documented. In fact, many of the contributors to this body 
of knowledge have themselves occupied high positions in successive governments.45 
This thesis will analyse the institutional arrangements intended to counteract the 
negative collateral effects of oil wealth and will expose the factors that have rendered 
those attempts ineffective. 
 
                                                 
42 See J.A. Gil-Yepes, ‘Public opinion, political socialization, and regime stabilization’ in 
J.McCoy and D.Myers, The unraveling of representative democracy in Venezuela (Baltimore, 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). See M.Naim, ‘The real history behind 
Venezuela’s woes’, Journal of Democracy 12 February 2001 for a similar reflection. 
43 R.A.González, Diagnóstico institucional del sistema de servicio civil en Venezuela, Inter-
American Development Bank, 2002. 
(http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=626920), p.60; Inter-American 
Development Bank, Venezuela Country Paper, Washington, 2006. 
(http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=424295); M.Naim, ibid.; 
R.Perez-Perdomo, ‘Corruption and political crisis’ in L.Goodman et al (eds.), Lessons of the 
Venezuelan experience (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
44 For a compilation of corruption scandals see Ruth Capriles, Diccionario de la Corrupción 
(Caracas, Capriles, 1989). 
45 Such is the case for Juan Perez-Alfonzo, Luis Oropeza, Jorge Olavarria, Gumersindo 
Rodríguez, Moises Naim, Ricardo Hausmann, Asdrubal Baptista, Bernard Mommer among 
others. 
 3) Although oil nationalisation in 1975 crystallised a consensual policy goal, it left 
unresolved issues of control of PDVSA and participation of private capital in the oil 
industry. 
 
Some analysts have viewed the ‘oil variable’ from a slightly different angle. Oil is not 
blamed as such for Venezuelan problems. Instead, they have raised the issue of 
ownership and control of PDVSA to explain them. The ideological debate on the ‘oil 
variable’ continued after nationalisation. Hellinger points out that the Venezuelan 
political system was envisioned by a generation of political leaders who since 1936 
had defended electoral democracy as the key to obtaining sovereign control over oil 
wealth.46 Nationalisation of oil in 1975 crowned a long era of consensual nationalistic 
goals. Decisions made at the time of nationalisation, however, did not settle the debate 
about the oil issue. 
 
Later on, for ‘oil nationalists’, dismal oil rents, and the consequential economic and 
political travails, were explained by the fact that the management of the nationalised 
industry inherited pre-nationalisation attitudes toward the oil industry. Venezuela’s 
interests, according to this line of thought, were not served by Venezuelan oil 
managers. Oil income had suffered from attempts to pursue policies that obstruct 
Opec’s price defence strategies, from doubtful management of oil operations intended 
to curtail state control of the industry and even using the oil company for political 
means.47  
 
This view, however, failed to account for the waste of the resources that the State has 
received, albeit limited according to this line of thought, from an industry 
administered by technocrats with anti-national attitudes. This thesis will demonstrate 
how oil money has been squandered despite successive attempts by the State to 
regulate it in the best public interests.  
                                                 
46 Daniel Hellinger, ibid. 
47 J.C. Boue, La internacionalización de PDVSA: una costosa ilusión (Caracas, Ministerio de 
Energía y Minas, 2004); J.C.Boue, ‘El programa de internacionalización de PDVSA: ¿Triunfo 
estratégico o desastre fiscal?’ in L.E.Lander, Poder y Petróleo en Venezuela (Caracas, Faces-
UCV, 2003); C.Mendoza-Pottella, Crítica petrolera contemporánea (Caracas, Faces-UCV, 
2000); F.Mieres, PDVSA y el golpe (Caracas, Fuentes,2003); B.Mommer, ‘Petróleo 
subversivo’ in L.E.Lander, Poder y Petróleo en Venezuela (Caracas, Faces-UCV, 2003). 
 Conversely, other analysts have suggested that the problem rests on precisely the 
state-owned character of the oil industry. Although these analysts do not accuse the 
management of the nationalised oil company of underperformance, they point to the 
adherence to Opec guidelines, the lack of investment due to the State’s hunger for 
fiscal revenues and political interference as the reasons which explain why the oil 
industry has not brought the benefits to Venezuelans that it should have done. They 
suggested the idea of privatising oil rents through financial mechanisms that would 
made distribution of this rents available to all Venezuelan citizens. With these 
mechanisms they offered an alternative to the mechanisms governments have 
implemented to distribute oil rents.48  
 
In a mirror image from ‘oil nationalists’, these analysts failed to acknowledge, that, as 
this thesis will show, oil rent contributions to the Treasury have decreased in part 
owing to the augmented costs of operating the oil industry at the time the industry was 
considered to be acting more independently from the State’s grip.  
 
 
4) Focus on the collapse of ‘Punto Fijo rules of the game’ and on the replacing 
rules has missed elements of continuity underlying institutional ‘volatility’. 
 
Faltering Venezuelan institutions have added an additional dimension to the analysis 
of the problem, beyond an oil-centred perspective. As Hillman acknowledges, 
“Without ignoring the impact of oil, alternative explanations for the crises can be 
found in social and political developments caused by ideological and cultural forces 
that have been continuous throughout boom and bust economic fluctuations.”49 
Levine has suggested that economic decline might not be the only explanation for the 
                                                 
48 J.L.Cordeiro, El Gran Tabú Venezolano La desestatización y democratización del petróleo 
(Caracas, Cedice, 1997); L.Giusti, Conference talk entitled ‘La economía venezolana y el 
petróleo: una tesis de armonización en términos de desarrollo nacional’, Fifth Venezuelan Oil 
Congress, November 1994; L.Montiel-Ortega, Venezuela: una economía petrolera (Caracas, 
Arte, 1996); A.Quiros-Corradi, Petro-Estado: el costo de la abundancia’, 54th Annual 
Conference proceedings (Caracas, Fedecamaras, 1994), p.55; A. Sosa-Pietri, Quo vadis 
Venezuela (Caracas, Andrés Sosa, 2000). 
49 R.Hillman, Democracy for the privileged : crisis and transition in Venezuela (Boulder, 
L.Rienner Publishers, 1994), p.17. 
crisis in the political system. Factors such as political organisation, democratisation 
and failure to reform are deemed to underpin contemporary Venezuelan crises.50 
 
The decline and ultimately the breakdown of the Punto Fijo system brought a broader 
issue of institutional failure to the forefront of Venezuelan analysis. Not only did the 
‘rules of the game’ embodied in the infamous Pact of Punto Fijo disintegrate but 
various other attempted institutional arrangements have either collapsed or have failed 
to fulfil their purposes. 
 
The Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958 created the foundation ‘rules of the game’ largely 
credited with having been instrumental for establishing democratic politics after 
dictatorship. The democratic system crafted by the Punto Fijo elite, however, has been 
equally questioned for having turned to a particular type of democracy deemed as 
partial, somehow artificial and restrictive.51  
 
The Punto Fijo institutional design, contained mainly in the Constitution of 1961, 
became some sort of a meta-institutional arrangement that departed from the intended 
‘democracy building’ order. This discrepancy has received critical scholarly attention. 
Punto Fijo rules ended up producing a “limited pluralist” democracy according to 
Gil-Yepes; a “conciliatory populist system” for Juan Carlos Rey; a “pactocracy” for 
Cockcroft; a “tarnished or pacted democracy” according to Hellinger; a “democracy 
for the privileged” for Hillman; and a “partyarchy or partidocracia” for Coppedge.52  
 
                                                 
50 D.Levine, ‘Beyond the exhaustion of the model: Survival and transformation of democracy 
in Venezuela’ in E.Diniz (ed.), Os desafios da Democracia na America Latina (Rio de 
Janeiro, IUPERJ, 1996); See also M.Kornblith and D.Levine, ‘Venezuela. The life and times 
of the Party System’ in S.Mainwaring and T.Scully, Building democratic institutions. Party 
systems in Latin America (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995); D.Levine and B.Crisp, 
‘Legitimacy, governability, and reform in Venezuela’ in L.Goodman et al (eds.), Lessons of 
the Venezuelan experience (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
51 J.Buxton, The failure of political reform in Venezuela (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001). 
52 James Cockcroft, Latin America. History, Politics and U.S policy (Chicago, Nelson-Hall 
publishers, 1996); M.Coppedge, ‘Partidocracia and reform in comparative perspective’ in 
J.McCoy et al. (eds.), Venezuelan democracy under stress (New Brunswick, Transaction 
Publishers, 1994); J.A.Gil-Yepes, The challenge of Venezuelan democracy (New Brunswick, 
Transaction Books, 1981); D.Hellinger, Venezuela: tarnished democracy (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1991); R.Hillman, ibid; J.C.Rey, ‘El futuro de la democracia en Venezuela’ in 
J.A.Silva-Michelena (ed.) Venezuela hacia el 2000: desafíos y opciones (Caracas, Nueva 
Sociedad, 1987). 
In fact, Punto Fijo rules allowed, first, a system in which democracy rested on 
managed electoral competition biased toward the AD and Copei incumbency.53  
 
Second, the Constitution of 1961 provided for a theoretical checks and balances 
institutional design that never worked adequately, save some instances when an 
opposition-controlled Congress curtailed some Executive initiatives or the infamous 
impeachment of President Pérez in 1993, when the system was already in evident 
decay.  
 
Third, the system promoted a cosy settlement with capital and labour. Almost every 
policy mechanism was designed to allow for a ‘corporatist’ arrangement with the 
participation of business (notably, the main umbrella business association –
Fedecamaras) and the unions (notably, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, the 
CTV). The arrangement was mirrored in the economic arena by a conception of the 
role of the State as the predominant economic actor combined with a model that, 
based on ISI rules, gave the private sector a protected environment in which to 
develop itself.  
 
By the mid-1980s, some parts of the Venezuelan elite pushed for reforms. This call 
for ‘new rules’ came from a sector of society which had benefited from the 
distribution of oil by becoming better educated, by having access to better living 
standards and by benefiting from the trickle down effect of expansionary, albeit 
unsustainable, economic policies. The prevailing argument behind the reforms was 
that the old rules were not fit for purpose under the new economic, social and political 
conditions. 
 
Fresh rules intended to revitalise the system were, therefore, introduced in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. First, political reforms, driven by the claims of the so-called 
civil society, and granted by the embattled Punto Fijo elite, were expected to restore 
legitimacy to the political system.54 The ‘decentralisation’ of the State and the 
                                                 
53 J.Buxton, ibid. 
54 These reforms were mainly crafted by the Presidential Commission for State Reform, 
known for its acronym ‘COPRE’, set during the administration of President Lusinchi (1984-
1989).  
opening of new political spaces, such as the election of State governors for the first 
time, initially brought a breath of fresh air to the political arena. This initial success 
encouraged a sense of optimism among some Venezuelan observers.55 Early success, 
however, was rapidly curtailed. President Caldera’s administration halted the 
decentralisation process. The surviving regulations promoting decentralisation of the 
State have not produced the intended results.56  
 
Similarly, some economic reforms were introduced with the short-lived, but highly 
influential neo-liberal inspired package in 1989-1993. In the same vein as the political 
reforms, some components of the neo-liberal package succeeded such as the 
dismantling of ISI policies and, similarly, some early success was achieved in limiting 
the State’s share of the economy by privatising some important state-owned assets.57 
The new rules in the economy, however, were resisted by old beneficiaries of Punto 
Fijo, mainly the traditional political parties, and to any practical effect, were sidelined. 
 
These failures to implement reform aggravated the weakness of the Punto Fijo 
system, resulting in a de-legitimisation of the whole political system. Analysts and 
scholars were left with no alternative other than to acknowledge that the Punto Fijo 
regime was severely, and perhaps fatally, damaged.58 A consensus about the 
underlying causes of Venezuela’s malaise returned, with explanatory emphasis again 
accorded to oil: economic deterioration mainly due to the failure to escape from oil 
dependency and the neglect of building an effective State capacity to deliver public 
                                                 
55 Merilee Grindle, Audacious reforms: Institutional invention and democracy in Latin 
America (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); There was much analysis of 
the emergence of new actors (or the so-called ‘Civil Society’). See, for instance, J.C.Navarro, 
‘Venezuela’s new Political actors’ in L.Goodman et al (eds.), Lessons of the Venezuelan 
experience (Baltimore, The John Hopkins; University Press, 1995); D.Levine, ibid. 
56 M.García-Guadilla, ‘Democracy, decentralization and clientelism. New relationships and 
old practices’, Latin American Perspectives, 29 May 2002. 
57 The most important was the privatisation of the national telecommunication company. 
58 See two volumes that compile a thorough reflection by both Venezuelan and American 
scholars on the strained Punto Fijo regime: L.Goodman et al (eds.), Lessons of the 
Venezuelan experience (Baltimore, The John Hopkins; University Press, 1995) and J.McCoy 
et al. (eds.), Venezuelan democracy under stress (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 
1994). For an early warning of the collapse of the Punto Fijo regime see J.C.Rey, ibid. For an 
analysis of the collapse of the neo-liberal package see: M.Naim, Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: 
the politics of Venezuela’s economic reforms (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1993); 
J.Corrales, Presidents without parties: the politics of economic reform in Argentina and 
Venezuela in the 1990s (University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). See 
also Scott MacDonald and George A.Fauriol, ibid ; Aníbal Romero, ibid. 
goods. The consensual view also identified that defiance by ‘civil society’ of the 
centralising, clientilistic and power monopolising AD and Copei practices combined 
with large disaffected sectors of society to erode the legitimacy of the system. 
 
Another broken rule that arose from the decaying process of Punto Fijo received less 
scholarly attention, relative to its crucial significance. The Chávez-led aborted coup in 
February 1992 broke the rule of military subordination to civilian power. Even if the 
military, despite further attempts in the form of an aborted coup or near-missed 
rebellions, never took power as such, subordination was no longer guaranteed and 
military-civilian tensions remained a political factor of the utmost importance.59  
 
The final blow to Punto Fijo materialised in the unforeseen sweeping electoral 
triumph of Hugo Chávez, which paradoxically questioned the ‘informal’ and, 
ultimately, trademark rule of the Punto Fijo regime: the bias in the electoral system in 
favour of AD-Copei.60 But it was not the election result in 1998 that buried Punto 
Fijo. It was the swift and decisive use of his electoral mandate that led Chávez to 
convene a constitutional convention to redraft the Constitution of 1961, the 
fundamental product of the Punto Fijo arrangement. Chávez seized the opportunity to 
rewrite the ‘rules of the game’ that the embattled Punto Fijo elite had failed to achieve 
despite numerous calls to do so in previous years.61 A new Constitution was approved 
in December 1999 abolishing the longest-standing Constitution in Venezuelan history. 
In fact, the Constitution of 1999, the 23rd in the history of the country, replaced the 
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Constitution of 1961 which had lasted for 38 years, a remarkable fact considering the 
tradition of short-lived constitutional texts.62 
 
This thesis will look at ‘rules of the game’ regarding the oil sector. In a similar 
fashion to the Punto Fijo and post-Punto Fijo sets of rules, successive institutional 
designs have failed to regulate the actual behaviour of both the oil company and the 
government. Findings regarding the performance of oil institutions will support the 
argument that ‘rules of the game’ per se do not seem to explain a continuous volatility 
in the institutional blueprint of the Venezuelan society coupled with continuous 
failure to organise political and economic arenas.  
 
The results of the rewriting of the Punto Fijo rules can be ascertained only with time. 
Some initial developments, however, are instructive. This thesis will examine various 
cases, regarding the oil sector, that show how the constitutional rules have performed 
in their initial implementation. These early indications seem to support the 
observation by some scholars that the system has retained many of the features of its 
predecessor.63  
 
Crucially, it is important to note that Venezuela has continuously produced rules to 
organise its polity and its economy but at the same time, has witnessed how these very 
same rules are either blatantly ignored, easily abandoned, rewritten in the hope of 
‘getting things right’ or simply accommodated to particular and circumstantial 
interests.  
 
This constant proclivity for rewriting the rules of the game has confused some 
analysts. When analysts have addressed the decline of Punto Fijo by correctly 
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describing many of its failures, they could not, however, have anticipated that the new 
‘rules of the game’ would retain Punto Fijo features, including those that were 
specifically identified as dysfunctional. 
 
 
5) Analysis of the ‘Chavista’ regime has tended to favour a polarised vision of its 
early features, obscuring signs of continuity with old Punto Fijo practices. 
 
That the collapse of the system was not followed by a significantly different new 
order has suggested a more subtle development of Venezuelan scholarly work. This 
has been all the more challenging because the analysis of current events, i.e. of the 
Chavista regime, is tainted by an acute sense of polarisation that in part has arisen 
from the common characterisation of ‘Chavismo’ as a ‘revolution’. This extreme view 
has emerged mainly as a consequence of a reiterative rhetoric emanating, to a great 
extent, from President Chávez himself, who consistently stresses the ‘revolutionary’ 
character of his government. This radical and limited vision of the changes occurring 
in Venezuela since Chávez has been in power, this thesis argues, has been reinforced 
by the parallel characterisation of the Chavista regime as a comprehensive departure 
from the past by the very same supplanted Punto Fijo elites and the analysts 
sympathetic to their vision.  
 
In analysing institutional failure in Venezuela, the Chavista regime has added a 
crucial new dimension. The emergence of a new political class in 1998 as the 
replacement of the Punto Fijo elite has been viewed, among commentators and some 
early scholarly work, with markedly contrasting prospects. The analysis of the 
significance of Chavismo in recent Venezuelan history ranges from interpretations 
that see it as an authoritarian regime, and President Hugo Chávez as an ‘aspiring 
dictator’, to an ‘alternative to neo-liberalism’, to a sort of ‘saviour of democracy’.64  
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Much of the analysis of Chávez’s presidency suggests it is personality-driven, given 
his extraordinary charisma and popular appeal, or focused on issues of leadership, 
given the ample ‘personalistic’ nature of the Chavista regime.65 This analysis has 
been supplemented with thorough accounts of the central events that have marked 
Chavismo, such as the Chávez-led aborted coup in February 1992, the run up to the 
elections in 1998 and the election itself, the enacting of a new Constitution in 1999, 
the anti-Chávez aborted coup in April 2002 and the major oil stoppage in 2002-
2003.66  
 
Both the tendency to hold a polarised vision of the Chavista regime and the 
concentration on him and on the main events that have shaped the Chavista era have 
left an analytical space for a deeper analysis of what the Chávez administration has 
done in concrete areas of public policy, including in the crucial oil sector.  
 
Developments in the oil market since President Chávez took office in February 1999 
have been of paramount importance. After his inauguration, one of Chávez’s first 
priorities, perhaps the main policy initiative outside his strictly political agenda was to 
revive the prospects of the sluggish Opec. The organisation’s heads of state met for 
the first time in decades under the auspices of President Chávez in Caracas in 2000. 
This triggered a recovery in oil prices, added to by the events in Iraq in 2003 and, 
more structurally, by the increased demand for energy in the fast growing economies 
of the world, notably China and India. 
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 High oil prices have produced an extraordinary windfall of oil revenues for the 
Chávez administration. This external factor has marked the Chavista regime as 
significantly as the events in the political arena. As has been the case throughout the 
history of Venezuela during the last eight decades, the oil variable is intertwined with 
other economic and political factors in explaining the country’s performance. 
President Chávez, similarly to some of his predecessors, has been put to the test in an 
area crucial to Venezuela’s performance: the task of handling an ‘oil boom’.  
 
Although social, economic and political conditions prevailing at the time of Chávez’s 
boom differ from those of the booms under the first Pérez’s administration (1974) and 
of the Herrera’s administration (1980), the capacity of the State to handle the 
additional revenues, this thesis will demonstrate, has shown important continuities 
with the 1970s and even the 1980s.  
 
This observation is critical to understanding the ‘oil variable’ in Venezuelan 
economy, politics and society. It provides a new dimension through which to analyse 
the causal relationship between the oil sector and developments in the wider 
economy, the political system and in Venezuelan society in general.  
 
Venezuela has managed its oil wealth, this thesis argues, in response to factors 
beyond oil-determined dynamics and, widely accepted, oil-determined effects. 
Causation does not run exclusively from the ‘oil variable’ to the rest of the 
determinant factors of Venezuelan political economy. This research demonstrates an 
alternative relationship. An examination, offered through the novel empirical 
evidence researched and analysed in this thesis, of the institutional arrangement 
adopted to deal with the ‘oil variable’ provides a complementary vision of the 
complex relationship between the Venezuelan State and its oil wealth. 
 
 
1.3 Organisation of the thesis 
 
The thesis analyses two concrete aspects of the relationship between the Venezuelan 
State and oil, and revises the accepted interpretations of them. It scrutinises oil policy 
in Venezuela over the three decades following the nationalisation of the oil industry in 
1975. The research focuses on the institutional arrangements (i.e. the ‘rules of the 
game’) concerning, first, the spending of the revenue which the Venezuelan State 
obtains from oil exports through royalties, taxation and dividends from the state-
owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela’s (PVDSA) – i.e. oil revenues; and 
second, the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to 
control PDVSA and define its policy guidelines – i.e. governance. 
 
First, the use of the revenues obtained from oil exports is addressed through 
investigating three funds that were directly fed with oil money: the Investment Fund 
(1970s-1980s), the Stabilisation Fund (1990s) and the Development Funds (2000s). 
These funds were chosen because they are the only three institutional arrangements 
that directly regulated oil revenues. The rest of the revenues collected from taxing the 
oil industry are channelled through normal budget mechanisms. 
 
Second, governance of PDVSA is analysed through examining three periods: the 
‘post-nationalisation’ period (1975-1988), the ‘neo-liberal inspired’ period (1989-
1998) and the ‘Chavista’ period (1999-2005). 
 
The thesis is organised chronologically. First, the thesis examines the oil boom of 
1974 and the immediate post-nationalisation period. Chapter 2 examines the post-
nationalisation institutional arrangements adopted to control PDVSA. It seeks to 
validate the observation that politicians responded to the long awaited step of 
nationalising the oil industry by, complacently, abandoning the previous regulatory 
capacity contained in the old Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons. Similarly, the 
chapter will reveal the breaching of rules agreed with the company as a consequence 
of self interested political entrepreneurship and circumstantial imperatives. These 
factors, it will be argued, initiated a chain of dysfunctional actions by both the 
government and PDVSA that hindered governance in the future. 
 
Chapter 3 will examine the Investment Fund set afresh in 1974 to channel the extra 
resources obtained from the unexpected surge in oil prices. It will be demonstrated 
that specific and well defined rules and a carefully constructed bureaucratic capacity 
were not enough to counteract lack of political will to get claims over oil resources in 
check. The Investment Fund, as conceived and initially implemented, was able to 
prevent misdirection of oil money. It was, however, bypassed and rendered ineffective 
by the rest of the State. 
 
The thesis then addresses the so-called ‘neo-liberal’ interlude. This period, from 1989 
to 1999 covers the second administration of both Presidents Pérez and Caldera. 
Chapter 4 examines the governance of PDVSA under two administrations that were, 
through different means, attempting to implement neo-liberal inspired policies. The 
chapter will demonstrate how the company emerged from that period in a superior 
position vis-à-vis its political master. The findings of the chapter will show that this 
supremacy of PDVSA resulted from two contradictory dynamics. First, during the 
technocratic Pérez cabinet, the government tried to curtail PDVSA’s influence. The 
company, however, could resist these initiatives because the government became 
critically weakened due to the political crisis of 1992-1993. The chapter will argue 
that it was during the administration of Caldera, who ran for the Presidency on a 
furious rejection of neo-liberalism, that PDVSA outmanoeuvred its regulators and 
pursued a privatisation policy. The resulting feature at the end of that period was that 
the relationship between PDVSA and the State was dysfunctional and likely to be 
rebalanced whoever followed those administrations. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the Stabilisation Fund enacted in 1998 but conceived as part of the 
orthodox thinking prevailing in the early 1990s. The chapter will show how, in similar 
fashion to the case of the Investment Fund, a straight forward mechanism targeted at 
correcting the macroeconomic distortions discussed earlier in this chapter, failed as a 
result, again, of lack of enforcement by other components of the State. Even the fact 
of having elevated the Fund to a constitutional status, in the Constitution of 1999, 
proved ineffective in guaranteeing its proper functioning. 
 
Finally, the thesis examines the period of the Chavista regime (1999-2005). Chapter 6 
addresses the Chávez administration’s actions regarding the governance of PDVSA. 
The chapter will show how, contrary to Chávez’s ex-post rhetorical representations of 
the facts, the administration’s initial response was influenced by a cautious stance 
toward the company, even as Chávez had made perfectly clear in the presidential 
campaign in 1998 his opposition to PDVSA’s privatisation drive. It was, the chapter 
will argue, the infiltration of a broader political dispute into the company by its 
technocrats that prompted the Chávez administration to overhaul the company in an 
extraordinary fashion. The new rebalancing of power, however, did not resolve 
agency issues and new problems are likely to preserve the dysfunctional character of 
the PDVSA-government relationship.  
 
Chapter 7 scrutinises the Chávez administration’s response to the surge in oil 
revenues in the early 2000s. By establishing a series of spending mechanisms that 
finally took the form of a Development Fund, the Chávez government, this chapter 
will argue, followed similar institutional mechanisms to its predecessors. The 
implementation of the Fund, in the form adopted by Chávez’s administration, required 
bending previous rules, accommodating new rules for short term imperatives and even 
overcoming constitutional mandates. Other parts of the State failed to counteract the 
administration’s use of the oil windfall in its preferred way. The spending of oil 
revenues continued to depend on the Presidency of the Republic.  
 
Chapter 8 consolidates the findings of the empirical chapters, drawing important 
conclusions about of the post-nationalisation management of oil in Venezuela. 
 
 Chapter 2 
 
Governance of PDVSA: the post-nationalisation years (1975-1989) 
 
 
This chapter examines the institutional arrangements adopted in 1975 to regulate the 
relationship between the State and the new oil holding, PDVSA. Nationalisation, the 
zenith of Venezuelan oil policy’s achievements, marked a significant change in the 
institutional arrangements that evolved since oil began to be exploited in the mid-
1920s. Put briefly, this arrangement regulated the distribution of oil rents between 
foreign oil companies and the State. This arrangement was implemented through a 
regulatory body, the Oil Ministry, amply considered an efficient watchdog.67 
 
The chapter examines the institutional arrangements that emerged from 
nationalisation, in conjunction with the circumstances in which the nationalisation 
process took place. Despite the great importance assigned to the long awaited move to 
nationalisation, the institutional set-up adopted did not serve the aims of, on the one 
hand, managing the oil company as an independent, commercial concern and on the 
other, maintaining the oil company’s accountability to its political masters. The main 
argument supported by this chapter is that politicians and policy makers alike became 
complacent following the nationalisation process, which they regarded as a significant 
achievement. In addition, prevailing conditions at the time of nationalisation imposed 
constraints that, combined with such complacency, produced an unbalanced and frail 
institutional arrangement. Notably, the efficient regulator that the Oil Ministry once 
was had become a weakened body. 
 
Later, when economic conditions worsened, policy makers tinkered with the oil 
business as a quick fix, or in an attempt to attenuate economic strains. In addition, key 
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policy makers meddled with oil policy decisions as a means to advance their own 
careers. Similarly, politicians used contentious oil issues as tools for inter-party 
competition during elections. This chapter argues that these factors combined 
distorted the post-nationalisation arrangements, sowed the seeds for subsequent 
tensions between the oil conglomerate and the Venezuelan State and began a pattern 
of politicisation that prevailed over subsequent years. 
 
The chapter is organised into five sections. The first section discusses the background 
of the nationalisation process and the prevailing constraints when the new institutional 
arrangements were designed. Section two examines the exact form of the institutional 
arrangements, adopted in the aftermath of nationalisation. Section three discusses how 
these arrangements were challenged and subsequently distorted during the years that 
followed. Section four underlines the decline of the Ministry of Energy as the most 
significant development of the pre-nationalisation arrangement. The final section 
draws conclusions from the analysis. 
 
 
2.1 Defining post-nationalisation rules of the game 
 
President Pérez signed the nationalisation law on the 29 August 1975. The occasion 
signified the culmination of continuous, incremental steps that the Venezuelan State 
had taken over five decades, to raise its claims over oil revenues. Regulation of the oil 
business evolved from bluntly favouring the operators (foreign companies) to the 
detriment of the owner (the State), to a more favourable arrangement for the 
Venezuelan State. Nationalisation represented the ultimate vindication for 
Venezuelans regarding oil governance.  
 
When commercial oil exploitation began in the 1920s the terms in which Venezuela 
participated in the business were extremely weak. The State regulatory body was 
immediately captured by the industry. When independent minded Minister 
Gumersindo Torres first drafted a law regulating the business in 1922, the foreign oil 
companies protested directly to President General Gomez. They argued that the 
reason they were interested in Venezuelan oil was that Mexico had raised taxes and if 
Venezuela were to do the same they would leave. Gomez replied by saying that he 
was a cattle rancher and knew nothing about oil. He asked the companies to write the 
legal code they deemed fit, promising that this would be State policy. In 1922 a new 
law was enacted, with the consent of foreign companies.68 Not surprisingly, when the 
nationalisation law was passed in 1975 a feeling of vindication was widely shared 
among policy makers and politicians.  
 
In fact, nationalisation was widely supported across the political spectrum. The main 
political parties AD and Copei threw their support behind the measure. Although 
nationalisation of the oil business generated heated debate and abundant commentary 
and analysis, main policy makers, politicians from different ideological stances and 
oil commentators celebrated the milestone amidst a highly emotional shared sense of 
national achievement.  
 
Table 2.1 summarises the main steps taken, from the 1920s to 1975, by Venezuela 
regarding the governance of oil wealth. Table 2.2 shows how Venezuela’ share of oil 
rents evolved throughout this period. This contribution of oil to total fiscal revenues 
(hereafter, oil fiscal participation) had grown to an average of 61.83% of gross oil 
income in the six years previous to 1975.69 The step of nationalisation was considered 
the zenith of the long struggle over the oil rents. 
 
The celebratory mood, however, overshadowed the need for important policy 
decisions. Such policy decisions needed to take into consideration several constraints: 
the conditions of the oil infrastructure; the need to assimilate oil technocrats and high 
management of the oil conglomerate to the new status as public sector managers and 
officials; the need for exploration of new oil reserves; and the necessity of access to 
technology and commercialisation channels in international oil markets.  
 
On the other hand, old oil policy pillars such as the tax regime, the oil conservation 
guiding principle and the role of the Ministry of Energy also needed to be 
reconsidered in the light of the new situation. 
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Table 2.1 Highlights of Venezuelan oil policy (1920s-1970s) 
Date Policy instrument Implications 
 
Pre-
commercial 
exploitation 
Colonial Laws of Mines 
(1584,1784) and first 
Republican laws (1829, 
1832, 1854, 1881 and 
1893) 
Gave the Venezuelan State (first, the Colony and 
later the independent Republic) the right to claim 
ownership over resources underneath the soil. Oil 
as such is first mentioned in the Mining Code of 
1893. 
Early 1920s First concessions Concessions are granted to explore oil reservoirs 
by General Gomez (dictatorship). 
1922 Law of Mines  First regulations of concessions system and 
royalties. 
End of 
1930s 
Consolidation of 
concessions 
After concessions were scattered and granted to 
General Gomez’s cronies, the industry is 
consolidated around three big foreign companies 
(50% Standard Oil, 35% Shell and 14% Gulf Oil) 
that bought those rights. 
1943 Hydrocarbons law Substantial rises in taxes on oil companies and 
regularisation of the concessions system for the 
next 40 years. 
1945-48 Tax reforms Oil companies were taxed beyond previous 
agreements. Fiscal participation in oil revenues 
rose. 
1956-1957 New concessions General Pérez Jimenez (dictatorship) granted new 
concessions. 
1958 Tax reforms Interim President Sanabria increased tax burden to 
oil companies (Decree 476 of 19 December 1958). 
1959 ‘No more concessions’ 
policy  
Minister of Mines Pérez Alfonzo stated policy of 
not granting more concessions on conservation 
grounds. President Betancourt strongly supported 
Pérez Alfonzo. 
Early 1960s Foundation of Opec Venezuela promoted the creation of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
1971 Reversion Law 70 and 
Decree 832 71 
Congress passed a law to regulate how oil assets 
will revert to public ownership once concession 
expired. Decree 832 tightened operational control 
by the Ministry. 
1975 Nationalisation law Concessions prematurely expired as the whole 
industry is transferred to public ownership. 
 
Source:  R. Betancourt, Venezuela, Oil and Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979); Giacopini ‘Aspectos 
historicos’ in J.C.Arreaza (ed), Diez años de la industria petrolera nacional (1976-1985).(Caracas,PDVSA,1986); 
B.Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2002). 
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71 Official Gazette 29,689, 18 December 1971. 
 Table 2.2  Fiscal participation (as % of value of a barrel of oil) 
Period Oil fiscal participation 
per barrel (US$) 
Price per 
barrel (US$) 
Oil fiscal participation 
per barrel (%) 
 
1917-1935 0.08 0.92 9 
1936-1944 0.19 0.97 20 
1945-1949 0.62 1.72 36 
1950-1958 0.82 2.39 34 
1959-1963 0.88 2.21 40 
1964-1968 0.92 1.91 48 
Source: Pérez Alfonzo, Juan ,Petróleo y Dependencia (Caracas,Sintesis Dos Mil, 1971) 
 
 
Policy makers had to take account of several factors when they designed the new 
institutional arrangements. Concomitantly, they were very cautious about disrupting 
the functioning of the industry. In the words of the former Minister of Energy and 
member of PDVSA’s board Alirio Parra, “There was a significant fear of failure in 
the great challenge of nationalisation, which had been decided by President Pérez 
from the very beginning.”72 
 
Oil industry infrastructure had deteriorated significantly and was in need of prompt 
updating. The foreign companies had reduced investment to the minimum enforced by 
the Ministry of Energy, since nationalisation was clearly on the horizon several years 
prior to 1975. Fresh investment was imperative in several areas such as oil wells and 
secondary gas recovery, just to maintain the production capacity of matured fields. 
Another area needing urgent attention was refining, as the country’s few refineries 
were technologically dated. Similarly, the petrochemical business was in disarray. 
The state-owned petrochemical company was not profitable and was in need of 
extensive restructuring.73 There was, in short, a clear programme of technical 
imperatives requiring immediate attention.  
 
Almost no new discoveries of oil had been made in the previous years. Exploration 
for new commercial reservoirs was essential. A great majority of the fields exploited 
by the concessionaries were of light and medium crude oil. Moreover, these fields 
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were mature and declining in production. The geophysical information available at 
that time suggested that the bulk of the Venezuelan reserves were of heavy and extra-
heavy crude oil. The Ministry needed to explore the oil province known as the 
Orinoco Belt, where a majority of those reservoirs were thought to be located. But not 
only was the Orinoco area to be explored. There were other areas such as offshore 
platforms. All these combined demanded a significant exploration effort, crucial to 
ensuring that Venezuela could augment its oil reserves. 
 
More than 15 companies operated the oil industry prior to 1975.74 Each company 
operated under its own systems of personnel, finance, procurement and 
commercialisation. The first priority was to integrate those systems into the new 
organisation to be created for administering the conglomerate. Additionally, the new 
entity had to assure access to technology and commercialisation channels as these two 
areas were most commonly managed by the foreign companies from abroad. Policy 
makers were aware of the great responsibility that running a complex industry implied 
and the risk associated with assuming that responsibility. The consensus was that 
decisions regarding administrative, organisational and technological issues were to be 
taken in a way that minimised possible disturbances to the current operations.  
 
Both the senior management and the technocratic layer of all foreign operators needed 
to be assimilated to the new status of public sector employees. Both the employees 
and public officials feared changes in the status quo, although for opposite reasons. 
Former oil companies’ employees were concerned with the possible interference of 
politicians in the running of the industry. Guillermo Rodríguez -Eraso pointed out, 
“There was a general expectation about the conduct, functioning and results of the 
industry under the control of the State and of the effect that possible changes in the 
administration and running of the new companies might have. These expectations 
were particularly acute among the personnel of the operating companies that were 
prepared to carry on with their daily duties with the same dedication but were fearful 
that nationalisation might introduce politics into the sector, therefore significantly 
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varying work conditions and the traditional merit based management of the 
industry.”75  
 
On the other hand, policy makers and politicians were deeply suspicious of the loyalty 
of former foreign companies’ employees. Having been trained under the 
organisational culture of foreign companies and having operated in a sort of ‘enclave’, 
those former employees contrasted with the typical public sector official. Ramón 
Espinasa, former Chief Economist of PDVSA, commented, “The oil companies were 
considered a foreign enclave requiring a Venezuelanisation.”76 LeopoldoDíaz-
Bruzual, former President of the Central Bank, said, “PDVSA people did not act in 
the best interest of the country. They were a bunch of inefficient and arrogant 
managers that believed they knew better. They were still in the transnational 
mindset.”77 Francisco Mieres wrote, “The companies that succeeded the transnational 
affiliates have local managers within that act as Trojan horses. They were 
subordinates to their old bosses’ schemes and are still loyal to their old headquarters 
and become anti-national enclaves.”78  
 
During the concessionary regime the institutional arrangements were based on the tax 
regime, technical regulations, pricing regulations and the policy guidelines such as 
what were known as the ‘conservationist’ and the ‘no more concessions’ policies.  
 
Formulated by Juan Pablo Pérez-Alfonzo, the most influential oil policy maker 
throughout the concessionary regime, the ‘conservationist’ policy was based on three 
principles. First, the rate of exploitation should not exceed the rate of discoveries of 
new reserves. Second, even if reserves were added at a faster rate than exploitation, 
oil production should not exceed a volume needed to finance indispensable public 
spending for social and economic development. Third, Venezuelan oil production 
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should not contribute to overflow the international market (i.e. supply exceed demand 
for oil).79  
 
The ‘no more concession’ policy was originally postulated by Pérez-Alfonzo in 1946. 
He considered that the concessions already granted to international oil companies had 
given them excessive power over Venezuelan oil.80 This policy principle was ratified 
when Pérez-Alfonzo served as Minister of Energy (1959-1964). He continued 
defending this policy arguing, for instance in 1965, that the unpublished reserves of 
all concessionaries doubled the officially reported figures.81 The nationalisation of the 
oil industry, in 1975, was the logical successor of this policy.  
 
These factors shaped the initial institutional arrangements adopted by policy makers, 
notably the Executive and Congress, in 1975. 
 
 
2.2 Post-nationalisation rules of the game 
 
Policy makers undertook a broad consultation process for defining a new institutional 
arrangement to implement nationalisation. The three main centres of policy making 
were: the Executive; a special Commission specifically created for defining 
nationalisation guidelines; and Congress. The process began in 1974 when President 
Pérez got a strong mandate in the 1973 elections (48.70% of votes). By that time 
conditions for nationalisation were ripe. Days after being inaugurated in office, 
President Pérez created the so-called ‘Presidential Commission for Reversion’ 
entrusted with defining nationalisation policy.82 Table 2.3 shows the ample political 
and technical spectrum of the members of the commission.  
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 Table 2.3  Members of the Presidential Commission for Reversion 
Member Affiliation 
 
Valentin Hernández Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons 
Hector Hurtado Minister of Finance 
Carmelo Lauria Minister of Industry and Commerce 
Gumersindo Rodríguez  Minister of Planning 
Carlos Carnevali Corporation of Venezuelan Petroleum 
Godofredo Gonzalez Senator from Copei party (Right wing) 
Arturo Hernández Deputy from AD 
Valentin Montana Armed Forces 
Radames Larrazabal Communist Party 
Freddy Munoz Socialist Party 
Leonardo Montiel Ortega URD party (Center left ) 
Celestino Armas Deputy from AD party 
Luís E. Oberto Copei party 
Armando Azpurua CCN party (Right wing) 
Alvaro Silva-Calderón MEP party (Left wing) 
Rafael Tudela FDP party (Center right) 
Augusto Malave Unions (CTV) 
Luís Tovar Unions (CTV) 
Carlos Pinerua Unions (Fedepetrol) 
Alfredo Paul Business (Fedecamaras) 
Reinaldo Cervini Business (Pro-Venezuela) 
Felix Miralles Business (Banking) 
Enrique Tejera Universities 
Alejandro Zahlout Universities 
Pedro Gomez Universities 
Gastón Parra Universities 
Domingo Maza Zavala Universities 
Hugo Pérez La Salvia Professional associations (Engineers) 
Julio C. Arreaza Professional associations (Lawyers) 
Haydee Castillo Professional associations (Economists) 
Miguel Layrisse Professional associations (Scientific) 
Anibal Martínez President representative 
Alirio Parra President representative 
Ezequiel Monsalve President representative 
Humberto Penaloza President representative 
Carlos Rafael Silva President representative 
Humberto Calderón-Berti Liaison staff of Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons 
Guillermo Altuve Liaison staff of Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons 
Ruben Gilson Secretary 
Source: Official Gazette, various issues; Julio Cesar Arreaza, ‘Aspectos Históricos y Jurídicos’ in Diez Años de la 
industria petrolera (Caracas,PDVSA, 1986) 
 
 
On the other hand, Congress was controlled by AD party. Table 2.4 shows the 
composition of Congress elected in 1973. Both the Commission and Congress worked 
in a relatively consensual fashion in producing a draft of the nationalisation bill, 
except for the very contentious issue of future participation of private capital. 
Despite disagreements on this later issue, which are discussed later in the chapter, 
AD’s control of both the Executive and the legislature guaranteed the passing of the 
law. 
 
 
Table 2.4  Composition of Congress (1973-1978) 
Party Senators Deputies 
 
AD 28 (59%)                      102 (51%) 
Copei 13 (28%)                        64 (32%) 
Others 6 (13%)                        34 (17%) (9 Right wing, 25 Left wing) 
Total 47                      200 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
President Pérez signed the law on the 29 August 1975.83 A day later, according to 
Article 6 of the law, the holding company ‘Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.’ (PDVSA) 
was created by presidential decree.84 These two legal acts officially initiated the new 
institutional arrangements regulating the oil industry and its new absolute owner, the 
Venezuelan State. This institutional arrangement is described in the next section. 
 
PDVSA was conceived as a holding responsible for “planning, coordinating, 
supervising and controlling the functioning of the affiliates”.85 At the same time, the 
subsidiaries were thought to mimic the former conglomerate of foreign owned 
operators. Gustavo Coronel, a member of PDVSA’s first board, pointed out, “During 
this very early stage in the life of the nationalised oil industry the relationships 
between the holding company and the operating companies was that of a loose 
federation with a rather weak central government providing industry with a general 
sense of direction and acting as a welcome cushion between industry and the political 
world.”86  
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 The adopted model addressed two concerns. First, by replicating the former 
organisational web of operating companies, minimum disturbances were guaranteed 
in administrative and operational factors. The companies could continue functioning 
as before, only substituting the foreign holding companies for a common holding, 
PDVSA.  
 
Second, it was aimed at isolating the operating companies from direct contact with the 
political world. The holding company was granted total independence in controlling 
its subsidiaries including naming the board of those companies. The tacit agreement 
was that the affiliates would carry on as they had been operating for decades. Pablo 
Reimpell, who served on the Board of PDVSA for 15 years, commented, “PDVSA 
had contact with the political world. The implicit promise was not to bother the 
operating companies.”87 Creating an intermediate level between the political world 
(i.e. the Executive, Congress, and other constitutional bodies) and the operating 
companies was one of the assurances President Pérez and prominent political leaders 
wanted to transmit to the oil technocrats.88 
 
The situation resulting from the urgent need to update the oil infrastructure, the 
necessity of discovering new reserves and rationalising the scattered organisational 
structure provided policy makers with a clear guideline of what to demand from the 
newly created holding. Political legitimacy was provided by blaming the old foreign 
companies for the lack of investment during the years leading up to nationalisation. 
As politicians had grown with the ‘nationalist’ sentiment, opposed to the foreign 
companies, the need to compensate for their failings fit perfectly with their 
inclinations.  
 
Additionally, a definitive and undisputable course of action such as this facilitated a 
good understanding between technocrats and policy makers. These conditions allowed 
the government and the senior oil industry management to agree on some ground 
rules. The most significant of these was economic independence. Consequently, the 
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holding company was granted financial autonomy. This prerogative was a high 
priority in the minds of technocrats. As, Gustavo Coronel put it, the company “could 
not risk going through the political system to obtain the capital required for 
investment because in a strongly politicised environment, such as the Venezuelan one, 
this would probably mean long delays, distortion of original objectives or, even 
worse, opening the doors to large scale corruption”. 89  
 
This financial independence was written in the nationalisation law. Article 6, Part 
Five ordered that: “To provide the company to be created with enough resources to 
develop the national oil industry, the operating companies to be constituted will 
supply an amount of money equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the net income 
produced by the oil exported by each of them in the previous month. This amount will 
be exempted from paying taxes or other national fees and will be deductible from the 
corporate income tax.”90 Table 2.5 summarises the consensual agenda: 
 
 
Table 2.5  Main issues of the post-nationalisation agenda 
Area Objectives 
 
Exploration Increase the proven reserves throughout the country.  
Refining Modernisation of refining facilities, adaptation to new environmental 
regulations and new needs from Venezuelan oil mix. 
Petrochemicals Rescue the ailing ‘Petrochemical Institute’ and restore profitability. 
Orinoco Belt 
Reservoir 
Evaluation of the vast oil province known as the ‘Orinoco Belt’ in the 
south east part of the country. 
Trade Improve international trading and transport capabilities. 
Technology Guarantee the technical assistance initially required and improve that 
capacity internally. 
Organisation Rationalisation of former network of multiple operating companies. 
Infrastructure 
updating 
Plant and equipment renovation. 
Source: Rodríguez -Eraso, Guillermo, “Aspectos Operacionales y Administrativos” in Diez años de la Industria 
Petrolera Nacional (Caracas,PDVSA, 1986); Coronel, Gustavo ,The Nationalization of the Venezuelan Industry 
(Lexington, Mass,Lexington Books, 1983) 
 
 
To complement the tacit agreement on the need to carry on with this agenda, 
PDVSA’s statutes stated that approval of the investment plans of the industry were a 
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responsibility of PDVSA’s board. Clause 27 Section 4 stated that the Board of 
PDVSA could “examine, approve and coordinate investments and operating budgets 
of the subsidiaries”.91 Similarly, procurement across the oil conglomerate was 
internally regulated.  
 
The initial institutional arrangements regarding personnel were aimed at 
implementing the assurances that the political world thought it was necessary to grant 
to former oil industry employees, who were concerned about their new status as 
members of the public administration. Pablo Reimpell said, “The nationalisation law 
gave the former employees the same prerogatives they enjoyed before. The law 
contained much detail about this, which was unprecedented in such a type of law.”92 
For instance, Article 8 of the nationalisation law specified: “The directors, 
administrators, employees and field workers of the companies to be created, including 
those of the Venezuelan Corporation of Petroleum once converted to a commercial 
firm, are not going to be considered as public administration officials or 
employees.”93  
 
Similarly, the first statute of PDVSA included several assurances to the senior 
management regarding its stability and promotions to the top levels. The regulation of 
the structure, duration and composition of the board was intended to transmit stability 
and respect from the old technocracy. Article 18 of the statutes stipulated that the 
board was to be in operation for four years and, more specifically, that it was in the 
future to be formed, preferably, from former board members.94  
 
The first board, however, was filled mostly with outsiders from the oil industry. 
Coronel explained, “Up to that moment …the oil executives had been working for 
multinational corporations, and public opinion tended to perceive them as closely 
associated with those interests. Although the patriotism and honesty of those men 
were never in doubt, there seemed to be good strategic considerations for keeping 
them at the operating company level, at least for the moment. The tacit agreement 
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among all concerned, though, was that by the time the nationalised oil industry settled 
down to routine, these men would be the logical choice for Petróleos de Venezuela’s 
highest positions.”95  
 
Policy makers promised to respect merit based and autonomous management of the 
operating companies’ personnel. Alirio Parra, member of the first board of PDVSA, 
confirmed, “Meritocracy was to be 100% respected in the PDVSA’s affiliates. That 
was the very clear consensus among all concerned.”96  
 
On the other hand, PDVSA as such, needed to be filled, at least partially, with the 
proven nationalists from the former pool of regulators. It was, however, not clear what 
to do with the Ministry of Energy. As the former source of proven nationalist 
technocrats, the Ministry risked being weakened if it were to be emptied. Bernardo 
Alvarez, former Deputy Minister of Energy, recalled, “When nationalisation was 
discussed there was more than one view on what to do regarding the Ministry and the 
new holding company. Some suggested that the Hydrocarbons division within the 
Ministry should be transformed as the head of PDVSA.”97 The compromise ‘rule of 
the game’ in this matter was to fill PDVSA with both former Ministry officials and 
individuals from the former old foreign companies. The exodus of senior Ministry 
officials to PDVSA is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The most immediate consequence of the nationalisation law was the termination of 
the old concessionary system. Article 1 of the law stated, “The concessions granted by 
the Executive are to be extinguished and that extinction will be effective on the 31 
December 1975.”98 This direct action was the ultimate manifestation of the ‘no more 
concessions’ policy established in 1959 the AD party had returned to power and was 
able to implement a policy that had been advocated in the 1940s. The rules 
concerning future participation of private capital, albeit partially, in the oil industry 
were the natural successor of that policy. 
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In fact, these rules, contained in what became the infamous Article 5, were the most 
controversial issue in an otherwise largely consensual discussion of the nationalisation 
law. At the end, the Executive, with the support of the AD hierarchy, imposed its 
position. The AD’s stance can be summarised in the words of its founder Rómulo 
Betancourt. He said, “I strongly support associations allowed in Article 5….it is 
similar to the security valves in the 1961 Constitution and in the Hydrocarbon Law of 
1967, in order not to tie the State’s hands.”99 Similarly, AD leader Gonzalo Barrios 
advocated flexibility in the rule. He said, “You do not embark into deep waters 
without a lifejacket.”100 This precaution was manifested in the controversial wording 
of Article 5. This provision was approved by the AD and other minor parties against 
the opposition of the right wing party Copei and left wing parties MEP, MAS and 
PCV.101 The approved rule allowed associations with private interest in ‘special cases’ 
under the following conditions: 1) limited duration; 2) the State should retain control 
of the associations; and 3) Congress must approve it. 102 Notoriously, former President 
and leader of Copei, Rafael Caldera fiercely opposed Article 5. In the debate in 
Congress he said, “All of us who have fought the transnationals know that if we open 
a little window they manage to transform it in an open door.”103  
 
Policy makers favoured continuity in most of the regulations that were in place during 
the concessionary system. They wanted to minimise disturbances during the transition 
to the new arrangements and to guarantee an uninterrupted fiscal contribution from 
the oil business. The tax regime was the most important institutional arrangement that 
was maintained. Table 2.6 summarises the most significant features of the tax regime. 
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Table 2.6  Principal features of the oil tax regime in 1976 
Date of regulation Regulated area Legal instrument 
 
January 1976 Liquidation of taxes (terms, 
instalments) 
Presidential Decree 1404 
March 1976 Export Fiscal Values Ministries of Energy and 
Finance joint decree104 
June 1976 Freightage (complement of Export 
Fiscal Values) 
Ministries of Energy and 
Finance joint decree105 
June 1976 Conversion to local currency of 
exports 106 
Central Bank and Ministry of 
Finance agreement107 
July 1976 Tax rate for oil activities  Presidential decree 108 
 
Source: Jose Moreno Leon, Profundización de la nacionalización petrolera venezolana (Caracas, Ediciones 
Centauro, 1981) 
 
 
The central feature of the inherited tax regime was the Export Fiscal Values. This was 
a taxation mechanism used during the concessionary system to prevent foreign 
companies manipulating prices between the local subsidiaries and their holding 
companies. The government retained the right to fix prices for oil exports as 
mandatory for taxation purposes. As the government had the legal right to fix those 
values, this tool was used for both fiscal purposes and to implement Opec agreements. 
 
In the new context of a nationalised industry this discretion was retained. In fact, it 
was one of the most important tools for controlling PDVSA. Pablo Reimpell 
remembered, regarding the initial years of PDVSA, “Although the government 
obtained the fiscal income it sought, the export fiscal values were always fixed after 
lengthy negotiations between the government and PDVSA.”109 It is noteworthy that 
during the initial years of PDVSA two factors facilitated these negotiations. First, 
international oil prices were at a peak and second, the consensus regarding the post-
nationalisation agenda discussed earlier in this chapter guaranteed that PDVSA 
investment plans were well received by government officials. 
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Other pillars of the pre-nationalisation arrangements were not challenged. As 
production had dropped 11.6% and 21.2% in 1974 and 1975 respectively, Pérez 
Alfonzo’s conservationist position, often in line with Opec policy, was not threatened. 
In fact, production declined in all ten years after nationalisation except for 1979.110 A 
decade later, in 1985, daily average production was two-thirds of that inherited from 
the concessionary arrangement. Similarly, proven reserves were 18,400 million 
barrels in 1975.111 The discovery and certification of new reserves brought significant 
results in 1985 when proven reserves almost tripled to reach 54,454 million barrels.112 
As proven reserves improved while production declined, the ‘conservationism’ 
principle was, in practice, well preserved for the immediate post-nationalisation years. 
 
 
2.3  The post-nationalisation Ministry of Energy  
 
The Ministry of Energy, created in 1950113 as a unit separate from the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, had become the main regulator of the oil industry. In 
addition to monitoring technical regulations and selling prices, the Ministry extended 
its control over managerial aspects as a consequence of the provisions established in 
the Reversion Law in July 1971 and further regulated in Decree 832 in December 
1971. These rules aimed to prevent opportunistic behaviour from the oil companies in 
the final years before the validity of the concessions expired.114 In addition, as the 
natural gas business was nationalised that year, it was widely accepted that 
nationalisation of oil was a just a matter of time.115 Table 2.7 shows the main controls 
introduced by Decree 832.  
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 Table 2.7  Main features of Decree 832 of December 1971 
Area Control 
 
Exploitation The Ministry had to approve production levels, exploitation plans and 
monitor compliance with conservationist regulations. 
Exploration The Ministry could set a minimum level of exploration activity. 
Sales The Ministry could veto clients and challenge prices. 
Reporting Number a frequency of reports regarding plans and programs in many 
areas were increased.  
Refining Ministry could modify refining levels. 
Financial data Companies had to inform the Ministry all financial data including 
sales, investments.  
Source: Gustavo Coronel, The nationalization of the Venezuelan Oil Industry (Lexington,Mass, Lexington Books, 
1983), p.41; Julio Cesar Arreaza, “Aspectos Históricos y Jurídicos” in Diez Años de la industria petrolera 
(Caracas, PDVSA, 1986), p.242 
 
 
Gustavo Coronel, a top manager in one of the foreign companies at that time, 
considered that Decree 832 significantly changed the role of the Ministry. Coronel 
pointed out, “For all practical purposes the Venezuelan Oil industry was in the hands 
of the State in 1972. The Ministry staff which, up to then, had been mostly auditors of 
the industry now became co-managers. There was nothing that the industry could do 
without the previous approval of the Ministry.”116  
 
When PDVSA commenced operating on the 1 January 1976 all these regulations were 
in place. Nothing in the Nationalisation Law or in the Statutes of PDVSA conflicted 
with the rules as they had applied to the foreign companies. The Ministry’s officials 
continued to enforce the old regulatory framework. The only difference now was that 
the Ministry’s counterparts also responded, albeit in theory, to the same political 
masters.  
 
At the highest level, however, this ‘business as usual’ approach rapidly gave rise to 
tension. Friction between the Board of PDVSA and the Ministry promptly emerged. 
Hostility between PDVSA’s President, General Alfonzo-Ravard and Minister of 
Energy Valentin Hernández was notorious.117 Alfonzo-Ravard presided over a board 
composed mainly of outsiders to the oil industry. Alirio Parra, a former Minister of 
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Energy, said, “Alfonzo-Ravard was a technocrat without a political agenda.”118 One 
initial, albeit informal, rule was that the President of PDVSA held regular meetings 
with the President, effectively bypassing the Minister. This way of working was 
maintained in subsequent administrations, making it very difficult for Ministers of 
Energy to exert their authority vis-à-vis the President of PDVSA. 
 
The Ministry, in 1976, had the pre-nationalisation senior staff still in their positions. 
As tensions grew during the first year, the board of PDVSA asked President Carlos 
Andrés Pérez, in December 1976, for a clarification of the roles of both PDVSA and 
the Ministry.119 Julio Cesar Arreaza, who was acting as interim President of PDVSA 
at the time, alluded to the outcome of that meeting, “Pérez said that the functions 
already granted to PDVSA by law were intact, that the relations between the 
Executive and the oil industry were to be channelled through PDVSA and the Decree 
832 had lost its validity with the nationalisation law.”120  
 
President Pérez promised a presidential directive clarifying the PDVSA-Ministry 
roles. He produced such a directive in the form of a memorandum three months later. 
This form of directive, inferior in the legal administrative hierarchy to a Decree, still 
hinted at a sort of ‘informality’ in this institutional arrangement, not commensurate 
with its vital importance. 
 
Nonetheless, the presidential directive established: 
 
The Ministry of Energy was responsible for:  
1) Establishing oil policy guidelines. 
2) Establishing goals for the development of the oil and petrochemical industries. 
3) Delineating geographic areas for operating companies to explore and exploit. 
4) Supervision of the oil and petrochemical companies in regard to technical 
regulations. 
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5) Controlling, in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, all matters regarding 
PDVSA’s tax contributions. Notably, both ministries were responsible for 
setting export fiscal values. 
6) Supervision, in conjunction with the Ministry of Environment, of all matters 
regarding environmental regulations. 
7) Relations with Opec and enforcement of its resolutions. 
8) Setting internal market prices for oil derivatives and other prices (such as 
transport freightage). 
9) Research and analysis of the oil and petrochemical economy. 
10) Statistics on the hydrocarbons industry. 
11) Representing the shareholder (i.e. the State) in PDVSA shareholders meetings.  
 
For its part, PDVSA, was responsible for:  
1) Executing directives of the Ministry of Energy. 
2) Approving operating companies’ budgets (operational and investment) and to 
inform the Ministry of Energy about them.  
3) Fixing oil and derivatives prices according to Ministry of Energy guidelines. 
4) Being an intermediate between the executive branch and the operating 
companies (subsidiaries). 
 
It was critical for PDVSA to ensure its control of the operating companies. Pablo 
Reimpell indicated, “The most important characteristic of the relations between 
PDVSA and the government was the independence of PDVSA in dealing with the 
operating companies, the core of the industry.”121 
 
The presidential directive helped to complete the initial institutional arrangements 
regarding the control of PDVSA. The roles of shareholder (the State) and 
administrator (PDVSA), however, were never clear cut. In practice, oil policy making 
and implementation of important decisions were defined through constant power 
struggles between the Ministry and PDVSA. Alberto Quiros-Corradi, President of the 
second largest subsidiary at that time, recalled that both PDVSA’s president and the 
Minister of Energy “carried a copy of the memorandum in their pocket in order to 
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show to each other when defending decisions that they considered to be under their 
sphere of influence”.122 This institutional arrangements performed only partially well 
in subsequent years. 
 
 
Changing roles of the Ministry  
 
The steps taken in 1971, leading to nationalisation in 1975 had substantially increased 
the power of the Ministry of Energy. The Reversion law and Decree 832, both of 
1971, demanded an expansion in the Ministry in order to attend to the new regulatory 
demands. Decree 832 strengthened the regulatory power of the Hydrocarbons 
Division (known as the Technical Office of Hydrocarbons). This division was the 
main regulatory arm within the Ministry. The Reversion law also commanded the 
creation of a new division, the Reversion Division. This unit was responsible for 
monitoring oil companies’ assets that would transfer to the State once the concessions 
expired.  
 
Completing the regulatory bodies within the Ministry there were two permanent 
committees, the Marketing and Conservation Committee, responsible for 
administering the export fiscal values, and the Local Market Committee, in charge of 
regulating the hydrocarbons internal market. Additionally, the Ministry participated in 
a joint committee with the Ministry of Finance, responsible for monitoring the foreign 
company finances and their tax payments.  
 
At the moment of nationalisation in 1975 the Ministry had a well structured and 
technically minded bureaucracy.123 The Ministry’s personnel shared a sense of 
‘nationalism’ developed during decades of dealing with foreign companies. Not 
surprisingly, the Ministry was very antagonistic to foreign companies. This 
independent stance was explained by the great political consensus in oil policy built 
across several decades. Since the early 1940s, all the main parties, including AD, 
                                                 
122 Alberto Quiros-Corradi, ‘Tres pasos al frente’, El Nacional, 17 November 1996. 
123 This is a consensual view ratified across numerous interviews with ex-officials in both 
government and foreign companies such as Pablo Reimpell, Alirio Parra, Ramon Espinasa, 
Alvaro Silva-Calderon. 
Copei and the left wing parties, had converged on a nationalistic oil policy based on 
vindicating the Venezuela position vis-à-vis the foreign company. Bureaucrats in the 
Ministry understood that advancement in their careers depended on the strength 
shown in dealing with the foreign companies.124  
 
Although Venezuelan bureaucracy is habitually associated with patron-client 
practices, cronyism and partisan politics, the Ministry of Energy had departed 
remarkably from such practices. Technical personnel were very stable. Alirio Parra, 
who joined the Ministry in 1957, said, “When the new democratic system replaced the 
Pérez Jimenez’s dictatorship in 1958 the new government respected the positions of 
the technical personnel in the Ministry. This stability continued for decades until 
nationalisation.”125  
 
The model adopted for nationalisation treated the companies as a ‘going concern’.126 
This position had several implications for policy making regarding the Ministry. The 
political consensus of policy makers was to continue, as much as possible, conducting 
business as they had before nationalisation. As a consequence of this ‘business as 
usual’ stance, the habitual position within the Ministry was to treat PDVSA the same 
way they had treated foreign companies.127 
 
On the other hand, there was a dilemma for politicians. Long held distrust of foreign 
company technocracy dictated that PDVSA had to be filled with proven ‘nationalist’ 
officials. Nationalist oil experts were mainly based in the Ministry of Energy. 
Transferring those officials, however, could risk depriving the Ministry of its best 
trained technocrats. The dilemma was partially resolved by transferring some of the 
Ministry’s officials to PDVSA. Alirio Parra, ex-Ministry official and member of the 
PDVSA’s first board, said, “The belief that PDVSA and the Ministry were the same 
thing was, at that time, in the mind of politicians and in all those concerned with oil 
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issues.”128 He added, “We simply did not foresee the need for a clear separation of the 
two.”129 
 
Table 2.8 shows some selected former Ministry of Energy staff who went on to 
occupy prominent positions in PDVSA.  
 
 
Table 2.8  Selected senior officials transferred from the Ministry to PDVSA 
Official Relevant public position Position in PDVSA 
 
Julio Cesar Arreaza State-owned CVP/ Legal 
officer in Ministry 
Vice President  
Alirio Parra Ministry’s official until 1969 Member of the board 
Jose Martorano Ministry’s official at 
Hydrocarbons division 
Member of the board 
Luís Plaz Bruzual Ministry’s official at 
Hydrocarbons division 
Member of the board 
Enrique Daboin Ministry’s official Member of the board 
Humberto Calderón-Berti Reversion Director in 
Ministry 
Director of Research & 
Development Institute 
Arevalo Guzmán-Reyes Hydrocarbons Director in 
Ministry 
Member of the board 
Source: Rafael Quiróz Serrano, Meritocracia petrolera ¿Mito o realidad? (Caracas, Editorial Panapo, 2003), p.104-
113 
 
 
In the middle ranks of the Ministry another development arose. Ministry officials, 
especially those located in the oil fields, were trained to keep their counterparts in the 
foreign companies in check. When nationalisation took place on the 1 January 1976 
the former ‘opponent’ remained the same but with the difference that both were now 
public officials. Coronel commented, “For many of them [Ministry officials] the 
continued presence at the helm of the nationalised oil companies of the managerial 
group that had worked under the multinationals seemed to be enough reason for 
distrust. A high level officer at the Ministry once confessed this feeling to me.”130 
Coronel, who was a foreign company official, cited a top level manager at the 
Ministry: “We do not know everything that is going on in the industry and I have the 
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suspicion that it is in the areas we know least about that you are deceiving us.”131 
Coronel added, “This deeply ingrained distrust was probably the product of many 
years in which the State sector had been left very much in the dark by more 
experienced oil industry staff.”132 
 
Arévalo Guzmán-Reyes, whose career in the Ministry of Energy spanned from oil 
field inspector to Deputy Minister, observed, “In the oil fields we had to be very 
aware of, and strict about, all manoeuvres of the foreign managers. I had numerous 
problems with them when I had to enforce regulations. Once, a top manager in one of 
the foreign companies tried to undermine my authority. He bypassed me and went to 
complain to my superiors in the Ministry. Fortunately, my position was maintained in 
the end.”133 Ministry officials, in 1976, wanted to continue enforcing the enhanced 
regulatory scope granted by Decree 832 in 1971.134 As long as PDVSA has asserted 
its position vis-à-vis the Ministry, officials from the latter were frustrated and 
demoralised. 135 
 
 
The languishing Ministry of Energy  
 
President Pérez’s solution for the diminished Ministry was to merge it, in December 
1976, with a division, formerly within the Ministry of Trade and Industry, responsible 
for regulating the electric sector.136 This administrative manoeuvre was intended, in 
the words of PDVSA’s vice president at the time, not as “a simple change of 
denomination, but it was intended to restrict the action of the office in the petroleum 
sector”.137 Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show how the divisions formerly regulating the oil 
industry were reduced.  
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Figure 2.1  MEM’s organisational chart in 1975 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  MEM’s organisational chart in 1976 
 
 
Figure 2.3  MEM’s organisational chart in 1981 
 
 
Notably, the former division in charge of developing the vast reservoirs of Orinoco 
Belt was dismantled in the new Ministry.138 This removal from the Ministry followed 
an earlier dispute between Minister Valentin Hernández and PDVSA’s board. 
Although Minister Hernández favoured transferring the Orinoco belt administration to 
PDVSA, the Ministry’s technocrats wanted to retain control over it. President Pérez 
resolved the dispute in PDVSA’s favour.139 The Orinoco belt development division 
was then taken away from the Ministry. 
 
The new Ministry, combining hydrocarbons, mines and the recently added electric 
sector began activities in 1977. Despite the expansion of the office to include an 
additional sector, the Ministry steadily continued its decay. Ministerial budget figures 
demonstrate this weakening. Table 2.9 shows the Ministry’s budget from 1976 to 
1989. 
 
The Ministry budget shrank significantly over the fifteen years following 
nationalisation. The 1989 budget was only 19.33% of the equivalent budget in 1976 in 
US dollar terms and only 18.85% in Bolívar terms. The Ministry of Energy’s budget 
also dropped in relation to the national budget. In 1975, the Ministry of Energy 
obtained 0.73% of all resources allocated in the national budget. This figure collapsed 
to only 0.26% in 1989, a decline in financial significance of almost two-thirds. 
 
Furthermore, the divisions within the Ministry directly responsible for monitoring the 
oil industry also lost their former significance. Table 2.10 shows the decline in 
importance of the activities branded as “planning, supervision and technical and fiscal 
control of the nationalised industry”.140  
 
The divisions responsible for monitoring the oil industry halved their internal weight 
within the Ministry. Similarly, the budget of these divisions relative to the value of the 
fiscal revenues obtained from oil activities being monitored, demonstrates the 
significance of the collapse. The allocated resources of these divisions were, in 1989, 
73% less than in 1976 vis-à-vis the total revenues obtained from the oil industry.  
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Table 2.9  Ministry of Energy’s annual budgets (1976-1989) 
Year US$ million 
(Current) 
Bolívar million 
(of 1984) 
 
As % of national budget 
1976 56.57 599.28 0.73 
1977 130.64 1,280.99 1.57 
1978 43.58 398.54 0.42 
1979 44.18 335.62 0.41 
1980 43.60 276.61 0.33 
1981 56.77 326.10 0.32 
1982 48.04 255.92 0.24 
1983 22.20 192.69 0.22 
1984 21.69 162.70 0.21 
1985 13.51 178.87 0.19 
1986 9.96 178.62 0.18 
1987 9.38 163.91 0.18 
1988 8.71 143.84 0.18 
1989 10.94 113.02 0.26 
Source: Budget Office (Onapre), BCV. Estimates by author. 
 
 
Table 2.10  Significance of oil industry direct monitoring within the Ministry of 
Energy. 
Year Budget of oil industry direct 
monitoring divisions as % of the 
Ministry of Energy’s total budget  
Budget of oil industry direct 
monitoring divisions as % of oil 
revenues 
 
1976 26.09 0.26 
1977  9.05 0.20 
1978 23.98 0.16 
1979 21.70 0.18 
1980 22.86 0.12 
1981 17.60 0.08 
1982 16.99 0.06 
1983 20.84 0.09 
1984 19.91 0.08 
1985 18.24 0.06 
1986 15.84 0.05 
1987 14.14 0.09 
1988 15.43 0.05 
1989 12.36 0.07 
Source: Ministry of Energy, Budget Office (Onapre). Estimates by author. 
 
 
Manuel Da-Silva, a staff member in one of those divisions commented that the 
Ministry was simply being deprived of resources to carry on with its normal activities, 
although it formally continued with its activities. There were no substantial changes 
except that it was now PDVSA which produced the information and the Ministry 
accepted it as accurate. They did not have the means to corroborate the accuracy of 
PDVSA’s reporting.141  
 
 
PDVSA’s aid to the Ministry 
 
PDVSA recognised the Ministry of Energy’s decline. Pablo Reimpell, a member of 
the PDVSA Board from 1977 to 1992, commented, “We observed the deterioration 
not only of the Ministry of Energy but of the whole public bureaucracy. The Ministry 
started to lack the former highly professional staff for which they were once 
renowned. Although this was happening in many other public offices, whilst PDVSA 
was growing stronger the Ministry was weakening. We were conscious that this 
disequilibrium was not going to help the relations between the two organisations. We 
even paid for a study by renowned consultants McKinsey into the possible 
reorganisation of the Ministry but that was never carried out.”142  
 
Ramón Espinasa, former chief economist of PDVSA, asserted, “The Ministry, which 
was formerly the pride of all ministries, deteriorated as did the other public offices. 
But the difference here was the existence of PDVSA, which created a marked 
contrast. The creation of PDVSA represented the Venezuelanisation of an Anglo-
Saxon enclave with a different culture. PDVSA wanted the rest of the country to be 
like them. There is no point in denying that PDVSA was assuming the role of the 
Ministry. PDVSA, however, thought about creating a sort of spin off that would 
become the industry regulator.”143  
 
None of the reorganisations of the Ministry that had been considered were ever 
implemented. The Ministry kept functioning in an inertial way. The Ministry’s size, in 
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terms of number of employees, stagnated. Between 1981 and 1990 total personnel 
dropped by 4.5% whilst the total of the so called ‘Public National Administration’ 
(i.e. all government ministries) increased by 51.3%.144 PDVSA instituted, both 
formally and informally, diverse forms of ‘aid’ to the Ministry.  
 
First, PDVSA complemented the salary of the Ministry’s staff. Initially, PDVSA paid 
for a supplement of the salaries of the Hydrocarbons and Reversion divisions of the 
Ministry.145 Later, this policy was extended to all employees in the Ministry.146 This 
supplement represented 60% of the remuneration of the Ministry’s personnel.147 In 
dollar terms, the Ministry of Energy’s employees were paid, on average, US$ 
208/month in 1986, 35% above the average for all ministries.148. The employees of 
the Ministry of Energy were, with this ‘aid’, among the best paid of all ministries (for 
instance, in 1991, only employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were better paid 
and that included salaries in US$ for diplomats posted abroad).149 Public bureaucracy 
salaries were, however, well below those in PDVSA.150 
 
Anecdotal evidence also illustrates the subordinate status of the Ministry of Energy in 
comparison to their counterparts in the oil industry. PDVSA often subsidised the 
Ministry by paying business expenses such as transportation and accommodation 
when they travelled together. PDVSA donated different type of office equipment, 
sometimes used, to the Ministry. Top officials in the Ministry had access to holiday 
homes that PDVSA maintained within its locations across the country.151 
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 By the end of the 1980s the Ministry of Energy was effectively incapable of matching 
the necessary technical and administrative resources of PDVSA. Its regulatory duties 
had been weakened although many regulations from the time of the concessionary 
system survived. The enforcement of those regulations was impaired by this lack of 
resources. For any practical purpose, the Ministry of Energy ceased to play the 
institutional role that it had done before nationalisation. 
 
 
2.4 Breaching the post-nationalisation rules of the game 
 
The so called ‘honeymoon’ post-nationalisation period lasted four years. During those 
years the institutional arrangements described in the previous section held mostly 
unchallenged. This stability, however, was first disrupted in 1979. President Herrera 
modified PDVSA’s statutes just days before the term of the first board was to expire. 
This reform of the statues marked the beginning of several challenges to the agreed 
post-nationalisation rules. This section discusses the main alterations of those rules. 
 
 
Reform of PDVSA statutes of 1979 
 
President Herrera named Humberto Calderón-Berti as Minister of Energy in March 
1979. He had previously held senior positions in both the Ministry (Director of the 
Reversion division) and in the oil conglomerate (Director of the Research and 
Development arm of the holding). Calderón-Berti had been associated to President 
Herrera’s party Copei and was one of the closest friends of Herrera.152 In August 1979 
the first board of PDVSA was about to finish its statutory term. On 23 August, 
President Herrera reformed the statutes altering two significant rules.153  
 
First, financial and operational independence was dented. Investment plans, not only 
of the holding company but those of the operating subsidiaries, were required to be 
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approved by the Assembly, which was also compelled to convene twice yearly. 
Additionally, Minister Calderón-Berti changed the previous practice of granting the 
holding autonomy in appointing operating companies’ senior officials.154  
 
Second, the regulations regarding the board of PDVSA were equally altered. The 
board’s term was reduced from four to two years. Additionally, the clause that 
guaranteed preferential rights to the members of the board to occupy the most senior 
positions on the Board was eliminated. This departure was also perceived as a rupture 
of the tacit agreement of respect for a merit based executive career within the 
industry, leaving more space for political manipulation of senior appointments.155 
 
These reforms gave the Ministry a tighter grip on the management of the oil industry. 
Senior managers’ initial reaction was, in the words of Coronel, to give Minister 
Calderón-Berti “the benefit of the doubt.”156 Later events, however, confirmed that 
fears about politicisation of the board were well deserved. Coronel pointed out, “The 
selection of some of the new directors did not seem to follow proper evaluation 
procedures but seemed to have been made on the basis of Calderón-Berti’s personal 
preferences.”157 Later in 1983, President Herrera appointed acting Minister of Energy 
Calderón-Berti as new President of PDVSA. Pablo Reimpell commented, “This 
appointment was simply a mistake; things were never the same after that event.”158 
The 1979 reforms hinted that the ‘non-intervention’ stance adopted by policy makers 
regarding PDVSA in the aftermath of nationalisation was broken. 
 
 
Foreign reserves crisis of 1982 
 
Although oil prices peaked in 1981 and 1982 reaching an average of US$ 32.51 and 
32.38 per barrel respectively,159 oil market prospects were grim. Locally, the 
Venezuelan economy had entered into a period of post-boom blues. Notably, foreign 
                                                 
154 Andrés Sosa-Pietri, interview by author, Caracas, 4 August 2003. 
155 Julio Cesar Arreaza, ibid., p.266. 
156 Gustavo Coronel, ibid.,p.180. 
157 Gustavo Coronel, ibid.,p.182. 
158 Pablo Reimpell, ibid.  
159 Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1999. 
reserves had been depleted thanks to a capital flight that had threatened the erstwhile 
strong Bolívar.160 International reserves held by the Central Bank had dropped by 
36% in recent months. In August 1982 they plunged to US$ 6,152 million (they had 
peaked in May 1981 at US$ 9,620 million).161 
 
The response of President Herrera’s administration to fend off the capital flight crisis 
was to rely on PDVSA’s own foreign reserves, with the aim of restoring financial 
health to the Central Bank. On 27 September 1982 the Board of PDVSA was 
summoned to the Ministry of Energy’s office to be informed that President Herrera 
had decreed that PDVSA’s foreign reserves were to be transferred to the Central 
Bank. PDVSA would have the equivalent amount frozen in Bolívars in a Central 
Bank account.162 The Central Bank was entitled to allow PDVSA to maintain some 
liquid assets in foreign currency for only specific uses and after rigorous 
consideration. The Central Bank, in any case, would be in charge of administering 
those assets. 
 
This hasty governmental directive further undermined the rule of financial 
independence agreed in the nationalisation law in 1975. PDVSA board’s immediate 
reaction was a bitter one, not only because of the lack of consultation during the 
drafting of the measure but because of the curtailment of its highly valued financial 
and administrative autonomy. PDVSA feared that it had now to depend on exogenous 
bureaucratic considerations to carry on with its own administrative affairs. PDVSA 
asked for compensation if the measure was to be ratified, such as for the income lost 
in interest on its liquid assets. Similarly, it suggested a reduction in the Export Fiscal 
Values. It also asked for several modifications to the original resolution in order to 
make access to foreign currency more flexible both for PDVSA and for the operating 
companies.163 
 
Senior government officials, led by the President of the Central Bank Leopoldo Díaz-
Bruzual, refused to modify the resolution. President Herrera, however, established a 
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joint PDVSA-government commission to discuss the company’s concerns. Díaz-
Bruzual was a sworn enemy of PDVSA. He commented, “The Board of PDVSA were 
a bunch of inept managers. I would long before have sent all members of the board to 
prison because of their lousy management of a purchase of pipes that was 
outrageously detrimental to Venezuela.”164  
 
Díaz-Bruzual was adamant in maintaining the government position. The government 
introduced a measure, intended as compensation to PDVSA, in December 1982. The 
Ministry of Energy ordered the creation of a trust fund in the Central Bank in which 
some of the retained PDVSA reserves would be invested in ‘secured assets’. The 
accruing interests from this trust would compensate PDVSA for the loss caused by 
not having the controversial foreign reserves at its disposal. The draft was almost 
approved, but was in the end opposed by the President of the Central Bank.  
 
Congress intervened in the dispute. The governing party did not have a majority either 
in the Senate or in the Lower chamber (see Table 2.11). The AD party led the defence 
of the PDVSA position. They introduced two reforms in Congress, on the 21 October 
1982, first to the Central Bank law and second, to the nationalisation law. Both 
reforms were intended to reverse President Herrera’s resolution. In the case of the 
Central Bank law reform, foreign currency generated by PDVSA exports was not 
counted as being part of the Bank’s reserves. As for the Nationalisation Law, the 
reform made explicit that PDVSA’s reserves held in the Central Bank could not be 
considered net profit subject distribution to the Treasury. The reform asserted 
PDVSA’s right to keep these resources for future investment or other needs related to 
the management of the conglomerate.165 
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Table 2.11  Composition of Congress (1978-1983) 
Party Senators Deputies 
 
AD 21 (48%)                   88 (44%) 
Copei 21 (48%)                   84 (42%) 
Others 2 (4%)                   27 (14%) (2 Right wing, 25 Left wing) 
Total 44                 199 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
Eleven months later, Congress approved only the Central Bank Law reform. With the 
votes of AD and some left wing parties, Congress passed a modification of the law 
ensuring PDVSA access to foreign currency in an amount set in the PDVSA annual 
budget, approved by the Assembly.166 This amendment to the law settled the PDVSA-
government dispute. PDVSA was, for the first time, seriously affected by a decision 
the company overtly opposed. PDVSA’s board almost resigned.167 Although the final 
outcome was a watered down version of the President Herrera’s initial resolution, this 
episode soured relations between the government and PDVSA. The top management 
of the industry became more suspicious of government intentions to extract ever 
larger resources from PDVSA for its own fiscal purposes. According to Bernard 
Mommer, they promised not to be taken by surprise again. He commented, “The 
PDVSA leadership took the fateful decision never to hold cash again and to spend the 
money before the government could levy taxes on it.”168  
 
The foreign reserves crisis of 1982 made public the enormous distrust that existed 
between PDVSA and the government. In a year-long dispute, the arguments, both in 
the congressional hearings and in meetings between government officials, PDVSA’s 
technocrats and politicians, revealed that PDVSA plainly feared that the government 
would utilise PDVSA’s funds for shoring up public finances.169 On the other hand, the 
President of the Central Bank Díaz-Bruzual accused PDVSA in a congressional 
hearing on the 25 November 1982 that the company “had plenty of resources while 
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the rest of the public sector was dried up”, and also questioned the judgement of 
PDVSA in its investment of those resources abroad.170 This dispute brought to an end 
the convivial arrangement that characterised the post-nationalisation years. 
 
 
The internationalisation crisis of 1983 
 
After the foreign reserves crisis in 1982, the next institutional feature to be tested was 
the association with privately owned companies. The controversial Article 5 of the 
nationalisation law regulated potential associations with private capital. The 
implementation of that provision, however, was not tested until December 2002. 
PDVSA’s board approved an association with the partly state-owned German 
company Veba Oil.  
 
The origin of the association with Veba was a cooperation agreement signed between 
the governments of Venezuela and Germany during the previous administration of 
President Pérez. PDVSA’s officials seized the opportunity and asked the government 
for permission to explore the possibilities for the energy area of the agreement (a task 
that normally would have been assigned to the Ministry of Energy). PDVSA led the 
exploratory contacts with Veba’s officials. Representatives of the Ministry of Energy 
participated in those negotiations. PDVSA thought that the public ownership (albeit 
partial) of Veba would represent a less contentious issue with the political world. In 
fact, PDVSA had previously explored, to no avail, an association with France’s state 
company Elf-Aquitaine.171  
 
The arrangement with Veba entailed a joint venture to operate a refining complex 
(known as Ruhr Oel) in Germany, intended to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil. 
PDVSA’s rationale was based on two arguments. First, access to international 
markets and second, the need to make the vast reserves of heavy oil marketable. The 
Minister of Energy Calderón-Berti backed the association. The remaining hurdle was 
to determine if Article 5 of the Nationalisation Law applied or not. Minister Calderón-
Berti defended the idea of signing without legislative approval. Solicitor General 
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Carlos Leañez172 ruled that there were no impediments for PDVSA in going ahead 
with the Veba deal as long as it was approved by PDVSA’s assembly.173 
 
PDVSA signed the Veba association in April 1983. The signing in Düsseldorf was 
attended by Minister Calderón-Berti and PDVSA’s officials. PDVSA’s president 
Alfonzo-Ravard was notably absent. He was unhappy with the Minister Calderón-
Berti’s high profile role in what he considered a technical and commercial matter. He 
feared that the Minister’s direct involvement would render the event too political.174  
 
In fact, the Veba association was soon questioned in the political arena. President 
Herrera’s administration was under great stress. Only months later, an acute economic 
crisis was triggered by the first devaluation of the local currency in decades. In 
addition, the governing Copei party was in a minority in Congress and elections for 
both Congress and President were scheduled for December that year. The potential 
conflict of the Veba association with the requirements of Article 5 of the 
nationalisation law brought a political dimension to the deal. The Copei party, which 
opposed Article 5 when nationalisation was sanctioned, defended the association and 
claimed it did not require the legislature’s approval. Conversely, the AD party, the 
main proponent of Article 5, insisted this association was unlawful.  
 
AD’s opposition to the Veba deal was led by Celestino Armas, a member of AD’s 
National Executive Committee175 and an expert in oil policy issues. He denounced the 
illegality of the Veba contract.176 AD with the backing of several left wing parties 
(Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, Communist Party, among others) initiated a 
congressional inquiry on the Veba deal.  
 
The special congressional committee appointed to investigate the deal undertook 
hearings and discussions for months. PDVSA’s officials and the Minister were grilled 
thoroughly. Pablo Reimpell recalled, “Those were turbulent times in which senior 
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PDVSA officials were accused of all sorts of wrongdoings. Frequently, the attacks 
reached personal levels. Congressional hearings were very tense. There were several 
inconvenient observations about PDVSA although they treated us with respect. They 
especially resented the fact that the negotiations were conducted mainly inside 
PDVSA.”177 Similarly, Minister Calderón-Berti complained that he was summoned to 
Congress thirty one times.178  
 
Opponents to the Veba deal in Congress extended their reservations beyond the 
original claim of non-compliance with Article 5.179 They objected to the 
inconvenience of a large investment abroad under another country’s sovereignty; to 
the cost of the operation; and to technological dependence on foreign companies. 
They also expressed conservationist concerns on the ground that the contract 
guaranteed the supply of a fixed amount of oil. They were also worried about 
neglecting local refining projects and the impact of the deal on commercialisation 
autonomy, including Opec binding agreements. Similarly, old concerns were revived 
by nationalist minded politicians. They saw this move by the PDVSA’s as a back-
door entry for foreign capital to have a say on Venezuelan oil again. Nonetheless, the 
debate was prolonged enough to reach the electoral contest in December 1983. By 
that time it was clear that a new administration and a new Congress would be 
responsible for resolving the dispute. 
 
The AD presidential nominee, Jaime Lusinchi, achieved a landslide victory in 
December 1983 (57% of the votes). The AD party obtained a handsome majority in 
Congress as well (see Table 2.12). 
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 Table 2.12  Composition of Congress (1983-1988) 
Party Senators Deputies 
 
AD 28 (64%)                       113 (57%) 
Copei 14 (32%)                         60 (30%) 
Others 2 (4%)                         27 (13%) (4 Right wing, 23 Left wing) 
Total 44                       200 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) 
 
 
President Lusinchi appointed former member of the congressional permanent 
committee of Energy Arturo Hernández-Grisanti as Minister of Energy. At the same 
time, President Lusinchi dismissed PDVSA’s board. He sacked Calderón-Berti, who 
had assumed the presidency of PDVSA only five months earlier, and restructured the 
board by appointing nine new members and ratifying five. Notably, Vice President 
Petzall, who played an important role in the Veba deal, was dismissed. Among the 
new comers was Juan Chacín, an oil industry man believed to be a blood relative of 
President Lusinchi. 
 
 
AD’s U-turn 
 
Back in power, AD’s oil policy makers, notably Hernández-Grisanti, changed their 
opinion about the internationalisation strategy. Pablo Reimpell recalled, “Hernández-
Grisanti told me that although he opposed it before he had realised that 
internationalisation was necessary.”180 After a period of caution, President Lusinchi 
gave his full support to the internationalisation strategy initiated by the Veba deal. 
Lusinchi and the AD party managed to achieve an ‘elegant’ conclusion to the 
congressional dispute. Another committee dominated by AD supporters was set up in 
Congress to give a final word to the debate. The committee produced a report 
condemning the way the deal had been carried out without congressional approval and 
considered that the Solicitor General’s opinion was not sufficient to comply with legal 
requirements. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court. It was, however, never 
pursued and was effectively forgotten.  
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 A popular President with a strong mandate and full legislative support in his 
‘honeymoon’ period was able to settle a controversial issue. On the other hand, 
PDVSA embarked, this time, in a lobbying effort to create the political conditions to 
pursue the internalisation agenda further.181 AD’s U-turn on the Veba deal and its 
backing of the internationalisation strategy revealed that the strong opposition of the 
party that had led to PDVSA’s policy during the election year of 1983 was not 
grounded in a significant disagreement with PDVSA. It seemed rather an 
opportunistic move to attack a vulnerable administration in an election year.182 The 
Veba association broke with another tacit rule of the post-nationalisation 
arrangements. PDVSA issues, which had been largely of an administrative and 
corporate nature, could now be used for partisan convenience. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Venezuelan policy makers obtained the long awaited goal of nationalising the oil 
industry in 1975. The ‘euphoria’ brought about by this step and the initial ‘cautious’ 
stance regarding the oil company, however, did not produce a stable institutional 
arrangement for the post-nationalisation era. Policy makers became complacent at the 
beginning of this period. A consensual agenda on the urgent tasks required to assure a 
smooth transition from the concessionary system to the new state-owned arrangement 
contributed, on the one hand, to grant legitimacy and to set clear rules on how to 
proceed in the immediate years following nationalisation in 1975. Yet on the other 
hand, this understanding between the oil conglomerate and the government was not 
translated into a more stable institutional arrangement.  
 
The resulting institutional arrangement was frail. First, the government left the 
Ministry of Energy to vegetate. The need to fill PDVSA with ‘proven nationalists’ 
deprived the Ministry of some veteran technocrats. Additionally, as the Ministry was 
                                                 
181 Pablo Reimpell cited in Cesar E. Baena, ibid., p.161. 
182 For a lengthier discussion of the internalisation strategy pursued by PDVSA in the 1980s 
see Cesar E. Baena, ibid.and Juan Carlos Boue, La internacionalización de PDVSA: una 
costosa ilusión (Caracas, Fondo Editorial ‘Darío Ramírez’/Ministry of Energy, 2004). 
neglected, no replacement was developed for the future. Second, policy makers and 
politicians distorted rules agreed in 1975 to serve other purposes. In 1979, the then 
Minister of Energy presided over a reform of PDVSA’s statutes that enabled himself 
to be appointed President of PDVSA years later. In 1982, a stressed administration 
facing an acute economic crisis, including a significant capital flight, abandoned the 
rule of financial independence of PDVSA to weather the economic storm of the 
moment. In 1983, an election year, the main opposition party and largest party in 
Congress opposed a deal led by PDVSA, only to give its approval some months later 
when they returned to power. Factors such as personal career advancement, economic 
urgency and inter-party competition during elections began to influence the 
governance of PDVSA after a honeymoon period following nationalisation. 
 
The weakening of the Ministry of Energy was matched with a strengthening of the 
PDVSA position vis-à-vis the regulator. PDVSA not only operated without the same 
scrutiny that the former foreign company had had but also assumed some roles such 
as the administration of reservoirs, as the case of the Orinoco Belt illustrates. 
Similarly, PDVSA’s technocracy reacted to the meddling of policy makers and 
politicians with the agreed rules. PDVSA factored those interventions into its 
corporate strategy. They minimised exposure to the risks associated with 
interventions, such as financial independence, which had been curtailed with the 
seizing of PDVSA’s foreign reserves. PDVSA also began to lobby politicians to 
minimise, as well, their interference as perceived by top technocrats.  
 
The resulting institutional arrangement was unstable. Although the government 
retained its authority over PDVSA, it began to be outmanoeuvred by a far better 
prepared technocracy. The weakening of the Ministry of Energy meant that the 
governance of PDVSA came to rely less on former regulatory mechanisms. This 
imbalance between the capacity of political masters to hold PDVSA to account and 
the need to guarantee to the PDVSA technocracy a stable institutional arrangement in 
which they could base their decision making on commercial and technical grounds, 
sowed the seeds for future governance problems, which are discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Moreover, left-leaning politicians confirmed their suspicions about 
PDVSA’s lack of response to the national interest. In all major Punto Fijo political 
groupings, anti- and pro-PDVSA positions began to coexist. Such tensions emerged 
later, both in the neo-liberal years (1990s) and when President Chávez took power. 
This is discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.  
 Chapter 3 
 
The Investment Fund (1974-1989) 
 
 
This chapter examines the Venezuelan Investment Fund created in 1974. The creation 
of the Fund coincided with the process of nationalisation analysed in Chapter 2. 
Venezuelan policy makers were faced with a unique opportunity regarding long 
standing oil policy goals. Nationalisation meant state control of business decisions in 
the oil industry. Redirecting oil wealth to productive investment had been a long 
standing aspiration symbolised by Arturo Uslar-Pietri’s infamous phrase published in 
1936: Sowing the oil.183 The phrase became a constant reference for politicians and 
intellectuals but it was never tested in practice. In 1974, for the first time, oil revenues 
were earmarked for a special fund aimed at ‘sowing the oil’. The Investment Fund 
represented an opportunity to make the old slogan a reality. 
 
The ‘clean slate’ that both nationalisation and the unprecedented oil boom meant for 
Venezuelan oil policy helped policy makers to commit to a new set of ‘rules of the 
game’ regarding oil wealth. The Investment Fund was intended as an institutional 
mechanism for the use of a significant share of oil revenues. Similarly to the rules 
designed to implement nationalisation, the regulation of the Fund was conceived in 
order to avoid politicisation and improvisation in the use of the vast resources that 
were entering into the economy. The chapter shows how this objective failed to 
materialise. 
 
This chapter reviews how the Fund was conceived and implemented and what results 
were obtained from it. The main findings of the chapter indicate that 
institutionalisation of the spending of extra oil revenues was not achieved despite a 
careful institutional design and professional implementation. Politicisation of the 
decision making mechanisms, unchecked supremacy of the President regarding the 
disposing of oil money and the absence of mechanisms of checks and balances meant 
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that distortions in the Fund’s purpose were not corrected. Consequently, resources in 
the fund were squandered to a large extent. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: first, it discusses the background that led to the 
creation of the Fund in 1974. Second, it describes the initial structure of the Fund. 
Third, the chapter shows how the Fund operated in practice. Fourth, it demonstrates 
how the Fund rules were either distorted or ignored, producing the opposite results to 
those originally intended. Lastly, the chapter examines the final conversion of the 
Fund to a privatisation mechanism. 
 
 
3.1 Towards the creation of an investment fund 
 
For 50 years, following the beginning of oil exploitation, Venezuela had managed its 
oil revenues through regular budgetary mechanisms. Those mechanisms were 
basically a central collection of taxes and allocation of spending through the national 
budget. The budget was prepared by the executive branch and required legislative 
approval. In practice, Congress exerted little or no influence over the budget. Oil 
revenues were appropriated in the form of taxes collected by the central government.   
 
In 1973 the oil price more than tripled, rising from an average of US$ 3.05 in 1973 to 
US$ 10.73 per barrel in 1974.184 Venezuelans suddenly faced the need to administer 
this ‘bonanza’. The newly elected president, Carlos Andrés Pérez, promised prudence 
in his inaugural speech (see introduction to the thesis).185  
 
Standard macroeconomic thought suggested that the injection of vast fiscal resources 
into the Venezuelan internal economic mainstream would cause serious imbalances, 
such as a sharp surge in the inflation rate. Within this context, the new 
administration’s economic team, lead by Gumersindo Rodríguez, Minister of 
Planning, and by Hector Hurtado, Minister of Finance, agreed the new government 
should hold part of the oil income aside from established, day to day spending 
mechanisms. Two months after being inaugurated the Pérez administration asked 
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Congress to concede to the Presidency special powers to dictate laws by decree in 
economic and financial matters. Among those matters was the establishment of the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV). 
 
When the FIV was established in the mid-1970s the idea of grand centralised plans for 
‘national development’ was in full swing. Gumersindo Rodríguez, indisputably leader 
of the economic team, thought himself “not a strong believer in planned economies, 
nor a blind supporter of the market logic, more an eclectic social democrat”.186 He 
envisioned his role as one of managing the economy not as a socialist economy but 
one that combined ‘state capitalism’ with a ‘socialist bias’, according to his own 
words.187 With the boom, the Pérez administration foresaw an immense opportunity to 
“accelerate the country’s economic development”.188 Venezuela, however, did not 
have any large scale projects underway at that time. Rodríguez lamented, “The largest 
project we inherited from the Caldera administration was an urban development in 
downtown Caracas called Central Park.”189 There were some iron, steel and 
petrochemicals projects, but clearly nothing of the scale of the economic and financial 
potential that ministers then believed to be possible given the hike in oil prices and the 
country’s increased wealth.  
 
As a consequence Rodríguez’s cabinet level portfolio, the Office for Planning (known 
as Cordiplan) promptly began preparing an ambitious plan, called the Fifth National 
Plan. This plan was encapsulated by President Pérez’s slogan ‘The Great Venezuela’. 
In addition to the grand ambitions of the Plan, Rodríguez joined with Hurtado and 
another influential Minister, Carmelo Lauria, regarding the need to introduce what 
they considered a key political strategy: the ‘irreversibility’ of the infrastructure 
projects to be undertaken. Rodríguez reaffirmed, “We needed to tie in those projects 
and to force their future financing. We feared that the ‘patron-client’ practices of 
Acción Democrática,190 which I knew very well, would rapidly eat all the 
resources.”191 Another political dimension of this ‘irreversibility’ strategy had to do 
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with a tension with Juan Pablo Pérez-Alfonzo’s policy of restraining oil production.192 
A commitment to a large scale national development programme certainly affected 
future oil policy, because the money required to finance the scheme whetted the 
appetite for oil revenues. Pérez-Alfonzo’s conservationist ideas were hindered 
because of the scale of the projects later chosen. The rationale was as follows: once an 
order is placed with a manufacturer to build a turbine for a ten megawatt hydroelectric 
power plant over five to eight years, reneging on that commitment would be very 
costly.  
 
It became clear to policy makers in 1974 that the opportunity to embark on an 
industrial expansion programme, fuelled by the rise in oil revenues, was finally at 
hand. This expansion, however, needed time to mature. As Constantino Quero-
Morales, former cabinet member and later FIV’s president, reflected, “It was critical 
to have a reserve available to implement an ambitious programme fostering 
productive structures at the heart of development plans.”193  
 
Venezuela already had two structures for promoting and implementing industrial 
expansion: a national ‘industry fostering’ corporation (Corporación Venezolana de 
Fomento, CVF) and the regionally orientated Venezuelan Corporation for Guayana 
(Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, CVG). Quero-Morales, however, 
acknowledged, “The CVF had lost its prestige and was in a vegetative state unable to 
evolve to manage the oil money. Its policy of diversification had distracted from the 
focus on industrialisation. They had abandoned seed capital policy and were involved 
in many other projects.”194 In short, in Quero-Morales’s view, these two bodies were 
not capable of handling the enormous investments to come. The Guayana Corporation 
was linked to only one region. Although that region received much investment from 
the future Fund, its regional horizon was not suitable for the new challenges. 
Additionally, Venezuela had another structure for industrial financing, a bank targeted 
to the industrial sector (Banco Industrial de Venezuela, BIV) but, in Quero-Morales 
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own words, “It was mired in corruption scandals and was in disarray.”195 These poor 
performing and ill equipped existing governmental agencies required a new entity to 
be created. 
 
Gumersindo Rodríguez commented on the situation, “I knew very well how the AD 
party worked. I knew something had to be done to protect some of the vast resources 
now available from the traditional practices within the party and its main 
constituencies. If we had not sheltered some of those resources there would have been 
a queue of local governors asking for infrastructure projects, the teachers unions 
asking for salary hikes, and so on.”196 Rodríguez and Minister Hurtado formed an 
alliance within the Pérez administration to give form to the new entity. 
 
Rodríguez acknowledged Hurtado’s crucial role. Hector Hurtado was a respected 
figure in the AD party with vast experience of Venezuelan public administration. 
Hurtado was a disciple of a former influential figure in AD, Manuel Pérez-Guerrero, 
an economic guru close to the AD’s founding father, Rómulo Betancourt. Hurtado, 
who had trained as a lawyer and had been a magistrate of the Supreme Court, had a 
comprehensive knowledge of Venezuelan public finances. He had been Deputy to 
Pérez-Guerrero and Minister of Planning in former AD administrations. Carlos Rafael 
Silva, former cabinet member and President of the Central Bank, said of Hurtado’s 
ability, “Hurtado was a very pragmatic figure. He knew exactly how to do things to 
please the President of the Republic even if it was not in the best overall national 
interest.”197 
 
Gumersindo Rodríguez explained how the ‘team’ worked: “Hurtado had an incredibly 
meticulous knowledge of the legalities of Venezuelan public administration. This 
knowledge and his skills, together with his being a trained lawyer, prepared him very 
well to shape the legislation the way it best suited the aims of the Fund as we 
intended. But Hurtado knew all the tricks of the public administration as well.”198 
Both Hurtado and Rodríguez realised that the opportunity was ripe to ask Congress 
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for an Enabling Law.199 They intended, in Rodríguez’s own words, “To squeeze every 
possible bit from an Enabling Law to allow the President to legislate on a myriad of 
economic issues without the interference of Congress.”200 Rodríguez believed, at that 
time, that Congress, controlled by AD, would easily pass the law because: “During 
the honeymoon period at the beginning of each administration, Venezuelan 
congressmen typically expect all kind of favours from the Executive, and they are 
therefore willing to approve anything the government submits to them.”201 Rodríguez 
bluntly concluded, “You know how things work in Venezuela… they are expecting 
perks of all sorts from the government, they are hoping for business ‘opportunities’ 
for their friends.”202 
 
Article 1, Section 3 of the Enabling Law, passed by Congress on 31 May 1974, 
authorised the President to: “Create the Venezuelan Investment Fund as an 
independent entity with legal authority whose purpose will be the administration and 
investment of its own assets in order to complement the funding of the expansion and 
diversification of the national economic structure, to invest resources in profitable 
options abroad and to promote international cooperation programmes. All of this is in 
order to contribute to the economic and financial stability of the country.”203  
 
The creation of the Fund required a change in the legislation regulating the national 
Treasury. The concept of ‘unity of the Treasury’ was reformed to allow for the 
creation of a separate fiscal entity. President Pérez, with the authority of the new 
Enabling Law of May 1974, changed the ‘Organic Law of Public Finance’ to pave the 
way for the establishment of the FIV. Decree 150, Article 1, dictated, “50% of the 
fiscal revenues coming from the tax on oil and gas exploitation and from income tax 
affecting those activities will be exempted from becoming part of the national 
Treasury and therefore the source for public spending.”204 It also established that, “At 
the end of each fiscal year, this percentage can be increased or decreased as the result 
of an adjustment mechanism related to the variation of the mentioned revenues in 
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relation to those of 1974.”205 A mechanism for controlling what proportion of oil 
income had to be devoted to the national annual budget and what had to be deposited 
in the Fund was deferred to the law regulating the Fund. This modification of a long 
lasting fiscal tradition allowed policy makers, for the first time, to separate some part 
of oil revenues from the traditional budgetary process. As the ‘unity of the Treasury’ 
had been broken, Pérez’s administration was entitled to allocate funds outside the 
budgetary loop. 
 
President Pérez and his team promptly began to work on the basis of that 
modification. First, they created two funds specially targeted to the industrial and 
agricultural sectors.206 Both the Industrial Credit Fund (Fondo de Crédito Industrial, 
Foncrei) and the Agriculture Credit Fund (Fondo de Crédito Agropecuario, FCA) 
were provided with an initial endowment of about US$ 500 million. Later in 1975, an 
identical fund with the same endowment was created for urban development (Fondo 
Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano, Fondur).207 These funds, however, did not have 
provisions for further replenishment from oil revenues. In a different approach, the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) was created, with a unique organisational 
structure and with provisions for redirecting oil revenues in the future. 
 
 
3.2 The Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) 
 
On 11 June 1974, enabled by Congress to legislate by decree, President Pérez created 
the FIV through the Statute of the Venezuelan Investment Fund.208 This instrument 
gave legal and organisational form to the Fund. 
 
The Fund reported to the Presidency of the Republic. The law regulating the structure 
of the executive branch, the ‘Organic Law of the Central Administration’, did not give 
the Fund the stature of a Ministry. The President, however, used a prerogative of 
creating ‘Ministries of State’ in charge of specific tasks (Article 3 of the Central 
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Administration Law) to give the FIV ministerial status.209 From the beginning, 
therefore, the Fund was fully considered a new Ministry. Its head formally known as 
‘President of the Executive Board of the Fund’ was immediately appointed to the 
cabinet. 
 
 
FIV’s funding 
 
The autonomous resources of the Fund were established as follows:  
 
a) An initial endowment of US$ 3,023 million (Bolívar 13,000 million) applicable 
to 1974’s fiscal year. 
b) 50% of revenues from taxes on oil and gas exploitation and from income tax on 
those economic activities. Those funds were to be deposited in the fund as long 
as they were collected. 
c) Contributions from the Executive originated in the direct or indirect State 
participation in the oil business. 
d) Benefits from the fund’s own operations and from the sale of its own assets. 
e) Any other extraordinary contribution in goods or in cash that the Executive 
might decide in favour of the Fund. 
 
Although it was established that 50% of oil revenues were to be deposited into the 
FIV, the Statute had a provision that allowed for adjustments on the annual 
contribution to the Fund. The last section of Article 3 stated: “In the case that the tax 
collection previously referred to in this article varies in relation to that of 1974, the 
percentage dedicated to the Fund will be adjusted as a function of those variations in 
accordance with: 1) In case of a rise in revenues: the percentage will be increased 
proportionally to half the proportion of that increment up to a maximum limit of 75%; 
2) In case of a fall in revenues: it will be decreased proportionally to double the 
proportion of that diminution. In any case the obligation to replenish the Fund cannot 
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interfere with the resources dedicated to the national budget in a proportion equalled 
to the previous year plus the average increase of the previous three years.”210 
 
 
FIV’s governance 
 
The Fund’s supreme authority was the General Assembly which was composed as 
depicted in Table 3.1. 
 
 
Table 3.1  Members of the FIV’s assembly 
Member Appointed by 
  
Minister of Finance (President) President of the Republic 
Minister of Industry and Trade President of the Republic 
Minister of Agriculture President of the Republic 
Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons (later 
denominated Minister of Energy) 
President of the Republic 
Ministry of Planning President of the Republic 
Three other Ministers  President of the Republic 
Two representatives of Legislature Congress of the Republic 
President of the FIV’s board President of the Republic 
President of the Central Bank Nominated by the President of the Republic 
and ratified by Congress. 
President of the National Banking Council Public-Private sector partnership. The 
President of the Council was chosen by the 
Minister of Finance, usually, from the most 
prominent Bankers in the country.  
President of the Conference of Venezuelan 
Workers 
Unions 
President of Private Business association 
(Fedecamaras) 
Private sector 
Source: Law of the Venezuelan Investment Fund 
 
 
Only four out of fifteen members were not direct appointees of the President of the 
Republic. The CTV (unions) and Fedecamaras (business association) members of the 
Assembly reflected the traditional ‘Punto Fijo’ practice of incorporating labour and 
business representatives into the boards of public bodies.211 Having two 
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representatives from Congress was also common in this type of public body. A 
quorum of twelve members was established and a minimum of nine votes were 
required to make valid decisions. This requirement strengthened the control of the 
Assembly by the executive branch. 
 
The General Assembly was responsible for overall policies of the Fund, especially 
those regulating the financial aspects such as the proportion of liquid assets it had to 
maintain. It was also responsible for the appointments of the internal comptroller of 
the Fund and external auditors. Additionally, it had to approve the Board’s annual 
report and to examine both the external auditor’s and the comptroller’s reports. 
 
The Fund’s top administrative body was the Executive Board. The Board was formed 
by a President, a Vice President and three other members, all of them in a full time 
capacity and all appointed by the President of the Republic. Nothing regulated the 
appointment or dismissal of a Board member. The Statute, however, established some 
requisites such as being a Venezuelan citizen, having sound knowledge and expertise 
in financial, banking and foreign exchange matters and being a solvent person, all 
common nominal requirements for most public posts in Venezuela. In practice, 
officials are usually nominated more on loyalty grounds than according to ‘sound 
knowledge’ or any other technical requirements. 
 
The Board also had three substitute members. Presidential absences were filled by the 
vice president, those of the vice president by any of the directors and finally, absent 
directors with substitute members of the Board. The quorum required for Board 
meetings consisted of the President and two directors. Decisions were made by simple 
majority. In case of a tie the President had a decisive vote. When the Board was 
convened under minimum quorum decisions required unanimity. 
 
The Board’s function included:  
1) Authorising contracts with third parties. 
2) Financial programming including annual budget, although the General 
Assembly’s approval was required. 
                                                                                                                                            
most of the time, and by Presidents to appoint labour and business representatives in public 
agencies, consultative commissions and state-owned company boards. 
3) Setting administrative norms, appointing officials to the fund, advisers, 
consultants, special agents and representatives of the Fund to third parties, 
both nationally and internationally. 
4) Preparing quarterly reports to Congress and the biannual report to the 
General Assembly. 
5) Dealing with, in general, all those matters that were not the exclusive 
responsibility of the General Assembly. 
 
Another important role reserved for the Executive Board, which proved subsequently 
to be very controversial, was the appointment of representatives of the Fund in those 
companies in which it had participation. This was later a source of conflict with other 
organisations of the central and decentralised administration. 
 
 
FIV’s functions 
 
The Fund was originally conceived for two purposes. First, investing in productive 
projects in prioritised industrial areas within the country, and second, to invest abroad 
in order to avoid the conversion of the all accumulated foreign reserves into Bolívar 
denominated funds. The Fund, however, was initially authorised only to finance the 
external component of those projects in a limited number of industrial areas, including 
hydrocarbons, energy, petrochemicals, steel and metals, mines, naval industry and 
international transport. The external component referred to imported services, 
equipment and materials. 
 
A window, however, was opened for other areas. Article 21, Section B of the Statute 
contained a feature common in Venezuelan legal frameworks. This window allowed 
the Fund to accommodate particular situations even if they did not comply with FIV’s 
original objectives. The section stated that the Fund could “complement, when 
necessary, the financing of great projects in agriculture and manufacturing areas 
inside the country and for exports through global credit facilities channelled through 
existing public financial institutions”. 212 A cap, though, was established for this type 
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of financing. It could not exceed half the budget already set for these financial 
institutions. 
 
The Fund was authorised to buy shares or other financial instruments, with no 
restriction on the type of company, but only “when the State was required to 
participate in certain enterprises”.213 This permitted activity anticipated the future 
policy of nationalisation that characterised the rest of 1970s. 
 
The list of permissible operations abroad was more extensive. The Fund could 
finance, directly or indirectly, projects abroad in which the Venezuelan private or 
public sectors participated. It could invest in high rated and liquid foreign securities 
and hold capital in foreign companies (there were no restrictions about the type of 
company). In addition, the Fund was allowed to establish trusts in high rated 
institutions abroad and to participate with them in international project financing. In 
terms of liabilities, the Fund was allowed to issue debt or other short term credit 
instruments denominated in local or foreign currencies. These credit operations were 
not included in the sovereign debt regulated by the law of public credit.  
 
 
FIV’s accountability 
 
The Fund had to report its financial situation twice a year. These reports needed to be 
approved by the General Assembly and published in the official report (Official 
Gazette) and in at least one national newspaper. The operations of the Fund were 
subject to the control of the Comptroller General (the government’s supreme 
accounting inspector). To facilitate this, the Comptroller General opened an office of 
inspection inside the Fund.214 Additionally, the Fund had external auditors reporting 
directly to the General Assembly. 
 
These provisions for the external control of the Fund were common among 
Venezuelan governmental agencies. The Comptroller General normally monitors 
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compliance with regulations regarding administrative procedures but does not assess 
the substantive quality of economic transactions. Similarly, the external auditing 
usually only reflects compliance with standard accounting practices. Neither the 
Comptroller General’s supervision, nor external auditing, could provide a check on 
the economic feasibility of the Fund’s decisions. 
 
 
3.3 FIV’s bureaucracy 
 
The original rules and procedures, conceived to make the Fund a distinctive 
bureaucracy, failed to perform as anticipated. Although traditional features of the 
Venezuelan public sector, such as low level of specialisation, cronyism and patron-
client politics were curtailed, decisions imposed in high levels of the Executive 
distorted the Fund’s objectives. 
 
The Fund started to function as a de facto ministry. Its first president was Carlos 
Guillermo Rangel, former president of the umbrella business association 
Fedecamaras. As a consequence of health problems he lasted only for a few months. 
He was succeeded by Constantino Quero-Morales, an economist also formerly linked 
to Fedecamaras in an advisory capacity. Quero-Morales was already serving in the 
cabinet as Minister of Industry and Trade. 
 
Quero-Morales was in charge of developing initial internal policies and procedures in 
the Fund. He recalled: “The initial phase could not have been more propitious, the 
legal instrument was potent, the initial staff was of excellent quality, and the Fund had 
the institutional backing of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) in Washington, and of the Central Bank locally. In short, the Fund was a 
flagship organisation prepared to undertake the duties for which it was conceived, 
which was not usual for Venezuelan bureaucratic standards.”215 Hermann Luís 
Soriano, Director of the Fund since 1976 and later President also recalled, “The Fund 
was directly reporting to the President, was well financed and had a very minimalist 
bureaucracy. Additionally, the presidents of the Funds were close allies of the 
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President of the Republic.”216 The Fund was in an unprecedented position in 
comparison with other bureaucratic bodies. 
 
This privileged position attracted to the Fund competition and resentment from other 
governmental agencies. The Ministry of Finance felt that the Fund should have been 
under its control. The Ministry of Energy and Mines resented the fact that the main 
electricity generation projects were controlled by the Fund. Furthermore, as the 
Guayana region industrial conglomerate was under its direct influence, the Guayana 
Corporation (CVG), also at cabinet level, usually joined forces with regional 
constituents to put pressure on the Fund for getting financing to varied projects in the 
region. When the Fund rejected some of these projects, frictions between Guayana’s 
interest groups and the Fund usually created an acrimonious environment. Put simply, 
the Fund was an unusual body in Venezuela’s public administration. The Fund 
disturbed traditional structures, which felt threatened by a new organisation and were 
fearful that it was taking their roles. 
 
The Fund received, in 1974, a primary endowment of US$ 3 billion plus a subsequent 
injection of US$ 1.8 billion. These initial resources represented an equivalent of 
32.2% and 53.48% of the 1974 and 1975 consolidated central government budgets 
respectively (see Table 3.2). At the outset, the use of these funds was unclear. What 
was to become the gigantic and ambitious national development plan, the ‘Fifth 
National Plan 1976-1980’, was in its earliest stage of development by the Ministry of 
Planning. Additionally, many of the projects in the Guayana region were at planning 
stage. As other projects were not mature for investment either, the Fund’s initial 
strategy was to invest the money abroad. 
 
 
In order to invest money abroad, the Fund built a network of financial relations with 
the multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the Caribbean Development Bank and the Central-America 
Bank for Economic Integration.  
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 Table 3.2  FIV assets vs. consolidated central government budget 
Year FIV’s total assets as % of 
consolidated central government 
budget 
 
FIV’s total assets as % of Central 
Bank international reserves 
 
1974 32.20 48.74 
1975 53.48 59.00 
1976 53.59 66.38 
1977 54.53 82.42 
1978 57.25 113.11 
1979 67.57 102.44 
1980 59.86 137.11 
1981 55.99 153.67 
1982 67.18 150.48 
1983 84.86 103.85 
1984 90.03 87.68 
1985 87.09 45.19 
1986 102.73 54.35 
1987 74.90 45.62 
1988 59.34 53.84 
1990 85.15 46.83 
1992 93.46 46.09 
1993 74.38 32.84 
1994 54.33 32.14 
1995 87.55 33.26 
Source: FIV annual reports (various years); IMF Government Finance Statistics yearbook (various years); BCV 
 
 
 
The Fund opened a trust in the IDB and bought a considerable amount of World Bank 
bonds. But, more significantly, apart from the financial tie, the Fund established 
technical cooperation agreements with the multilateral organisations. The government 
invited Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, to visit Venezuela. 
Gumersindo Rodríguez, who hosted the visit, recalled, “The World Bank was very 
keen on assisting a rich country, such as Venezuela was at that time. They were 
expecting further increases in oil prices and saw an enormous potential to embark on 
big industrial and infrastructure projects.”217 
 
These international organisations served as the main technical advisors to the Fund. 
This cooperation brought technical expertise into the area of project valuation. 
Moreover, these imported techniques were transmitted to other public bureaucracies 
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such as the Ministry of Planning. Additionally, experts from these international 
organisations, hired especially for that purpose, assessed many of the projects 
presented to the Fund. 
 
The FIV’s staff was trained by World Bank and IDB technical experts. Most of the 
technical procedures for analysing the industrial projects were copied from prevailing 
practices in the multilateral organisations. Quero-Morales corroborated the high 
quality of the relationships, in terms of cooperation, between the FIV and these 
organisations.218The President of the IDB, Antonio Mena, brought Quero-Morales to 
the Bank in Washington, DC after he left the Pérez administration in 1979. He spent 
the next ten years in several different roles, but always as Mena’s advisor. In addition 
to the cooperation with multilaterals, Fund staff was also trained by leading private 
sector financial organisations such as First Boston, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Guaranty 
Trust, Salomon Brothers, Citicorp, Deutsche Bank and Swiss Bank Corporation. 
 
Within Venezuela, the Fund had assistance from the Central Bank, both logistically 
and technically. FIV occupied some Central Bank offices for more than twenty years. 
The Fund also used the information technology facilities of the Central Bank. Many 
of its initial staff had previously been trained in the Central Bank bureaucracy, 
reputed for being technically minded and, by Venezuelan standards, non-politicised. 
The Central Bank also supported the Fund in its international financial operations, 
both as financial agent and in an advisory capacity. In short, as Julian Villalba, 
President of the Fund in 1993-1994, commented, “The Fund was created under the 
shadow of the Central Bank.”219 
 
These circumstances and bureaucratic influences inherited from those organisations 
ensured the Fund was a professional, efficient, and technically minded agency. The 
Fund, which was managing an amount equalling to almost 70%, on average, of 
Venezuela’s consolidated central government budget (see Table 3.2), and almost 75% 
of the foreign reserves controlled by the Central Bank, never had more than 200 
employees. Ten years after being created, the performance of the Fund’s internal 
bureaucracy was considered effective. In the words of the Fund’s own report, “All 
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achievements of the Fund have been reached as a product of a reasonable 
administrative continuity and the selection of capable personnel that have enjoyed 
enough stability and have worked with dedication and optimism.”220 
 
Stability is a rare attribute of Venezuelan public office. Hence, the Fund’s self 
congratulatory description of its administrative achievement. Furthermore, Aquiles 
Viloria, who spent more than 20 years at the Fund and served as General Manager 
before retirement, corroborated the Fund’s atypical behaviour in terms of patron-
client practices in the public bureaucracy usually controlled by the two main political 
parties. He said, “There was always certain autonomy in personnel selection. Merit-
based considerations prevailed over political interferences most of the time.”221 He 
further pointed out, “The staff enjoyed a great deal of technical power. They often 
used that power to counteract central government attempts at tinkering with the 
Fund’s functioning. Using technical and legally backed objections, the Fund officials 
managed to make it very difficult for such interferences to go through.”222 
 
FIV’s internal operation was carefully established. Operating procedures were 
thoroughly laid out. The ‘operating policy’ manual stated a thorough list of 
procedures to inform Fund officials of what actions were allowed.223 These manuals 
were intended to protect the Fund from the appetite of all other public entities for 
seeking financing. In addition to the administrative units, a series of committees was 
set up to make decisions on the operations of the Fund. As a result of all these 
procedures, the Fund was formally able to filter, revise and modify the projects that 
were submitted for consideration.  
 
The personnel of the Fund held a special status amongst public bureaucracies. 
President Pérez decreed a special statute for the Fund’s employees.224 This instrument 
gave the Fund employees special treatment in many areas, such as job security, 
promotion, selection, and many others. The instrument even included a provision 
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(Article 52) that allowed the President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers to 
establish a special regulation for working day hours. Another Presidential Decree 
gave Fund employees benefits beyond those granted to other public employees in 
areas such as social protection. This special regulatory framework conferred on Fund 
employees a privileged status among public officials. 
 
The Fund’s bureaucracy was well placed to function as a highly specialised agency. It 
was relatively well protected from other governmental units and from interference by 
political parties. Several of FIV’s former senior officials confirmed that the 
bureaucracy should not be blamed for the Fund’s overall performance. Quero-Morales 
said, “The Fund rapidly acquired a mature, proficient group of technocrats capable of 
assessing the merits of each project that the Fund had to consider.”225 Luís Hinestrosa, 
General Manager 1979-1984 confirmed, “The evaluation of the projects was made 
under strict professional criteria with international expertise.”226 Hermann Luís 
Soriano, President of the Fund 1981-1984, characterised the Fund’s bureaucracy as: 
“Small, well trained, and well resourced, as well as in direct contact with the 
President of the Republic through the President of the Fund, who was generally 
accessible to him.”227 Julian Villalba, former President of the Fund, admitted, “When 
I entered the Fund, in its Privatisation era, we did not change its functioning, which 
was professional and generally adept and efficient, in terms of the number and 
expertise of its employees.”228  
 
All these factors taken together suggest that the FIV bureaucracy was well positioned 
to achieve the Fund’s objectives. The Fund’s internal functioning was relatively 
immune to the vices that have generally undermined other Venezuelan public bodies. 
The existence, however, of a relatively professional organisation was not a sufficient 
condition to avoid deviations from its original purpose. Middle levels of FIV 
bureaucracy, although proficient, were mostly unable to resist decisions taken at the 
highest level. In addition, some of those decisions were not implemented by the Fund. 
Once a loan was granted to a public enterprise or direct participation in a state-owned 
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company’s capital was decided at the senior level, or rather externally imposed on the 
Fund, its middle ranks were constrained in making significant changes. 
 
The defensive strategy adopted by the Fund’s internal bureaucracy, as claimed by 
former FIV’s general manager Viloria, was powerless to avert deviations from the 
Fund’s purpose. The Fund, as became clear with the passage of time, evolved from a 
saving fund devoted to highly productive investments into a hotchpotch of industrial 
holdings, a quasi-nationalisation instrument, a bail out agency for all sorts of ailing 
public ventures and a caretaker of dying enterprises. In other words, it became a kind 
of residual agency governed by politics. 
 
 
3.4 FIV’s decision making  
 
Since the Fund was not legally a ministry, it did not report to Congress. It had to 
report, though, to the General Assembly, the highest internal FIV’s authority. The 
legal requisite, however, for the General Assembly to approve the annual report was 
stated in the FIV’s Statute (Article 31).229 The configuration of the General Assembly, 
though, assured it became a mere appendage of the cabinet and practically impossible 
to contravene the wishes of the President of the Republic. 
 
The corporatist habit of having senior trade union members and top business 
representatives as members of this collective body was simply gesture politics. The 
same can be said of the inclusion of two appointees from Congress. The Assembly 
was not an effective monitor of, or counter balance to, the Executive but rather a 
formality.230 The design of the Fund had effectively blocked any counter balance from 
other branches of the State. Furthermore, limiting the role of Congress in exercising 
oversight reduced enormously political parties meddling with the Fund. The Fund was 
a direct bureaucratic instrument of the President of the Republic. Contrary to the 
national budget, which required congressional approval, the discretion the President 
had over the Fund was absolute. 
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This total Presidential autonomy over the Fund was exactly what President Pérez’s 
economic team, lead by Gumersindo Rodríguez and Hector Hurtado, had conceived 
of. The economic team wanted to shield the extra oil money pouring in during the 
boom, from other parts of the State. The rationale was to protect the extra resources 
from the temptation of spending it irrationally and insensibly by pork barrel politics in 
the Congress and elsewhere.  
 
This protection was thought to be achieved by restricting the areas in which the Fund 
could invest. Although the Statute of the Fund established a set of restrictions on the 
areas in which the Fund could operate it still granted a great deal of discretion to the 
President of the Republic. The protection of the funds relied on the judgement of the 
President. The FIV’s design was intended to assure that while oil prices were high, a 
significant proportion of the subsequent extra oil revenues were handled through an 
autonomous Presidential mechanism. 
 
The formal body for operational decisions was the Fund’s Executive Board. Members 
of the Board were directly appointed by the President of the Republic. In its original 
version the Statute determined that the Board was composed of the Fund’s President, 
a Vice President and three Directors. This arrangement was later changed to the 
President and four Directors.231 Initially, President Pérez (from AD Party) asked 
Copei (the main opposition party) to nominate two members of the board (a 
‘Principal’ and his Deputy). Constantino Quero-Morales, FIV’s President at that time, 
recalled, “President Pérez told me that he regarded the Fund as a high priority for the 
State. With such a significant amount of resources to be administered he wanted to 
have a monitoring presence from the opposition. I went to talk to Rafael Caldera, 
founder of Copei, and communicated this to him. As a consequence they nominated 
Alejandro Suels and Hermann Luís Soriano for the Board.”232  
 
The Fund’s board was, however, rarely the place where conflicting interests were 
resolved. The President of the Board enjoyed significant influence over decisions 
supposedly to be taken by that plural decision making mechanism. On many 
occasions the Board acted as a rubber stamp. In addition, the way the Board was 
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configured guaranteed a sufficient majority of appointees of the President of the 
Republic. Table 3.3 shows how the FIV’s Board compared to other boards of similar 
public entities. The configuration of other such boards usually responded to 
‘corporatist’ practices. Non-presidential appointees often opted for cooperative 
strategies that accommodated their interests.  
 
In practice, the President of the Republic’s direct access to the FIV was through the 
Fund’s President. The President of the Fund was elevated to the cabinet as Minister of 
State  (see Table 3.4).  
 
 
Table 3.3  Configuration of Executive Boards 
(Selected governmental organisations) 
Organisation Total 
members 
Direct 
presidential 
appointees  
 
Indirect appointees  
FIV 5 5 0 
 
Foncrei 7 4 3 {1 from Industrial Council (private), 1 
from CTV( Unions) and 1 from Small and 
Midsize Enterprises Federation (private)} 
 
FCA 7 4 Similar but from agriculture sector 
 
Fondur 7 4 3 {1 from National Banking Council 
(semi-private), 1 from Savings and Loan 
entities Federation (private), 1 from State 
workers. 
Source: Official Gazette (various issues)  
 
 
FIV’s decisions were usually taken at the cabinet level. Presidents of the Republic 
were unconstrained in imposing important decisions on the FIV, usually presented at 
the cabinet meetings. Decisions on large industrial and infrastructure projects were 
imposed on the FIV. The Fund had to deal with the implementation and execution of 
those projects rather than acting as a strategic investor making business-like decisions. 
The power over the Fund’s decisions was located outside the FIV. The Fund was a 
player among others in the game of getting approval by the President of the Republic.  
 
Despite FIV’s de facto ministerial autonomy, traditional ministries such as Energy or 
Finance, or entities such as the Guayana Corporation (CVG) all felt that they had to 
influence fund allocation. As new resources became available in the Fund, a complex 
‘game’ of influences between different ministries and regional actors began. The 
FIV’s initial stance was to act as a project financier and comptroller. The Fund 
wanted to provide ‘seed capital’ and to be a lender for local projects.233 The other 
initial aim was to serve as the arm for international cooperation, especially financing 
poor countries hit by the oil price hike.  
 
 
Table 3.4  Presidents of the Fund (1974-1989) 
Year President F.I.V. Background P President of 
the Republic 
 
1974 Carlos Guillermo Rangel Businessman, Ex President 
Fedecamaras (1971-1973) 
C.A.Pérez 
1975 Constantino Quero-Morales Economist- Fedecamaras consultant C.A.Pérez 
 
1977 Hector Hurtado Former held many post in Public 
Administration- Closely related to A.D. 
C.A.Pérez 
1979 Leopoldo Díaz-Bruzual Economist and Lawyer. Central Bank 
experience. Former President of 
Institute for Foreign Trade- Related to 
Copei 
L.Herrera 
1981 Hermann Luís Soriano Economist. Former Director of the Fund 
1976-1979. Closely related to Copei. 
Member of the L.Herrera Campaign 
team. 
L.Herrera 
1984 Carlos Rafael Silva Economist. Vice-President of Central 
Bank for 18 years. Former Minister of 
Education 
J.Lusinchi 
1986 Hector Hurtado Former President of FIV (see above) J.Lusinchi. 
1988 Heberto Urdaneta Former senior staff FIV  J.Lusinchi 
 
Source: FIV, Special Report (Memoria Especial) (1974-1988)  
 
 
These initial FIV investment priorities were, however, rapidly tested by the most 
varied requests for funding. Intense competition for the Fund’s resources soon started. 
The Guayana regional development corporation (CVG) led the process. CVG had 
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been established in the 1960s. It was responsible for various industrial projects in the 
iron and aluminium sectors. CVG’s good reputation for efficient management put it in 
the front line to receive FIV’s resources. Both the iron (Sidor) and aluminium 
(Alcasa) ventures immediately asked for grand-scale expansion projects. Furthermore, 
CVG asked for funding for new enterprises in aluminium (Venalum), steel (Acelcar), 
bauxite (Interalumina and Bauxiven), among others.  
 
Several ministries, directly or indirectly, emerged as bidders. The Ministry of Energy 
and Mines, responsible for the electric sector, pushed for hydroelectric (Edelca) and 
thermoelectric (Cadafe) projects. The Ministry of Defence, the de facto administrator 
of state-owned companies such as the maritime cargo company (Cavn), shipyards 
(Dianca and Astinave) and an aeronautical company (Venemaica), equally requested 
financing from the Fund. The Ministry of Agriculture asked for financing for its 
sector’s development bank (Bandagro). Mining projects in salt, gold and carbon were 
also submitted for FIV funding. Four projects for cement plants were also proposed. 
Similarly, FIV was used to implement nationalisation policy in the electric 
distribution business. FIV bought 98.63% of Enelbar and 99.85% of Enelven, both 
regional electricity companies nationalised by President Pérez.  
 
Political lobbying, from all quarters, was intense. First, regional pressure groups soon 
asked for their share in the FIV financing pie. Luís Hinestrosa, former FIV General 
Manager, remembered, “Each regional group pushed for their own projects. The State 
of Zulia wanted another steel mill, the State of Anzoátegui pressed for its mines, the 
city of Cumana wanted a shipyard and so on.”234 Regional development corporations, 
state-level business and labour associations, universities, state legislatures’ 
representatives joined forces to apply pressure on the Fund to invest in their local pet 
projects. 
 
On the international front, the activity was no less intense. Since one of the Fund’s 
permitted areas of investment was in programmes of international cooperation, 
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy and Mines (linked 
to Opec) and even the President of the Republic indirectly generated commitments 
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which the Fund had to honour or pay attention to.235 Some of the projects involved 
foreign private interests. Leopoldo Díaz-Bruzual, a former FIV President, 
remembered how even “the King of Spain showed interest in one of the shipyard 
projects under consideration in which Spanish investors were participating”.236 Luís 
Hinestrosa, Díaz-Bruzual’s Deputy, also recalled, “I received calls from the office of 
France’s Prime Minister lobbying for one of the projects.”237 
 
With the passage of time, all of these efforts were creating an intricate web of 
hierarchical relations, indirect links and informal liaisons between the Fund, state-
owned enterprises and many other governmental high offices (see Figure 3.1). The 
game of power over the Fund’s decisions was played with the President of the 
Republic as supreme arbitrator.  
 
In turn, the President of the Fund and other senior officials competed to influence the 
President. Many decisions were taken in the cabinet or through informal ministerial 
meetings. Luís Hinestrosa recalled a meeting, in a private hotel, chaired by the 
Minister of the Interior, with fellow Ministers of Industry, Finance and the FIV where 
the Fund’s senior officials presented their case for a long debated and controversial 
steel mill project for the Zulia region. When the project was rejected, the Minister of 
Interior, who was the least you would have expected to lead a decision making 
process for a strictly economic issue, was very disappointed. Hinestrosa said, “The 
Minister of Interior pulled his hair out because he was the one who had called the 
meeting.”238 
 
The real power over decisions shifted all the time around the President and whichever 
Minister had ascendancy over his/her peers and had a more influential relationship 
with the President of the Republic. There were no predictable patterns. Theoretically 
powerful ministries, such as Finance or Industry, were not necessarily as powerful as 
observers might expect. The President of the Guayana Corporation(CVG), who 
oversaw the great bulk of FIV financed projects, for instance, enjoyed a similar status 
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Figure 3.1  Relationships between FIV and other governmental bodies and state-
owned companies. 
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of Minister of State. For a long period of time that position was held by a powerful 
AD figure, Leopoldo Sucre-Figarella. He was known as ‘Tsar of Guayana’ for his 
strong dominance over the region. He had been treasurer in most of the AD electoral 
campaigns and enjoyed a formidable grip on the party. 
 
On another occasion, Carmelo Lauria, who served in several AD administrations and 
was also, several times, an influential Deputy, was appointed Minister of State in 
charge of the ‘Basic Production’. This post combined oversight of many industrial 
projects, including several in which the Fund had capital participation or had lent 
significant amounts of money to. Conflicts of interest, friction and clashes were the 
order of the day. Carlos Rafael Silva, former president of both FIV and the Central 
Bank, remembered his public disagreements with Sucre-Figarella over the conduct of 
several companies in the Guayana industrial conglomerate. He commented, “Based on 
a concept of administrative hierarchy, Sucre-Figarella wanted to appoint the boards of 
these companies. This was the source of much dispute with him.”239 
 
On other occasions, power clearly shifted to the FIV’s side. This was the case when 
Leopoldo Díaz-Bruzual was President of the Fund in the late 1970s. He enjoyed the 
trust of President Herrera Campins and exerted great influence over him. Díaz-
Bruzual was known by the nickname ‘Buffalo’ for his strong character and reputation 
for stubbornness. Carlos Rafael Silva acknowledged, “Díaz-Bruzual enjoyed 
incomparable political power, to the extent that many of his cabinet colleagues feared 
him.”240  
 
Luís Hinestrosa, Díaz-Bruzual’s Deputy, illustrated a typical power struggle. On one 
occasion, the Minister of Defence wrote to Díaz-Bruzual ordering the appointment of 
an admiral to the post of president of a shipyard company. Díaz-Bruzual strongly 
rejected what he considered to be an interference with the Fund’s prerogatives. The 
admiral had been moved from his position and had left his home in one of the naval 
bases since his appointment to the shipyard company was considered a done deal. 
Díaz-Bruzual refused the appointment despite intense lobbying, including personal 
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visits to the Fund’s offices by the admiral, during which he was ignored by the 
President.241 
 
This anecdotal evidence indicates that control over the Fund’s decisions shifted over 
time. Moreover, decisions were made on the basis of non-institutionalised practices 
and informal channels and decision making points. The formal mechanisms set up for 
governing the Fund, the General Assembly and the Executive Board, were often 
overridden by ‘unofficial’ decisions taken elsewhere. The game of influence played 
around the President of the Republic to get the Fund’s resources was one in which the 
Fund often did not even play. The rules established for the Fund’s governance did not 
guarantee a transparent, professional, and ordered process to allocate such a 
significant amount of oil wealth. What is more, it was often necessary to ‘bend’ some 
of the FIV’s regulations so that the outcome of those power games could be 
accommodated legally. 
 
 
3.5 Distorting the Investment Fund 
 
The legal framework of the FIV followed a common practice in Venezuelan 
legislation. Legal codes are often meticulous. They contain abundant details about 
less significant issues but are purposely scarce or ambiguous about major matters. 
This ‘flexibility’ commonly allows discretionary interpretation of the rules and 
regulations. FIV’s statute was no exception to this. Relaxed interpretation, however, 
was accompanied by further modifications in order to suit particular needs. Two 
major rules, those for deposits and permitted investments, were either ignored or 
adapted to accommodate Presidential requests. Both changes proved sufficient to 
distort the Fund’s original purpose. 
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Deposits  
 
On the deposit side, the Fund was conceived as the ‘money box’ to save oil revenue (a 
pamphlet titled ‘The Great Money Box’ was published by FIV in 1977).242 
Consequently, replenishment of the Fund was critical for its purpose. The 
enforcement of the initial deposit rule, however, was erratic.243 In the first six years of 
operation, apart from the initial endowment of US$ 3 billion, in three out of the 
subsequent six years the Fund did not receive any further deposit at all as can be seen 
in Table 3.5.  
 
 
Table 3.5  Deposits to the Fund (1974-1989) 
Year Deposits (in Bs. 
million) 
Deposits (in US$ 
million) 
% of that year’s oil 
exports 
 
1974 13,000 3,023 28.66 
1975 7,532 1,752 21.05 
1976 0 0 - 
1977 2,500 581 6.38 
1978 0 0 - 
1979 0 0 - 
1980 3,000 698 3.97 
1981 11,609 2700 14.51 
1982 5,601 1303 8.33 
1983 2,696 449 3.24 
1984 1,584 211 1.42 
1985 1,359 94 0.73 
1986 2,106 96 1.34 
1987 2,777 92 1.02 
1988 3,924 101 1.24 
1989 0 0 - 
Average   3.57% 
Source: FIV annual reports (various years), BCV, Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004 
 
 
Constantino Quero-Morales, President of FIV during part of that period, responded to 
questions about why the Fund did not receive any resources, even though the law 
required it to do so: “There was a lot of friction inside the Executive. The Minister of 
Finance, Hector Hurtado, who had created the original formula for deposits to the 
                                                 
242 Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela, La Gran Alcancia (Caracas, FIV, 1977). 
243 See initial Statue of the Fund, Official Gazette 30,420, 10 June 1974. 
Fund, interpreted it in such a way that there was no new money for the Fund. After 
much struggling, I had to obtain an agreement with him in 1976. I reached a 
compromise. There was a budgetary appropriation to compensate the Fund for what it 
had given to the public enterprises.”244  
 
This special contribution to the Fund was implemented through an ad hoc 
mechanism.245 In fact, the law authorising a credit to the Fund allowed FIV to receive 
Bs.2,500 million in 1977. Such an amount could have hardly come from applying the 
formula in the FIV Statute. It was a compromise solution for having ignored the FIV’s 
rules. More importantly, none of the other constitutional bodies (Comptroller General, 
Attorney General, and Legislature) initiated any action regarding the non-compliance 
with FIV’s rules. Jose Andrés Octavio, Comptroller General from 1976 to 1979, 
responded to the question of why that body did not act regarding the lack of 
contributions to the Fund saying, “We did not have the legal capacity to act in that 
matter. The Office of the Comptroller General is more concerned with the compliance 
with administrative procedures and regulations regulating budgetary and procurement 
matters. The procedure regulating the FIV contribution was not among them.”246  
 
In 1979, the fall of the Iranian regime triggered another surge in oil prices. The FIV’s 
deposit formula was, however, changed in the middle of this second oil boom. 
Congress passed a reform of the FIV Statute.247 This new formula considerably 
reduced the annual contribution to the Fund. It established an automatic contribution 
of 5%, instead of the existing 50%, of revenues from tax on oil and gas exploitation 
and from income tax on those economic activities. Furthermore, worded ambiguously, 
the new formula defined an additional conditional contribution. The condition was 
based on a definition of a surplus in oil revenues. The Fund could obtain up to a 70% 
of that surplus in 1980 and from that year on that cap was to be reduced 1% yearly 
until it reached 50%.  
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246 Jose Andrés Octavio, interview by author, Caracas, 21 August 2003. 
247 Official Gazette 2,709 Extraordinary, 30 December 1980. 
The likelihood of this new source of funding being realised was threatened by two 
sources of uncertainty. First, the definition of the percentage applicable to the surplus 
was very broad (i.e. up to a 70%). Second, the definition of the surplus was dependent 
on the total budget figure. As a saving rule, this provision was feeble. It was the 
equivalent of defining ‘savings’ as whatever remains after one spends without 
restraint. In any case, as Table 3.5 shows, deposits to the Fund reached an average of 
3.57% of oil exports in the following 10 years after that modification. 
 
Investments  
 
On the investment side, some modifications were introduced on the use of FIV 
resources. President Pérez, still sanctioned by the enabling law of May 1974, 
reformed the original FIV’s Statute less than a year after it was first passed.248 Among 
those modifications were the inclusion of two new areas for investment and the 
explicit inclusion of international cooperation, limited, however, to 15% of FIV’s total 
assets. Two other subtle but significant new rules were introduced. First, the explicit 
requirement to raise decisions to cabinet level although only when it ‘was required’. 
This euphemism allowed political oversight of ‘big’ decisions, thereby further 
removing the power from FIV’s senior management.  
 
Second, the Fund was allowed to finance the so-called ‘internal’ component of 
projects,249 thereby contradicting the initial objective that only the external 
components could be financed. The former rule was intended to achieve the 
macroeconomic goal of not creating inflationary pressures, but additionally it 
provided the Fund authorities with a filter to apply whenever abundant requests for 
financing were received. Therefore, with the removal of that limitation, another crack 
in the original FIV edifice was opened. The original constraint for financing 
agriculture and manufacturing was effectively lifted, hence removing another restraint 
to indiscriminate spending. 
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Balance of FIV’s operations 
 
By 1988, before the Fund was converted to a privatisation agency by the neo-liberal 
second Pérez administration, the Fund had squandered a great portion of its assets. 
The total value of all the assets of the Fund on 31 December 1988 was US$ 3,562 
million. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show how assets were distributed among economic 
sectors. More importantly, if all deposits to the Fund (see Table 3.4) are adjusted for 
inflation, FIV’s net worth in 1988 was only 21.35% of the accumulated value of those 
deposits (US$ 16,585 million of 1988).250  
 
 
Table 3.6  FIV’s assets to 31 December 1988 
Assets Main components US$ 
million 
% of 
total 
 
Liquid investments Financial assets abroad   397 11.15 
International cooperation Loans under San Jose Agreement251   268  7.52 
Domestic loans See Table  3.7 for further details   143  4.01 
Domestic shareholding See Table  3.7 for further details 2,530 71.03 
Trusts  Various Investment   139  3.90 
Others Dividends and interests     85  2.39 
Total  3,562 100 
Source: FIV, Special Report 1974-1988 
 
 
Table 3.7  Distribution of domestic investments by economic activity 
Economic activity Domestic 
shareholding (% of 
each activity) 
Domestic loans (% 
of each activity) 
Total domestic 
investment as % of 
total assets 
 
Electricity 33.50 74.00 49.84 
Metallurgy 22.14 20.66 14.43 
Mining 5.39 1.68 1.31 
Naval/aeronautical 4.02 2.26 1.64 
Banking 16.26 1.35 1.54 
Others 18.70 0.05 0.78 
As % of Total assets 4.01 65.54 69.55 
Source: FIV, Special Report 1974-1988 
                                                 
250 This adjusted value was estimated based on the US Producer Price Index published in the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
251 The San Jose Agreement was the name given to the energy cooperation scheme signed by 
Venezuela and Mexico with Central American and Caribbean countries. 
  
Even allowing for some adjustment in the reported value of the FIV’s assets, as a 
consequence of the devaluation of the Bolívar not taken into consideration by the 
financial reports, the enormous difference in value leaves no option but to conclude 
that the Fund failed to invest wisely the oil resources collected in two booms. After 15 
years in operation the Fund ended up mainly concentrated in two areas: electrical 
(generation and distribution) and metallurgic (mainly aluminium and steel). Those 
two areas combined accounted for 31.15% of total assets in 1978, at the end of the 
first Pérez’s administration. Then, at the end of the following administration in 1983 
the share of electrical and metallurgic areas reached 67% of total assets and, as Table 
3.7 shows. By the end of 1988 they represented 64.27%.252 FIV net worth and 
distribution of assets in 1988 indicate that either the invested oil money was not 
diversified wisely or it had been translated to productive assets, as was the objective 
of the Fund. The Fund invested the oil revenues in a myriad of industrial projects that 
failed to preserve or create value for Venezuelans. It also invested in projects that 
violated the initial rules such as in the agricultural sector.  
 
The FIV became almost the only shareholder (87.1% in average) in the public owned 
firms it invested in.253 Such high participation was possible because of the breaching 
of the rule that required the Fund to invest only in the external components of those 
industrial projects. The FIV was coerced by other ministers and the President to 
rescue ailing companies by injecting fresh capital, which contradicted the original 
‘seed’ capital strategy intended when the Fund was formed.254 In summary, the Fund 
did not succeed in achieving its original goals. The neo-liberal administration that 
took power in 1989 realised that was the case and began work to develop a 
privatisation strategy to dispose of the FIV assets.   
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FIV’s new role 
 
President Pérez’s second administration changed drastically Venezuela’s economic 
policy, which included a new role for the FIV.255 It redefined the Fund’s objectives 
not only as a disposing agency for its own assets but as executor of the policy of 
privatisation of other public assets.256 The new FIV’s functions were extended to 
allow the Fund to act as a restructuring agent for a large number of state-owned 
enterprises in order to prepare them for privatisation. The FIV’s Statute of 1980 was 
replaced with a Law passed by Congress in December 1991. This new law made 
official a de facto situation by establishing the end of all contributions to the Fund. 
Article 3, Section 2 of the new law phased downwards the annual contribution from 
the former 5% to 3%, 2% and 1% of oil fiscal revenues for 1992, 1993 and 1994 
respectively. The Fund ceased to be a recipient of oil revenues from 31 December 
1994.257 
 
The next and final phase of the Fund’s life began under President Chávez’s 
administration. In October 1999, empowered by an Enabling Law of April 1999, the 
President reformed the Law of FIV.258 He watered down the privatisation drive that 
the 1991 reform had granted the Fund, although it did not completely eliminate 
privatisation.259 Furthermore, in May 2001, empowered again by another Enabling 
Law,260 President Chávez transformed the Fund into a development Bank, now called 
the Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank (Bandes).261  
 
FIV assets were transferred to other official entities save for some shares in public 
financial bodies. A special trust was established for FIV shares in two regional 
electricity distribution companies, apparently because they were thought to be ready 
for privatisation, although this did not materialise in the following years. Although it 
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is fair to say it had been practically moribund for ten years, and in reality the Fund, as 
it was originally conceived in the midst of the oil boom of the mid-1970s, operated for 
only fifteen years, President Chávez’s executive decision made the Fund officially 
extinct. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) failed as an institutional tool to manage oil 
revenues on two grounds. First, it could collect only a limited amount of the oil 
income obtained during the 15 years it was operating (3.57% of oil exports on 
average). Moreover, that stretch of time included two major oil booms in 1974 and 
1980. Second, it failed to create economic value within Venezuela. After its 15 years 
of operation, the Fund’s net worth was only around 20% of what was collected by it.  
 
The fate of the FIV was determined mainly by the failure of Venezuelan presidents to 
keep the numerous claims on those resources in check. Instead, they embarked on a 
myriad of industrial projects, spread geographically and over many sectors, which did 
not obey standards of financial diversification but responded to regional pressure 
groups and other public sector demands.  
 
FIV clearly did not fulfil its institutional purpose. As a collecting revenue mechanism, 
the FIV was promptly overruled and managed to get only a small share of the vast 
resources coming from oil exports. Furthermore, the technically minded and fresh 
bureaucracy attached to the Fund was incapable of ensuring independent and 
economically sound decision making regarding the use of those resources. 
 
Despite a careful design of the Fund, having obtained multilateral and other external 
sources of know-how in project management and a generous financial endowment in 
which to operate, the relatively well functioning FIV bureaucracy was not strong or 
effective enough to guarantee that the resources collected in the Fund were channelled 
to the best uses.  
 
FIV’s bureaucracy was often bypassed by others parts of the executive branch, 
notably the President. Decisions about FIV’s investments were made externally. FIV 
was left only to accommodate decisions imposed from outside. Additionally, the 
FIV’s own capacity to deal with all the projects in which it had invested in was 
diminished by their wide range. As the Fund became involved in many relatively 
minor projects, the bureaucracy had to devote resources to areas of little economic 
value and, at the same time, devote less attention to the monitoring of big and more 
valuable projects. Additionally, competence for control of those enterprises from 
other governmental bodies such as ministries and regional corporations contributed to 
lessening the FIV’s capacity to exert its control. 
 
Other constitutional bodies did not enforce the FIV. The legislative body, instead, 
granted Presidential petitions, directed at changing FIV rules to meet the President’s 
preferences. Others, such as the Comptroller General or the Attorney General, did not 
challenge the Executive when it failed to comply with FIV’s rules. Presidents were 
both unconstrained in their ability to influence the FIV’s decisions, yet also unable or 
unwilling to keep the demands over funds in check. The initial decisions, governed by 
a belief in the need to deliver a great industrial expansion, and implemented under the 
‘irreversibility’ strategy envisioned by President Pérez’s cabinet in 1974, proved 
decisive in restraining the options available to the Fund after its initial set-up.  
 
The share of the windfall from two oil booms was committed to an uncontrolled 
industrial expansion that resulted in, to a large extend, the squandering of those 
resources. The institutional arrangements designed to assure that such an industrial 
expansion met sound fiscal and economic rules failed completely. The Fund, created 
to avoid the fate of other governmental bodies such as the corporation for industrial-
fostering (CVF) and to stay away from patron-client mechanisms typical of the 
bureaucratic Venezuelan public sector, ended up as another instrument for replicating 
uncontrolled State involvement in the economy. It simply served to revive a form of 
pork barrel politics. Venezuelans lost, with the FIV, the opportunity to make the noble 
and fine ‘sowing the oil’ dreams a reality.  
 
 Chapter 4 
 
Governance of PDVSA: the ‘neo-liberal’ years (1989-1998) 
 
 
This chapter reviews the relationship between the government and PDVSA during the 
period 1989-1998. The previous pattern of governance of the oil company was altered 
during this period. Oil institutions, largely unchanged since nationalisation in 1975, 
were modified both formally and in practice to allow first, private sector participation 
in the business and second a great deal of independence to PDVSA in setting its own 
directives and in influencing oil policy in general. The chapter argues that the shift of 
power to PDVSA was not a result of the perceived shift in ideological preferences 
generally attributed to politicians in the 1990s, but to a weakening in the State’s 
capacity not only to control PDVSA but to survive political instability. Such 
weakening was not the design of the so-called ‘neo-liberal’ package of the early 
1990s but the consequence of accumulated and unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalances, earlier policy mistakes and de-legitimised political institutions. 
 
Politicians had not changed their basic preferences toward the oil business. Old policy 
pillars such as the State’s prevalence in the oil business, allegiance to Opec as an 
institutional tool to defend oil prices and suspicion toward PDVSA still characterised 
the mindset of politicians. Their capacity, however, to translate these traditional 
preferences into action was limited in the 1990s.  
 
On the other hand, the post-nationalisation agenda regarding the oil business had been 
implemented successfully. New definitions in oil policy were in order. The oil 
conglomerate was in need of a new wave of investment and organisational reform. As 
these decisions needed to be dealt with, a weakened State lost much of the initiative 
and its technical grip, allowing the oil conglomerate to take the lead in setting policy. 
Although politicians resented this state of affairs, they had to accept this shift of 
power as an inevitable outcome of that frail position of the political system during the 
turbulent 1990s. In the midst of an acute institutional crisis, the oil conglomerate 
emerged in a stronger position vis-à-vis its owner. Oil policy setting and 
implementation in effect shifted to PDVSA in a sort of ‘regulatory capture’ that 
altered the previous institutional arrangements. This relatively privileged position, 
however, prepared the terrain for a future rebalancing of the relationship between 
PDVSA and the State. 
 
The chapter is organised into four sections. Section one sets out the backdrop for 
PDVSA-government interaction during the decade of the 1990s. Section two 
examines the process of setting oil policy at the beginning of the 1990s in the context 
of the neo-liberal reforms embarked upon by the Pérez administration. Section three 
explains how the political instability of 1992-1993 allowed PDVSA to advance its 
own policy preferences. Section four analyses the process of the ‘oil opening’ in the 
Caldera administration.262  
 
 
4.1 Economic distress, the neo-liberal package and PDVSA 
 
PDVSA-government interaction in the 1990s was influenced by three factors, which 
are scrutinised in this section. First, it examines the acute economic crisis that reached 
its peak in 1989. Second, it reviews the neo-liberal inspired measures undertaken by 
the Pérez administration to tackle the crisis and its implications for oil policy. Third, it 
discusses the perception most politicians and policy makers developed regarding 
PDVSA since its creation as an oil state-monopoly in 1976.  
 
 
Economic crisis of 1989 
 
Dubbed the ‘lost decade’ for the developing countries, the 1980s was a decade of 
great stress for the economies of the developing world. Although Venezuela still 
profited from the second oil boom in the early 1980s, it did not escape that pattern. 
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Despite half a decade of still healthy oil income (see Table 4.1), Venezuela’s public 
finances were adversely hit in the 1980s. Growth in that decade was the worst since 
oil was discovered in the 1920s (see Table 4.2). The expansion of the public sector 
generated by the oil windfall in the 1970s created budgetary rigidities that reduced the 
margin for manoeuvre when oil income dropped. Between 1973 and 1982 the size of 
the budget rose six-fold in dollar term. The currency devaluation crisis of 1983 
provoked a public finance collapse. The public budget shrank dramatically, reflecting 
oil price decline and the impossibility of shifting to external financing. The Debt crisis 
of 1982 had closed access to debt markets.263 To make matters worse, Venezuela’s 
external debt had increased almost twelve-fold between 1973 and 1982. 
 
Table 4.1  Oil exports in the 1980s 
Year Million US$ % Paid as taxes & royalty 
 
1980 17,562 69 
1981 18,609 71 
1982 15,633 65 
1983 13,857 61 
1984 14,824 67 
1985 12,956 64 
1986 7,178 56 
1987 9,054 69 
1988 8,158 62 
1989 10,001 74 
Source: Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004, Ministry of Energy (compiled by Bernard Mommer) 
 
 
Table 4.2  Annual rate of growth (1920-1999) 
Decade GDP per capita 
 
1920-1930 13.7% 
1930-1940 0.5% 
1940-1950 7.5% 
1950-1960 2.1% 
1960-1970 2.2% 
1970-1980 0.3% 
1980-1990 -2.6% 
1990-1999 -0.4% 
Source: Ricardo Hausmann, "Venezuela's Growth Implosion: A Neo-Classical Story?" In  Dani Rodrik (ed.)  In 
Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).  
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 Governments in the 1980s chose to postpone dealing with these imbalances. Table 4.3 
summarises the main macroeconomic variables for the 1980’s. The size of the budget 
tripled in nominal Bolívar between 1982 and 1989, although in dollar terms it dropped 
to less than a third. This was caused by constant depreciation of the currency that took 
the value of the Bolívar from US$ 4.30 to US$ 43.05 in 1989, a ten-fold devaluation. 
As two-thirds of fiscal income came from oil taxation in dollars, the recurrent 
devaluations of the Bolívar against the US dollar allowed governments to sustain 
increasing nominal budgets. Additionally, in six years of the decade the government 
faced a budget deficit with the inevitable inflation that accompanied unsound fiscal 
policies. Prices increased more than five-fold between 1982 and 1989 (524%). 
Workers felt this deterioration sharply, as nominal wages did not keep pace with 
inflation. Income per worker collapsed as real incomes in Bolivars in 1989 were only 
41% of their 1982 value, or only 26.5% in dollar terms.  
 
 
Table 4.3  Macroeconomic imbalances in the 1980’s 
Year Consolidated 
government 
budget 
(million US$) 
 
Surplus/deficit 
(million US$) 
Inflation 
index 
(base 
1984) 
Exchange rate 
Bolivars/US$ 
(to 31 Dec) 
Income per 
worker 
US$ 
1980 15,510         26 72.8 4.30 6,083 
1981 23,657 (-)    907 80.4 4.30 6,557 
1982 22,486 (-) 2,947 86.7 4.30 6,534 
1983 19,038 (-) 1,019 92.8 7.50 3,949 
1984 12,993      1,932 107.4 12.65 2,293 
1985 13,730      3,148 117.2 14.50 2,213 
1986 14,681 (-) 1,233 132.1 22.70 1,468 
1987 10,662 (-) 2,173 185.3 30.18 1,420 
1988 14,464 (-) 2,830 251.1 39.30 1,312 
1989    8,352           58 454.5 43.05 1,734 
Source: BCV; IMF Government Finances Yearbook (1990 and 1997); A.Baptista, Bases Cuantitativas de la 
Economía Venezolana 1830-1995 (Caracas, Fundacion Polar, 1997) 
 
 
Politically, however, the strategy of postponement seemed to pay off as the country 
was relatively calm until 1989. General elections in 1983 and 1988 showed little 
abstention (12.25% and 18.1% respectively) and on both occasions the President was 
elected with a strong mandate (55.32% of the vote for President Lusinchi in 1983 and 
52.76% of the vote for President Pérez in 1988, the two largest shares of the vote 
since 1958 when democracy was established). This apparent normality in the political 
arena was broken dramatically with the Caracazo riots on 27 February 1989, a mere 
three weeks into President Pérez second administration. When President Pérez took 
office in February 1989 Venezuela had accumulated years of acute economic 
imbalances that required immediate attention. To face this critical situation, his 
economic team adopted a different approach from traditional policies. 
 
 
The ‘neo-liberal’ package 
 
Venezuela’s traditional policies since import substitution in the 1960s had been, 
barring minor deviations, driven by protectionism and the dominant role of the State 
in planning, delivering, controlling and regulating large parts of the economy.264 
When Venezuelans went to vote in December 1988 there were no signs that a 
substantive change in these traditional policies was envisioned. The AD candidate 
Carlos Andrés Pérez ran his campaign based on the message that he represented the 
‘good times’ of the early oil boom in 1974, when he served as President for five years. 
He gave no indication of what economic policies he would implement to tackle the 
accumulated imbalances. 
 
In addition, Pérez was not the favoured candidate of the AD party machine. He got 
the nomination based on his high levels of popularity among the grassroots but 
against the preferences of senior AD officials and incumbent President Lusinchi. This 
fact created a tension that would explain many outcomes of President Pérez policies, 
including oil issues.265 
 
Organisational strengths of the AD party worked, however, in Pérez’s favour, to 
guarantee him a landslide victory in December 1988. Once elected, Pérez brought to 
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the cabinet an economic team, totally divorced from his party that had been preparing 
to assume governmental responsibilities outside the party sphere.  
 
Pedro Rosas-Bravo, a member of that team, recalled, “The whole team was initially 
gathered around financier Pedro Tinoco. We regularly met Tinoco and other 
technocrats in his offices. There was a team of high minded professionals mainly 
trained abroad. The main characteristic was that none were directly connected to AD. 
Pérez was always adamant about excluding the AD from policy discussions and 
decision making.”266 Pérez named his technocratic cabinet and top positions favouring 
this team, although some concessions to AD were made, notably the Ministry of 
Energy. AD was still a powerful player since, among other things, it controlled 
Congress. Although they were short of a majority in both chambers (22 out of 46 
senators and 97 out of 201 deputies) they usually succeeded in achieving a majority 
along with small parties.  
 
Soon after inauguration in early February 1989, Pérez’s economic team launched the 
so-called ‘neo-liberal package’. The ‘package’, inspired in the Washington 
consensus267 set of policies, initially aimed at reversing many of the stances in State 
policies common since the 1960s. Table 4.4 shows the main goals of the ‘neo-liberal 
package’. 
 
Oil policy as such was largely neglected in this initial layout of policy priorities in 
‘the package’. This can be explained partly on conceptual grounds. Oil was regarded 
as a great distorter of the Venezuelan economy in the mindset of the principal 
architects of the new policies. Furthermore, traditional oil policy values such as state- 
ownership, allegiance to Opec and suspicion of PDVSA independence constituted one 
of the few points of convergence between President Pérez and his AD party. In fact,  
President Pérez’s apparent conversion to neo-liberalism was not deeply rooted in a 
pro-market stance. 
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International Economics, an international economic think tank based in Washington. It is so-
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Table 4.4  The ‘neo-liberal package’ 
Area Policy 
 
Macroeconomic 
stabilisation 
Floating exchange rate, removing price controls, liberalising interest 
rates, reducing real public spending, increasing prices of public sector 
goods. 
1.1 Fiscal  1.2 Overhauling of tax system to reduce dependency on oil revenues 
1.3 Public Debt 1.4 Reducing burden through negotiation 
Trade  Liberalisation  
Deregulation Deregulating capital, goods and labour markets 
Reform Reforming agricultural, industrial and financial sectors 
Foreign investment Promoting capital inflows 
Privatisation Transferring to the private sector public utilities, state-owned 
enterprises and diverse assets 
Social subsidies Targeting the most vulnerable groups of society instead of 
widespread price subsidies 
Source: Moisés Naim, Paper tigers & Minotaurs. (Washington, Carnegie Endowment,1993) 
 
 
In the words of Moises Naim, his Minister of Industry, “Pérez’s actions proved his 
determination to take whatever measures were needed to deal with the deep rooted 
causes of the nation’s long term economic deterioration. But more than a belief in the 
workings of the market per se, profound disillusion with the capacities of the State in 
a developing country seemed to guide his economic thinking and policy actions.”268  
 
President Pérez appointed Celestino Armas as Minister of Energy and Mines. Armas 
was an AD member and one of the AD’s major oil experts. He had been highly 
critical of the internationalisation policy of PDVSA. He represented the traditional 
values AD had defended in oil policy. For instance, as long standing AD politicians, 
Pérez and Armas regarded Opec as one of the greatest achievements not only of 
Venezuelan oil policy but also of AD oil credo. Pedro Rosas-Bravo, a technocrat 
member of Pérez’s cabinet, commented, “We tried to avoid the issue of Opec with 
Pérez since he was very reluctant to accept a change in that area. Opec was a non-
negotiable part of the policy paradigm.”269 
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Moreover, some of PDVSA policies interfered with the implementation of the 
technocratic cabinet’s policy priorities. On the one hand, PDVSA was planning a big 
expansion after 1990 (as discussed later in this chapter). On the other hand, one of 
government’s priorities was to negotiate a re-scheduling of the external public debt 
within the framework of the Brady Plan270 and with support from multilateral 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Pedro 
Rosas-Bravo recalled, “The main preoccupation of the economic team regarding 
PDVSA in 1989 was not to interfere with the negotiations of the debt plan with 
multilateral organisations, especially the International Monetary Fund. These 
organisations did not understand how the country could ask for the special conditions 
of the Brady Plan while at the same time the state-owned oil company was planning a 
big expansion on its own. PDVSA had such an influence on public finances that any 
plan that diverged from the government policy would create a large distortion in 
macro variables such as exchange rate, fiscal deficit, etc.”271 
 
 
PDVSA: ‘a state within the State’ 
 
The expression ‘state within the State’ became a frequent way to refer to PDVSA in 
political circles. PDVSA was no doubt different from the rest of the public sector. As 
social and economic conditions worsened in the 1990s, PDVSA became alienated 
from the rest of the public sector and seen as a secretive, arrogant and autonomous 
organisation. 
 
Several factors account for that perception. First, PDVSA was built from a 
conglomerate of foreign companies that operated in an ‘enclave’. The oil fields were 
confined to specific areas, generally apart from the great cities. The foreign 
companies imported not only their technological and administrative procedures but 
their own personnel and culture. Pablo Reimpell, who occupied high positions both 
under the multinationals and in the nationalised industry, said, “We were trained in a 
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culture of responsibility for the work we did. Personal responsibility for our destiny is 
not a typical cultural trait of Venezuelans. We tend to rely more on external forces: 
the government, luck, God, to provide for our future.”272 Ramón Espinasa defined the 
nationalisation as a “Venezuelanisation of the previous systems of personnel, 
management, finances, etc. Some sort of Anglo-Saxon enclave in a different 
culture”.273 Apart from PDVSA inheriting the ‘enclave’ nature of the former 
establishment it was also left with the same mistrust that engulfed former foreign 
companies’ operations in Venezuela. Gastón Parra, an oil sector academic who later 
became PDVSA president, pointed out how the historical experience of the country 
testifies to how the international corporations “unashamedly manipulated” accounting 
rules to pay less tax.274 Decades of struggling with them over how to divide the oil 
rents pie nurtured all sorts of negative views of the oil business. 
 
A second difference between the PDVSA and the rest of the public bureaucracy was 
in its management of personnel. On the one hand, PDVSA managed personnel 
independently form public patronage. PDVSA people recognised that, by and large, 
political interference with personnel policy was insignificant. They considered 
themselves run by a system of internal meritocracy.275 Oscar Veracoechea, a middle 
manager in the oil company, said, “The meritocracy system functioned. Even if 
sometimes injustices might have been present, the system proved right in the long run. 
Many mistakes were corrected over time. One can say that the career of many 
managers reflected their potential and achievements.”276  
 
On the other hand, patron-client relationships prevailed in the rest of the Venezuelan 
public bureaucracy. Politicians and other policy makers recognised the patrimonial 
quality of the Venezuelan public apparatus. Gumersindo Rodríguez, architect of the 
first Pérez administration economic policy (1974-1979) admitted as much. When they 
were designing the oil investment fund he said, “We did not want another 
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Corporación de Fomento” referring to a financial agency created to foster 
development that was already marred by inefficiencies and corruption charges.277 
 
PDVSA employees enjoyed generous medical benefits, better salaries, holiday 
allowances, and even privileged access to services such as obtaining identification 
cards from the central government. For instance, it was common for PDVSA to 
arrange for public offices such as the National Identification Office (DIEX) to run 
special services inside PDVSA premises for their employees. Rafael Garrido, an 
internal auditor, illustrated this point, “We brought other parts of the Venezuelan 
public sector to PDVSA. We had privileged access to many services. It was clear we 
were living in a different State, in a place where we had benefits other parts of the 
State could not have.”278 Not surprisingly, these differences generated friction with 
other parts of the State and politicians. Reimpell recalled the evident animosity of 
members of Congress during public hearings.279 The media was full of stories of 
PDVSA managers’ excesses such as the use of the corporation’s private plane fleet.280  
 
PDVSA tried to provide public works out of its core business. They embarked on 
projects ranging from fish preservation to large infrastructure projects such as 
motorways. Pablo Reimpell recalled, “Politicians and government officials usually 
asked for PDVSA involvement in public projects on the grounds that we were loaded 
with financial resources and the rest of the country was poor.”281 Although PDVSA 
involvement in various public projects was rather successful,282 attitudes toward the 
company did not change significantly. 
 
Part of the perception followed PDVSA’s lack of reporting. Rafael Garrido 
acknowledged, “There was a view that not too much information should be passed to 
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politicians because they were likely to distort it.”283 Oscar Murillo, a former chief 
legal officer in PDVSA, agreed, “PDVSA did not give any more information to the 
government than was strictly required.”284  
 
Politicians’ complaints about the degree of secrecy of PDVSA was long standing, and 
it was commonly referred to as a ‘black box’. Siuberto Martínez, a congressman from 
the opposition complained, as early as 1981, that there was a “tendency in PDVSA 
and affiliates to avoid control of Congress, which should not be tolerated”.285 This 
perception remained intact for decades. Earlier in 2002, in a conference in Caracas, 
former Senator Didalco Bolívar, affirmed, “In all my time as a member of Congress 
there was not a sole instance when I got the information I had requested from 
PDVSA.”286 Reflecting on the relationship of PDVSA and the State, former senior 
PDVSA officials, do not contradict this view of the conglomerate’s alienation. Alirio 
Parra, former Director of PDVSA, pondered, “PDVSA believed the State’s 
bureaucrats knew nothing and was not very transparent in its relations with the rest of 
the country.”287 Alberto Quiros-Corradi-Corradi admitted that PDVSA’s operations 
were inefficient, such as its procurement of unnecessary equipment on the grounds 
that “it was not worth giving the money to politicians”.288 Ramón Espinasa, former 
chief economist, also reflected, “PDVSA wanted the State to reflect the company and 
not the other way around. We aspired the country to be like ourselves.”289 
 
 
4.2 Defining a new oil policy  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the oil conglomerate had achieved all objectives set for the 
post-nationalisation agenda. Table 4.5 summarises the main operational goals, 
initially established in 1975 for the post-nationalisation period, which the industry had 
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achieved by the late 1980s. Oil production, however, had substantially decreased. In 
the decade before nationalisation (1966-1975) Venezuela produced 3.32 million 
barrels/day on average. From nationalisation to the end of the 1990s (1976-1989) 
production dropped by 42% on average, to 1.91 million barrel/day. The Opec quota 
system had limited Venezuela’s oil output during the second half of the 1980s. In fact, 
by 1989 Venezuela’s quota was 1.81 million barrels/day and had been cut further to 
1.75 million barrels/day after accepting a reduction of around 40,000 barrels/day at an 
Opec meeting in June 1989.290 
 
 
Table 4.5  Main indicators of post-nationalisation agenda success 
Area Results 
 
Oil Reserves From 18,398 in 1975 to 59,040 million barrels in 1989 (220% increase)  
Gas reserves From 1,247 in 1979 to 2,993 billion standard cu m in 1989 (140% 
increase) 
Refining 
capacity 
From 1,445 in 1975 to approximately 3,000 thousands barrels / day in 
1989 (40% in Venezuela and 60% abroad) 
Organisational 
structures 
From 14 operating companies in 1975 to 3 big operators in 1989 
Tanker fleet From 12 old tankers in 1975 to 14 in 1989 (mostly with new building 
standards) 
Sources: Opec 1999 annual bulletin, Gustavo Coronel, The nationalization of the Venezuelan Oil Industry, 
(Lexington,Mass, Lexington Books, 1983), Cesar Baena, The policy process in a Petro-State (Ashgate, Aldershot, 
England,1999) 
 
 
There was a need to define policy guidelines regarding future development of the oil 
industry. The Ministry of Energy set up such guidelines, which PDVSA developed 
and updated in 1989.291 They emphasised a gradual expansion of the production 
capacity292 and an increase in the certification of oil reserves. It was a six-year plan 
(1990-1995) that included investment of about US$ 30 billion in areas such as 
production (US$ 12 billion), refining (US$ 8 billion) and petrochemicals (US$ 5 
billion).293 The Ministry emphasised the idea of ‘production potential’ as distinct from 
‘production increase’, as adherence to Opec’s production ceilings was the favoured 
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policy of Minister Armas and President Pérez. Although Armas was adamant in 
complying with the Opec quota system, he also thought there was a need to exploit 
other parts of the oil business. 
 
New oil policy 
 
In 1989, Minister Armas set up an ad hoc task force (only partially related to the 
Ministry) to prepare the strategic guidelines for a renewed policy regarding PDVSA. 
He commissioned AD oil expert Rafael Guevara to put together a mixed group of oil 
experts. Table 4.6 shows the composition of that group. 
 
This ad hoc task force, coordinated by Rafael Guevara, produced a set of 
recommendations for future policy that were presented to Minister Armas in January 
1990 and subsequently approved by President Pérez. The recommendations were 
thought to complement the expansion plans already approved by the PDVSA 
shareholders meeting in December 1989.294 
 
 
Table 4.6  Oil task force set by Minister Armas in 1989 
Member Affiliation 
 
Rafael Guevara AD advisor in oil issues 
Luís Giusti Vice President of PDVSA subsidiary Maraven 
Atilio Osorio Gas Manager at PDVSA subsidiary Corpoven 
Arnaldo Salazar Board Member PDVSA subsidiary Lagoven 
Ulises Ramírez Ministry of Energy and Mines 
Ricardo Corrie Ministry of Energy and Mines 
Cesar Pieve Private sector  
Tarquino Romero Lawyer 
Joaquin Parra Lawyer 
Source: Rafael Guevara, ibid. , José Arrioja , Clientes Negros (Caracas, Libros de El Nacional, 1998) 
 
 
The proposal made by Guevara’s team, however, contained a more significant 
recommendation. They favoured an opening up to private sector participation in the 
oil business for the first time since nationalisation. The rationale for this major shift in 
traditional oil policy was based on the need to develop three areas of the oil business 
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thought to be beyond PDVSA expertise or investment priorities. First, the need to 
make the heavy oil from the vast Orinoco basin economically exploitable; second, 
exploitation of the non-associated gas reservoirs in the north east of the country; and 
third, exploitation of matured oil fields that had been abandoned by PDVSA but were 
considered still to be profitable.295 
 
In March 1990 a new board was appointed in PDVSA. President Pérez chose as 
PDVSA’s president an outsider, former Senator and businessman Andrés Sosa-Pietri. 
Additionally, two members of the Guevara-coordinated team, Cesar Pieve and 
Arnaldo Salazar, were appointed to the Board. Luís Giusti was made responsible for 
the Strategic Planning of the conglomerate. Sosa-Pietri was not well received within 
the industry, which tended to resent outsiders. Sosa-Pietri had been associated in the 
past with the left wing MAS party but was also the nephew of Julio Sosa-Rodríguez, a 
traditional oil businessman strongly associated with Copei founder Rafael Caldera. 
Sosa-Pietri rapidly strengthened his position in the company by presiding over an 
organisational overhaul of the holding led by external consultants McKinsey that 
internally reinforced PDVSA’s presidency. 
 
The Guevara-coordinated team had suggested that the opening up of the oil business 
should be implemented under the legal framework of the Nationalisation Law (Article 
5). This law allowed contracting private firms to provide PDVSA with a specific 
service under the so-called ‘service contracts’. The Ministry of Energy proposed a 
legal mechanism known as an ‘exploitation agreement’, which would allow private 
firms to exploit oil reservoirs assigned by the Ministry. Sosa-Pietri initially rejected 
this on the principle that it was wrong to diminish PDVSA influence. In his own 
words, “To leave oil production that can be made by PDVSA with its own human 
resources and technical staff, in the hands of others is to condemn PDVSA to a 
secondary role.”296 The Ministry went ahead with the initiative nonetheless. 
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Exploitation of abandoned fields  
 
Although Sosa-Pietri opposed the idea of the ‘exploitation agreement’ with private 
firms, the Ministry and PDVSA went ahead with them. Based on a beneficial 
interpretation of the Article 5 of the Nationalisation Law, they obtained the favourable 
opinion of the Permanent Energy Committee in the Senate in 1991. The Ministry 
chose 12 oil fields that had been inactive or abandoned by PDVSA and conducted two 
bidding rounds in 1992 and 1993. Three areas containing medium and light oil 
reservoirs were granted in 1992 and nine in 1993.  
 
The contracts did not obtain approval from Congress because the interpretation given 
to Article 5 of the Nationalisation Law assumed that approval from the Permanent 
Energy Committee was sufficient. To comply with Article 5, the contracts were 
limited to 20 years plus a possible extension of five years where delays were caused 
by force majeure. 
 
It was considered that the contracting companies were not producing oil as such but 
providing a service to PDVSA, therefore the tax regime was the same as that 
applicable to corporations (i.e. a rate of 34%). Similarly, as the oil fields were 
considered mature and not profitable under the established royalty rate of 16.67%, 
PDVSA obtained a dispensation from the Ministry of Energy to reduce the rate to 
1%.297 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism was a departure from a traditional legal stance 
Venezuela had maintained throughout the decades of negotiation with foreign firms. 
The disputes were set to be settled through national arbitration (under the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s rules) and not the national courts.298 For 
international companies the preferred solution would have been international 
arbitration. The surrender of Venezuelan courts departed from the long held principle 
of settling disputes in the national courts established in former Venezuelan legislation 
after a well known legal precedent in Latin American jurisprudence known as the 
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‘Calvo clause’. 299 Table 4.7 summarises the main terms of the exploitation contracts 
for the abandoned fields. 
 
These bidding rounds carried out by the Ministry of Energy, with the agreement of a 
reluctant PDVSA, was the first step in what later became known as ‘oil opening’. The 
contracting terms were deemed compatible with traditional Venezuelan oil policy in 
general and the AD party’s stance on oil policy in particular. The qualification of 
inactive and abandoned fields constituted, in the eyes of AD policy makers, the 
‘special case’ requirement contained in Article 5 of the Nationalisation Law.300 In this 
context, the so-called ‘oil opening’ was initiated under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Energy and an unenthusiastic PDVSA. Significantly, Congress agreed that exploiting 
abandoned fields was in the national interest and therefore compatible with Article 5 
of the Nationalisation Law. 
 
 
Table 4.7  Abandoned fields exploitation contracts 
Topic Contracting terms 
 
Rationale to 
invoke ‘special 
case’ under 
Article 5 
Contract applicable to abandoned oil fields (also known as matured 
fields) 
Control required 
by Article 5 
Foreign companies were considered a ‘service contractor’ therefore there 
were not association with PDVSA hence no control clause was required. 
Tax rate Corporate rate (34%) as contractors were not producing oil as such, they 
were providing a service to PDVSA. 
Royalties 1% as the fields was considered mature and non-profitable with a 16.67% 
royalty. 
Dispute 
settlement 
National arbitration (under rules of International Chamber of Commerce) 
governed by Venezuelan law. 
Changes in 
regulation 
Not applicable.  
Bidding 
parameter 
Service fee and an oil fields development plan (a common plan was later 
devised by the Ministry). 
Source: Bernard Mommer, ibid. 
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PDVSA-government tension  
 
PDVSA under Sosa-Pietri’s direction became more defiant of Ministry of Energy 
directives than ever. Sosa-Pietri’s strong personality is normally portrayed as a major 
cause of PDVSA policy at that time. First, it was his defiance of one of the more 
strongly held oil policy principles over several decades: the commitment to Opec. 
Sosa-Pietri considered adherence to Opec-imposed limitations as a ‘blunder’. In July 
1990, at an Oil conference, he publicly expressed the need to redefine Venezuela’s 
position towards Opec.301  
 
Friction between the Ministry of Energy and PDVSA materialised, however, when 
Sosa-Pietri presided over a revision of the 1990-1995 plan approved by the Ministry 
of Energy in December 1990. The new plan, called the ‘accelerated plan’,302 
expanded previous production targets. The 1991-1995 plan required a significant 
investment (US$ 48 billion over the six years). It included exploration of new fields, 
new refineries both in Venezuela and abroad, new petrochemical ventures, gas and 
carbon exploitation, updating the tanker fleet, research and testing of new heavy-oil 
processing technology and crucially expanding both production and, the Ministry of 
Energy’s preferred policy, production capacity. By 1995 the total capacity was 
planned to reach 3.6 million barrel/day.303  
 
Discrepancies with PDVSA’s aspirations were, however, not confined to the Ministry 
of Energy. The so-called ‘technocrats’ faction of the cabinet was at odds with the plan 
as well. They resented the sheer magnitude of the plan on two grounds. Miguel 
Rodríguez, head of President Pérez’s economic team referred to it as a “Father 
Christmas list”. He was worried about the repercussions for the rest of the economy of 
a massive expansion of the oil sector based on the well known effect of ‘Dutch 
disease’.304 Similarly, as it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the economic team 
was very sensitive to the distortions that PDVSA’s own actions inflicted on the main 
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macroeconomic variables and the possibilities of negotiating a public debt 
restructuring with the multilateral organisations on good terms.305  
 
The rest of the Pérez team, so keen on liberalising the economy, were still worried 
about the plan and they tried to scale it down. Pedro Rosas-Bravo explained, “We had 
a problem with the IMF over how we should treat PDVSA. According to IMF policy 
PDVSA had to be considered as part of the Venezuelan public sector. PDVSA’s plan 
demanded substantial spending at a time when the IMF was requiring a cap on the 
fiscal deficit. PDVSA’s needs competed, in that context, with the rest of public 
spending. It was very difficult to justify a burgeoning oil investment on the one hand 
and public sector austerity on the other.”306 
 
In addition, PDVSA expansion distorted monetary policy. The Central Bank, headed 
by influential Pedro Tinoco, another crucial figure of Pérez’s economic team, also 
pushed to limit the plan. Sosa-Pietri recalled that he tried to convince the IMF’s 
managing director, Michael Camdessus, to consider PDVSA as separate from the 
Venezuelan public sector and not to restrict Venezuela’s oil expansion.307  
 
Financing the expansion plan was based mainly on the efforts of PDVSA . Sosa-Pietri 
favoured an expansion in Venezuelan oil production that contradicted the Opec 
binding agreements and collided with the Ministry of Energy’s position. As has been 
mentioned above, Minister Armas and President Pérez, as many other long standing 
AD politicians, regarded Opec adherence as ‘sacrosanct’. 
 
Initially the compromise decision to get the plan going was to consider the expansion 
not as an increase in production but instead as an ‘increase in production capacity’. 
The rationale was that once the increased production potential was incremented then 
Venezuela would has been in a better bargaining position to demand a larger Opec 
production quota. Sosa-Pietri remembered that President Pérez personally corrected 
one of his speeches to stress that position.308 Sosa-Pietri, contradicting his political 
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masters, made clear his position that augmenting ‘production capacity’ was inherently 
linked to increasing production.309 
 
The second source of financing sought by PDVSA was through a reduction in its tax 
obligations. The concrete proposition was to eliminate the fiscal mechanism known as 
‘Exports Fiscal Values’ or, as they were formerly known, ‘reference oil prices’ 310 that 
allowed the government to extract additional rent for each exported barrel. These 
reference prices were capped to 20% over the real selling prices. Sosa-Pietri 
campaigned determinedly for a reduction and ultimately the elimination of these fiscal 
values.311 Initially, the government agreed to reduce the cap to 15% but that decision 
was reverted soon after.312  
 
The expansion plan was clearly at odds with the rest of the macroeconomic 
restructuring intended by the technocratic cabinet. Additionally, its viability depended 
on modifying various pillars of traditional Venezuelan oil policy.313 PDVSA was 
caught between a hostile AD, which had broken with old and long cultivated oil 
policy paradigms, and a government economic team that wanted to concentrate on 
restoring macroeconomic equilibrium and negotiating an agreement with the IMF. 
 
The conflict was, however, temporarily resolved as a consequence of a fortuitous 
event. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 brought a change in the oil 
market situation with important implications for Venezuela. As Venezuela was the 
most important oil exporter outside the conflict ridden Middle East region, it was 
expected to respond by increasing its production to compensate for the shortage in 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti exports. PDVSA seized the opportunity by promptly preparing for 
an immediate surge in production.314 Sosa-Pietri stressed that the extra production and 
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reduced Fiscal Export Values, which he was lobbying for intensively, would produce 
the financial resources to fund the expansion plan.  
 
Minister Armas reacted more cautiously as he prioritised the diplomatic efforts to get 
Opec to agree on new quotas or production regimes in the light of the military conflict 
between two of its members.315 Opec finally reacted by liberalising production quotas. 
In fact, Venezuela initially increased production by about 400 thousands barrels/day 
and in the subsequent years continued producing around 600 thousands barrels/day 
above the pre-conflict levels.316 PDVSA had achieved the expansion initially required 
to finance the plan. At the same time, it did not affect its immediate fiscal 
contribution, thereby making the expansion palatable to the government. 
 
 
PDVSA’s rebellion 
 
The consequences of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict in 1990 enabled a compromise solution 
between PDVSA’s expansionist aspirations and the Government’s more cautious 
position, which was motivated both from the cabinet technocrats’ stance against too 
much investment in the oil sector and the governing AD party’s traditional values 
regarding Opec and rent maximisation. Differences, however, soon appeared when 
Sosa-Pietri went ahead with the expansion plan assuming an ‘accelerated’ pace until 
reaching the production expansion he favoured.  
 
Hostilities of the political world toward PDVSA were ventilated in a media campaign 
based on PDVSA excesses. Although involving relatively minor issues, such as the 
use of PDVSA plane fleet, the media exposure of PDVSA’s supposed wrongdoings 
was a means of politicians seeking to contain PDVSA power. The Ministry of Energy 
and PDVSA openly collided in 1991. The conflict materialised as a personal dispute 
between Sosa-Pietri and Minister Armas. 
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In August 1991 Minister Armas sent a memorandum to PDVSA instructing them to 
restrain several activities that the PDVSA’s board considered to be in their sphere of 
autonomous decision making (see Table 4.8). This triggered a crisis that illustrates 
PDVSA and government interaction. The Armas’ directive to PDVSA prompted a 
reaction from the board and senior management.  
 
 
Table 4.8  Main issues of the Minister Armas’s directive in 1991 
Area Directive 
 
New Subsidiaries The Ministry must approve opening new subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries The Ministry must approve appointments to the boards of existing 
subsidiaries. 
Compensation 
policy 
The Ministry must approve salaries, benefits and pension plans among 
other things regarding personnel compensation policy. 
Debt The Ministry must approve contracting new debt to finance new 
investment not included in the annual budget. 
Source: Andrés Sosa-Pietri, ibid.  
 
 
PDVSA’s board sent a rebuttal letter to President Pérez who, in response, made clear 
it was his idea to order Minister Armas to produce the directive. Sosa-Pietri explained 
all concerns and said that the company could not be managed under the restrictions 
contained in Armas’s directive. President Pérez agreed to make further consultations 
about the situation. Sosa-Pietri, however, did not wait for Pérez’s consultations. He 
challenged the Ministry’s orders by refusing to comply with the directive. President 
Pérez reacted angrily to such a defiant position. Sosa-Pietri offered to resign. Five 
days later, however, the Minister of Energy sent a substitute, watered down directive. 
The ‘approval’ requirement was changed to include the need to inform the Ministry 
about those decisions originally curtailed in the Armas’s directive.  
 
The PDVSA’s board was split on how to respond although all members had signed 
the first letter. Sosa-Pietri, however, accepted this new version but asked PDVSA’s 
legal department to produce a guideline on how to implement the new instruction. 
Some members of the board opposing Sosa-Pietri protested about the guideline. This 
second directive, however, settled the conflict.317 New discrepancies between PDVSA 
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and the Ministry emerged months later when Sosa-Pietri opposed a reduction in the 
Venezuela’s Opec quota. Soon after, President Pérez appointed a new Minister of 
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and the Ministry over oil policy and over the roles both organisations played within 
the institutional arrangements responsible for policy implementation. This conflict 
will re-emerge later and it is discussed in following sections. 
 
 
4.3 PDVSA’s agenda and the political crisis (1992-1993) 
 
The control, however difficult, exerted by the government over PDVSA during the 
first three years of the Pérez administration ceased in practical terms as the 
government’s own stability was seriously shaken by critical events of 1992-1993, as 
summarised in Table 4.10. 
 
Two attempted coup d'état in February and November 1992 severely debilitated the 
Pérez administration. Pérez bowed to the AD party’s anti-reform stance. Corrales 
characterises Pérez’s new approach as a switch “from party-neglecting to party-
yielding”.318 On the oil front, the new Minister Alirio Parra and new PDVSA 
president Gustavo Roosen were brought in attempting to return Ministry-PDVSA 
relations to normality. President Pérez was finally removed from office in May 1993 
when the AD led a process of impeachment that finally put a close to Pérez’s 
presidency and halted his neo-liberal reforms. 
 
AD, as the main political party in Congress (see Table 4.9), led the selection of 
Ramón Velazquez, an AD veteran, as the constitutional replacement of Pérez. 
Velazquez reflected on his appointment, “AD leaders approached me on several 
                                                                                                                                            
book. See Andrés Sosa-Pietri, ibid.  
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and Venezuela in the 1990s (University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 
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occasions to offer me the Presidency. My initial reaction was to decline the offer. The 
situation with the Military was very tense. Minister of Defence Iván Jiménez was 
believed to have suggested that in the absence of a suitable candidate, someone from 
the military might be appointed. AD leaders insisted that I was a consensus candidate. 
I bowed to their pressure but I asked them not to leave me alone. I requested full 
congressional support for urgent measures the country needed to overcome economic 
crisis.” 319  
 
 
Table 4.9  Composition of Congress (January 1989-January 1994) 
1.5 Party Deputies % Senators % 
 
AD 97 48.26 22 47.82 
Copei 67 33.33 20 43.48 
Others 37 18.41 4 8.70 
Total 201 100 46 100 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral 
 
 
AD and Copei joined forces not only to appoint Velazquez but to grant him the full 
congressional support he asked for when he accepted the Presidency. In particular AD 
leaders changed their former hostile stance against some of the economic measures 
contained in the former President Pérez’s reform package. For instance, AD voted for 
granting Velazquez legislative powers to decree the Value Added Tax, a fiscal 
measure the Pérez technocratic cabinet had long asked for. Corrales explains this, 
observing that AD hostilities toward reform were more a reaction against an 
administration they did not trust. In Corrales words, “For most AD leaders, it was not 
the reforms themselves, but rather their implementation by a party hostile to the 
government that was objectionable.”320 Copei cooperation was understood as essential 
to the stability of democracy threatened by the political crisis in 1992-93. Table 4.10 
shows the main events of the 1992-1993 crisis period. 
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Table 4.10  Main events of political crisis 1992-93 
Date Event 
 
4 February 1992 
(am) 
Aborted coup attempt. Military insurrection led by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hugo Chávez (later to be President). Although defeated, Chávez and 
other insurgents obtained instant popularity. 
 
4 February 1992 
(pm) 
Copei’s founder Rafael Caldera denounced in Congress Pérez’s neo-
liberal government as responsible for economic and social deterioration 
as the cause of conditions that explain popular appeal of insurgency. 
 
March 1992 President Pérez called for a united government. A council of 
personalities was convened to reflect on the political situation. Some 
Copei members were brought to the cabinet that was reshuffled 
sidelining some of the so-called neo-liberal technocrats. 
 
November 1992 Another aborted coup attempt. Military insurrection led by Air Force’s 
General Visconti. 
 
December 1992 Charges of corruption were levied against President Pérez. Attorney 
General Escovar Salom gathered evidence of misusing funds by 
President Pérez. 
 
May 1993 Supreme Court ruled that there was enough evidence to raise a legal 
case against President Pérez. Congress impeached President Pérez and 
named an interim President, Octavio Lepage, acting President of 
Congress.  
6 June 1993 Congress appointed Ramón Velazquez as President, ending Pérez’s 
term.  
 
December 1993 Elections for President were held amidst rumours of Military 
discontent. A coup is allegedly aborted following US State 
Department’s strong signal of disapproval of military action.321 Rafael 
Caldera is elected by a narrow margin as President. Congress is split 
and no party got a majority although AD party remained as the largest 
plurality.  
 
Source: El Nacional, El Universal, Venezuela Analítica 
 
 
PDVSA’s agenda during the Velazquez’s interim government 
 
Two important events took place during Velazquez’s short presidency (June 1993 to 
February 1994). First, the long-demanded elimination of the Fiscal Export Values was 
passed by Congress in June 1993. Similarly, the so-called ‘strategic associations’ to 
                                                 
321 See Janet Kelly and Carlos Romero, ‘Getting along: issues in U.S. Venezuelan relations’ 
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exploit heavy-oil reservoirs in the Orinoco basin were also approved by Congress in 
September 1993.  
 
PDVSA lobbied heavily for suppressing the Fiscal Export Values since they had 
embarked on the expansion plan originally approved by the government in 1989, and 
later expanded, albeit controversially, under Sosa-Pietri’s command in 1990, relying 
on their own funding. The temporary increase in Venezuela’s Opec production quota 
brought extra resources that were used for financing the plan. These extra resources, 
however, had to be supplemented by loans. The elimination of the Fiscal Export 
Values was the definitive solution to restoring financial health to the company. The 
PDVSA’s rationale was always that the Treasury was to be recompensed in the future 
by the extra production brought by the expansion plan.322  
 
The embattled AD and the weak interim government of Velazquez were in no 
position to challenge PDVSA aspirations again. With an extremely deteriorated 
economic, social and political environment, PDVSA was thought of as the only pillar 
of the Venezuelan State that remained strong. AD and Copei finally granted PDVSA 
the elimination of the Fiscal Export Values. Congress passed a law phasing them out 
from 1993 to 1996.323 The immediate effect was mild as the exports values were 
capped at 16% for 1993 (originally they were 20%). That limit was cut to 8% in 1994 
and 4% in 1995. They were completely eliminated after 1996. 
 
The rationale of future compensation to the Treasury never materialised. PDVSA’s 
fiscal contribution declined in the following years, as Table 4.11 shows, although 
production increased during those years. More significantly, PDVSA contributions to 
the Treasury as a percentage of its gross income collapsed during the 1990s. These 
figures supports claims made by PDVSA’s critics that the elimination of the Fiscal 
Export Values was to favour an expansion of PDVSA at the expenses of the rent 
collected by the State.324 PDVSA obtained the elimination of Fiscal Export Values in 
similar fashion to other controversial policies such as the internationalisation policy in 
                                                 
322 Ramón Espinasa, ‘Petróleo y Desarrollo Económico’. Mimeo. 1997. p.12. 
323 Official Gazette 35,243, 30 June 1993. 
324 See Carlos Mendoza Potella, ‘Apertura petrolera: nombre de estreno para un viejo 
proyecto antinacional’ in www.soberania.com, 13 March 2003. 
the 1980s. In both cases government acceptance of PDVSA’s preferred policies 
largely responded to a fait accompli.325 In this case, PDVSA achieved a preferred 
policy by emphasising the urgent need created by the fait accompli of being already in 
the midst of the implementation of a plan approved only half heartedly by the 
Ministry of Energy.  
 
 
Table 4.11  Fiscal contribution of PDVSA (1990-1999) 
Year Fiscal contribution in 
million US$ 
 
As % of PDVSA gross income 
1990 10,209 69 
1991 8,609 64 
1992 7,116 59 
1993 5,250 46 
1994 4,948 41 
1995 4,806 33 
1996 9,082 47 
1997 7,059 36 
1998 3,327 25 
1999 5,699 32 
Average 1976-1989 8,577 66 
Source: Ministry of Energy (compiled by Bernard Mommer), Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 1999 
 
 
Strategic associations 
 
The second major event during the Velazquez interim government was the approval 
by Congress of the so-called ‘strategic associations’. Congress approved in September 
1993, with AD and Copei votes, a framework contract allowing PDVSA’s operating 
subsidiaries to enter into association with private firms for exploitation of the extra-
heavy oil reservoirs in the Orinoco basin. The rationale for these associations was 
based on the fact that extra-heavy oil represented a special case that could be 
regulated through Article 5 of the Nationalisation Law. In fact, the technical case for 
this was widely accepted. Extra-heavy oil (characterised by a very low API gravity326) 
requires a further processing called ‘upgrading’ to make it marketable.  
                                                 
325 Cesar Baena, The policy process in a petro-state: an analysis of PDVSA’s (Petroleos de 
Venezuela SA’s) internationalisation strategy (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999). 
326 API Gravity is a specific gravity scale developed by the American Petroleum Institute 
 The technology for such ‘upgrading’ was not fully developed at that time either by 
PDVSA’s own research and development arm or by foreign firms. The case for 
exploiting such a type of crude oil was compelling based on the estimates of 
Venezuelan reserves. They were deemed probably one of the largest reservoirs of 
crude oil in the world. Venezuelan policy makers were persuaded of the need to 
develop both the oil fields and the technology. Equally, they were convinced that 
PDVSA should have concentrated on the exploitation of more profitable medium and 
light oils. 327  
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruling of 1991 that clarified the requirement of Article 
5 of the Nationalisation Law regarding the control of any business association with 
the private sector allowed PDVSA to enter into minority shareholdings. In fact, the 
Ministry had included these associations in the expansion plan approved in 1989.328  
 
Additionally to extra-heavy oil reservoirs, there were vast reserves of non-
associated329 natural gas in the northeast coastal region of Venezuela. To Venezuelan 
policy makers this was another ‘special’ case that could be regulated by Article 5. In 
fact, the exploitation of those gas reservoirs was the project that motivated the 
Supreme Court interpretation in 1991. Consequently, Congress approved, in August 
1993, the terms for the contract to exploit gas in association with foreign firms Shell, 
Exxon and Mitsubishi.330  
 
The tax regime was relaxed for both gas and extra-heavy oil as these two activities 
were considered different from the rest of PDVSA core business. This was achieved 
through a modification of the Tax law applicable to corporations. Congress approved 
in September 1993 a reclassification of those activities (gas and heavy oil) as non-
hydrocarbon enterprises, therefore obtaining a different tax treatment.331 Table 4.12 
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shows the main characteristics of the contracts of the so-called ‘strategic 
associations’. The most controversial was the arbitration clause that, again, did not 
follow the traditional Calvo clause discussed earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, this 
time the contracts required ‘international’ instead of ‘national’ arbitration. 
 
 
The extra-heavy oil rich Orinoco basin was not a traditional part of Venezuelan oil 
reservoirs administered by the Ministry of Energy. The ‘strategic associations’ was a 
solution envisioned by both PDVSA and the Ministry taking into account 
technological needs and PDVSA investment priorities. Additionally, the conditions 
agreed responded to demands by potential investors since this exploitation of extra-
heavy oil was considered risky due to the untested upgrading technology.332 
 
 
Table 4.12  Main terms of the strategic associations in gas and heavy oil projects 
Topic Contracting terms 
 
Rationale to invoke 
‘special case’ under 
Article 5 
 
Contract applicable to abandoned extra-heavy oil and unexploited 
natural gas reserves. 
Control required by 
Article5 
Shareholding majority not required. Control can be achieved through 
contractual terms granting special privilege to PDVSA shares 
(known as ‘golden shares’). 
 
Tax rate Applicable to non-hydrocarbons entreprises (34%). 
 
Royalties Flexible. Possibility that the Ministry reduce the 16.66% royalty 
applicable to other oil activities. Royalty was later reduced to 1%.333 
 
Dispute settlement International arbitration (under rules of International Chamber of 
Commerce) governed by Venezuelan law. 
 
Changes in 
regulation 
PDVSA would compensate foreign firms for unexpected changes in 
rules that caused harm to them.  
 
Source: Official Gazette of 9 September, 1993 
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Alirio Parra, Minister of Energy when the associations were contracted, recalled, “It 
was not an easy task to attract investors to a relatively new area of the business. Even 
companies that were convinced about investing found difficulties in obtaining 
financing.”334 In any case, the legal framework approved in September 1993 allowed 
PDVSA to enter in four association agreements in extra-heavy oil, one in heavy oil 
and one in gas (see Table 4.13). 
 
These ‘strategic associations’ together with the exploitation agreements of 1992 and 
1993 for abandoned fields constituted what later was presented as a fully fledged ‘oil 
opening’. Each process responded to different needs, and in both cases the Ministry of 
Energy envisioned the ‘opening’ as a solution to problems such as abandonment of 
mature oil fields, the need to make exploitation of extra-heavy oil reservoirs profitable 
and exploration of the gas reservoirs. The ‘oil opening’ was, however, significantly 
expanded in the following administration of President Caldera. The next section 
discusses this process. 
 
 
Table 4.13  Strategic associations 1993-1997 
Project Type of oil/gas Foreign private 
investors 
 
Approved in Status 
Petrozuata Extra heavy oil 
 
Conoco 1993 In operation (*) 
Sincor Extra heavy oil 
 
Total and Statoil 1993 In operation (*) 
Cerro Negro Extra heavy oil 
 
Exxon-Mobil and Veba 1997 In operation (*) 
Ameriven Extra heavy oil 
 
Arco, Philips and 
Texaco 
1997 In operation (*) 
Boscan Heavy oil 
 
Chevron 1995 In operation 
Cristobal 
Colon 
Natural gas Shell, Exxon and 
Mitsubishi 
 
1993 Never entered 
into operation 
(*) They were producing in total 600 thousand barrels/day of ‘upgraded’ oil by 2006 according to PDVSA. 
Source: PDVSA; Bernard Mommer, ibid.  
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These ‘strategic associations’ together with the exploitation agreements of 1992 and 
1993 for abandoned fields constituted what later was presented as a fully fledged ‘oil 
opening’. Each process responded to different needs, and in both cases the Ministry of 
Energy envisioned the ‘opening’ as a solution to problems such as abandonment of 
mature oil fields, the need to make exploitation of extra-heavy oil reservoirs profitable 
and exploration of the gas reservoirs. The ‘oil opening’ was, however, significantly 
expanded in the following administration of President Caldera. The next section 
discusses this process. 
 
 
4.4 The extended ‘oil opening’ 
 
The so-called ‘oil opening’ process was intensified during Caldera’s administration. 
PDVSA took complete control of the process as the administration was in a 
precarious position from its very beginning. President Caldera was elected in a close 
election in December 1993. In the same election, the resulting Congress was divided. 
No party could get a majority. Caldera’s own coalition of small parties obtained only 
about 25% of the deputies (lower chamber) and 22% of senators (upper chamber).  
 
A major economic event marked the first two years of the administration. Three 
weeks before the inauguration of President Caldera an acute banking crisis erupted, in 
which about 70% of the banking system collapsed. The public bail out implied a fiscal 
burden of about 20% of GDP.335 More importantly, facing the banking crisis 
consumed Caldera’s economic team for two years. No other major policy was 
addressed during that time bar an attempt at fiscal reform.  
 
Caldera had campaigned on a platform of strong opposition to the previous 
administration’s reforms. Caldera coined a phrase that summarised his policy stance. 
Mocking the links of President Pérez’s policies to the multilateral organisations based 
in Washington, specially the IMF, Caldera promised that his priority was the ‘people’ 
by saying he had signed a “letter of intent with the people”. Once in power, Caldera’s 
economic team was left with, on the one hand, the promise of distancing itself from 
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Washington based organisations, and on the other hand, few alternative policy 
options, in large part owing to the unexpected bail out of collapsed banks.  
 
Oil policy was, in this context, an area where Caldera was less tied by campaign 
promises. The initial signs were of a reliance on PDVSA not only for the conduct of 
oil policy but also to help his government to address other urgent needs. Caldera 
initially assigned a businessman linked to the oil industry, Julio Sosa-Rodríguez, to 
coordinate of the economic team. Sosa-Rodríguez, named Minister of Finance, 
assembled a team of close advisors that included Jose Moreno-Leon, former Minister 
of Energy during the Herrera administration (1979-1984) as responsible for the tax 
agency (Seniat) and Luís Grisanti, an executive from Sosa-Rodriguez’s own oil 
company, as Deputy Minister of Finance.336 Some senior PDVSA officials were ‘lent’ 
to the government. Gustavo Roosen, PDVSA’s president, was made responsible for 
administering Banco Latino, the largest collapsed bank. Soon after, another PDVSA 
official, Alonso Velazco, was appointed to an emergency board created to address the 
banking crisis (Junta de Emergencia Financiera). Other PDVSA staff was re-assigned 
to various public bureaucratic positions. Among others, J. J. García, former Chief 
financial officer in PDVSA, was named Director of Public Credit within the Ministry 
of Finance. Edgar Olivo, a PDVSA official, was made responsible for the technical 
aspects of a new office created to administer an exchange control mechanism in 1994 
(OTAC). David Moran went to serve as advisor to the Deputy Minister of Finance 
Grisanti. 
 
Caldera picked Edwin Arrieta as Minister of Energy. Arrieta was an oil businessman 
who was serving as Ambassador to Kuwait at the time. More surprising, Caldera 
selected Luís Giusti as president of PDVSA. Caldera was determined to name an 
insider in PDVSA, contrasting with his predecessor’s policy. High ranking executives 
within the industry were considered for the job. The selection of Giusti was an 
unexpected one since several executives were considered to be ahead of him in the so-
called system of ‘meritocracy’ within the oil conglomerate. Alirio Parra, the 
incumbent Minister of Energy, recalled, “Sosa-Rodríguez was testing possible 
candidates from the high ranks such as presidents of PDVSA’s main operating 
                                                 
336 Julio Sosa Rodríguez was the main shareholder of a petro-chemical group of companies 
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subsidiaries. I was consulted by Sosa-Rodríguez in that regard. I gave him a list of 
possible candidates agreeing with the proposed contenders such as Trinkunas, 
Volkenborn, and Mandini. I recommended Giusti as member of the board but not for 
President. He had impeccable credentials but was too young and an older generation 
of executives was in front of him. He was certain to be President of PDVSA one day 
but not in 1994.”337 
 
Giusti had been associated, as an advisor in oil matters while he was acting as 
PDVSA staff, first with Eduardo Fernández, Secretary General of Copei, and later to 
Caldera’s contender in the 1993 election, Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, the candidate of 
Copei. Nonetheless, Giusti was appointed President of PDVSA. He stayed in that post 
for the entire Caldera administration. During this time, PDVSA developed an 
unprecedented and orchestrated lobby campaign in political circles for the new policy 
ideas.338 Even before, Giusti was convinced of the need to explain PDVSA ideas 
about oil policy. In Giusti’s words, “We had the opinion that in order to have a long 
term oil strategy for Venezuela, we had to make sure that the people who will 
eventually lead the country knew what was going on.”339 He acknowledged that this 
was a new position among PDVSA’s top ranks. He also admitted having initiated 
consultations with the political world because “one of the problems that the oil 
company had long had was that it had effectively been absent from the country, even 
hidden from the country at times, immersed in a sort of crystal bubble…when talking 
to politicians was a sin”.340  
 
Giusti’s public exposure caused him to be heavily identified with the main issues of 
oil policy during this time. He later presided over major organisational changes in 
PDVSA and assumed the leadership of oil policy. Internally, Giusti pushed the 
reorganisation of the oil conglomerate from the holding-operating subsidiaries scheme 
to a fully integrated oil company. Externally it was, however, the direction he took in 
the so-called ‘oil opening’ that represented a major shift in oil policy. 
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 Pushing the PDVSA’s ‘oil opening’ agenda 
 
As early as 1994 PDVSA was determined to develop the ‘opening’ in other areas of 
the oil business. Claus Graf, PDVSA’s Vice President, acknowledged that although 
the Ministry of Energy had not approved the opening of the oil business for 
conventional crude oil, PDVSA had got “an authorisation to contact politicians to test 
the water regarding the feasibility of the project”.341 
 
PDVSA thoroughly prepared the next ‘round’ of the oil opening342. Juan Garantón, a 
lawyer from the law firm that advised PDVSA on the contracts for the round, recalled, 
“PDVSA assembled a very well prepared team for the negotiations with the foreign 
companies and for conducting the bidding process. PDVSA’s professionals were at 
the same level as any of the big international companies.”343 
 
PDVSA developed a comprehensive rapprochement with the principal political and 
economic actors. PDVSA donated computer and other office equipment to the 
Ministry of Energy. Additionally, it paid the Ministry’s staff extra bonuses to improve 
their salaries344 Alí Rodríguez , President of the Energy Permanent Committee in the 
Chamber of Deputies, remembered that PDVSA invited the members of the 
committee to visit its subsidiaries abroad. PDVSA provided the committee with 
information technology equipment since, as Rodríguez lamented, the committee did 
not have a single computer or other means to allow them to do their job.345 
 
Local capital and labour welcomed the oil opening. As one of the earliest criticisms of 
the oil opening was that the participation of local private firms was neglected or 
severely limited,346 PDVSA later offered to reserve five exploration areas for 
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Venezuelan companies alone or in partnership with foreign investors. Venezuela’s 
private oil sector embraced PDVSA’s auctions of new fields, if only to acquire greater 
participation.347  
 
Organised labour supported the oil opening as well. Carlos Ortega, President of the 
main oil union (Fedepetrol) endorsed the oil opening as a positive measure to 
overcome the economic crisis of that moment.348 Coincidently, the other main 
discussion during the time of the oil opening under Caldera’s administration was the 
reform of the social security system, especially the severance and retirement 
protection regime. One of the ideas that the main labour union, CTV,349 was keen to 
explore was that the State would pay accumulated government debt to workers 
(related to the social security system) with shares or other financial instruments issued 
by PDVSA. The oil opening was in line with those aspirations.350 Although PDVSA 
never made public its institutional position regarding the transfer of shares to the 
workers, the implicit support of the main labour union was to its advantage. 
 
PDVSA also approached the university sector. PDVSA offered the three main 
universities with oil engineering faculties three marginal oil fields allowing them to 
obtain financial resources for the universities as a whole and to serve as training and 
research resources.351 PDVSA had successfully accomplished consultations with all 
important actors when it finally submitted its proposal to the Ministry. 
 
PDVSA presented its proposal to the Ministry of Energy in November 1994 for 
further consultation with the President of the Republic. Luís Giusti, President of 
PDVSA, described this process: “We prepared the framework, bound in grey and blue 
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books, of the opening and we went to the office of the Minister Arrieta in mid-
November…Arrieta presented it to President Caldera and later to the cabinet.”352  
 
President Caldera deemed the proposal too complex and postponed its consideration 
for weeks. Caldera’s objections were based on his traditional position regarding the 
participation of private investment in the oil business. He had opposed the infamous 
Article 5 in the debate of the Nationalisation Law in 1975 and was highly critical of 
the foreign companies during the concessions regime.353  
 
Additionally, his political success in 1993 opposing the neo-liberal orientation of 
President Pérez put him at odds with the idea of privatisation of part of the oil 
business. On the other hand, Caldera had been warned of flaws in the PDVSA 
proposal by his political allies and later his Minister of Planning Teodoro Petkoff. 
Petkoff and a PDVSA advisor, Bernard Mommer, who opposed several aspects of the 
proposal, informed Caldera about the shortcomings of the proposal. Other members of 
Caldera’s cabinet such as Minister of Planning Werner Corrales, and PDVSA’s board 
member, Hugo Pérez La Salvia (who was also a former Minister of Energy and close 
advisor to Caldera), also voiced reservations about the project.354 Despite this 
opposition, President Caldera gave his approval to the project in December 1994. 
 
Caldera’s administration was extremely weak. Since his narrow victory in the 
elections of 1993 Caldera had faced serious threats to his position. First, support from 
the armed forces was not guaranteed as was evident by the well known intervention of 
the US State Department to discourage military unrest in December 1993. Second, the 
banking crisis that saw almost three-quarters of the banking system disappear in less 
than a year brought widespread social unrest. There were numerous protests in 
Caracas and other large cities by pensioners, small depositors of the collapsed banks, 
saving associations and other groups hit by the closure of the banks.  
 
To make matters worst, Caldera lacked a majority in Congress to back several 
legislative measures that were needed to attend to the unprecedented financial crisis. 
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Caldera sought a political alliance with AD. AD secretary general Luís Alfaro-Ucero 
gave his support. This was first manifested when AD threw its full support behind the 
legislative measures to tackle the financial crisis.355 
 
While both the banking crisis bail out and the resulting recession created a severe 
deficit in the public finances, PDVSA was the only immediate source of fiscal 
revenue.356 PDVSA represented not only a secure source of fiscal revenues but the 
best guarantee of securing international financing in such dire fiscal conditions.357 In 
light of these financial problems, the government seriously considered issuing a 
financial instrument called ‘Oil bonds’ in the international market in order to raise 
funds for the banking crisis bail out.358 The idea was that such bonds were to be 
directly guaranteed with PDVSA’s crude oil sales. PDVSA’s president Luís Giusti 
defended the usefulness of these bonds.359 The government, however, opted for 
financing mainly through the Central Bank and internal debt. The possibility of using 
PDVSA directly in the resolution of the banking crisis showed the reliance of 
Caldera’s administration on the sole part of the public sector that remained strong.360 
 
Alí Rodríguez, president of the Energy Permanent Committee in the Chamber of 
Deputies, suggested that the timing of the presidential approval was related to the 
need for opening international financial flows.361 As President Caldera was about to 
attend the first presidential Summit of the Americas in Miami, USA, in mid-
December, the oil opening was certainly the most concrete and immediate signal 
Venezuela could have sent to the international financial markets to attract the urgently 
needed capital inflows. The Caldera administration was in no position to reject an 
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initiative so strongly advocated by senior PDVSA officials that, at the same time, 
helped the government’s efforts to solve the severe financial crisis. 
 
In fact, the oil opening was to become one of the central points of the so-called 
‘Agenda Venezuela’. 362 This ‘agenda’ was an attempt by the Caldera administration 
to promote policies that basically was based on the same rationale as the previous 
President Pérez so-called ‘neo-liberal package’. Similar to Pérez’s policy package in 
1989, the Venezuelan Agenda included the financial assistance of the multilateral 
organisations such as the IMF. The oil opening played a double policy role in that 
context. On the one hand, it signalled a policy of welcoming private investment as 
was discussed earlier. On the other hand, it allowed an expansion of the oil sector in 
particular and the economy in general without committing significant public 
investment. The IMF had demanded a contraction in public spending including a 
limitation in PDVSA investment plans.363 
 
 
The ‘oil opening’ and the Congress (1994-1999) 
 
Seven months after Caldera’s cabinet approved the PDVSA’s proposal Congress 
endorsed the next phase of the oil opening. Congress approved the guidelines for the 
contracts PDVSA used in the auctions they were preparing for 1996.364 The process, 
in a much divided Congress (see Table 4.14), was prolonged even with PDVSA’s 
intense lobbying efforts with the main political actors.  
 
The main political parties supported the PDVSA’s proposal. Copei was content with 
the idea in principle. The previous personal association of PDVSA’s president Luís 
Giusti first with Secretary General Eduardo Fernandez and later with Copei’s former 
presidential candidate Oswaldo Alvarez Paz assured a sympathetic position to 
PDVSA’s proposal. Secondly, Caldera’s political understanding with AD secured its 
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conclusions from my conversation on the subject with two interviewees, Pedro Rosas 
(interview by author in London several times) and Teodoro Petkoff, interview by author in 
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364 Official Gazette 35,754, 17 July 1995. 
support. AD’s position, however, was not consistent. The oil opening as presented by 
PDVSA conflicted with AD’s traditional values in oil policy. AD’s traditionalists 
such as Carlos Canache-Mata and Luís Piñerua-Ordaz opposed the proposal. AD’s 
Secretary General Luís Alfaro-Ucero, however, threw his full support behind 
PDVSA’s proposal although he later opposed a possible further privatisation of the 
company.365  
 
 
Table 4.14  Composition of Congress (January 1994-January 1999) 
1.6 Party Deputies % Senators % 
 
AD 55 27.1 16 32 
Copei 53 26.1 14 28 
Caldera coalition 
(Convergencia and MAS) 
50 24.6 11 22 
Causa R 40 19.7 9 18 
Others 5 2.5 0  
Total 203 100 50 100 
Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral 
 
 
Major resistance to the proposal came from the ‘Radical Cause’ party (Causa R). This 
party’s congressman Alí Rodríguez played an active role as co-chairman of the 
bicameral committee of 23 deputies and senators specially set up to discuss the 
proposal. Some members of Caldera’s coalition in Congress, such as the President of 
the MAS party Gustavo Márquez, also opposed some aspects of the proposal. The 
measure was finally passed with the votes of Copei, AD and the parties of Caldera’s 
coalition. The final version included minor concessions such as a proposition from 
Gustavo Márquez to grant the Ministry of Energy the responsibility to select the 
president of the committee to be created to control each association. According to Alí 
Rodríguez, several members of the bicameral committee voted in favour of the 
proposal, obeying party whips.366 The political agreement between President Caldera 
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política petrolera’, El Nacional, 19 October 1998; ‘Alfaro reitero que PDVSA y Edelca no 
son empresas privatizables’, El Nacional, 4 August 1998. 
366 Ali Rodríguez cited in José E. Arrioja, ibid., p.145. 
and the AD party ensured sufficient additional votes, along with those of Copei, to 
proceed with the oil opening.  
 
Although Congress consented to the PDVSA oil opening initiatives, it resisted 
PDVSA’s privatisation drive on two occasions. First, the lower chamber of Congress 
passed ‘an accord’ to outlaw the possibility of privatising PDVSA. The ‘accord’ was 
proposed by the AD party and got the backing of Caldera’s coalition (MAS and 
Convergencia) and Causa R.367 The Congress’s reaction can be seen as a response to 
public announcements by senior PDVSA officials, President Giusti among them, 
suggesting the possibility of the privatisation of PDVSA. Giusti is reported to have 
said in a meeting with the main business association Fedecamaras in May 1996 that 
he preferred not to talk about the privatisation of the oil industry because “it was 
counterproductive at this moment. I am afraid it could get me in trouble with 
Congress when they discuss the oil opening contracts”.368  
 
Congress’s accord against full privatisation in June 1996 signalled that the approval of 
the eight oil opening contracts was a limited legislative endorsement of the 
participation of foreign capital in the oil business instead of a fully fledged welcoming 
of that policy. Congress’s cautious attitude to transferring oil business activities to the 
private sector was again demonstrated in 1998. PDVSA prepared a bill regarding the 
opening of the hydrocarbons internal market. Notably, the intention was to allow free 
market competition in petrol distribution and commercialisation.369 Even if Congress 
approved the bill, an important modification was introduced regarding the power to 
set petrol prices.370 The approved bill retained that power in the hands of the Ministry 
of Energy.371 Internal petrol prices have always been a controversial policy issue. 
Congress’s modification reiterated the traditional view of mainstream political parties 
that Venezuelans are entitled to low petrol prices. PDVSA’s call for deregulating 
petrol prices went unheard.  
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 The ‘oil opening’ auctions of 1996 and 1997  
 
PDVSA conducted two rounds of auctions under the new regulatory framework. The 
first auctions were known as the ‘profit sharing agreements’ round. PDVSA chose 
thirty areas of light and medium oil to be auctioned although the first ten areas were 
relatively unexplored. As the legal framework was based on Article 5 of the 
Nationalisation Law, this was a loose interpretation of that article, since it was 
original conceived for ‘special circumstances’. The previous uses of the Article in the 
cases of extra-heavy oil, natural gas and abandoned medium-oil fields were less 
controversial as these were deemed non-traditional oil activities and hence ‘special 
cases’. The new chosen areas, however, contained oil of similar quality to the oil that 
constituted the core business of PDVSA.  
 
The new agreements basically allowed PDVSA to transfer its right to explore 
designated plots to private companies who acted as contractors. The companies, 
selected in a public auction, acquired the right to explore for up to nine years. In case 
of successful discovery of oil, the companies would enter into a consortium in which 
PDVSA had the option of participating up to 35%. The consortium could exploit the 
plot for 20 years and a possible extension of 10 years. Table 4.15 shows the main 
contractual terms included in the profit sharing agreements. 
 
The fiscal regime was flexible. In particular, the royalty could be reduced following 
the attainment by PDVSA of special treatment for those associations.372 Additionally 
some accounting rules such as depreciation rates, inflation adjustments, and tax 
credits for investments were given a favourable interpretation to make the investments 
more attractive to foreign firms.373 Finally, municipal taxes were waived. This later 
concession triggered a legal action in the Supreme Court by opponents of oil opening, 
who deemed this measure unconstitutional.  
 
                                                 
372 The Ministry of Energy signed on the 5 December 1995 an agreement with PDVSA’s 
subsidiary, CVP, to make the royalty payment subject to the profitability of the exploitation 
measured by internal rate of return. In practice, these calculations were made by PDVSA not 
by the Ministry. 
373 Gastón Parra, ibid., p.21. 
PDVSA conducted a bidding round in June 1996. Eight out of ten auctioned areas 
were granted to international consortiums. The eight contracts, based on the general 
framework approved by Congress in July 1995, were presented to Congress in March 
1996 to final approval. They were all approved swiftly in June 1996. 374 
 
 
Table 4.15  Profit sharing agreements (1996) main contractual terms 
Topic Contracting terms 
 
Tax rate Rate applicable to conventional crude oil (67.7%). 
 
Royalties Flexible. Possibility that the Ministry reduce the 16.66% royalty 
applicable to other oil activities. Royalty to be adjusted according to 
profitability of the exploitation (measured by the internal return rate to be 
calculated for each project). 
 
Control required 
by Article 5 
Shareholding majority not required. Control achieved through contractual 
terms granting veto power to a Controlling Committee of four members, 
two chosen by foreign companies and two chosen by PDVSA. One of the 
PDVSA appointees was to be the President of the committee (In case of a 
tied vote, the President had a decisive vote). 
 
Dispute 
settlement 
International arbitration (under rules of International Chamber of 
Commerce) governed by Venezuelan law. 
 
Changes in 
regulation 
PDVSA would compensate foreign firms for unexpected changes in rules 
that caused harm to them. 
  
Bidding 
parameter 
Companies bid an excess profit levy called Participation of the State in 
Profits or PEG (Participation del Estado en las Ganancias) for the January 
1996 bidding round. For the following round (June 1997) the bidding 
parameter was a Valorisation Factor (Called FDV), a lump sum paid in 
advance for the right to explore the auctioned plot. 
Source: Bernard Mommer, ibid., p.53 
 
 
The next oil opening round was held in June 1997. The contracts were slightly 
different. The chosen areas were those requiring a “reactivation of production or 
incremental production”.375 The contracts were considered ‘services contracts’ similar 
to those used in the 1992-1993 bidding conducted by the Ministry of Energy. PDVSA 
offered 20 areas (five reserved for local investors) and received a favourable response 
for 18. Table 4.16 shows the principal features of the two auction rounds.  
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 Table 4.16  Main aspects of the 1996-1997 auctions 
Aspect Auction of January 1996 Auction of June 1997 
 
Areas 10 prospective areas to be 
explored. 
20 productive areas that need 
reactivation or incremental 
production. 
 
Extension (total) 17,953 Square Kilometres 7,699 Square Kilometres 
 
Reserved for local 
investors 
None Five (16% of total) 
Bidding parameter PEG (participation of the State in 
profits). An extra levy on profits 
after normal tax and royalty 
payments). 
 
FDV (factor of valorisation). Lump 
sum payment for right to exploit 
the reservoir. 
Areas granted 8 
 
18 
Approval of 
Congress 
All eight contracts approved in 
June 1996. 
Not explicit congressional approval 
(based on 1992-1993 services 
contracts). 
Source: Gastón Parra, ibid. Own estimations. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The relationship between PDVSA and the administrations of Presidents Pérez, 
Velazquez and Caldera was dictated by the increasing weakness of the government. 
After the worst decade of growth on record, Venezuelan governments in the 1990s 
tried to restore stability to the economy and to the political system. Those efforts not 
only failed but fostered more economic problems and more political instability. In this 
context, PDVSA emerged not only more independent of its political masters but the 
supreme force in setting and implementing oil policy. This supremacy was reached 
through a combination of the old strategy of advancing decisions prior to their 
scrutiny by the government (fait accompli) and taking advantage of opportunities 
brought by external factors such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 as well as, in 
particular, the government’s continuous need to address political and economic crises.  
 
The increasing involvement of PDVSA in policy issues such as the administering of 
Venezuelan oil reservoirs brought politics to the company in an unprecedented 
fashion. Two former patterns of PDVSA-government relationships were altered. First, 
PDVSA progressively took over the Ministry of Energy’s responsibilities and second, 
PDVSA developed an unprecedented strategy of lobbying politicians and policy 
makers to advance its preferred policies. 
 
The Ministry of Energy initially sought to implement a limited opening to private 
investors outside PDVSA’s core activities as a solution to the specific needs of the 
Venezuelan oil mix (abandoned oil fields, extra-heavy oil, and natural gas). An 
initially reluctant PDVSA, however, assumed the leading role in implementing that 
initiative to the point that, in a sort of regulatory capture, it ended up controlling all 
aspects of the policy. Moreover, when the government was extremely weak due to 
political instability, PDVSA took the initiative itself.  
 
The oil company pushed the so-called ‘oil opening process’ to its core business, 
contradicting traditional Venezuelan oil policy values.376 PDVSA’s political masters 
could do very little to resist the oil company’s offensive since not only were they 
concerned about their own survival but also because PDVSA was the only reliable 
source of stability and the only economic sector through which to attract immediate 
investment to boost the economy.  
 
Partial privatisation of the oil business, however, was not a response to the neo-liberal 
reforms of the 1989-1992 period. As is illustrated by the ad hoc commission created 
in 1989 to set oil policy, the Ministry had lost its technical capacities long before 
President Pérez introduced his reform package. The Venezuelan public bureaucracy 
had been debilitated for decades. Having lost its capacity to steer policy, the 
government had to rely on its hierarchical prerogatives to appoint or to remove from 
office senior PDVSA officials thought to be in line with its preferences.  
 
This state of affairs gave PDVSA enough room to advance its own preferences. 
PDVSA not only pushed its own expansion but it assured control of the private 
investment-led expansion. In the 1990s, and especially in the second half of the 
decade, the government had little choice but to rely on PDVSA’s judgement. 
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President Caldera’s permanently weak position prevented him from resisting PDVSA 
initiatives. Moreover, PDVSA’s leading of the process of oil opening suited Caldera’s 
immediate political needs. 
 
 Chapter 5 
 
The Stabilisation Fund  (1991–2005) 
 
 
This chapter reviews the implementation of the stabilisation fund established in 1998. 
The motivation for the creation of this fund stemmed from a long held belief among 
economists that fluctuations in oil-generated revenues had, over time, harmed the 
Venezuelan economy. The Stabilisation Fund aimed to deal with volatile oil prices 
and to provide the Venezuelan Treasury with a steady income from oil taxes.  
 
Establishing a stabilisation fund had been considered in the past by several separate 
administrations. In practice, however, it was attempted seriously only by the 
technocratic administration of President Pérez (between 1989 and 1993). Pérez, 
however, failed to create the fund, and it was in 1998, during the last days of the 
Caldera administration, that the Macroeconomic Stabilisation Investment Fund 
(FIEM) was finally passed into law. This chapter examines the process that led up to 
the creation of the Fund, and its implementation during President Chávez’s years in 
office (1999-2005). The chapter also analyses the changes the Fund has undergone 
during the Chávez administration, and the extent to which it has departed significantly 
from the original. 
 
The findings of this chapter support the argument that Venezuelan institutions are 
malleable according to the preferences of the President. They suggest that oil income 
tends to be depleted by the President according to his perceived short term needs, 
leaving no margin for allocating part of those funds for later use (i.e. inter-temporal 
allocation). This dynamic resulted in politicisation of the management of the fund. 
The executive branch disposed of the collected funds as it saw fit for the President’s 
political needs. Established rules of the game were ignored or modified by the 
Executive. As on similar occasions neither the legislature, nor the judiciary, nor the 
Central Bank were able to constrain the Executive’s ability to implement its 
preferences. In this context, the Venezuelan State, during the period 1999-2005, did 
not allow for the institutionalisation of a stabilisation fund despite the fact that the 
Constitution of 1999 had a clear mandate to do so.  
 
The chapter is organised into four parts. It first examines how the idea of having a 
stabilisation mechanism for the volatile oil income evolved among Venezuelan policy 
makers, and its evolution from a proposal in the early 1990s to legislation by the end 
of the decade. Second, it reviews both the events surrounding the creation of the Fund 
in 1998 and the modifications made to the regulation of the Fund in the first years of 
the Chávez administration. Third, the chapter analyses how the fund was run down 
between 2001 and 2003, and finally, section four explains how the Fund moved away 
from its original purpose.  
 
 
5.1. Towards the creation of a stabilisation fund 
 
The oil price is set in the international market. Despite efforts from producers, such as 
Opec, oil prices respond to complex conditions, which more often than not are beyond 
their control. Analysts have observed that historically the oil price follows an erratic 
path. The random characteristics described by Powell means that predicting oil prices 
is extremely difficult.377 This difficulty has major consequences for the Venezuelan 
economy. Given the importance of the oil sector to the overall economy, fluctuations 
in oil prices ripple throughout the economy, and impact significantly on the most 
important macroeconomic factors.  
 
The economic literature suggests that ‘stabilisation’ mechanisms can offset some of 
the distortions that fluctuations in commodity prices bring to producers.378 This 
complex economic theory can be simplified in every day parlance as ‘saving for a 
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rainy day’. Venezuelan policy makers first considered a stabilisation mechanism in 
the first decades of the Twentieth Century. During the dictatorship of Juan Vicente 
Gomez (1908-1935), his Minister of Finance, Román Cárdenas, floated the idea and 
created a similar, but short-lived mechanism for that purpose. The Venezuelan 
economy, even before oil was a significant economic force, depended on exports of 
major commodities such as coffee beans.  
 
Later, in the so-called ‘Trienio’ period (1945-1948), Rómulo Betancourt, the leader of 
the dominant political party, AD, contemplated the idea of a stabilisation mechanism. 
Betancourt mentioned the need for the creation of an anti-cyclical fund for use in any 
crisis resulting from unfavourable oil prices.379 A proposal presented to Congress in 
1948 was not approved because, according to Betancourt himself, it was not possible 
to conclude the discussions about it that year due to the accumulation of legislation 
being debated.380 In fact, in November 1948, a coup d'état thwarted the ‘Trienio’ 
agenda. Betancourt was particularly sensitive to what he characterised as the ‘miner 
mentality’ of Venezuelans. He complained that, “Venezuelan behaviour was typical 
of mining communities, as in the California gold rush days. There was a national urge 
to spend until one’s pockets were empty.”381 When Betancourt became President 
(1959-1964) he oversaw the passing of a law by Congress, which included a form of 
stabilisation mechanism that would have been managed within the Central Bank. The 
clauses of the Central Bank Law of 1960 regarding the stabilisation fund, however, 
were never implemented. 
 
The concept of a stabilisation mechanism lay dormant until the early 1990s. 
Hausmann explained that the Venezuelan economy adopted other mechanisms to 
adjust to oil price fluctuations.382 He identified three periods in which Venezuela 
managed oil rents in a relatively orderly manner. First, the 1943-1957 period was 
characterised by a fixed exchange rate, free access to foreign exchange, free trade and 
balanced budgets. The fiscal arena was the necessary ‘shock absorber’ of the 
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fluctuations in oil revenues. Less oil income meant reduced budgets. Second was the 
period 1958-1973, which witnessed the first significant shock to oil revenues, after the 
surge in oil prices triggered by the Suez Crisis of the late 1950s. Venezuela’s 
government faced the challenge of fluctuating income by devaluing the currency and 
reducing expenditure. Additionally, import substitution policy replaced free trade. 
Budget prudence and protectionism served to limit the impact of oil price volatility. 
Third, the 1974 boom in the oil market was translated into an uncontrolled expansion 
of public expenditure, through both regular budgetary channels and a massive 
expansion of public enterprises. This increase in spending broke the pre-existing 
‘rule’ of budgetary prudence. The steep hike in oil prices was thought of, by 
politicians and policy makers, as a permanent condition for the oil market. It was in 
this context that political leaders saw an opportunity to boost economic growth 
through massive public investment funded by oil revenues.383 High prices, however, 
proved short-lived and the oil price had levelled by 1977.  
 
The Herrera administration, inaugurated in 1979, moved to contain this fiscal 
profligacy when the Iranian Revolution occurred, and oil prices again rocketed. This 
new rise in the oil price allowed Venezuelan politicians to postpone the need to 
address the obvious imbalances in the public finances. Furthermore, around this time, 
the worldwide abandonment of fixed exchange rates and the increase in inflation 
brought additional challenges to the Venezuelan economy. When, in 1982, the oil 
boom finished, it was clear that the divergence between public spending and Treasury 
receipts was unsustainable. This imbalance forced Venezuela to abandon fixed 
exchange rates. Her currency was devalued on 18 February 1983, thereby exposing 
the Venezuelan economy to volatility and the fluctuating price of oil exports. The 
initial policy response to this crisis was a combination of foreign exchange, price and 
interest rate controls. Hausmann termed these responses “the administrative 
prohibition of imbalances”.384 
 
The Herrera government’s ability to manage complex macroeconomic variables, 
however, proved limited. Administrative incompetence led to continuous devaluation 
of the national currency, the Bolívar, against the US dollar. Periods of devaluation 
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characterised the whole of the 1980s. The logic was painfully consistent. Once a set of 
macroeconomic administrative measures proved ineffectual, the government resorted 
to new devaluations. Devaluation, which led to an increase in Bolívar-denominated 
resources, created the illusion of fiscal equilibrium. The consequence of devaluation 
was inflation, which of itself caused further imbalance and helped manufacture the 
next crisis. The consequence of the collapse in oil prices in 1986, during Lusinchi’s 
administration, was postponed by three years by raiding the foreign reserves. When 
the reserves ran dry, in 1989, Venezuela experienced three digit inflation and a 
dramatic fall in GDP. 
 
Consequently, when President Pérez took power in 1989 he faced a disastrous and 
worrying set of economic conditions. He appointed a cabinet of technocrats to help 
manage the crisis, and one of the decisions taken was to revive the concept of a 
stabilisation fund. The delivery of the stabilisation fund was the responsibility of the 
Minister of Planning, Miguel Rodríguez, who instructed the Cornell University-
educated economist Ricardo Hausmann to prepare the proposal for the fund.  
 
 
The Stabilisation Fund: failed first attempt  
 
In 1991 the government of technocrats, led by Pérez, adopted the Hausmann Report, 
and advanced the case for a stabilisation fund in Congress. Ministers began by testing 
the willingness of congressional leaders, notably the influential members of the 
Finance Permanent Committee in the lower chamber.385 This committee was 
controlled by two veteran congressmen: Armando Sanchez-Bueno (AD) and Haydee 
Castillo de López (Copei).386 
 
Congressional approval, however, proved difficult because relations between the elite 
of the AD party and President Pérez were strained. The tension was partly the 
consequence of Pérez embracing neo-liberal ideals and delegating policy making to a 
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non-partisan technocratic cabinet. Underlying this policy difference was a long 
standing distrust between Pérez and AD, which meant that the relationship between 
the two was only ever distant. Despite his appeal to the AD rank and file, Pérez was 
not popular with the AD political elite. The traditionalists within the senior ranks of 
AD favoured Octavio Lepage during the contest for the selection of the candidate for 
President. Whilst Pérez won the nomination, by the vote of party members, his 
relationships with the party leaders were bitter. Not surprisingly, AD and Pérez 
clashed when, once inaugurated, he broke with tradition and chose to appoint to 
cabinet few traditional AD members. A Minister from the Pérez team recalled, “Pérez 
just hated AD. When we were considering appointing somebody to an important post, 
we usually presented Pérez with three names. Two linked to AD , usually 
recommended by the AD Secretary General Alfaro-Ucero, and one name not linked to 
AD. Pérez always chose the latter.”387  
 
The government-AD relationship reached crisis levels when policy announcements 
emanating from the cabinet technocrats sharply contrasted with traditional AD 
positions. Inspired by the infamous ‘Washington consensus’, cabinet ministers 
promoted trade liberalisation, financial deregulation, removal of exchange controls 
and privatisation. It was in this context, with free market policies being promoted by 
the cabinet, that AD traditionalists opposed the idea of a stabilisation fund as a neo-
liberal solution, despite being advocated by the AD founder, Betancourt, around 40 
years earlier. 
 
The technocrats’ agenda needed a substantial legislative effort. The scope of the 
intended policy reforms were well beyond the realm of administrative measures the 
Executive could undertake. The ‘package’, as the technocrats agenda was commonly 
known at the time, needed to go through AD-controlled Congress. This gave the AD 
elite the opportunity to check Pérez’s power. Rosas-Bravo, Deputy to Minister 
Rodríguez at that time, recalled bitterly, “We have to fight law by law in the 
Congress. By no means was AD control of the Congress a guarantee that our 
proposals would succeed.”388  
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By the time the Stabilisation Fund Law was proposed, the rate of success, measured 
by how many proposals the government had managed to get approved by the AD-
dominated Congress, was mixed. Trade liberalisation and privatisation laws had 
cleared congressional hurdles. Tax and financial sector reform, however, had not 
enjoyed the same success. Miguel Rodríguez admitted, “The reforms we proposed 
were out of tune with the political times. In a society used to having oil revenues 
paying for almost everything, our proposals, such as the creation of a fund to save oil 
money, just short circuited with the political elite.”389  
 
The proposal for a stabilisation fund faced resistance. Gustavo García, a close advisor 
to the government at that time recalled, “Senior congressional leaders simply did not 
buy the idea of a fund whose functioning was regulated by a complicated formula. 
The law based on the Hausmann’s report was complex and written in a highly 
technical language that just created more scepticism about a new Pérez government 
initiative.”390 Rosas-Bravo also observed, “The Hausmann proposal was considered 
an exquisite policy proposal, too sophisticated for the taste of traditional legislative 
leaders.”391 But not only congressional leaders resisted the project for a fund. 
PDVSA, the oil company, disagreed with several aspects of the proposal. Since part 
of the saved money that was to be in the Fund were to be at the PDVSA’s disposal, 
the company technocrats were also very critical of the proposal and objected to some 
parts of it.392  
 
Later political events complicated matters even further. The February 1992 failed 
coup d'état led by Hugo Chávez, the following coup attempt in November of the same 
year, plus the impeachment of President Pérez in May 1993, combined to bury all 
Pérez initiatives, including the Stabilisation Fund.  
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5.2. The Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilisation (FIEM) 
 
The political balance of the country completely changed after 1993. The scheduled 
elections, for President and Congress, in December 1993 marked this shift. 
Dominance by the Punto Fijo era’s main political parties was seriously threatened. 
They could barely retain control of Congress and the results of the presidential 
elections emphasised their weakness. For the first time since 1958 a candidate not 
supported by either AD or Copei won the Presidency.  
 
Rafael Caldera was elected after running as an independent backed by a coalition of 
small parties. He ran his campaign on a platform of complete rejection of Pérez 
policies. Although his victory was by a narrow margin, it was interpreted as a 
backlash against the so called ‘neo-liberal experiment’ of the previous Pérez’s 
administration. On the other hand, it was understood that constant rumours from the 
Military regarding its support for democracy diminished Caldera’s ability to 
govern.393 
 
The Caldera administration obtained political support from the AD party led by its 
Secretary General Luís Alfaro-Ucero, who had been the most furious opponent to 
Pérez’s reforms. Difficulties in the economic front soon appeared. Caldera faced a 
severe banking crisis and the subsequent bail out entailed fiscal commitments of 
around 10% of GDP. After two years of economic instability Caldera decided to make 
a U-turn, which was carefully presented as a “reform package with a human face”. 
Branded as ‘Agenda Venezuela’, the new policy impetus was not very different from 
the rejected Pérez package of 1989.  
 
The initial implementation of the ‘Agenda Venezuela’ concentrated on three areas: 
tax reform, the liberalisation of the foreign exchange regime and a return to 
privatisation (mainly of assets seized during the banking crisis bail out and a steel 
mill). The Stabilisation Fund was reassumed as well. Caldera delegated on the 
Minister of Planning Teodoro Petkoff the task of advancing the “Agenda”. Minister 
Petkoff said, “The proposal for the Fund was an extra we offered to the multilaterals. 
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Somehow, the idea of a stabilisation fund was widely accepted among all influential 
economists at that time.”394 Hausmann also acknowledged, “The intellectual case for 
the fund was ripe.”395 The idea, once again, was yet to succeed in passing through the 
necessary legislative channels. 
 
This time, however, one particular event facilitated the introduction of the proposal to 
Congress. One of the projects agreed with the multilaterals was the creation of an 
office inside Congress to provide expert advice on economic and financial matters. 
That office, called OAEF (Oficina de Asesoria Económica y Financiera), was set up 
with funds from the IDB. The first director of the office was Gustavo García, linked 
to the 1989 Pérez economic team. The Stabilisation Fund proposal was jointly taken 
by a team now including the OAEF, Central Bank, PDVSA and both the Ministries of 
Planning and Finance. According to Luís Rivero, a former member of the Board of 
the Central Bank, “The final impulse for this long standing idea was given by the 
Central Bank.”396 
 
Nevertheless, the proposal waited for more than two years in Congress. Petkoff 
lamented, “There was always something more important on the legislative agenda. 
The proposal was stuck for a long period of time because it was not a priority for the 
leadership in Congress. It was still so much against their traditional beliefs.”397 In fact, 
this congressional leadership was quite the same as before when Congress did not 
pass the original Pérez proposal. 
 
 
The FIEM Law  
 
With less than a month to hold both congressional and presidential elections, 
President Caldera decreed the creation of the Investment Fund for Macroeconomic 
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Stabilisation (FIEM).398 Congress had granted Caldera powers to legislate on that 
matter through an enabling law. Decree 2,991 of 4 November 1998 established the 
characteristics of the FIEM through the Law of the Macroeconomic Stabilisation 
Investment Fund.399 The most important terms of the law are described as follows.  
 
The Fund was not established as a separated legal entity with an attached bureaucracy. 
Instead, it was entrusted to the Central Bank. The board of the Central Bank was the 
governing body of the Fund with authority to: establish the fund’s budget, report 
annually to Congress, dictate norms of operation, establish investment policies and 
approve withdraws (Articles 1 and 2). 
 
The Fund was to be endowed with the so-called excess oil revenue. ‘Excess’ was 
defined as the amount above the average oil income in the previous five years. In this 
regard, the formula was a simplification of the one proposed in the first draft 
presented to Congress in the early 1990’s after the Hausmann report. The new 
formula for accumulation was, however, still complex due to intricacies of the way oil 
revenues are managed in Venezuela’s public accounts. Deposits to the fund came 
from three different sources: the Treasury on behalf of the central government, the 
Treasury on behalf of the states and municipalities, and PDVSA. 
 
This distinction originated in the way oil revenues were collected by Venezuela’s 
public entities before the creation of the Fund. First, oil taxes went directly to the 
Treasury, which is managed by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the central 
government (i.e. the general budget). The Venezuelan states,400 however, are entitled 
by the Constitution to a fixed transfer from the general budget. This entitlement gave 
the states an earmarked share of any revenues accrued to the Treasury. Additionally, 
the states were also entitled to a special transfer established in a law passed in 1996 
called the ‘Law of Special Transfers for States from Mines and Hydrocarbons’.401 
This law set aside some of the oil revenues for the states, mainly for those states 
where oil exploitation occurred.  
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 PDVSA retained part of its oil revenues for its investment and operational needs. The 
Fund’s law stipulated that PDVSA was obliged to deposit in the Fund any revenue 
above the average of the past five years after deducting its tax obligations. 
Consequently, the three sources of accumulation to the Fund were: 
 
1) From the central government (Article 4): Revenues in excess from taxation of 
oil activities (direct taxes such as exploitation tax and income taxes to oil 
companies), dividends from PDVSA and revenues from associations with 
private firms after the subtraction of the mandatory transfers to states. 
2) From the states and municipalities (Article 5): their proportion from excess 
revenues according to the constitutional provision and the law for special 
transfers. 
3) From PDVSA (Article 6): the excess revenues after deducting taxes paid to the 
Treasury. 
 
The Fund had to maintain separate accounts according to the sources identified above. 
Equally, any benefit the Fund obtained from investing these resources had to be 
credited in the above proportions to those accounts (Article 7). The assessment of 
whether the conditions for accumulating funds were met had to be done in the first 
thirty days of each quarter and the corresponding transfers in the following sixty days. 
(Article 8). In all cases resources had to be maintained in US dollars and were to be 
invested with the same criteria and procedures that the Central Bank applied for 
international foreign reserves (Article 18).  
 
Symmetrically to the accumulation rules, when the reverse conditions applied (i.e. 
when oil revenues were below the average of the past five years) the three 
beneficiaries of the Fund could withdraw from it. The Treasury and the states had to 
withdraw in local currency and PDVSA in US dollars (Articles 9, 10 & 11). The 
states were requested to transfer to the municipalities a share of their withdrawals in 
the same proportion that they share the constitutional grant established in the general 
budget.402 
                                                 
402 Municipalities are entitled to a fixed proportion of any income the states get from a budget 
 Deposits to the Fund were calculated after taxes were collected. Withdrawals, 
however, were based on estimates of oil revenues. All withdrawals needed the 
previous opinion from both the lower chamber (Deputies) of Congress and the 
Finance Permanent Committee of the upper chamber (Senate). Both bodies were 
requested to give their opinion in the following twenty days after the Executive 
submitted a proposal. In the case that no opinion was given in that period it was 
assumed to be favourable (Article 12).  
 
This provision served as an inadequate check since, according to administrative law in 
Venezuela, ‘opinion’ does not mean approval. According to this wording, even with a 
negative opinion the withdrawals could have been be made. Similarly, the Board of 
the Fund (Central Bank board) had to automatically approve withdrawals once the 
executive branch had informed them that conditions for withdrawals had been met 
(Article 13). Since withdrawals were based on estimates of future revenues, a degree 
of discretion was granted to the executive branch. Either Congress or the Central 
Bank did not have any participation in assessing those estimates. 
 
Some balance was somehow achieved through the imperative that at the end of every 
fiscal year withdrawals made that year needed to be recalculated against revenues 
collected. In case the re-calculated withdrawals exceeded the withdrawals made, the 
Executive had to refund the Fund in the following ninety days (Article 14). This rule 
allowed the Executive to get short term financing from the Fund since no restrictions 
were imposed on how to estimate oil revenues.  
 
Caps were imposed on both withdrawals and deposits. Withdrawals were limited to 
two-thirds of the amount in the Fund at the beginning of each fiscal year. Similarly, 
resources accumulated in the Fund could not exceed an amount equivalent to eighty 
per cent of the total oil exports in the previous five years (Articles 15 & 16).  
 
In case the Fund reached those caps, the excess amount had to be transferred back to 
the three beneficiaries. They, however, had restrictions on how to use that money. 
                                                                                                                                            
grant called ‘Situado constitucional’.  
These restrictions were: 1) the central government’s share was earmarked to pay for 
public debt. This had to follow a mechanism set in a law passed in December 1997 
that created another fund for the anticipated amortisation of the national public 
debt.403 The share of the states and municipalities and that of PDVSA had to be 
returned directly to them. Finally, the Fund could not serve as financial guarantor of 
any sort to other governmental entities or PDVSA. Similarly the Fund could not issue 
any kind of debt instruments. 
 
 
First amendment to the FIEM’s Law (1999) 
 
International oil prices were at a quarter of a century low when Hugo Chávez took 
office in February 1999. The top priority of Chávez’s administration was to promote a 
recovery in oil prices, and Chávez took the initiative among Opec countries to restore 
discipline to the cartel. Chávez’s economic team considered that the Stabilisation 
Fund’s rules would potentially restrict any fiscal reward that might come from 
improved oil prices.404  
 
President Chávez faced an opposition-controlled legislature. He responded to this 
limitation by coercing Congress to grant him enabling powers to legislate in economic 
matters. The possibility of a constitutional convention for re-writing the Constitution 
was high at that time. The opposition controlled both chambers of Congress but feared 
for its own existence since Chávez’s proposal for a new Constitution was clearly 
intended to overhaul existing institutions. Congress, however, opted for a cooperative 
stance with Chávez instead of putting up a fight over the Constitution. They approved 
an Enabling law on the 26 April 1999 authorising President Chávez to legislate in 
economic affairs by Presidential decree.405 Less than a month later, Chávez used those 
powers to introduce his first modification of the Stabilisation Fund’s law.406 
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The first Chávez amendment inserted a provision for withdrawals in case of a “re-
estimation” of the revenues Now, forty per cent (40%) of the Treasury’ share was 
earmarked for a new Fund called the Unique Social Fund (FUS)407 which was yet to 
be created. Similarly, in case the Fund reaches its accumulation limit, the share of the 
refund accruing to the Treasury was to be distributed as follows: 40% to the FUS, 
25% to the Fund for early amortisation of Public Debt and 35% to the Venezuelan 
Investment Fund.  
 
The accumulation rules were changed significantly. Chávez introduced a special 
regime for the period 1999-2004. Instead of the norm that refers all excess oil income 
to the average of the last five years, the new provisions were expressed as excess over 
fixed parameters. These fix referential values were established as follows: 
 
1) Income tax paid by oil companies: US$ 420 million 
2) Oil and gas exploitation tax: US$ 967 million 
3) Dividends from PDVSA: US$ 1.254 million 
4) Average oil price (Venezuelan exports): US$ 9/barrel 
5) Share of states from income tax paid by oil companies: US$ 105 million 
6) Share of states from oil and gas exploitation tax: US$ 323 million 
7) States’ income from Law of Special Transfers: US$ 323 million 
 
More importantly, the rule for saving oil revenue in excess of those new parameters 
was changed. The requirement of saving 100% of the excess was relaxed to 50% 
(Article 25 of the modified law). The new accumulation rules for the 1999-2004 
period were anticipated to facilitate the accumulation of oil revenues for that 
period.408 Nonetheless, the special 1999-2004 regime was aimed not only at boosting 
saving but at creating a legal instrument for spending outside of the budgetary 
process. 
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The President’s discretion over withdrawal of funds was significantly enhanced. 
Rules regulating use of funds were modified in two ways. First, a new provision 
(Article 26 of the modified law) allowed the President total discretion in the use of 
resources in the Fund even if it had not reached the legal ceiling of 80% of the 
average total oil exports in the previous five years. The new regime introduced for 
1999-2004 authorised the President to use the ‘excess fund’ at any time. Additionally, 
the restriction of withdrawals to two-thirds of what the fund had was removed for 
each of the accounts (Article 27 of the modified law).  
 
The distribution of withdrawals was altered too. The central government’s share, 
previously not earmarked, needed to be allocated as follows: 40% directly to the 
Unique Social Fund (FUS) and the rest to the Treasury (Article 9 of the modified 
law). In the case of withdrawals of the excess funds the new distribution rule makes 
mandatory the use of those funds as: 1) 25% for early amortisation of public debt (it 
was 100% before); 2) 35% for the investment fund (FIV) and 40% for the Social Fund 
(FUS). In regard to the share of PDVSA, the use of its withdrawals was now direct in 
the hands of the President of the Republic, instead of the total discretion that the 
company had over those resources before (Article 16 of the modified law).  
 
The 1999 amendment transformed the character of the Fund. The original conception 
of the Fund as a neutral mechanism was drastically altered. The adopted special 
regime allowed a great deal of discretion to the President of the Republic with little 
scrutiny from other branches of the State. The Congress’s economic advisors office 
warned about the increasing discretion and the new rigidities introduced for the 
allocation of those resources to an already very rigid budgetary process. They argued 
that these features were contrary to the main purpose of the Fund in stabilising public 
finances.409  
 
Moreover, the increasing earmarking of resources from the Fund, such as the 
mandatory transfer to the Social Fund (FUS), out of the normal budgetary process 
weakened scrutiny and risked resulting in the bad practice of funding regular spending 
out of a non-regular source of revenue. Additionally, the discretion of PDVSA over 
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its share in the Fund was reduced, and therefore also its independence from the 
political process. Finally, the original idea of using ‘excess’ funds to lower the public 
debt was severely altered. The overall consequences of these modifications were to 
increase public spending when oil prices recovered. This boost for spending turned 
the Fund in a much less anti-cyclical tool,410 which was precisely the purpose of a 
stabilisation fund.411 
 
Francisco Rodríguez, a former head of the congressional economic advisors office, 
OAEF, observed, “In retrospect, the 1999 modification had mixed implications. On 
the one hand it signalled that the government wanted to accumulate funds. This was, 
probably, intended by the Planning Minister Jorge Giordani as a message of fiscal 
responsibility to the markets. On the other hand, the change to save only 50% of the 
excess oil revenues introduced an incentive to the government to extract more 
revenues from the oil industry.”412 
 
 
Second amendment to the FIEM’s Law (2001) 
 
The new Constitution, approved in December 1999, created the National Assembly as 
the new unicameral legislative body replacing former Congress. New members of the 
Assembly were elected in July 2000 together with presidential elections. President 
Chávez’s mandate was ratified and his supporters won a handsome majority in the 
new National Assembly.  
 
The new Constitution, for the first time, included a mandate for a stabilisation fund. 
Article 321 of the Constitution reads, “A fund for macroeconomic stabilisation will be 
established by law in order to guarantee stability in spending at municipal, regional 
and national levels to confront fluctuations in ordinary revenues. The rules of the fund 
will be guided by basic principles of efficiency, fairness, and no discrimination 
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between the public entities that accumulate resources in it.”413 This constitutional 
provision strengthened the existing stabilisation fund although its vague wording left 
enough room for discretion in interpreting the norm. 
 
The new Constitution also augmented the scope of matters that the legislative branch 
could delegate to the President of the Republic (Article 236). Formerly, only 
economic and financial matters were permitted. The new Constitution put no 
restrictions. President Chávez made immediate use of this constitutional provision and 
asked for powers to legislate. The National Assembly passed, on 13 November 2000, 
a very wide ranging Enabling Law granting President Chávez those powers. 
 
The enabling law did not explicitly mention the Stabilisation Fund. It did, however, 
authorise the President to “unify and order the legal regime of hydrocarbons”.414 As 
the Fund received resources from hydrocarbons exports, Chávez interpreted this 
authorisation as sufficient to legislate on the Fund. Another provision of the Enabling 
Law provided additional justification. These additional terms read: “Legislate on the 
planning function of the State with the purpose of increasing government capacity for 
the formulation, execution and control of public policy. To ensure that the legal 
regime regulating planning is updated. Additionally the functions pertaining to each 
level of government and the new constitutional bodies related to the planning process 
will be defined in order to establish the interrelation between plans and their link to 
the public budget and the strengthening of consulting mechanisms and democratic 
participation in the national planning process.”415  
 
Presidential Decree 1,478 of 15 October 2001 amended the Stabilisation Fund. It 
substantially modified the accumulation rules by establishing a special regime for the 
period from the last quarter of 2001 to 2007. First, no accumulation was required for 
the period from the last quarter of 2001 to 2002. Additionally, the new law established 
that only 6% of the oil revenues were to be saved if conditions apply for the year 
2003. This percentage was increased one percentage each year until the year 2007 
until reaching a top level of 10%. 
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5.3 FIEM’s operations 
 
The Fund began to operate in 1999. Although rules were modified mid-year they still 
stipulated that the Fund was to receive resources from a prospective rise in the value 
of oil exports. In fact, prices went from US$ 10.57 at the beginning of 1999 to 16.04, 
25.91 and 20.21 per barrel for the average Venezuelan oil export basket in 1999, 2000 
and 2001 respectively (see Table 5.1). Consequently, these three years were 
notionally, according to the rules initially set and later modified, years of 
accumulation in the Fund. In practice, this was not exactly the case. 
 
 
Table 5.1  Oil prices from 1998 to 2003 (2nd Qtr) 
Year 
 
Venezuela (US$/barrel) 
 
Opec basket (US$/barrel) 
 
1998 10.57 12.33 
1999 16.04 17.47 
2000 25.91 27.55 
2001 20.21 23.12 
2002 22.18 24.36 
2003 26.10 28.22 
Source: Ministry of Energy 
 
 
In 1999 oil prices recovered more than 50% and oil exports were US$ 905 million 
above the average of the previous five years. PDVSA, however, was the only entity 
that accumulated resources in the Fund (US$ 215 million), as can be seen in Table 5.2 
 
 
Table 5.2  Deposits to the Fund 1999-2001 (US$ million) 
Year 
 
PDVSA 
 
Central 
government 
States 
 
Total 
 
1999 215   215 
2000 2,346 1,658 457 4,461 
2001 (first three-quarters) 1,542 154 604 2,300 
Accumulated 4,103 1,812 1,061 6,976 
Source: BCV 
 
 
Later, in 2000 and 2001, PDVSA, the central government and the states transferred to 
the Fund US$ 6,761 although the process for transferring those resources was not well 
ordered. Minister of Finance José Rojas announced in October 1999 that the Fund was 
about to received US$ 750 million in 1999.416 The Fund received only US$ 215 
million. President Chávez, in November 1999, adamantly announced that his 
government “had faced the hike in oil prices with rationality and not with 
irresponsible and out of control spending, unlike any other previous government”.417 
The Deputy Planning Minister, however, acknowledged the need for more precise 
rules to calculate the exact amount of contributions although they expected these 
contributions to be in the region of US$ 1,000 million for 1999.418 This announcement 
revealed that rules for accumulation were not sufficiently clear in the Law. 
 
 
Discrepancies with the deposits to FIEM 
 
The contributions to the Fund were questioned publicly. The President of the 
Permanent Finance Committee of the Lower Chamber Liliana Hernández challenged 
these contributions. She accused the government of circumventing the legal 
procedures to avoid transferring money to the Fund.419. The National Assembly’s 
economic advisors office, OAEF, also disputed the amount deposited. They 
suggested, according to their own calculations, that the Fund should have received 
around US$ 2,500 million.420 The Minister of Energy Alí Rodríguez concurred with 
this estimate. He announced that the Fund was to receive that amount from the 
government.421 Independent economists suggested other estimates for contributions to 
the Fund.422 The Minister of Finance acknowledged that part of the extraordinary oil 
income in 1999 was channelled to regular spending. He admitted that those resources 
were needed to compensate for the fiscal deficit.423 
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 The Fund accumulated US$ 4.2 billion in 2000. These contributions, however, were 
challenged in the same way as those of 1999. The Governor of Carabobo State, 
Henrique Salas-Feo, in opposition to Chávez, questioned the contributions to the 
Fund. Salas-Feo, acting as President of the Association of Governors, alerted the 
Finance Permanent Committee of the National Assembly about two negligent actions 
from the Executive. First, the Fund, according to a correct interpretation of the rules, 
lacked about US$ 1,500 million and second, a contravention to the requirement to 
separate those funds belonging to the states and municipalities.424 The National 
Assembly’s OAEF rejected Salas-Feo’s calculations.425 Consequently, the Assembly 
did not act on Salas-Feo’s claims. The Ministry of Finance, however, acknowledged 
delays in transferring funds but said that the bureaucratic procedures were being 
cleared to comply with the rules.426 
 
According to the Fund’s rules, deposits to the Fund have to be made every quarter if 
conditions apply. These conditions pertained throughout 2000 and 2001. Only in 
November 2001, however, as the Ministry of Finance publicly admitted, did the 
Executive submit to the National Assembly a request for the approval of those 
contributions.427 This minor bureaucratic delay later triggered a broader legal 
challenge. The governors’ claims to the National Assembly activated an investigation 
by the Assembly’s OAEF. This investigation concluded that the Executive had not 
followed the rules for accumulating money in the Fund.  
 
A major legal challenge surfaced with regard to the contributions corresponding to the 
last quarter of 2000 and the first three-quarters of 2001. As the Budget Law for 2001 
did not contain sufficient budgetary appropriations to comply with the obligations to 
deposit in the Fund, the government needed to seek approval from the National 
Assembly for the missing appropriations. Those provisions were approved in October 
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and November 2001.428 In fact, President Chávez decreed two additional budget 
appropriations for Bolívar 1.3 and 1 billion after receiving authorisation from the 
National Assembly.429 The transfers, for a total of Bolívar 2.3 billion (US$ 2.9 
billion), however, were never made to the stabilisation fund. This went unnoticed 
until May 2002 when it emerged publicly due to an independent report made by an 
ex-Comptroller General. 
 
Former Comptroller General Eduardo Roche, while compiling an academic report, 
noticed that the Stabilisation Fund had not received any contributions in the first 
quarter of 2001. Deputy Elias Matta, from the opposition party Causa R, requested a 
congressional inquiry based on Roche’s findings on the issue.430 Francisco Rodríguez, 
head of the National Assembly economic advisors office, OAEF, demanded the 
Ministry of Finance clarify the irregularity.431 The Finance Permanent Committee 
initiated an inquiry on the accusations but promptly discontinued it.432 Another 
committee, the Audit Committee, however, began a separate inquiry.433 
 
The ex-Minister of Finance Nelson Merentes, was summoned to the Audit 
Committee. Merentes admitted that no contributions had been made. He justified this 
irregularity on the grounds of a severe deficit in the Treasury. He validated his 
decision not to contribute to the Fund based on the need to prioritise the use of 
existing resources for more urgent social needs. He cited the Constitution to support 
his decision of using the available funds in the Treasury for public payroll payments, 
Christmas bonuses for public employees and debt payments. He insisted that paying 
salaries for the public bureaucracy was a constitutional mandate.434 Merentes 
emphasised that he merely interpreted the law according to his best judgement. 
Additionally, he maintained that resources in the Treasury were not earmarked. 
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Therefore, they can be administered according to perceived priorities.435 President 
Chávez backed Merentes’s justifications.436 
 
The Audit Committee continued with the inquiry despite the official explanations. 
The Committee comprised 15 members, seven members from the opposition, seven 
from the official coalition and an independent, Deputy Rafael Jiménez. The 
Committee summoned and heard evidence from senior officials, Deputy Matta and 
Francisco Rodríguez, head of the OAEF. President Chávez, who was required to 
answer a questionnaire sent by the Committee, opted not to cooperate with the 
inquiry, which is a presidential prerogative.  
 
Deputy Conrado Pérez, President of the Committee, produced a preliminary report 
accusing the officials of being responsible for the mismanagement of the Fund’s 
contributions in July 2002.437 This report was rejected by the official coalition faction 
in the Committee who produced a separate report. When both reports were put for 
internal vote in the committee, the Pérez’s report was approved in a controversial 
session.438 The government coalition supporters were absent except for one member 
who demanded a postponement of the decision. His presence, though, was sufficient 
to validate the Committee’s meeting. Deputy Jimenez joined the opposition’s deputies 
to approve the report.439 The National Assembly did not proceed any further with the 
case. Deputy Enrique Ochoa-Antich, however, introduced a legal action in the 
Supreme Court on 27 June 2002.440 Deputy Matta and other members of the National 
Assembly backed that claim in the Supreme Court.441 
 
The Attorney General’s office, through the department responsible for corruption in 
the public bureaucracy,442 opened an investigation based on Deputy Matta’s claims.443 
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Comptroller General Clodosbaldo Russian announced he was about to order an 
inquiry on the merits of the case.444 The Supreme Court ordered the Attorney 
General’s office to consider the merits of the case on the 16 September 2002.445  
 
The legal claims of this case were likened to the legal case that led to the 
impeachment of former President Pérez in 1993.446 In both cases, the legal allegations 
were based on the Anti-Corruption law that outlawed the misuse of funds. Article 60 
of that law stated that funds cannot be used for purposes other than those established 
in the appropriation bill (i.e. the approved budget and any other additional 
appropriation added to the budget during the corresponding fiscal year). The law set a 
penalty for this infringement, even if the funds were used in the public interest.447 
 
In President Pérez’s case, the Supreme Court judged that the alleged use of secret 
funds by the Pérez’s government for the security of the Nicaraguan President Violeta 
Chamorro was a case of misused funds, therefore he and two ministers were found 
guilty.448 The jurisprudence set by the Pérez decision in 1996 established that even if 
the actual use of the diverted funds was legal the diversion procedure was illegal.  
 
Three years after the claim was introduced, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
Stabilisation Fund’s misuse case. They ruled, on 15 June 2005, that the plaintiff in the 
case, Deputy Ochoa-Antich, was not entitled to take legal action since he was not an 
injured party in the alleged wrongdoing. The Court’s ruling did not address the merits 
of the alleged offences (i.e. misusing funds earmarked for the Stabilisation Fund). The 
Supreme Court consisted of 32 Justices. All Justices had been appointed since 1999 
following a variety of procedures due to the special situation arising from the new 
Constitution of 1999. The following section discusses this particular state of affairs. 
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The Constitution approved on the 15 December 1999 mandated a new structure for 
the Supreme Court, renamed the Supreme Tribunal of Justice.449 After the new 
Constitution was approved the constitutional convention (National Constituent 
Assembly) designated provisional Justices to the new Supreme Court on the 24 
December 1999.450 The 131-member Assembly was controlled by President Chávez’s 
supporters (all but six members favoured President Chávez). When the constitutional 
convention was dissolved, a temporary legislative body called the National 
Legislative Commission was created until the new National Assembly was elected. 
This provisional body completed the configuration of the provisional Supreme Court 
by appointing all Deputy Justices.451  
 
The new National Assembly elected in July 2000, however, passed a law regulating 
an ad hoc procedure for appointing new Justices to replace the interim Court. This ‘ad 
hoc’ legislation, called the “Special Law for the ratification or appointment of the 
member of the Citizen Power and Justices of the Supreme Tribunal for their first 
Constitutional Term”, was itself a piece of provisional legislation since it did not 
follow the constitutional mandate for such a type of appointments.452 This was 
justified on the grounds that some of the procedures established in the Constitution 
were impossible to comply with since some constitutional bodies, such as the so-
called Citizen Power, had not yet been implemented.453 
 
The National Assembly appointed a new high tribunal following this ad hoc 
legislation. The appointment required a two-thirds majority. Although Chávez’s 
coalition was short of that majority, they negotiated with other parties to agree on the 
Justices’ names.454 Later, the National Assembly passed by a simple majority455 a new 
law regulating the Supreme Tribunal, including an expansion of the Court to 32 
Justices.456 This new Supreme Court Law relaxed the requirements for the 
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appointment of Justices. Article 8 of that law established that if the National 
Assembly failed to form a two-thirds majority after putting the appointments to the 
vote three times, a simple majority was sufficient to make the appointments lawful. In 
fact, the Assembly, by simple majority, appointed 17 Justices in December 2004 to 
fill the newly created posts and five vacancies.457 This so-configured High Court was 
responsible for the decision on the alleged misuse of funds for the Stabilisation Fund. 
 
Another decision, however, partially vindicated the misuse claims. The Attorney 
General’s office found merits for imputing the National Treasurer, Julio Viloria, for 
breaking the law when he falsely certified that the Treasury had resources for 
depositing in the Stabilisation Fund in the last quarter of 2001. This decision, 
however, did not address the main thrust of the claim regarding the deposits that were 
never made into the Stabilisation Fund in 2000 and 2001. As the other constitutional 
body with jurisdiction over the issue, the Comptroller General, never acted on the 
claims, the issue practically remained unsettled.  
 
Claims regarding a breach in the stipulated use of withdrawn funds in 2001 and 2002 
also emerged. National Treasurer, Leyda Betancourt, admitted wrongdoings regarding 
withdrawn funds in 2001. During the hearings held by the Audit Committee of the 
National Assembly in August 2002 she acknowledged that the Unique Social Fund 
did not receive the resources stipulated in the Fund’s law for withdrawals.458 The 
Unique Social Fund’s budget appropriations did not correspond to the amount it 
should have received from its corresponding share of the Stabilisation Fund’s 
withdrawals made in 2002.459 The National Assembly did not act on these claims. 
 
 
5.4 Depleting the Stabilisation Fund 
 
The conditions stipulated in the Fund’s law for savings applied during the first three 
years of the Chávez’s administrations. The Fund collected almost US$ 7 billion, 
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despite the contentious interpretation of the rules. This was the highest level of 
resources achieved in the Fund. Not only did contributions cease in 2001 but the 
government, PDVSA and finally the states depleted the fund in the following two 
years. This section discusses this process of depletion.  
 
The Treasury was close to a deficit in December 2001. The government had failed to 
obtain financing in the debt market. Consequently, the government decided to 
withdraw money from the Fund for the first time in December 2001.460 The Treasury 
withdrew US$ 894 million, which represented about 47% of the accumulated 
resources available in its account. Then, in the first four months of 2002 the Treasury 
made withdrawals of US$ 600, 65 and 300 million,461 practically depleting all its 
resources in the Fund (there remained about US$ 50 million, less than 3% of what 
was available in November 2001).  
 
Both the procedures followed by the government to make these withdrawals and the 
use of the withdrawn funds were irregular. The head of the National Assembly’s 
economic advisors office, OAEF, denounced the government for withdrawing US$ 
300 million without the ‘opinion’ of the Finance Permanent Committee of the 
National Assembly and for exceeding the amount permitted by law.462 These 
irregularities were not addressed by any legally entitled body. 
 
The oil company PDVSA withdrew US$ 1604, 69, and 500 million in June, July and 
December of 2002 respectively (see Table 5.3). In early June, the Executive 
authorised PDVSA to withdraw US$ 2,445 million, which was roughly 60% of its 
share in the Fund at that moment.463 PDVSA’s President Alí Rodríguez justified the 
withdrawals on the basis of the company’s financial needs for the investment plan 
already approved. He insisted that PDVSA’s funds in the Stabilisation Fund were 
reserves the company had for its eventual needs and rejected allegations that PDVSA 
would pass these resources on to the Treasury via taxes.464 In fact, the political 
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conflict that directly engulfed PDVSA in April 2002 had left the company in a 
vulnerable position. The post-April political consensus, however, was favourable to 
isolate PDVSA from the repercussions of the political crisis.465 Consequently, the 
Finance Permanent Committee of the National Assembly promptly gave its 
favourable opinion.466  
 
 
Table 5.3 Withdrawals from the Stabilisation Fund (2001-2003) 
(US$ million) 
Year Treasury States PDVSA Total 
 
2001 894   894 
2002 965 732 2,173 3,870 
2003 51 416 1,372 1,839 
Total 1,910 1,148 3,545 6,603 
% of available funds 0 99.82% 77.57% 86.54% 
Source: BCV 
 
 
The conditions faced in 2002 were repeated in the following year, and even more 
acutely. A two-month strike that almost paralysed the oil industry left PDVSA 
financially vulnerable again. The cabinet minutes where authorisation for PDVSA 
withdrawals from the Fund was discussed acknowledged the “reduced capacity of the 
company to comply with its obligations, including the fiscal ones”.467 PDVSA went 
on to withdraw US$ 1,372 million in 2003, leaving US$ 1,025 million which 
represented almost 14% of its share in the Fund.  
 
In 2002, governors and mayors asked the central government to adjust the 
contributions that the Treasury should have made into the Stabilisation Fund on behalf 
of the states.468 Governors, mayors and senior government officials met in the city of 
Barcelona (Anzoátegui State) in June 2002 to discus this issue.469 They signed a 
declaration named “The Anzoátegui Consensus”, whereby the government agreed to 
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transfer to the Stabilisation Fund the long overdue resources on behalf of the regions. 
In addition, it was agreed that the local governments470 would be allowed to withdraw 
the states’ shares of the Fund.471  
 
The agreement was promptly implemented in July 2002. The Executive asked the 
Finance Permanent Committee of the National Assembly to give its favourable 
opinion for a withdrawal, on behalf of the states, for US$ 732 million, roughly two- 
thirds of what they had available in the Fund. The withdrawal was approved in two 
parts. In effect, states and municipalities withdrew US$ 366 million in July and 
September 2002.472 The Fund’s rules (Article 6, Part B) stipulated that those resources 
should be used for investments. Consequently, governors announced that they were to 
invest these resources in infrastructure, health, education and security projects.473 In 
reality, the use of these resources is seldom monitored.  
 
In February 2003 the government agreed to allow the states to take out the rest of the 
available resources. The states intended to use those resources in ordinary spending. 
This use, however, was outlawed. Therefore, a modification was needed to the Fund’s 
rules in order to circumvent this restriction. This amendment was passed by the 
National Assembly on 20 March 2003 (these later modifications are discussed later in 
this chapter). The states, nonetheless, had withdrawn US$ 208 million in February. 
The law’s change, passed a month later, allowed governors to use the Fund’s 
resources in ordinary spending, with effect on past withdraws. Consequently, by 
March 2003 the governors’ share in the Fund was reduced practically to zero. 
 
 
5.5 Distorting the Stabilisation Fund  
 
By October 2002 the Stabilisation Fund had operated for four years within a cycle of 
high oil prices. The Fund, however, was almost depleted. Only PDVSA had any 
resources available. President Chávez’s administration, however, asked the National 
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Assembly to extend the special regime that exempted the government from depositing 
in the Fund. 
 
The National Assembly approved a further modification to the Stabilisation Fund 
Law. The amendment extended until 2008 the special regime established a year 
earlier for the period of 2002 to 2007. The immediate effect was that no accumulation 
was required for the year 2003. Consequently, the requirements of saving 6% to 10% 
of all oil income above the average was moved from the year 2004 to 2008. 
Additionally, states were authorised to withdraw up to 20% of excess funds as was 
stipulated in the original law.474 
 
Two months later, in December 2002, the National Assembly modified the 
Stabilisation Fund again. For a period of five years, starting with immediate effect, the 
President of the Republic was authorised to withdraw from the Fund with the sole 
condition of having a positive opinion from the Finance Permanent Committee of the 
National Assembly. PDVSA could withdrawal without limit. The central government 
and the states, however, could withdrawal only the excess funds after the Fund 
reached the cap established in the original law and were limited to the two-thirds of 
accumulated funds.475 
 
The National Assembly removed, in March 2003, the restriction of withdrawals up to 
two-thirds of accumulated funds when the Fund reaches its cap. This was applicable 
only to the central government and the states. Additionally, the states were also 
authorised to withdraw from the Fund without satisfying the requirement that 
revenues should have decreased. The requirement that the states must dedicate 
withdrawals to investment was also removed for the year 2003. The Permanent 
Finance Committee of the National Assembly, however, was exhorted to monitor the 
use of those resources according to “a financial programming suitable to priority 
spending in accordance with administrative coordination, efficacy and principles of 
transparency”.476 
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These latest modifications substantially altered the original aims of the Stabilisation 
Fund. In practice, the Fund was suspended until 2008. The degree of discretion 
granted to the President distorted the original purpose of having an independent 
mechanism for using oil revenues in an orderly a predetermined manner. The 
Stabilisation Fund, as was conceived in 1998, was in the end abolished in November 
2003. The next section discusses the law that created a new Fund. 
 
 
The November 2003 Stabilisation Fund 
 
The National Assembly passed a law that created a new Stabilisation Fund in 
November 2003.477 The new Fund abolished the one established in 1998. The new 
Fund, called the Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund (FEM), instead of 
Macroeconomic Stabilisation Investment Fund (FIEM), retained some of the 
characteristics of the original Fund. Significantly, it preserved the notion of saving 
revenues from oil exports where they were above the average of previous years. 
Similarly, the same notion applied for withdrawing from the Fund when oil exports 
decreased. The law, however, introduced a new condition for withdrawals. In case of 
a state of economic emergency478 the central government was authorised to withdraw 
from the Fund unrestrictedly.  
 
The FEM law introduced a new governance structure intended to represent the main 
stakeholders in the Fund (the central government, the states and municipalities and 
PDVSA). Similarly, it lowered the caps for withdrawals to 50% of what was 
accumulated in the Fund. The caps for accumulating funds in the Stabilisation Fund 
were reduced to 30% of the value of oil exports in the previous three years for the 
central government and PDVSA and 10% for the states and municipalities. The 
distribution of excess resources once the Fund reached those caps was modified as 
well. The new law required using those funds for an Intergenerational Fund,479 early 
payment of public debt or investment.  
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 The law included a new provision establishing penalties for senior officials who did 
not enforce its regulations. The law (Article 27) set a penalty of around US$ 6,000 for 
those officials that failed to comply with the regulations, especially those regarding 
deposits into the Stabilisation Fund. Finally, the law exempted the government and 
PDVSA from contributing for the fiscal year of 2004.  
 
In practice, this law was never implemented although conditions for accumulating, in 
principle, held true. Venezuelan oil exports in 2004 were US$ 36,200 and the average 
of Venezuelan oil exports from 2001 to 2003 was US$ 26,138.480 An interpretation of 
the law, however, allowed 2004’s oil exports to be disregarded for calculating any 
contribution to the Fund in 2005. The National Assembly passed a new law in 
October 2005 that changed the whole idea of stabilising oil income.481 The next 
section discusses this new law. 
 
 
The October 2005 Stabilisation Fund 
 
The Stabilisation Fund created by the law of October 2005 is based on the concept of 
fiscal surplus. The rules for accumulation and withdrawals to and from the Fund have 
no direct relation to the value of oil exports. The condition for saving is now 
contingent to a fiscal surplus. This surplus is defined as the difference, in real and 
comparable terms, between total fiscal revenues and public expenditure. As no 
restrictions are set, either in this law or in any other law, over the level of public 
spending, surpluses were subject to the voluntary restraint from the Executive. The 
compulsory nature of the stabilisation mechanism completely disappeared in this 
version of the law. It is perfectly legal, within this legal framework, to spend any 
windfall in oil revenues.  
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In the event that the Fund accumulates resources, the conditions for withdrawals are 
that fiscal revenues are lower than the average of the previous three years. Even in a 
year of budget surplus the funds could be withdrew from the Stabilisation mechanism. 
The provision for allowing withdrawals in case of an economic emergency was 
maintained. Additionally, PDVSA was excluded from the stabilisation mechanism.  
 
In terms of governance, the new fund is controlled by a board of five members, all 
appointed by the President. The Central Bank was removed from any involvement 
with the Stabilisation Fund. The new Bank of the Treasury replaced the Central Bank 
as the agency responsible for providing technical and administrative support. The 
former condition of requiring the ‘opinion’ of the Finance Permanent Committee of 
the National Assembly was relaxed. Now the Fund has only to inform the Committee 
and the Comptroller General before proceeding with any withdrawals. Caps for 
withdrawals were not altered. Caps for accumulation, however, were lowered for the 
central government to 20% of oil exports in the previous three years. Table 5.5 
highlights the main characteristics of the two latest versions of the FEM. Finally, the 
government was again exempted from any obligation to save in the fiscal year of 
2005.  
 
 
Table 5.4  Main characteristics of the FEM’s law 
Aspect Law of 27 November 2003 Law of 4 October 2005 
 
Tutelary body Ministry of Finance Bank of the Treasury 
Administered 
by 
Central Bank of Venezuela Bank of the Treasury 
Governance  Board of five members, 
appointed by: 
- Ministry of Finance 
- Ministry of Planning 
- States 
- Municipalities 
- PDVSA 
These appointments needed 
ratification of the National 
Assembly. 
 
Board of five members all appointed 
directly by the President. 
Internal 
administration 
1) A General Council constituted 
similarly to the Board responsible 
for administrative tasks 
2) A Technical Secretariat  
Bank of the Treasury 
 
Aspect Law of 27 November 2003 Law of 4 October 2005 
 
Deposits 1) The central government 
had to deposit the excess 
amount in collected oil 
taxes over the average of 
oil taxes in the previous 
three years once the legal 
transfer to the judiciary 
was deducted. 
2) The states and 
municipalities had to 
deposit their proportion 
established by law of the 
above income. 
3) PDVSA had to deposit 
50% of the excess amount 
in collected revenues 
from oil exports once all 
applicable taxes were 
deducted. 
  
1) The central government shall 
deposit at least 20% of the 
excess amount in real terms 
of collected fiscal revenues 
over fiscal expenditures in 
the previous year. 
2) The states and municipalities 
have to deposit their 
proportion established by 
law of the above income. 
3) PDVSA is exempted from 
depositing in the Fund. 
Conditions for 
Withdrawals 
1) When fiscal revenues 
from oil taxation were 
lower than the average of 
the previous three years.  
2) Oil exports were below 
the average of the 
previous three years. 
3) In case of economic 
emergency as established 
by the Constitution and 
the applicable laws. 
 
1) When total fiscal revenues 
are lower than the average of 
the previous three years. 
2) In case of economic 
emergency as established by 
the Constitution and the 
applicable laws. 
Control by 
other branches 
Withdrawals had to obtain the 
‘opinion’ of the Finance 
Permanent Committee of the 
National Assembly (opinion 
was not binding).  
In case of economic 
emergency this requirement 
could be relaxed. 
Withdrawals have to be reported to 
the Finance Permanent Committee of 
the National Assembly and the 
comptroller general. 
In case of economic emergency this 
requirement could be relaxed. 
Caps for 
withdrawals 
The central government, states 
and municipalities could 
withdraw up to 100% of the 
difference between the estimated 
income for the fiscal year and the 
average of oil income in the 
previous three years but never 
exceeding 50% of the 
accumulated funds in the 
Stabilisation Fund. 
 
 
The central government, states and 
municipalities can withdraw up to 
100% of the difference in total 
income up to 50% of the 
accumulated funds in the 
Stabilisation Fund. 
 
Aspect Law of 27 November 2003 Law of 4 October 2005 
 
 2)PDVSA could withdraw up 
to 75% of the difference 
between the estimated income 
for the fiscal year and the 
average of oil income in the 
previous three years but never 
exceeding 50% of the 
accumulated funds in the 
Stabilisation Fund.  
In case of economic emergency 
there is no limitation on 
withdrawals. 
 
 
Caps for 
accumulation 
Entities could accumulate 
funds up to a fixed percentage 
of the average of total oil 
exports in the previous three 
years as follows: 
1) Central government: 30% 
2) States and Municipalities: 
10% 
       3)   PDVSA: 30% 
Entities could accumulate funds 
up to a fixed percentage of the 
average of total oil exports in the 
previous three years as followed: 
1) Central government: 20% 
2) States and municipalities: 
10% 
 
Use of funds 
once they 
reach 
accumulation 
caps 
1) The central government’s 
share could be allocated 
to an Intergenerational 
Fund or for payment of 
Public Debt. 
2) States and municipalities 
could use excess funds for 
investment purposes. 
3) PDVSA’s funds could be 
allocated to the 
Intergenerational Fund or 
for investment purposes. 
 
No limitation was established. 
Penalties for 
administrators 
Minister of Finance, President of 
PDVSA and Members of the 
Board were responsible for 
enforcing the rules, otherwise 
they were liable to pecuniary 
penalties and other sanctions.  
Penalties were abolished except for 
the obligation of the Minister of 
Finance, the director of the Budget 
Office and the National Treasurer to 
provide information to the Fund’s 
Board. 
 
No savings in Fiscal year of 2004 Fiscal year of 2005 
 
Source: Official Gazette 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Venezuelan policy makers had long contemplated a stabilisation mechanism for 
volatile oil income when they finally implemented it in the 1990s. The Investment 
Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilisation proved a short-lived initiative. The 
institutionalisation of a saving mechanism to smooth oil revenues failed to 
materialise. The legal instrument eventually conceived was largely ignored or rapidly 
distorted by the executive branch. Other constitutional branches, the legislative and 
the judiciary, overlooked the operation of the Stabilisation Fund. Moreover, the 
legislative branch cooperated with the President to in effect annul the stabilisation 
mechanism. 
 
Venezuelan oil exports boomed in the years following the creation of the Stabilisation 
Fund in 1998. Table 5.5 shows that in all years from 1999 to 2005 oil exports were 
above the average of the previous five years. The Stabilisation Fund had US$ 733 
million at the beginning of 2006. The stabilisation mechanism, instrumented through 
two laws and six amendments in seven years, failed to achieve its original aim.  
 
The mechanism failed on various accounts. First, rules on contributions to the fund 
were only partially enforced. Second, rules on withdrawals were equally distorted. 
Third, withdrawals were allocated for ordinary spending.  
 
Table 5.5  Venezuelan Oil Exports (1994-2005) 
Year Venezuelan oil exports in us$ Difference with average exports 
previous five years 
 
1994 16,089  
1995 18,457  
1996 23,060  
1997 21,624  
1998 17,193  
1999 20,190 905 
2000 31,413 11,308 
2001 25,353 2,657 
2002 25,890 2,735 
2003 27,170 3,162 
2004 36,200 10,197 
2005 (*) 43,588 14,383 
Source: Opec Annual Bulletin 2004; (*) Opec Monthly Oil Market Report January 2006 and Ministry of Energy 
  
The Fund’s regulations were continuously modified to suit the short term preferences 
of the executive branch. Each modification weakened the mechanism that was 
originally conceived as an independent, neutral device to deal with extraordinary 
revenues from a period of high oil prices. The last version of the Fund bears little 
resemblance to an oil income stabilisation fund. Venezuelan institutions did not 
provide the necessary conditions for the operation of such a self governing 
mechanism. The case of the Stabilisation Fund proves that institutions are malleable 
to the President’s preferences. 
 
The fate of the Stabilisation Fund is comparable to that of the Investment Fund 
instituted in 1974 during the first significant oil boom. In both cases policy makers 
envisioned a mechanism for regulating the use of oil income according to the best 
technical advice. In both instances, however, regulations were largely ignored and 
ultimately modified to the point of rendering the initiative ineffectual. In both cases, 
the President’s preferences for short run spending prevailed over any alternative usage 
of oil revenues, such as saving either for orderly investment or for stabilisation 
purposes.  
 Chapter 6 
 
Governance of PDVSA: The ‘Chavista regime’ years (1999-2005) 
 
 
This chapter investigates PDVSA-government relationships since President Chávez 
came to power in February 1999. It demonstrates that the governance of the oil 
company in this period became politicised as a consequence of a combination of long 
standing, unresolved issues and new political conditions, notably the non-
institutionalised power struggle between President Chávez and his political 
opposition. As a consequence of these factors, the chapter argues, politicisation of the 
governance of PDVSA has been strained and taken to unprecedented levels. The oil 
company came under the direct control of the executive branch and decisions taken 
regarding the company followed the President’s immediate needs. The Ministry of 
Energy remains the same organisation that it was in pre-Chávez times. It has, 
however, assumed a direct operational role reflected in the fusion of the role of the 
Minister and other senior officials in the Ministry with the Presidency and other high 
ranking executives of the company. Despite a large overhaul of the ‘rules of the 
game’ regulating the oil business (i.e. a new Hydrocarbons law) the governance of 
PDVSA and oil policy decisions continue to depend on the President. The legislative 
and other branches of the State remain inconsequential for both governance of the oil 
business and oil policy.  
 
Three main events marked this period. First, the new Hydrocarbons Law enacted in 
2001. Second, the conflict in February to April 2002 which culminated in an 
attempted coup d'état that ousted President Chávez for two days. Third, the oil 
stoppage from December 2002 to January 2003. President Chávez’s response to these 
two conflicts shaped a substantially different post-strike institutional arrangement. 
 
The chapter analyses those three events and the post-strike arrangement. The analysis 
is set against a backdrop characterised by four main factors. First, the long and widely 
held perception across the political spectrum that PDVSA was a ‘black box’ that has 
eluded proper public scrutiny. Second, Chávez’s position in the presidential campaign 
in 1998 against privatisation of the oil business. Third, a perception, during the years 
prior to Chávez’s rise to power, that PDVSA was interfering in political outcomes. 
Fourth, PDVSA’s declining fiscal contributions. 
 
 
6.1. Old and new claims against PDVSA 
 
During the 1998 presidential election campaign oil issues were, unusually, 
contentious. Formerly, as nationalist claims were highly consensual across the 
political spectrum, oil issues were not an important election topic, save during the 
1983 campaign, when both AD and Copei candidates wanted to rectify what was, at 
that time, considered an inappropriate political interference by President Herrera.482 
PDVSA governance and other oil topics were important issues that were highly 
ventilated in 1998.  
 
 
Politicians’ long standing resentment of PDVSA  
 
In addition to the ‘state within the State’ perception discussed in Chapter 4, PDVSA 
was widely perceived as a ‘black box’ as well. This perception grew during the years 
since nationalisation. As early as the first Pérez administration (1974-1979), PDVSA 
was considered a ‘secretive’ organisation. Jose Andrés Octavio, Comptroller General 
at that time, comments, “PDVSA was very difficult to audit. Although we established 
a special taskforce to monitor it from within the company was very secretive. They 
hid information up to the point that I had to complain formally to PDVSA’s President 
Rafael Alfonzo-Ravard about information specifically requested and never given by 
the company.”483 The sentiment that PDVSA was a ‘black box’ became widely held 
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over decades. By 1998, this was an accepted, if not always publicly admitted, truth in 
the political world. 
 
The so-called ‘oil opening’ process in the mid-1990s, examined in Chapter 4, revived 
the debate about PDVSA’s independence and prominent policy role. More 
importantly, it raised the ideological debate about the private sector role in the oil 
business. Opposition to the oil opening agenda arose against not only the opening 
process itself but to any attempt to proceed towards some sort of privatisation of 
PDVSA itself. The oil opening was deemed for many analysts and politicians as a 
‘testing the water’ exercise for a possible full privatisation drive. Concurrently with 
the oil opening, there was much debate, in the big media and in business conferences, 
about possible financial options to allow national private capital in PDVSA.484 
 
AD veteran leader Carlos Canache opposed any attempt to privatise PDVSA.485 He 
represented AD’s old guard, which had remained faithful to AD’s traditional 
nationalist stances, and fiercely opposed the liberalisation agenda of Pérez’ second 
administration. Ironically, ex-President Pérez also opposed the oil opening on the 
grounds that “it violates the country’s strategic interests with regard to the subsoil 
ownership”.486 It was, however, an organisation called Fundapatria that went through 
legal channels to challenge the oil opening. Previously, Alí Rodríguez, president of 
the Energy Permanent Committee of the lower chamber in Congress, had denounced 
the unconstitutional nature of the contract.487 Fundapatria were the most active voice 
among opponents to oil opening. Both the Ministry of Energy and the President of 
PDVSA denied that full privatisation was seriously considered.488 
 
                                                 
484 See for example, Francisco Monaldi and Alberto Quiros-Corradi’s proposal about 
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(Fedecamaras) annual meeting in 1998.  
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Fundapatria coordinated a group of Venezuelans who demanded the annulment of oil 
opening contracts in the Supreme Court in December 1995. They claimed that the 
process suffered from several legal flaws. First, they equated the new form of the 
contracts to the extinct concession system explicitly abolished by the Nationalisation 
Law. Therefore, such new contracts were deemed illegal. Secondly, an exception to 
paying municipal taxes granted in the Congress’s approval was also judged 
unconstitutional. Thirdly, they questioned the arbitration mechanism set up in the 
contracts. It was, for them, a violation of the sovereign right of Venezuela to settle 
any dispute in its own courts. Fourthly, they also questioned the transfer of regulatory 
duties from the Ministry of Energy to a PDVSA subsidiary. 489 
 
A second lawsuit was introduced by the same group on 23 January 1996. They 
included new allegations of illegality that complemented the first legal action. When 
this new lawsuit was introduced to the Supreme Court, the presidential candidate 
Hugo Chávez and hundreds of supporters joined the plaintiff group in a demonstration 
in front of the Court’s building.490  
 
Fundapatria asked Congress to delay approval of individual oil opening contracts until 
the Supreme Court ruled over the annulment request. 491 They asked the Attorney 
General to intervene as well.492 Eighteen months later, Fundapatria’s president, Luís 
Vallenilla, insisted that the Supreme Court speed up a decision on the lawsuits.493 The 
Attorney General, Iván Badell, rejected Fundapatria claims. He stated that “the oil 
opening process complied with all constitutional and legal requirements, therefore 
Fundapatria’s claim should be considered invalid”.494 The Supreme Court finally 
decided on the subject in 1999, ruling against Fundapatria’s petitions. 
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Although a relatively isolated effort, the Fundapatria lawsuit had important 
connotations. It galvanised those who support the oil opening on the one hand and 
those who opposed the PDVSA agenda on the other. 1998’s presidential campaign 
further demarcated these two camps. All presidential hopefuls other than Hugo 
Chávez aligned themselves with the opening agenda, although they were cautious 
about full privatisation of PDVSA.495 Chávez’s position on PDVSA and other oil 
policy issues such as the support for Opec was clearly different. He promised to revise 
oil opening contracts as early in the campaign as December 1997.496 Both Alí 
Rodríguez and Bernardo Álvarez, Chávez’s oil policy advisors, called for a change in 
the orientation of the oil opening.497 Another advisor, Alvaro Silva-Calderón, opposed 
anti-Opec stances and equally requested a revision of oil opening.498 Oil policy 
positions were clearly established by contending candidates when Venezuelans 
elected Chávez in December 1998.  
 
 
PDVSA’s interference with political affairs  
 
PDVSA was not only considered independent from political control and of being too 
influential in oil policy but was also perceived as interfering in electoral politics in 
1998. As the campaign was progressing all candidates, including Hugo Chávez (an 
outsider in politics at that time), with a realistic prospect of winning came from non-
partisan platforms as anti-party sentiments in public opinion had grown substantially. 
 
The AD party, the dominant political organisation for more than four decades, was 
under threat, with polls suggesting a significant decline in the party’s electoral 
prospects. AD secretary general, Luís Alfaro-Ucero, sought an unexpected alliance 
with PDVSA president Luís Giusti. Both had become close political allies when 
PDVSA, under Giusti’s presidency, intensively lobbied political elites for the 
                                                 
495 For example, main candidates expressed their ideas on a series of interviews published by 
El Nacional as followed: Henrique Salas Romer on the 15 October 1998, Irene Saez on the 17 
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implementation of its corporate strategy in the 1990s. Additionally, PDVSA had 
invested significant resources in Monagas and other states,499 AD’s traditional 
strongholds and Alfaro-Ucero’s local constituency.  
 
Paulina Gamus, a former congresswoman and a member of Alfaro-Ucero’s campaign 
team in 1998, confirmed, “Alfaro-Ucero and Giusti maintained a fluid and constant 
communication. Alfaro-Ucero was close to Giusti despite the fact that he was 
commonly associated with 1993’s Copei candidate Alvarez Paz. A Giusti candidacy 
supported by AD was certainly a possibility considered by Alfaro Ucero although 
never formalised in the party’s internal bodies.”500 Alfaro Ucero ordered an internal 
survey that, however, showed little grassroots support for a possible Giusti 
nomination.501 Similarly, Rafael Garrido, internal auditor in PDVSA, admitted, “The 
self-promoting activities carried by Giusti to position himself as a presidential 
candidate were sotto voce within the company.”502  
 
Luís Giusti was a charismatic manager whose leadership in PDVSA had been heavily 
associated with the oil opening process. Bernardo Alvarez, former Deputy Minister of 
Energy, pointed out, “Giusti was very successful selling that PDVSA strategy to the 
mainstream political elite, mainly based on a great expansion in oil production, 
designed to pay for the external debt, public sector labour debt, and for foreign 
reserves to pay for imports. The political elite threw their support behind this vision in 
the campaign. Chávez’s alternative vision was bound to generate political conflict.”503  
 
Giusti denied, on several occasions, his intentions to become a candidate.504 The 
hypothetical Giusti’s candidature was, however, deemed as unprecedented intrusion 
into politics by a senior PDVSA official. The proposed use of the ample resources of a 
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corporation as powerful as PDVSA to promote the prospects of an individual was not 
well received among contenders. Although these claims were never proved, such a 
perception lingered on during the presidential campaign. 
 
 
Collapse in PDVSA’s fiscal contributions 
 
PDVSA’s contribution to the Treasury had been declining significantly for years. 
Figure 6.1 shows how the fiscal share in relation to oil revenues had declined to 25% 
in 1998. This decline has occurred even as oil revenues have increased over the years 
as can be seen in Figure 6.2. This contrast was widely considered as being the 
outcome of a ‘tax avoidance’ strategy by PDVSA. 
 
Ramón Espinasa, former PDVSA’s chief economist explained, “From 1975 to 1985 
there were enough resources to inject new capital to PDVSA without diminishing 
fiscal contributions. In the 1990s, however, this was not the case. Fiscal pressure on 
the company had to decrease in order to pay for the expansion plan and other 
necessary investment. In some sense, all accusations against PDVSA in that regard 
were true. The fiscal contribution went from 18% of GDP in the 1970-1980s to 8% in 
1995 and 1996. At the same time PDVSA increased its production potential by one 
million barrels per day. The idea was to pay less tax per barrel but to get an expanded 
production volume to compensate for it.”505 
 
PDVSA’s fiscal contribution was, on average, 65% of its revenues since 
nationalisation in 1975 until 1993. In other words, two-thirds of gross PDVSA 
income was always captured by the Venezuelan Treasury. Historically, this 
participation had been 45% for the whole period of commercial oil exploitation 
(1938-2001) and 37% during the multinationals exploitation era (1938-1974). From 
1994 until 1998, however, PDVSA fiscal contribution dropped to 36%.  
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Figure 6.1 Fiscal Participation as % of Oil income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy (compiled by Bernard Mommer) 
 
Figure 6.2 Oil income (1974-2001) in Billion US$ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy (compiled by Bernard Mommer) 
 
 
Although associated to Giusti’s term as President of PDVSA, reduced fiscal 
contributions followed, among other factors, changes in the taxation regime passed 
earlier. The elimination of the Fiscal Value for Exports, passed in 1993, gave PDVSA 
significant tax relief. PDVSA had obtained this from its weakened political masters 
when PDVSA’s President Sosa-Pietri imposed, in practice, an expansion plan in the 
early 1990s. Ramón Espinasa explained, “There was a tension between the owner of 
the resources who wanted more rents and the manager who wanted to produce more. 
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PDVSA imposed its position in solving that tension at a time of unfavourable market 
conditions.”506 This state of affairs was, however, unattainable as Bernardo Alvarez 
pointed out: “This was simply politically unsustainable.”507 
 
This significant decline in PDVSA’s fiscal payment exposed the company to two 
claims. The explanation given by Espinasa about PDVSA investing part of its surplus 
in its own expansion was not shared by many in the political world. On the contrary, 
other explanations were believed. Either the company had a bloated cost structure (see 
Figure 6.3) or tax avoidance strategies were deliberately in place to dry up fiscal 
commitments. 
 
Figure 6.3 Ratios of Costs and Taxes to Total PDVSA income 
Costs and Taxes / Total Income PDVSA 1976-2000
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Source: Ministry of Energy (compiled by Bernard Mommer) 
 
 
The issue of escalating costs and declining fiscal contributions was never settled. In 
the absence of a formal mechanism to address those matters, explanations were 
formed through non-official channels and through anecdotal evidence. For instance, a 
widely circulated ‘joke’ among top officials in the company after the restructuring in 
1998 cast some light on the ‘bloated bureaucracy’ argument: top executives joked 
about the company being ‘Hollywood’ because ‘everybody had a double’, in a clear 
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reference to the fact that the big restructuring led by Giusti in the mid-1990s had 
maintained widespread duplications in many managerial posts.508  
 
On the tax avoidance argument, a senior PDVSA official, said, “Yes, we did fiscal 
planning.”509 ‘Fiscal planning’ is used here as a euphemism for avoiding tax, in this 
case, in Venezuela. 
 
Venezuela’s limited technical and administrative capacities and PDVSA’s secrecy 
combined to create a sort of ‘witchcraft’ situation. Politicians who did not trust 
PDVSA simply accepted those claims as absolute truth. PDVSA, in turn, distrusted 
the political world intensely. Furthermore, as Alirio Parra, former PDVSA board 
member and Minister of Energy, reflected, “PDVSA believed the Venezuelan State 
knew nothing.”510  
 
 
6.2 Chavez administration’s initial oil policy 
 
President Chávez’ s oil policy during his first three years in office was more 
externally oriented than directed to control PDVSA. The government concentrated on 
an international agenda to revitalise Opec and international oil prices. PDVSA 
remained, operationally and institutionally, untouched by governmental initiatives. 
President Chávez, however, filled top ranked positions both in PDVSA and in the 
Ministry of Energy with his most trusted oil advisors. 
 
Chávez named an oil liaison commission during the transition to power (December 
1998 to February 1999) with his main advisors, notably Alí Rodríguez, Alvaro Silva-
Calderón, Hector Ciavaldini and Bernardo Alvarez. They announced a total revision 
of PDVSA plans and oil policy in general.511 Members of this commission went to the 
most senior positions in the governmental oil hierarchy, as shown in Table 6.1. These 
new senior officials were all former veterans in oil policy with large congressional 
                                                 
508 Rafael Garrido, interview by author, Caracas, 7 August 2003. 
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and long standing party experience. Chávez was faithful to his campaign promises to 
bring a ‘nationalist’ tradition to oil policy. 
 
President Chávez used his prerogative to name a new PDVSA board, even when the 
term of the existing board had not expired. On 18 February 1999 he named a new 
PDVSA board (see Table 6.2). Notably, he chose Roberto Mandini as Giusti’s 
replacement. Mandini, a respected top executive with a solid and extended career 
within the industry, was then vice chairman of PDVSA’s largest foreign subsidiary 
CITGO. He had been at odds with Luís Giusti and had been maintained in a foreign 
position. He had previously presided over PDVSA’s former subsidiary Corpoven for 
eight years until 1994.512 That year Luís Giusti was appointed President over the 
heads of the usual hopefuls, such as those presiding over the main operating 
companies, as was the case of Mandini. 
 
 
Table 6.1  Chávez administration’s top oil policy officials 
Name Position Background (most relevant positions) 
 
Alí Rodríguez  Ministry of Energy Congressman; President of Energy Select 
Committee in Congress; 
Member of Causa R (left wing party). 
 
Alvaro Silva-
Calderón 
Deputy Ministry of Energy Member of the Nationalisation Law 
Committee in 1975; 
Congressman in various terms; 
Member of Energy Select Committee in 
Congress; 
Member of MEP (left wing party). 
 
Bernardo 
Alvarez 
Deputy Ministry of Energy Congressman; 
Member of Energy Select Committee in 
Congress; Member of Causa R (left wing 
party) 
 
Hector 
Ciavaldini 
Member of PDVSA board Former middle-level staff at a PDVSA 
subsidiary. 
 
Source: Official Gazette, various issues, compilation by author. 
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Table 6.2  PDVSA’s boards (1999-2001) 
February 1999 to  
August 1999 
August 1999 to 
February 2001 
March 2001 to  
February 2002 
 
Roberto Mandini (President) Hector Ciavaldini 
(President) 
Guaicaipuro Lameda (m) –
President since Oct 2000 
Hector Ciavaldini Aires Barreto Jorge Kamkoff 
Eduardo Lopez-Quevedo Domingo Marsicobrete Karl Mazeica 
Eduardo Praselj Eduardo Praselj Vincenzo Paglione 
Oswaldo Contreras (m) Oswaldo Contreras (m) Arnaldo Rodríguez (m) 
Alfredo Carneiro (m) Carlos Jorda Juan Torres (m) 
Note: (m): military 
Source: Official Gazette, various issues, compilation by author. 
 
 
Mandini’s appointment was widely regarded as a cautious move by President Chávez. 
Other presidential appointments, such as Maritza Izaguirre, ratified as Minister of 
Finance (she had served in the previous Caldera administration) were viewed as a 
prudent stance by the Chávez’ administration, intended to calm those expecting a 
radicalisation of the government. Another appointment in PDVSA, however, was not 
well received among the conglomerate’s senior officials. Hector Ciavaldini was 
named Vice President. He was a controversial figure because he was a former 
employee of the company who terminated, in 1995, his working relations in 
contentious circumstances. Ciavaldini sued the company on the grounds of unfair 
dismissal.513 The company alleged that Ciavaldini asked for an early retirement on the 
grounds of psychological stress. The legal action had not been settled by 1999.514 In 
any case, the Ciavaldini appointment and his later influence in PDVSA internal 
management was the only significant interference by President Chávez with the status 
quo prevailing in the conglomerate prior to his coming to power.  
 
 
Chávez administration’s Opec revitalisation agenda 
 
Minister Rodríguez and other oil policy makers went on an international offensive 
focused on an Opec revitalisation agenda. It was widely accepted at that time that 
prevailing weak oil prices during the previous years was partly caused by Opec 
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indiscipline over production quotas. Moreover, Venezuela was considered one of the 
‘undisciplined’ producers despite its tradition of strong enthusiasm for Opec policies. 
It was believed that PDVSA maintained unreported reserves of oil in Caribbean 
deposits, among other tactics, to exceed Venezuelan production quotas515.  
 
President Chávez and his oil team gave top priority to restore discipline among Opec 
producers. Chávez himself embarked on a personal diplomatic effort to bring Opec 
members to agree on better coordinated actions. Table 6.3 shows the main events 
promoted by Venezuela in that direction. Opec heads of state met in Caracas for the 
first time in decades. The strategy came to fruition as oil prices recovered (also shown 
in Table 6.3).  
 
 
Table 6.3  Venezuela’s Opec revitalisation agenda (1999-2000) 
Date Event Oil Price 
($/Barrel) 
March 1999 Participate in Amsterdam meeting of Opec and 
independent producers to lower production. 
 
9.96 
June 1999 Venezuela suggested a presidential level summit of Opec 
countries to boost new strategy (last summit of that kind 
held in Argel, 1975). 
 
15.61 
July 1999 A top level Venezuelan delegation (lead by Deputy 
Minister of Energy and Mines Silva-Calderón and Deputy 
Foreign Affairs Minister Jorge Valero) visited 10 Opec 
countries to muster support for summit and new strategy. 
 
18.28 
November1999 Venezuela suggested a global action plan for Opec 23.75 
August 2000 
 
President Chávez visited ten Opec countries 28.30 
September 2000 Summit of Opec countries’ presidents is held in Caracas 31.48 
Source: El Nacional and El Universal , Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 2001. 
 
 
Chavez administration-PDVSA’s initial relationships  
 
President Chávez’s administration policy toward PDVSA did not significantly change 
its preceding status despite the fact that PDVSA’s performance had not improved 
                                                 
515 This was explained to me by a PDVSA official who requested anonymity. 
from the previous year. Changes in the composition of the board (see Table 6.2) had 
little influence over the running of the company. Roberto Mandini, the first Chávez 
appointee, was undermined by the increasing influence of another Chávez nominee, 
Hector Ciavaldini, who had direct access to Chávez most trusted advisors. 516 Mandini 
resigned in August 1998, only seven months into his term. In September 1999 
Ciavaldini was appointed the next PDVSA president.  
 
Ciavaldini’s tenure was brief though. He had to negotiate a labour contract with the 
main workers union, led at that time by Carlos Ortega.517 Negotiations were 
troublesome. Industrial action threatened the company’s traditionally peaceful labour 
relations. In October 2000 the company’s functioning was seriously threatened. 
Ciavaldini agreed a deal with the unions that was deemed a failure. This triggered his 
sacking by Chávez.  
 
PDVSA’s third president in twenty months was appointed suit. Chávez resorted this 
time to a military man. This was a usual practice of Chávez, as he filled many of the 
important posts in his administration with both retired and active military personnel. 
In fact, the PDVSA board already had members from the military when General 
Guaicaipuro Lameda was appointed to replace Ciavaldini.  
 
PDVSA’s activities and the oil opening ventures remained intact throughout this 
period. Although Minister Rodríguez had insisted that oil opening would have to be 
modified he likewise gave the assurance that the government would honour contracts 
signed under previous administrations.518 
 
Similarly, Chávez’s team’s intentions of reviewing PDVSA’s escalating costs did not 
translate to effective results, despite Ciavaldini’s early announcements regarding a 
cost reduction strategy.519 PDVSA’s cost structure followed similar patterns as the 
recent past, during 1999-2001, as Table 6.4 shows, although improving oil prices in 
                                                 
516 Ciavaldini was a close associate of Minister of Planning Jorge Giordani. They used to 
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in the general strikes of 2002. 
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2000 and 2001 enabled a better cost/income ratio. In addition, the oil opening was not 
affected, as an opponent of Chávez, former Minister Calderón-Berti, recognised .520  
 
 
Table 6.4  PDVSA cost and income per barrel (1999-2001) 
Cost 
Income 
Average 
1994-1998 
 
1999 2000 2001 
Cost per barrel 
($) 
5.10 6.77 
 
4.87 5.36 
Income per 
barrel ($) 
15.28 16.73 26.25 20.95 
Cost/Income 
ratio  
40% 44% 20% 28% 
Source: Ministry of Energy, compiled by Bernard Mommer 
 
 
While PDVSA was left practically untouched, other oil issues and political events 
evolved satisfactorily in favour of Chávez and his early objectives. On the one hand, 
oil prices recovered in 2000. Minister Alí Rodríguez was appointed Secretary General 
of Opec, and Alvaro Silva-Calderón the new Minister of Energy. On the other hand, 
the 1999 Constitution had mandated new elections for all posts. President Chávez got 
elected in July 2000 for a new constitutional term of six years. A new legislative body 
was instituted. The National Assembly was also elected in July 2000. Chávez 
obtained a handsome majority. In November 2000, the National Assembly granted 
President Chávez power to legislate by decree. A new overarching legislation for the 
oil industry was top priority in Chávez’s agenda. 
 
 
6.3  Reshaping oil’s rules of the game 
 
Once Chávez was able to legislate by decree, the top oil policy makers of his 
administration sought the opportunity to craft a regulatory framework that addressed 
all their former concerns about the sector: governance of PDVSA, possible 
privatisation and PDVSA’s dismal fiscal contributions. 
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 PDVSA’s new constitutional status 
 
The first change was at the constitutional level. In fact, the Constitution of 1999 
introduced an important innovation regarding ownership of PDVSA. State rights over 
PDVSA were elevated to the constitutional level. Any possible privatisation scheme 
was explicitly blocked in the constitutional text. In fact, Article 303 establishes: “For 
sovereignty, political and national strategic reasons, the State will keep the totality of 
shares in Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or of any other entity created to manage the 
oil industry, except those of subsidiaries, strategic associations, companies or any 
other that have been formed or will be formed to develop Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. businesses.”521 This constitutional provision settled the debate about a possible 
partial or total privatisation of PDVSA during the previous decade. Gastón Parra, the 
member of the constitutional convention who pioneered the legal provision, had 
opposed private participation in the oil sector since the discussion of the 
Nationalisation Law in 1975.522 
 
The new Constitution mandated new elections for all elected posts and a renewal of 
all other constitutional posts. Chávez got elected with 59.5% of the votes. In the new 
legislative body, the National Assembly, Chávez supporters got a majority of 108 out 
of 165 deputies. Justices and other high constitutional posts were filled directly by a 
transitional body created by the Constituent Assembly called the National Legislative 
Commission, which was amply dominated by Chávez’s supporters. Figure 6.4 shows 
the extensive process of institutional overhaul conducted in less than two years 
(February 1999 to December 2000).  
 
Additionally, the new Constitution augmented the scope of matters that the legislature 
was entitled to delegate on the President. The so-called ‘enabling’ laws authorise the 
President to legislate by decree. Article 230 of the 1999 Constitution put no 
restrictions regarding which matters can be delegated to the President.  
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Figure 6.4  Institutional overhaul (1998-2000) 
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-New Congress (National Assembly) 
National Assembly 
Pro-Chavez  
Majority (108 out of 
165 deputies) 
(2000-2005) 
President of 
the Republic 
Hugo Chavez 
Elected with 
56.9% 
(2000-2006) 
High Tribunal of 
Justice 
Extended to 
32 Magistrates in May 
2004. 
Comptroller General 
Clodosbaldo Russian (2000-2007) 
Attorney General Isaias 
Rodríguez  (2000-2007) 
Ombudsman German Mundarain 
(2000-2007) 
 It requires only a three-fifths majority to approve and to limit the duration of the 
delegation.523 In fact, on 11 November 2000, the National Assembly passed an 
‘Enabling law’ granting Chávez the widest authority to legislate by executive decree 
that a Venezuelan President had ever enjoyed since democracy was reinstated in 
1958.524 The ‘enabling’ law specifically authorised the administration to unify 
regulations on all hydrocarbons activities and to preserve public ownership over oil 
reserves (Article 1, Section 2.e) 
 
 
Rebalancing PDVSA-government relationships 
 
For Chávez’s senior officials, reversing the balance of power vis-à-vis PDVSA was 
the top priority. Bernardo Alvarez, closely involved in the drafting of the law, 
commented, “Reversing PDVSA power seemed an impossible task, but that was 
exactly what we wanted to achieve with the new law, knowing that it would be 
contentious.”525 They were especially concerned with three aspects of the relationship 
with PDVSA.  
 
1) Declining the Ministry of Energy’s regulatory capacities 
 
The Ministry had, in practice, given away its policy setting role and its capacity to 
administer oil reservoirs to PDVSA. Additionally, its diminished role to monitor, 
control and direct oil activities was evident to all. PDVSA had also taken increased 
responsibility over areas such petrochemicals, gas and carbon. The oil opening 
process had only highlighted this developing state of affairs. The new administration 
was concerned to reverse this trend and re-establish the primary role of the Ministry 
of Energy. 
 
                                                 
523 Official Gazette 5,453, 24 March 2000. 
524 Official Gazette 37,076, 13 November 2000. 
525 Bernardo Alvarez, ibid. 
2) PDVSA’s low fiscal contribution 
 
The Ministry of Energy was not only an ineffectual regulator but in addition the 
senior officials in PDVSA who had been appointed by Chávez had not succeeded in 
getting PDVSA in check. By 2001, three years into Chávez’s administration, 
reviewing costs within PDVSA was yet to be done. Alí Rodríguez, Minister of Energy 
at that time and later President of PDVSA pointed out, “PDVSA was practically 
impossible to audit. Former management had created an extremely complex web of 
companies both nationally and abroad. The limited resources available in PDVSA 
could not be devoted to carry on with the task of reconstructing old practices. We had 
to concentrate on the future and in halting old practices that went against the interest 
of Venezuela. We had to concentrate on keeping costs down. The company had 
accumulated a vast amount of managerial waste.”526  
 
Additionally, the government’s tax collecting body was deemed unprepared to 
monitor PDVSA tax payments. In fact, both the former structure within the Ministry 
of Finance (called the Division for Sector Rents) and its successor (called Servicio 
Nacional Integrado de Administracion Aduanera y Tributaria, or Seniat) were poorly 
prepared for supervising a corporation of the complexity and magnitude of PDVSA.  
 
In 2004, the unit directly responsible for supervising PDVSA tax payments was the 
Unit for the Energy Sector within the Supervision Division of the Regional Unit 
(Capital Region) for special taxpayers. This organisational structure placed this Unit 
in the fifth layer of the Seniat hierarchy, as it is showed in Figure 6.5. 
 
Edelmira Durán, the Energy sector unit coordinator commented, “Our unit supervises 
all companies of the energy sector in the country, including refining, transport and 
commercialisation of hydrocarbons. PDVSA is only one of them. With the opening of 
oil exploitation to the private sector, the division has focused on those companies. We 
have limited resources and inspections are concerned with general accounting 
principles and not on the substantial nature of their economic activities. We do not 
                                                 
526 Ali Rodríguez , interview by author, Caracas, 26 February 2004. 
have the personnel to carry out such tasks. We plan to prepare personnel for that 
purpose in the future but it has not been possible so far.”527   
 
Bernard Mommer, who was very influential in drafting the hydrocarbons law, 
recognised, “The Venezuelan government is an inefficient regulator; it is better to 
have simple but applicable regulatory rules such as the royalty, which is a flat tax.”528 
 
 
Figure 6.5  Seniat’s organisational structure (Energy sector Unit) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Seniat. Official Gazette Extraordinary 4,881, 23 March 1995 and 36,233, 23 June 1997 
 
3) Path initiated with ‘oil opening’ 
 
Objections to the ‘oil opening’ abounded. First, oil opening contracts exercised 
control over the associations through a ‘Control Committee’, instead of the traditional 
                                                 
527 Edelmira Duran, interview by author, Caracas, 20 February 2004. 
528 Bernard Mommer, interview by author, Caracas, 5 March 2002. 
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majority shareholding.529 In practice, this represented some sort of ‘golden share’ 
scheme commonly used in business associations. Although the Supreme Court had 
ruled that ‘golden share’ schemes were sufficient to guarantee state control (and 
comply with legal requirements), oil opening opponents deemed them unfit to ensure 
control.  
 
Second, auctioned areas during the oil opening were, according to PDVSA, those of 
low productivity. Oil opening opponents were at odds with that. They believed that 
this was a façade to grant access to exploration and exploitation of the reservoirs, 
largely the most profitable part of the value chain in the oil business. Finally, the 
participation of national private capital was deemed to be hindered by the high 
qualifications required for bidders.  
 
Drafters of the law, led by Minister of Energy Alvaro Silva-Calderón, wanted to use 
the new legislation to correct flaws that had been denounced for a long time. They had 
total discretion over the draft, because of the legislative delegation in the enabling 
law.  
 
 
The new Hydrocarbons Law 
 
The Ministry of Energy produced a first draft of the law eight months after the 
Enabling Law’s authorisation. In August 2001 Chávez appointed a presidential 
commission in charge of revising the draft. Table 6.5 shows the composition of the 
Commission. It included four former members of the commission which wrote the 
Nationalisation Law in 1975.  
 
The commission set a deadline for 15 October that year to submit a final draft to 
President Chávez’s cabinet. In principle, the new hydrocarbon law was aimed at 
unifying the scattered legislation that regulated the sector, a purpose agreed by all 
members. Although the commission met with experts from various sort, most of the 
debate took place through the media. 
                                                 
529 Juan Carlos Garanton, interview by author, Caracas 19 August 2003. 
Table 6.5  Members of the Revising Commission for the Hydrocarbons Law 
Member Relevant position (background) 
 
Alvaro Silva-Calderón Minister of Energy and Mines (*) 
Nelson Merentes Minister of Finance 
Jorge Giordani Minister of Planning 
Guaicaipuro Lameda President of PDVSA 
Hugo Hernández R. Oil Business association (Private sector) 
Domingo Maza Zavala Central Bank of Venezuela (*) 
Gastón Parra Luzardo Oil expert, University professor (*) 
Mazhar Al-Shereidah Oil analyst, Private Sector 
Anibal Martínez Ex-PDVSA staff (expert in Geology) (*) 
Jose Giacopini Zárraga  Ex-PDVSA staff 
(*) Former members of the Nationalization commission in 1975 
Source: El Universal  
 
 
Business and former supporters of PDVSA’s agenda in the 1990s disagreed with the 
draft. As was discussed in Chapter 4, PDVSA had imposed its agenda of production 
expansion, private sector participation and a new Venezuelan position toward Opec 
on an albeit reluctant Punto Fijo establishment.  
 
On the other hand, political forces that gathered around Chávez in the 1998 election 
threw their full support behind the draft, which was not surprising, since the draft 
followed long held views about how the oil industry should had been organised after 
the end of the concessions system in 1975. Bernardo Alvarez, referring to the 
provision in the draft that suppressed PDVSA’s exclusivity to operate the oil state-
monopoly, said, “We specifically included an article that allowed the Ministry of 
Energy to carry on with oil business activities either directly or through one or more 
public companies. PDVSA people were very angry at the possibility of its loosing its 
exclusivity.”530 
 
Another common objection from business associations was that the new royalty tax 
rate was too high and would hinder the profitability of any potential joint venture with 
PDVSA. Bernard Mommer responded, “The 30% royalty is the easiest way to collect 
                                                 
530 Bernardo Alvarez, ibid. 
the oil rent given the very poor capacity of the State to supervise and control tax 
payments.”531  
 
Former objections to oil opening were also addressed. Exploitation activities were 
open to private capital but limited to 49% of the shareholding. The controversy about 
whether ‘golden share’ schemes guaranteed state control was solved by imposing a 
majority (51%) requirement for all potential ventures of private-public capital. 
National capital participation was only loosely encouraged in the law (Article 18). 
The possibility of considering national capital as part of the 51% majority required for 
public shareholding was ignored.  
 
The Hydrocarbon Law revising commission was opened to hear objections but, 
according to opponents, never discussed them. Two members of the commission 
publicly denounced the lack of discussion. First, PDVSA president, General Lameda 
sent a ‘private’ letter that was promptly leaked to the public. He later admitted, “The 
commission thoroughly went through all past issues that troubled some members of 
the commission.”532  
 
Hugo Hernández, another member, said that “he opposed the ‘working methodology’ 
of the commission because they were presented at the beginning with a draft to be 
discussed instead of policy guidance to stimulate an open debate starting from a more 
neutral position”.533 He publicly expressed his discontent: “Various proposals made 
by different organisations were heard but never discussed or analysed. The 
commission should have thought about legislation for the next fifty years instead of 
focusing on correcting the past.”534 
 
Silva-Calderón defended the government’s position: “We heard all voices but 
obviously we had to reach decisions which were not always what opponents 
wanted.”535 
 
                                                 
531 Bernard Mommer, ibid. 
532 Guaicaipuro Lameda, interview by author, Caracas, 1 March 2002. 
533 Hugo Hernandez, interview by author, Caracas 7 February 2002. 
534 Hugo Hernandez, El Nacional, 8 November 2001. 
535 Alvaro Silva-Calderon, interview by author, Vienna, 7 July 2003. 
The law was decreed by Chávez just before the enabling powers were about to expire 
in November 2001. The final version was very close to the Silva-Calderón draft. 
Notably, the controversial 30% royalty regime was supplemented with a provision to 
lower the royalty to 20% for heavy oil exploitation when it was sufficiently justified 
that the 30% level made that exploitation unprofitable.  
 
Lameda’s opinions made his position as President of PDVSA untenable. Silva-
Calderón, the Minister of Energy at that time, said, “Lameda was totally absorbed by 
PDVSA’s former culture. When he expressed such a dissident position from the 
government I told President Chávez that his position as president of PDVSA had to be 
reconsidered.”536 President Chávez did not ratify General Lameda as President of 
PDVSA in February 2002.  
 
Along with the Hydrocarbon Law, President Chávez decreed another 48 laws, ranging 
from minor issues to land reform. The so-called ‘49 Laws Package’ unleashed a 
militant opposition push by anti-Chávez groups. This opposition drive resulted in two 
years of acute political conflicts with direct repercussions for PDVSA-government 
relationships. 
 
 
6.4  PDVSA and the political crisis (2002-2003) 
 
The passing of ‘49 Laws Package’, including the new hydrocarbon law, triggered a 
chain of events that escalated into two acute conflicts involving the oil company. The 
intensity and gravity of both conflicts represented a disproportionate response to the 
changes introduced by Chávez. As a consequence of these conflicts, PDVSA-
government relationships reached unprecedented levels of politicisation. 
 
 
                                                 
536 Alvaro Silva-Calderon, ibid. 
The conflict of February 2002 
 
In February 2002, President Chávez decided to change the PDVSA board in a striking 
way.537 PDVSA’s President Lameda had been considered by Chávez’s senior 
administration officials as “absorbed by the prevailing culture of PDVSA and not 
capable of representing the administration’s policies”.538 Consequently, President 
Chávez resorted to a proven oil nationalist, Gastón Parra, who was a former academic 
and oil expert who was a member of the Nationalisation commission in 1975, the 
constitutional convention in 1999 and the new Hydrocarbons Law writing 
commission in 2001. President Chávez named Gastón Parra as the new President on 8 
February 2002.539 He also appointed a new board on 25 February 2002.540 The new 
board is shown in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6  Board of PDVSA appointed in February 2002 
Board member Background 
 
Gastón Parra Academic, oil expert. Former member of Nationalisation commission 
(1975) and constitutional convention (1999). 
Jorge Kamkoff Various top positions in PDVSA. He also directed the Social Security 
agency (as part of PDVSA special status transferring top executives 
to other government posts on a temporary basis). 
Carlos Mendoza 
Potella 
Academic, oil expert. Former ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Militant 
opponent of privatisation schemes for PDVSA. 
Gral. Arnoldo 
Rodríguez  
Military. Only member of former board ratified. 
Alfredo Riera PDVSA official (not ranked in top positions according to PDVSA 
personnel ranking system). 
Luís E. Dávila PDVSA official (not ranked in top positions according to PDVSA 
personnel ranking system). 
Argenis Rodríguez PDVSA official (not ranked in top positions according to PDVSA 
personnel ranking system). 
Felix Rodríguez PDVSA official (not ranked in top positions according to PDVSA 
personnel ranking system). 
Jesús Villanueva PDVSA official (not ranked in top positions according to PDVSA 
personnel ranking system). 
Rafael Ramírez Gas regulator (Ministry of Energy and Mines). 
Clara Coro Ministry of Energy and Mines. 
Source: Official Gazette, compilation by author 
                                                 
537 In his annual address to the National Assembly on the 17 January 2003, President Chavez 
reflected on the February 2002 appointments in PDVSA by saying he wanted to provoke a 
crisis within the oil company. 
538 Alvaro Silva-Calderon, ibid. 
539 Official Gazette 37,382, 8 February 2002. 
540 Official Gazette 37,391, 25 February 2002. 
The Presidential announcements immediately triggered strong opposition from 
PDVSA’s top ranks. On the same day as the announcements, they issued a 
communiqué against the appointments. On 25 February, 34 top PDVSA’s executives 
signed a petition rejecting the ‘politicisation’ of the industry. The main thrust was the 
alleged breaking of the so-called ‘Meritocracy’. According to them, the merit-based 
personnel system that had prevailed in PDVSA since its creation in 1975 was being 
severely affected by the appointment of board members that did not correspond with 
the necessary qualifications in that system.  
 
 
A mid-ranked PDVSA manager commented, “The Parra and new board appointments 
were just the last drop to fill the glass in the government attempt to control the 
industry. The three years of the Chávez administration had been full of controversial 
internal appointments such as the main internal security official, a military officer 
closed to Chávez, who had implemented a state of terror inside the company. 
Numerous rumours of sackings, internal reorganisations and new directives were 
abundant over the last years, up to a point that a large proportion of the managerial 
ranks were extremely anxious and fearful about their future in the company.”541  
 
An historic review of former appointments reveals that ‘Meritocracy’, as the 
personnel system had traditionally been presented, had not in fact been properly 
adhered to in the past.542 Table 6.7 shows a summary of previous appointments to the 
board. 
 
                                                 
541 Victor Ramos, interview by author, Caracas, 2 May 2002. 
542 The ‘Meritocracy’ argument was presented as suggesting that the Board of PDVSA should 
be filled with top-ranked officials from within PDVSA. 
Table 6.7  Members of PDVSA’s board (1975-2002) by background 
Main background in: Number of 
members 
% of Total % of total weighted 
by time in office 
Oil industry (both pre- and post- 
nationalisation) 
 
41 
 
50.6 49.4 
Non-Oil industry (details below)    
Public Sector (including Ministry of 
Energy) 
13 14.8 19.4 
Private Sector (including oil 
industry suppliers) 
15 18.5 16.0 
Other  
(Unions and Military*) 
12 16.1 15.2 
 
Sub-Total Non-Oil Industry 40 49.4 50.6 
 
Total 
 
81 100 100 
*Until 1999 it was customary to have two members of the board chosen by Labour. Since 1999, President Chávez 
has resorted to members of Military to fill many bureaucratic positions  
Source: PDVSA annual reports, Rafael Quiróz in Meritocracia Petrolera: Mito o Realidad (Caracas, Panapo, 
2003). Estimates by author. 
 
 
Table 6.8  Presidents of PDVSA (1975-2002) 
President Period Background 
 
Rafael Alfonzo-
Ravard 
August 1975 – 
August 1983 
Military (General); Guyana Development 
Corporation (President)  
Humberto 
Calderón B. 
August 1983-
February 1984 
Ministry of Energy and Mines 
Brígido Natera February 1984- 
November 1986 
President largest PDVSA subsidiary (Lagoven) 
Juan Chacín  December 1986-
March 1990 
Director PDVSA subsidiary Meneven 
Andrés Sosa P. March 1990- 
March 1992 
Entrepreneur (oil industry supplier) 
Gustavo Roosen March 1992- 
March 1994 
Top manager in private conglomerate Polar; Ex- 
Minister of Education 
Luís Giusti March 1994-
February 1999 
Strategic Planning Director at PDVSA 
Roberto Mandini February 1999-
August 1999 
President PDVSA third largest subsidiary 
(Corpoven); Vice President PDVSA’s largest 
foreign subsidiary (Citgo) 
Héctor Ciavaldini September 1999-
October 2000 
Middle rank staff in PDVSA subsidiaries (Bariven, 
Intevep) 
Guaicaipuro 
Lameda 
October 2000-
February 2002 
Military (General); Director of National Budget 
Office 
  
Source: Official Gazette, various issues, PDVSA annual reports, compilation by author 
 
 
Only five out of 10 previous Presidents of PDVSA, as shown in Table 6.8, came from 
within the industry. Notably, only two of them, Natera and Mandini, were considered 
top-ranked at the moment of the appointment. Selections such as that of Juan Chacín 
in 1986 or Luís Giusti in 1994 were criticised. Chacín on the grounds that an alleged 
blood relationship with the acting President of the Republic (Jaime Lusinchi) 
prevailed over professional qualifications and, Giusti on the grounds that there were 
many other officials better ranked than him at that time.543  
 
On the other hand, ‘internal discontent’ seems to better explain the virulent reaction, 
disproportionately to past experiences, against the Board’s appointments. Although 
PDVSA’s presidents in the first years of the Chávez administration had not 
significantly altered the way PDVSA was operating, internal rumours were rife about 
imminent changes within the company. The main issue, however, was an 
investigation conducted by an internal control office called the ‘Losses Control and 
Prevention Corporate Unit’.544 This unit, commonly referred to by its acronym in 
Spanish, ‘PCP’, was headed by a military man, closely associated to President 
Chávez, called Colonel Gustavo Pérez-Issa.  
 
There was a report leaked to the press that implicated 68 top executives in 
wrongdoings. 545 Although no specific actions had been taken, the mere existence of 
the investigations was a disturbance for many in senior positions. The secrecy 
involved in the scrutiny of former practices, and the alleged espionage methods used 
by PCP, created an uncertain working environment, which explains the widespread 
anxiety among top officials. A revision of the role of PCP was high on the agenda of 
the dissenting technocrats, as was revealed in a published confidential document.546 
The document details the strategic plan discussed in the Assembly held by PDVSA 
managers on 6 March 2002.  
                                                 
543 There were 18 top officials ranked above Giusti when he was chosen as PDVSA’s 
President. See Rafael Quiróz, Meritocracia Petrolera: ¿Mito o Realidad? (Caracas, Panapo, 
2003). 
544 Gerencia corporativa de prevención y control de perdidas. 
545 Published in a weekly newspaper called ‘Quinto Dia’ by Miguel Salazar in his column 
‘Las verdades de Miguel’ in two consecutives editions (282, 22-29 March and 283, 29 March 
to 5 April 2002). The list is reproduced in a book called F.Mieres (various authors) PDVSA y 
el Golpe (Caracas, Fuentes, 2003). 
546 F.Mieres (various authors), PDVSA y el Golpe (Caracas, Fuentes, 2003). 
 Top PDVSA officials, however, made the ‘Meritocracy’ claim the centrepiece of a 
swiftly organised collective action. The former ‘veil of secrecy’ normally associated 
with internal affairs in PDVSA, and widely cherished by technocrats, was broken.547 
 
The conflict promptly crossed the company’s frontiers. It received enormous backing 
from business, the principal labour union and the ‘big media’. Fedecamaras, the top 
business federation, offered support for PDVSA technocrats on 25 February.548 Later, 
on 1 March, Fedecamaras president Pedro Carmona demanded the resignation of 
PDVSA’s president Gastón Parra.549 The largest union, CTV, similarly backed 
PDVSA officials by offering help in turning the protest into a broader industrial 
action.550 Similarly, several small organisations of the so-called ‘civil society’ joined 
rebellious PDVSA managers in their protest.551  
 
On the other hand, President Chávez’s supporters became equally organised to 
counteract the technocrats’ actions. The ‘Frente Bolívariano de Profesionales y 
Técnicos’, an association of PDVSA professionals sympathetic to Chávez, led various 
demonstrations to back official policy and to support the appointment of the 
PDVSA’s board questioned by the anti-Chávez forces.552  
 
‘Big media’ (the main TV channels and top newspapers) gave extensive coverage to 
the rebellious PDVSA technocrats’ actions. These included frequent stoppages during 
working hours usually accompanied by gatherings in front of PDVSA’s main 
corporate buildings in Caracas and other parts of the country.553 
                                                 
547 A saying in Spanish ‘los trapos sucios se lavan en casa’ (‘You don’t wash your dirty linen 
in public’) 
548 ‘Fedecamaras brinda su respaldo’, El Universal, 26 February 2002. 
549 ‘Tiene que renunciar Parra’, El Universal, 1 March 2002. 
550 ‘CTV apoyara huelga petrolera si los trabajadores la convocan’, El Universal, 7 March 
2002; ‘CTV esta asesorando a trabajadores de la nomina mayor’, El Universal, 15 March 
2002. 
551 Organisations such as ‘Mujeres por la libertad’, ‘Asamblea ciudadana’, ‘Vision 
emergente’, ‘Queremos elegir’, ‘Alianza por la libertad’, ‘Frente institucional military’ and 
‘Sinergia’ gathered in a top hotel (CCCT) to show support (reported in El Universal, 16 
March 2002). 
552 ‘Lanzan ultimatum en PDVSA’, El Universal, 5 March 2002; ‘Bolivarianos tomaron 
PDVSA’, El Universal, 7 March 2002. 
553 Such as headquarters in La Campiña neighbourhood and a major office building in Chuao, 
 The conflict peaked when two senior officials were sacked by PDVSA’s President 
Parra.554 During the previous fortnight a conciliation commission of National 
Assembly deputies, led by Deputy Luís Salas had tried to mediate in the conflict. 555 
The commission met the Vice President of the Republic Diosdado Cabello and 
dissenting managers, both separately and together, to no avail. The rebellious 
managers gathered in a general assembly held in a top hotel in Caracas on 24 
March.556. They gave the government an ultimatum to rectify both appointments and 
annul the sackings by 1 April.557 
 
The PDVSA quarrel was, by then, beyond the control of the rebellious officials. 
Fedecamaras and CTV both announced that further measures were to be taken if the 
technocrats’ demands were not met. Fedecamaras president Pedro Carmona visited 
PDVSA offices.558 CTV called for a general strike in support of the PDVSA workers. 
Fedecamaras quickly joined the labour union’s call.  
 
It was, however, a direct intervention in the conflict from President Chávez that 
triggered a broader response. On his weekly TV programme ‘Alo Presidente’, held on 
7 April, President Chávez publicly sacked seven PDVSA top managers and ordered 
the early retirement of another seven.559  
 
The PDVSA internal conflict irrevocably expanded to national levels when 
Fedecamaras and CTV called a general strike for the 9 April. An acute broader 
conflict unravelled the following week. Table 6.9 shows the main events during that 
week. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
a corporate building district. 
554 This episode is not clear. Press reports stated that Oscar Murillo, Chief Legal advisor and 
Armando Izquierdo, Director of Public Affairs, were sacked by Parra (see ‘Gaston Parra 
exigio la salida a dos gerents de PDVSA’, El Universal, 23 March 2002) but another version 
was that they asked for early retirement benefit. 
555 Deputy in the National Assembly for a small party called ‘Vamos’. 
556 For the first time, non administrative staff joined the conflict. 
557 ‘Empleados dan plazo de una semana a la Junta Directiva’, El Universal, 25 March 2002. 
558 As denounced by Deputy Arnaldo Marquez in ‘Diputado Marquez rechaza presencia de 
Fedecamaras en PDVSA’, El Universal, 5 April 2002. 
559 The sacked managers were: Eddie Ramírez, Juan Fernández, Horacio Medina, Gonzalo 
Feijoo, Edgar Quijano, Alfredo Gómez and Carmen Hernández. 
 Table 6.9  Main events 8 to 14 April 2002 
Date Event 
 
Monday 8 Fedecamaras and CTV called for a general strike. 
Tuesday 9 General strike commenced. Additionally, numerous protesters gathered in 
PDVSA’s office in Chuao to support PDVSA senior management. 
Wednesday 
10 
Gathering in Chuao escalated. Chávez’ supporters also surrounded the area. 
Municipal policemen were deployed to protect the gathering.560 
Thursday 
11- (AM) 
A significant march summoned to finish in Chuao is diverted to the 
Presidential palace to demand President Chávez’s resignation.561 
Thursday 11 
– (PM) 
The march approached the Presidential palace. Bloodshed followed when 
both Chávez opponents and supporters collided nearby.  
Thursday 11 
– midnight 
Top army officers rebelled against President Chávez (Chief commander of the 
army). Army Inspector General Lucas Rincon announced Chávez had 
resigned. Chávez is arrested and taken to a naval base. 
Friday 12 – 
early hours 
Fedecamaras’ president Pedro Carmona is called by the rebel army offices to 
serve as President of the Republic. 
Friday 12 – 
(PM) 
Carmona sworn in as President in the Presidential Palace accompanied by 
future cabinet members and businessman. Neither the National Assembly nor 
other constitutional powers are present. In fact, the Carmona proclamation 
decree included the dissolution of all those powers. 
Friday 12 – 
late hours 
Chávez supporters gathered in various areas of Caracas demanding his return 
to power. 
Saturday 13 Rebel army officers made a U-turn and re-installed Chávez as President. 
Sunday 14 Reinstalled President Chávez addressed the nation on network TV.  
Source: El Nacional, El Universal. TV Stations (compilation by author) 
 
 
President Chávez returned to power on 14 April on a conciliatory stance.562 The 
PDVSA situation was the first issue to be addressed. Chávez decided to reinstate the 
sacked top managers and to appoint a new Board (the PDVSA board had resigned on 
11 April). He brought acting the Secretary General of Opec and former Minister of 
Energy Alí Rodríguez to lead the company, an appointment well received by all 
political actors.  
 
Chávez set up a ‘council of personalities’ and called a ‘dialogue roundtable’ to host 
talks with all conflicting sectors. Several commissions were formed within that 
                                                 
560 Both Baruta and Chacao municipalities (were Chuao is located) and the Metropolitan 
(Capital) district were controlled by Chavez-opposing majors. 
561 Estimates of people who joined that march range from half a million to 1 million. 
562 He publicly apologised to the sacked PDVSA senior managers for his public 
announcements of 7 April. See F.Mieres (various authors), PDVSA y el Golpe (Caracas, 
Fuentes, 2003). 
framework to address contentious issues, including a revision of the hydrocarbon law. 
Several meetings were held and although some recommendations were drafted no 
reform of the hydrocarbon law was passed by the National Assembly. 
 
PDVSA’s post-April climate was very tense. Political activism had been introduced in 
different forms. First, the April crisis had created the incentives for an unprecedented 
collective action at the managerial level. The informal gatherings and decision making 
assemblies were followed by the creation of two organisations. First, they formed a 
managerial union called ‘Unapetrol’.563 Second, they also set up a ‘civic association’ 
called ‘Gente de Petróleo’ (Oil People) to advance oil-related interests.564  
 
Gente del Petróleo played a dual role. On the one hand they intervened in internal 
affairs within PDVSA. For example, when PDVSA’s board relocated some of the top 
managers who had been very active in April’s conflict, they demanded that the Board 
“not let political factors affect organisational decisions”.565 
 
At the same time, Gente del Petróleo was active in national politics. They joined an ad 
hoc political body called ‘Coordinadora Democrática’ (Democratic Coordinator). This 
political vehicle was formed by forces opposing President Chávez such as the 
traditional political parties AD, Copei and MAS, and several of the so-called ‘civil 
society’ organisations.  
 
Similarly, Chávez supporters inside the company formed a parallel association called 
‘Asopetroleros’. Additionally, discrepancies flourished between the radical wing of 
Chávez supporters and the new PDVSA president. Late in 2002, recently appointed 
Minister of Energy Rafael Ramírez admitted the existence of some sort of parallel 
board of PDVSA, which convened in an informal parallel shareholders Assembly. 
Ramírez disqualified that meeting on the basis that it was political act. Members of 
parallel board included former Vice President Adina Bastidas, PCP’s manager 
                                                 
563 This union was never legally recognised by the Ministry of Labour. Unapetrol asked the 
Supreme Court to decide on that recognition. See ‘Unapetrol interpuso recurso ante el TSJ’, 
El Universal,  29 November 2002.  
564 This is a typical legal form used for Non for profit organisations in Venezuela. 
565 ‘Cuatro directores rebeldes fueron reubicados’, El Universal, 29 August 2002; ‘Rechazan 
cambios en PDVSA’, El Universal, 30 August 2002. 
Gustavo Pérez-Issa and former PDVSA board members Gastón Parra, Carlos 
Mendoza Potella, Alfredo Riera, Argenis Rodríguez and Felix Rodríguez.566 Although 
the Minister denied knowing details of that group’s recommendations, it was public 
knowledge that this ‘parallel board’ was very critical of Alí Rodríguez’s conciliatory 
position vis-à-vis the April’s rebellious managers. In any case, it was evident that 
PDVSA was functioning amidst an unprecedentedly politicised internal environment. 
 
 
The conflict of December 2002 
 
By late 2002 the various factions opposing Chávez radicalised their positions. 
Fedecamaras and CTV called for a general strike on 2 December, demanding 
Chávez’s resignation and fresh elections. Juan Fernández, President of Gente de 
Petróleo, admitted that there were pressures on PDVSA to join the strike. He said that 
joining the strike was an individual decision that had to be taken individually on the 
basis of each person’s consciousness as a citizen and not as oil workers.567  
 
Since rebellious PDVSA officials in April had been pardoned by President Chávez as 
a consequence of the external pressures, it seems plausible they felt obliged to support 
the Democratic Coordinator’s actions.568   
 
The General Strike commenced on 2 December, PDVSA workers joined the strike in 
large numbers in the following days. They succeeded in paralysing oil operations on a 
large scale. Production of crude oil and refining products was severely affected, as 
Table 6.10 illustrates.  
 
 
                                                 
566 ‘Talibanes petroleros piden la remocion de Ali Rodríguez’, El Nacional, 29 November 
2002. 
567 ‘Animos se caldean en PDVSA por posibles detenciones’, El Universal, 27 November 
2002. 
568 This observation follows a conversation with various PDVSA’s staff who requested 
anonymity. 
Table 6.10  PDVSA crude production (2001-2003) 
Period Monthly production  
(000) Barrels 
 
Average year 2001 85,523 
Average year 2002 (January-November) 70,884 
December 2002 19,860 
January 2003 15,535 
February 2003 30,380 
March 2003 62,055 
April 2003 66,734 
May 2003 51,481 
Average June-December 2003 76,362 
Source: PDVSA Form 20F/SEC, 2003 
 
 
PDVSA production during the two-month long strike was only 25% of the level of 
production in the previous year. Petrol had to be imported when local supply dried up 
leaving the country at an almost complete halt. The two-month long paralysis was 
extremely costly. The price differential of imports caused a US$ 504 million loss to 
the company. Additionally, damages to installations and malfunctioning equipment 
were estimated at US$ 209 million.569  
 
Collateral effects, however, are more difficult to quantify. PDVSA’s report to the 
Security Exchange Commission in 2003 states, “The work stoppage of operations also 
caused other effects that, although they cannot be quantified or valued accurately, 
significantly affected the operations of PDVSA and its Venezuelan subsidiaries. 
Among other factors, there were delays to the environmental remediation plans; the 
loss of sensitive operating information; interruption of the information systems; 
delays in compliance with obligations to creditors; a deterioration of PDVSA as a 
reliable supplier of oil; failure to comply with financial, legal and contractual 
obligations; loss of market share; delays in execution of plans and projects; and the 
loss of human resources and intellectual capital with an average specialised 
experience of 15 years.”570 
 
                                                 
569 PDVSA, Form 20F, US Security Exchange Commission, 2003. 
570 PDVSA, ibid.  
In fact, the most dramatic effect of the strike was the “termination of employment, 
effective 1 January 2003, of approximately 18,000 employees”.571 Although this 
represents 40% of the estimated total, its impact was much broader. The lost 
personnel were in the top end of the organisational structure. An estimate of the 
personnel loss indicates that 75% of top executives, 51% of professionals and senior 
technical staff and 7% of operators were dismissed as a result of the strike.572  
 
According to PDVSA, the total number of employees in Venezuela by 2003 was 
28,841. This represents 63% of the total number of employees of the previous year 
(see Table 6.11). In addition, there have been allegations that sacked employees were 
blacklisted for jobs in supplier companies. An official in one of the foreign companies 
that operated in association with PDVSA corroborated that rumour.573 In any case, the 
loss of trained personnel was significant. 
 
 
Table 6.11  PDVSA employees (2001-2003) 
As 31 December of Total number of employees In Venezuela Abroad 
 
2001 46,425 40,945 5,480 
2002 45,683 40,133 5,550 
2003 33,998 28,841 5,157 
Source: PDVSA Form 20F , US SEC, 2003 
 
 
6.5 Post-conflict PDVSA  
 
After the government rode out the two-month strike, President Chávez’s political 
control over the company was total. A new board was appointed in March 2003 (see 
Table 6.12) 
 
 
                                                 
571 PDVSA, ibid. 
572 Report by Gente de Petroleo and Unapetrol, 2003, similar estimates were given by Alberto 
Quiros-Corradi in his weekly collaboration to El Nacional, 6 July 2003. 
573 Interview with an executive of a foreign company located in Caracas who requested 
anonymity. 
Table 6.12  PDVSA boards (2003-2005) 
Board appointed  
6 March 2003 
Board appointed  
11 March 2004 
Board appointed  
13 January 2005 
 
Alí Rodríguez (ratified) Alí Rodríguez Rafael Ramírez (previously 
appointed on the 22 Nov 04 
as Minister of Energy)574 
Luís Marín Iván Hernández Luís Vierma 
Félix Rodríguez Félix Rodríguez Alejandro Granado 
Dester Rodríguez Dester Rodríguez Eudomario Carruyo 
Aires Barreto José Rojas Jesús Villanueva 
Luís Vierma (Deputy 
Minister of Energy) 
Luís Vierma (Deputy 
Minister of Energy) 
Dester Rodríguez  
Nelson Núñez (Unions) Nelson Martínez Eulogio del Pino 
Rafael Rosales (Unions) Rafael Rosales (Unions) Asdrubal Chávez 
 Nelson Núñez (Unions) Ivan Orellana 
 Victor Álvarez (Deputy 
Minister of Industry) 
Bernard Mommer (Deputy 
Minister of Energy) 
 José Luís Prieto575 Carlos Martínez 
Source: Official Gazette, various issues 
 
 
Subsequent months were consumed with several restructuring efforts to adjust to the 
massive loss in personnel. Alí Rodríguez commented, “We concentrated in 
reconstituting information systems, filling the most sensitive posts and in eliminating 
the enormous administrative waste we found. The company had several 
administrative buildings in Caracas and outside the operating areas. This situation was 
unsustainable. Our task was to rebuild the company and to make sure we could 
operate it with substantial cost reductions, allowing improved fiscal contributions and 
prioritising social projects.”576 
 
Table 6.13 shows the distribution of PDVSA personnel according to their functions. 
According to the same source, 17.6% of total personnel were placed in the capital city 
of Caracas. These personnel were exclusively for administration purposes, since no 
operating areas were located in the capital.  
 
 
                                                 
574 Official Gazette 38,070, 22 November 2004. 
575 Appointed on the 20 April 2004, Official Gazette 37,920 of that day. 
576 Ali Rodríguez, interview by author, Caracas, 26 February 2004. 
Table 6.13  PDVSA distribution of personnel before December 2002 
Top Executives 
(Executive payroll) 
Professionals 
(Major payroll) 
Administrative support 
and technical (Major 
payroll) 
 
Unionised 
operators (daily 
payroll) 
2.4% 47% 32% 19% 
 
Source: PDVSA (Human Resources Department) published in Rafael Quiróz, Meritocracia Petrolera: ¿mito o 
realidad? (Caracas, Panapo, 2003) 
 
 
Internal personnel movements and other readjustments, however, triggered politically 
motivated tensions among Chávez administration loyalists. Alí Rodríguez was 
constantly accused by the Bolívarian movement (MVR577) sympathisers of taking 
decisions in the company on partisan lines. They alleged Rodríguez favoured former 
associates from his party (PPT578). Constant denunciations regarding PDVSA internal 
decisions were made through two websites associated with radical Chávez supporters, 
www.aporrea.org, run by an organisation called ‘Asamblea Popular Revolucionaria’, 
and www.soberania.org, associated to oil pundits that published abundant information 
on oil-related issues. Although these channels were rather informal they signal how 
politically sensitive business decisions had become within PDVSA.  
 
Former secrecy in PDVSA internal affairs gave way to a politicised environment in 
which decisions were taken beyond technical considerations and unusually exposed to 
public scrutiny and manipulation. On the other hand, PDVSA top management were 
instructed by the Executive to address contentious issues that were not attended before 
despite previous orders by government officials. Silva-Calderón, former Minister of 
Energy recalled, “Alí Rodríguez as president of PDVSA had to execute orders that he 
gave as Minister of Energy three years earlier.”579  
 
 
                                                 
577 MVR (Movimiento Quinta Republica) was the party founded by Chavez. 
578 PPT (Patria para todos) was one of the parties that supported Chavez. 
579 Alvaro Silva-Calderon, ibid.  
Reversing the ‘oil opening’ 
 
The reversing of ‘oil opening’ and other decisions made by former administrations 
regarding association with private capital was the top priority. Oil opening contracts 
were revised. Table 6.14 shows major changes in rules regulating the so-called oil 
opening introduced by PDVSA since 2003. 
 
 
Table 6.14  Major changes to ‘oil opening’ regulations 
Changing rules regarding: Foreign companies 
involved 
 
Major changes 
Associations to exploit heavy 
crude oil in the Orinoco Belt 
Four strategic associations 
where PDVSA is minority 
shareholder 
Royalty went from 1% to 
16.66% 
‘Operating agreements’ to 
exploit marginal oil fields 
32 agreements with foreign 
led consortia (13 out of 32 
have been change amicably 
until October 2005) 
Conversion of former legal 
contract to associations with 
PDVSA according to new 
Hydrocarbon law 
‘Operating agreements’ to 
exploit marginal oil fields 
32 agreements with foreign 
led consortia (those who still 
function as operating 
agreements) 
Limit payments to the 
foreign companies up to 
66.67%  
‘Operating agreements’ to 
exploit marginal oil fields 
32 agreements with foreign 
led consortia 
Revision of Tax payments 
through the life of the 
contracts signed during 
1992-1997 
Source: PDVSA Corporate bulletin “Avances” 5 May 2005 
 
 
The ‘operating agreements’ were finally terminated in March 2006. The agreements 
were converted to joint ventures between PDVSA and former contract holders.580 The 
National Assembly approved a new contractual framework to regulate the joint 
ventures on 30 March 2006. Later, the Assembly sanctioned 21 contracts with the 
former foreign companies who agreed to convert their agreements to joint ventures. 
The Ministry of Energy announced that the government finally approved the new 
scheme in June 2006. Particularly, the joint ventures formed to exploit the fields 
                                                 
580 Not all former beneficiaries of the ‘operating agreements’ formed joint ventures with 
PDVSA. Notably, Exxon-Mobil pulled out from one of the agreements and Total and ENI 
challenged PDVSA for terminating their agreements. 
auctioned in the oil opening process in the 1990s received similar tax treatment to 
PDVSA (i.e. a Royalty of 30%, a Corporate Tax rate of 50%).  
 
 
Fusion of roles of Minister of Energy-President of PDVSA 
 
The most important institutional change, however, introduced by the Executive 
concerned the Minister of Energy and his role vis-à-vis PDVSA. First, both positions 
of Minister of Energy and President of PDVSA were merged. Chávez’s Presidential 
Decree 3,264 appointed Minister Rafael Ramírez as PDVSA’s president. This 
appointment was however not permitted, at the time, by PDVSA bylaws approved on 
10 December 2002.581 In fact, the government corrected the illegality by modifying 
PDVSA’s bylaws again on the 7 December 2004, allowing the Minister to sit as 
PDVSA president.582 Similarly, from March 2003, the Deputy Minister of Energy also 
sat in the board of PDVSA. In 2005, three acting officials from the Ministry were part 
of the Board (Minister Ramírez, Deputy Bernard Mommer and Iván Orellana, Opec 
governor). 
 
Later in January 2005, the Ministry of Energy was restructured. Attributions 
concerning regulation of mines were taken away from the Ministry (passed to the 
Ministry of Industry).The Ministry was renamed “Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum”.583 This later modification, however, has not accompanied by other 
organisational changes in the Ministry. 
 
 
Fiscal contribution of PDVSA since 2002 
 
Since the government took complete control of the oil company after surviving the oil 
strikes in 2002, PDVSA has paid taxes in the same proportion as it did before the 
strikes. Table 6.15 shows a comparison between oil taxes and the value of oil exports. 
 
                                                 
581 Official Gazette 37,588, 10 December 2002. 
582 Official Gazette 38,081, 7 December 2004. 
583 Official Gazette 38,109, 18 January 2005. 
 Table 6.15  Fiscal contribution of PDVSA (2000-2006) 
Year Fiscal contribution in 
million us$ 
As % of value of oil 
exports(*) 
 
2000 10,800 37 
2001 6,865 31 
2002 8,099 40 
2003 8,193 44 
2004 7,504 26 
2005 12,155 28 
2006 (estimated) 15,460 33 
Average 1990-1999 6,611 45 
(*) Figures of PDVSA gross income were not available since 2002, Value of oil exports, as reported in Opec 
statistics were used instead. 
Source: Opec Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004, Onapre. 
 
 
Although the government oil officials had previously been very critical of PDVSA’s 
diminishing fiscal contributions, they adopted a strategy of limiting PDVSA’s 
contributions to the National Treasury 2002. They achieved that by underestimating 
the price of oil in the national budget calculations submitted to the National Assembly 
for approval. Since real oil prices were well above those estimates the resulting 
surplus has been captured through other mechanisms, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Old issues regarding the governance of PDVSA, the role of private investment in the 
oil business and PDVSA’s fiscal contributions had troubled political elites for 
decades. PDVSA had emerged largely independent from political interferences. Punto 
Fijo policy makers had succumbed to PDVSA pre-eminence. Although dubbing 
PDVSA a ‘black box’ or a ‘state within the State’, Punto Fijo politicians had accepted 
an increasing role for PDVSA in policy setting, a movement towards increasing 
privatisation of the business and a reduced fiscal contribution. The substitution of this 
established political elite by Hugo Chávez in 1998 triggered an inevitable revision of 
those issues.  
 
President Chávez, however, adopted a cautious stance towards PDVSA in the first 
three years of his administration. Chávez’s political agenda was concentrated on 
overhauling the constitutional order. Once that endeavour had been achieved, he 
promoted a similar overhaul in the regulations of the hydrocarbons sector. He made 
use of his handsome majority in the National Assembly in 2001 to obtain special 
legislative powers to legislate by decree. He then produced a new hydrocarbon law 
that had a paradoxical reception among the displaced elite. The new law was deemed 
as a unilateral exercise by Chávez’s oil advisors, most of them linked to the left wing 
parties that had been critical of governmental oil policy since nationalisation. The new 
law, however, was more open to private investment than the nationalisation law. 
 
On the other hand, the government’s intention to revise the ‘oil opening’ process 
provoked controversy. Government officials wanted to produce a new framework for 
private participation that corrected the flaws of the oil opening they had denounced 
when they were in opposition. Disagreements about the regulation of private capital, 
however, were not to translate into immediate action when the law was passed. It was 
political opposition to Chávez on other policy issues that engulfed PDVSA-
government relations. Chávez’s new oil policy was implicitly challenged by the 
PDVSA’s technocracy when they rebelled against Chávez’s appointment to the board 
in February 2002. 
 
Discontented technocrats allied with broader opposition forces. In the absence of 
organised opposition following the collapse of the traditional Punto Fijo parties AD 
and Copei, opposition to Chávez was led by an alliance of the traditional media, the 
private sector through Fedecamaras, and the unions formerly linked to AD. The 
PDVSA’s internal conflict rapidly escalated to a national conflict. Protests by PDVSA 
senior managers were used in the power struggle between Chávez and anti-Chávez 
forces. Notably, in April 2002, the PDVSA executives’ rebellion disproportionately 
spiralled into a constitutional crisis. Only eight months after the crisis was overcome, 
the PDVSA technocracy became yet more militant in challenging Chávez’s rule. A 
two-month oil stoppage provoked by the rebellious managers ended in a major shake 
up of the company. Eighteen thousand administrative employees were sacked for 
participating in the strike. President Chávez filled top positions with loyal executives. 
Later, he merged the role of Minister of Energy and President of PDVSA, among 
other changes, to ensure total control of PDVSA policy decisions.  
 
Chávez’s responses, albeit different in gradation, followed a similar pattern to those in 
the past: being unable to challenge PDVSA through technical regulation and policy 
setting because of the weak Ministry of Energy, Venezuelan presidents used their 
prerogative to appoint officials in the hierarchy of the company as a way to exert their 
power. Yet politicisation reached an unprecedented level. Not only are decisions 
tightly controlled by the Executive, but PDVSA’s internal management is subject to 
political considerations. 
 
Ironically, the main banner of the protests by senior PDVSA officials had been to say 
no to the politicisation of the company’s affairs such as the appointment of senior 
officials. The resulting conflicts, during February to April 2002 and December 2002 
to February 2003, brought national politics, perhaps for a long time, to the core of the 
industry. President Chávez’s response to the challenge was to tighten political control 
of the oil business. This degree of control completely departed from the post-
nationalisation agreement of keeping politics out of the management of the oil 
company. 
 
PDVSA was, after the 2002-2003 conflicts, finally brought under the control of its 
political masters. This new character of the governance of the oil company was, 
however, attained at a high cost and in a way that does not guarantee an 
institutionalisation of PDVSA-government relationships. So much was still subject to 
Presidential discretion and to the imperatives of political conditions.  
 
 Chapter 7 
 
The development funds (2003-2005) 
 
 
This chapter analyses the institutional arrangements established by President 
Chávez’s administration to channel a significant part of the extraordinary oil revenues 
the country obtained during the period between 2003 and 2005.The chapter describes 
how the institutional structure regulating the public finances was modified to bow to 
President Chávez’s preferences on how to spend the oil windfall. It argues that 
President Chávez’s administration responded to his preference for State-led 
development and, crucially, to his perceived electoral needs.  
 
Chávez’s administration opted to implement its strategy through ad hoc and makeshift 
spending programmes funded by extra oil revenues. After a series of provisional 
measures and organisational reforms, the Chávez administration consolidated the 
extra-budgetary spending mechanisms in the so called Development Funds. The 
findings of this chapter corroborate the hypothesis that Venezuelan presidents are able 
to alter pre-existing institutional arrangements in order to implement their short term 
preferences. The chapter shows how in practice, institutions that regulate public 
spending, were altered under presidential pressure. The chapter also demonstrates 
how President Chávez’s administration established ‘parallel structures’ in response to 
the limits that were imposed by the weak public apparatus.  
 
 
7.1 The recovery in revenues from oil export  
 
International oil prices in the first six years of the Chávez administration developed 
favourably. Oil exports, however, faced disruption as a consequence of political 
events. This meant that the international oil price recovery did not immediately fully 
translate into a major boost in oil income. Table 7.1 shows how the Chávez 
administration’s first three years compared to the previous four years of the Caldera 
administration. 
 
Average oil prices in Venezuela were 33% higher in the first three years of the 
Chávez administration. During this time oil exports grew by 38%. Oil revenues for 
the following three years, however, did not follow the same pattern. While 
international prices for Venezuelan oil almost doubled from the price in Caldera’s 
times (by 96.65%), oil exports grew only 50%. This difference is explained by the 
disruption caused by the escalating conflict that involved PDVSA. 
 
 
Table 7.1  Oil prices & oil exports (Caldera’s v. Chávez’s administration) 
Administration Average Oil 
price 
(US$/barrel) 
Variation vs. 
Caldera’s 
administration 
(%) 
Average oil 
exports 
(US$)million 
Variation vs. 
Caldera’s 
administration 
(%) 
 
Caldera’s  
(1994-1998) 
15.82 - 15.217 - 
Chávez’s 
(1999-2001) 
20.94 +32.68 21.047 +38.31 
Chávez’s (2002-
2004) 
31.11 +96.65 22.824 +49.99 
Source: Ministry of Energy 
 
 
The political conflicts that occurred in the years between 2002 and 2004 took place 
against a backdrop of a steady recovery in international oil prices. As Table 7.2 
shows, the average price in 2003 for the Venezuelan ‘oil basket’ was 17.4% higher 
than the previous year. Despite the damage that the oil strike inflicted on Venezuelan 
production, oil exports in 2003 dropped only 7.77% from the level in the previous 
year.  
 
By 2004 it was evident to the government that oil prices were to reach a new plateau, 
as prices again improved, year on year, by almost 27%. In spite of the strikes that hit 
PDVSA, Venezuela experienced a boom in oil exports and a windfall in oil revenues. 
As a consequence of a recovery in the international oil market, the State could limit 
the effect of the general strike on the economy, although it could not prevent GDP 
dipping during that period, as is shown in Table 7.3. In 2004, the political climate did 
not encourage private investment, either domestic or foreign. The oil sector was to be 
relied upon as the source of any economic recovery. 
 
Following the oil strike President Chávez decreed an exchange control mechanism 
that severely limited the transfer of reserves in US$ from the public to the private 
sector. Additionally, the economic recession, suffered for two consecutive years 
(15.9% from 2002 and 2003 combined), lowered the demand for imports. These two 
factors, combined with high oil prices, caused the Central Bank to accumulate 
international reserves at an accelerated pace.584 As Table 7.4 shows, international 
reserves went from US$ 13.898 million at the end of the oil strike in late January 
2003 to US$ 21.332 million by the end of November that year.  
 
 
Table 7.2  Venezuelan oil prices & oil exports (1998-2005) 
Year Venezuelan oil 
average/barrel 
(US$) 
Variation 
previous year 
(%) 
Venezuelan oil 
exports 
(million US$) 
Variation 
previous year 
(%) 
 
1998 11.44  12.007  
1999 16.31 42.57 16.465 37.13 
2000 26.31 61.31 26.629 61.73 
2001 20.21 -23.19 20.047 -24.72 
2002 21.95 8.61 20.337 1.45 
2003 25.76 17.36 18.756 -7.77 
2004 32.61 26.59 29.379 56.64 
2005(*) 44.14 35.36   
Sources: Venezuelan oil prices: 1998-2000 Tia Juana Light in Opec Annual Bulletin 2004; 2001-2005 Ministry of 
Energy. Venezuelan Oil Exports in Opec Annual Bulletin 2004. 
 
                                                 
584 Foreign currency denominated reserves are accumulated in the Central Bank through a 
mechanism discussed later in this chapter. 
 Table 7.3  Venezuela’s GDP (1997-2005) 
Year Variation on previous year 
 
1997 - 
1998  +0.29% 
1999  -5.97% 
2000  +3.69% 
2001  +3.39% 
2002  -8.86% 
2003  -7.72% 
2004 +17.85% 
2005   +9.33% 
Source: BCV 
 
 
Table 7.4  International reserves in Central Bank 
At the end of year: US$ million 
 
1998 14,849 
1999 15,379 
2000 20,471 
2001 18,523 
2002 14,860 
2003 (31-Jan) 13,898 
2003 (28-Nov) 21,332 
2003 21,366 
2004 24,208 
2005 29,636 
Source: BCV 
 
 
This 54% increase in the level of international reserves contrasted with an average of 
5.5% inter-annual increases in the last six years. This situation was rather unusual. 
The fact that the Central Bank had an unprecedented level of foreign reserves during a 
time of internal economic depression attracted the attention of government officials. 
By the end of November 2003, President Chávez decided to act. His aspiration to 
relieve the Central Bank of its reserves will be discussed at length later in this chapter. 
 
 
7.2 Government programmes (2003-2004) 
 
The general strike, which took place from December 2002 to January 2003, was 
followed by months of political turmoil. Although the end of the general strike 
reinforced the government’s position and authority, political instability continued to 
threaten violent outbursts and the possibility of a military coup.585 
  
International organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the 
United Nations Programme for Development (UNDP) and the Carter Center 
intensified their mediation efforts to avoid political conflict tipping over into violence. 
These efforts saw the ‘Declaration against violence, for Peace and Democracy in 
Venezuela’ signed by government, opposition organisations and the international 
mediators on 18 February 2003.  
 
After failing to force President Chávez’s resignation by orchestrating the general 
strike, the political forces opposing the Chávez regime regrouped and organised 
themselves to collect signatures for a petition to hold a ‘recall referendum’ to force 
President Chávez from office. This constitutionally permitted event focused all 
political activity in the country for the following eighteen months (February 2003 to 
August 2004). During that period numerous intermediate steps were taken by the 
Electoral authorities, opposition organisations and the government as each political 
actor manoeuvred to defend its position. This lengthy road to the recall referendum is 
summarised below in Table 7.5 
 
The economic contraction inflicted by the general strike and the oil stoppage left 
President Chávez’s administration in a weak position from which to fight the calls for 
a recall referendum. Table 7.6 shows quarterly GDP data from the last quarter of 2002 
to the third quarter of 2003. Although, the recall referendum had been legally 
activated early in 2003, the chances of it succeeding became more real throughout 
2003. The process of appointing new electoral authorities allowed the government to 
avoid the referendum being held in the middle of the severe economic contraction. 
When, at the end of November 2003, the possibility of the recall referendum was 
                                                 
585 The Carter Center, Report, 2005. 
imminent, the Chávez administration was urgently needed to improve economic 
prospects and its popular appeal in order to fend off the revoking of its mandate.  
 
Table 7.5  Main events leading to the Recall Referendum 
Date Event 
 
Sept-Oct 2002 Collection of signatures to request a ‘Consultative’ referendum (allowed in 
Art.71 of the National Constitution). 
 
2 Feb 2003 Collection of signatures to request a recall referendum (allowed in Art.72 of 
the National Constitution). 
 
23 May 2003 Government and opposition signed an agreement that included the 
commitment to name a new electoral authority and to fill the constitutional 
requirements to allow a recall referendum. 
 
August 2003 A new Electoral Authority (National Electoral Council-CNE) is appointed 
by the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) after the National Assembly failed to 
agree on the composition of the Council following months of legislative 
manoeuvring.  
 
12 Sep 2003 The new Electoral authority declared invalid the signatures that had been 
gathered during the previous February. 
 
16 Oct 2003 President Chávez and political organisations supporting him named a high 
political taskforce called ‘Comando Ayacucho’ to carry on with activities to 
counteract a possible Recall Referendum. 
 
Nov 2003 New collection of signatures to request a recall referendum is held under 
strict CNE supervision with international observers monitoring. 
 
Jan 2004 CNE invalidated 45% of the collected signatures and called for a ‘Repair 
process’ for the invalid signatures in order to correct detected irregularities. 
 
29-30 May 
2004 
Invalid signatures were ‘repaired’ in a CNE-supervised process with 
international observers monitoring. 
 
June 2004 CNE declared that there were enough valid signatures to activate the Recall 
Referendum as stipulated in Art.72 of the National Constitution. 
 
8 June 2004 Chávez dissolved Comando Ayacucho. Government-supporting political 
organisations named a new taskforce called ‘Comando Maisanta’ to 
campaign for the ‘NO’ vote in the Recall Referendum (The ‘No’ option was 
to favour President Chávez staying in power). 
 
15 August 
2004 
Recall referendum is held. The ‘NO’ option got 59% of votes, according to 
CNE. Opposition organisations claimed fraud. CNE ratified Chávez as 
entitled to finish his presidential term (ending in January 2007).  
 
Source: El Nacional, El Universal, TV Stations (compilation by author) 
 
Table 7.6  Quarterly GDP (2002-2003) 
Quarter Variation on previous 
quarter (%) 
 
2002-3rd - 
2002-4th -9.6 
2003-1st -14.3 
2003-2nd  20.9 
2003-3rd -1.2 
Variation 2003-3rd-2002-3rd -7.5 
Source: BCV 
 
 
By May 2004, the likelihood of the government facing a recall referendum was 
extremely high. President Chávez reorganised his campaign team. The task force that 
was responsible for coordinating the government’s response to the recall referendum, 
called Comando Ayacucho, was summarily dismantled. Another taskforce was 
created to work directly with President Chávez. Table 7.7 shows the members of the 
new electoral unit called ‘Comando Nacional Maisanta’ at the national level. 
 
Figure 7.1 shows how the national command was organised from top to bottom. The 
Electoral Battle Units (EBU) were integrated with the so-called ‘Missions’, the 
umbrella name of various social programmes including, literacy, high school 
enrolment, primary medical attention and the issuing of Identity cards. The ‘Missions’ 
are explained in the next section. 
 
Table 7.7  Members of ‘Comando Nacional Maisanta’ 
Member Position 
 
Jorge Giordani Cabinet member 
Diosdado Cabello Cabinet member 
William Lara Congressman 
Samuel Moncada MVR 
Jessé Chacón Cabinet member 
MariPili Hernández MVR 
William Izarra MVR 
Tania de Amelio Congressman 
Haiman El Troudi MVR 
Simón Pestana MVR 
Nelson Merentes Cabinet member 
Rafael Ramírez Cabinet member (Ministry of Energy) 
Source: El Nacional, El Universal 
Figure 7.1  Chávez’s organisational structure for campaigning for the Recall 
Referendum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: El Nacional, El Universal, Transcripts of “Alo Presidente” by Minci 
 
 
The Social Programmes (Missions) 
 
Venezuelan’s State bureaucracy was highly inefficient when President Chávez took 
power in February 1999.586 Additionally, as an outsider to the political elites who had 
run the State for forty years, Chávez met with resistance from the largely politicised 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the political groups that supported Chávez lacked an 
extended organisational network across the country. Chávez’s initial response was to 
resort to the military for implementing makeshift programmes targeted to alleviate the 
urgent needs of the population.587 
 
                                                 
586 Despite abundant fiscal resources, Venezuela scored very low when it was compared to 
other Latin American countries in terms of efficiency in social spending. See Alan Angell and 
Carol Graham, ‘Can social sector reform make adjustment sustainable and equitable? Lessons 
from Chile and Venezuela’, Journal of Latin American Studies 27:1, 1995, p.189-219. See 
also M.Penfold and J.M.Puente, Mitos y realidades del gasto social en Venezuela (Caracas, 
IESA, 2000). 
587 Plan Bolivar 2000 and a similar follow-up programme were implemented with military 
personnel. The plans undertook activities from school refurbishment to primary health care.  
National Command “Maisanta” 
Regional Command “Maisanta” 
(Each of the 23 States) 
Electoral Battle Units – EBU- (one for 
each electoral district set by CNE) 
Electoral Patrol (10 members) 
On the other hand, Venezuela had a tradition of international cooperation with the 
Caribbean and Central American countries, orientated around the financing of oil 
purchases by those countries and bilateral commercial exchanges.588 President Chávez 
used that framework to deepen cooperation ties with Cuba. The first fruit of this 
collaboration was an exchange of crude oil for educational material and training for a 
programme targeted at the eradication of illiteracy.  
 
The literacy programme was launched in April 2003 under the name of ‘Misión 
Robinson’.589 The Robinson mission extended throughout the whole country and 
reached many poor areas. This programme was the centrepiece of the government’s 
public communications. ‘Misión Robinson’ was widely welcomed and supported by 
the general public.590 The use of the word ‘mission’ to name other social programmes 
followed suit.  
 
The ‘missions’ were not planned as an integral governmental initiative. They 
responded, instead, to the necessity to address specific needs that were entirely within 
the scope of the Venezuelan, albeit collapsed, bureaucratic apparatus. Its 
implementation beyond the existing public bureaucracy followed the government’s 
strategy to prevent resistance, to speed up results and to bypass the inefficient 
bureaucratic channels.591  
 
The ‘missions’ served communication purposes but were not coordinated by any 
central authority. Nonetheless, they were presented collectively as the key 
governmental action plan. Table 7.8 shows a list of social programmes implemented 
under the ‘mission’ umbrella in 2003 and 2004. 
 
The ‘missions’ were managed separately and following distinctive financing and 
organisational schemes. Each mission was usually managed by a Foundation created 
specially to execute its main purpose. Resources were put together according to the 
                                                 
588 There was a treaty signed in the 1980s by Mexico and Venezuela with the Caribbean and 
Central-American countries known as the San Jose Treaty, which regulated this cooperation. 
589 This was to honour Simon Rodríguez, a 19th century intellectual who was Simon Bolivar’s 
tutor and used the pseudonym of ‘Robinson’. 
590 See Luis V. Leon, ‘Vender el sofa’, El Universal, 28 December 2003. Leon was President-
Director of one of the leading poll firms in Venezuela (Datanalisis).  
591 Dester Rodríguez, interview by author, Caracas, 12 September 2005. 
characteristics of each programme. Typically: personnel and other resources are 
specially contracted for each programme; some existing facilities within the public 
apparatus are used; and there is supplementary collaboration from the Armed Forces, 
voluntary participants within the local communities that are recipient of the services 
provided by each programme. Three missions used personnel provided by the 
government of Cuba. In fact, Missions ‘Barrio Adentro’, ‘Ribas’ and ‘Robinson’ were 
implemented through the participation of Cuban doctors and teachers whose costs 
were paid by the exchange of crude oil.  
 
The ‘missions’ as such were not reported in the national budget. In the 2005 budget, 
for instance, direct references to the ‘missions’ programmes accounted for only 0.32% 
of the total budget (US$ 103.46 out of US$ 32,244 million). The same budget 
contains references to 2003 and 2004 where the ‘missions’ only accounted for 0.06% 
and 0.38% of those budgets respectively.592 Nor are there public accounts of the 
payroll or detailed budget for each ‘mission’.593 Government’s official information 
reported some data about the ‘missions’ in the form of, for example, number of 
patients treated by the health programme ‘Barrio Adentro’ (updated to November 
2004) or graduates from the literacy and high school education programmes but not 
official public information on the finances of the programmes. 
 
These programmes became the most important issue for President Chávez’s campaign 
during the recall referendum. The President’s campaign slogan used the ‘missions’ as 
the main piece of evidence of the benefits the government was delivering for its 
citizens. ‘Defend the missions’ was the centrepiece of the Chávez campaign. Opinion 
poll surveys from the country’s main polling companies showed that the ‘missions’ 
were well regarded, and people felt they were both a necessary policy and a 
successful Chávez initiative.594 The opposition repeatedly announced that the 
                                                 
592 Ministry of Finance, Budget Law of 2005. 
593 In the ‘official’ website of the ‘missions’ there some imprecise statistics about payroll of 
some ‘missions’. For instance, it informs that ‘more than 20,000’ doctors and nurses are 
operating under ‘Barrio Adentro’ mission. See 
htttp://www.misionvenezuela.gov.ve/01BarrioAdentro/01MisionAmor.htm 
594 As a sample see Datanalisis survey reported in El Nacional, 24 June 2004; Greensberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research reported in El Universal 3 July 2004; and Keller and associates 
reported in El Nacional, 30 July 2004. 
‘missions’ were to be maintained and even improved.595 Minister of Energy Rafael 
Ramírez emphasised the electoral significance of the ‘missions’ for the government. 
He stressed the Chávez administration’s commitment to those programmes, arguing, 
“Although the opposition has announced that they will keep the missions, we know 
they do not believe in this. We believe in the missions. We are not going to turn our 
back on these programmes. PDVSA has to adapt itself to these new 
responsibilities.”596 
 
Table 7.8  Social programmes under the umbrella of ‘Missions’ 
Mission Area Started in: Work in conjunction 
with: 
 
Robinson Literacy April 2003 Military/  
government of Cuba/ 
Ministry of Education 
Ribas Secondary education 
for drop-outs from 
high school 
November 2003 PDVSA and Ministry of 
Energy/ government of 
Cuba 
Sucre Access to tertiary 
education 
2004 Ministry of Superior 
Education 
Barrio Adentro Primary health and 
social assistance 
December 2003 Military/Ministry of 
Health/government of 
Cuba 
Mercal Food distribution  2004 Armed forces 
Identidad Identity cards October 2003 Military/Ministry of 
Interior (Onidex) 
Vuelvan Caras Employment & 
training programmes  
2004 Ministry of Popular 
Economy/ National 
Institute for Capacitating 
Education (INCE)  
Guaicaipuro Indigenous population 
assistance 
October 2003 Ministry of Environment 
 
Miranda Military training 2005 Ministry of Defence/ 
armed forces 
Source: Minci 
 
The political importance for the government of the missions was publicly emphasised 
by President Chávez in his weekly TV programme on the 13 June 2004. In that 
programme he outlined his strategy for the campaign to defeat the recall referendum. 
He set out an organisational structure, shown in Figure 7.1. The ‘EBU’ and the 
Regional Maisanta’ commands were to work with the missions. He publicly instructed 
                                                 
595 Enrique Mendoza, interview in El Universal, 8 June 2004. 
596 Rafael Ramírez, interview by El Universal, 4 July 2004. 
Minister Ramírez to run these programmes: “The missions have to be represented in 
the units of electoral battles. Minister Ramírez had been assigned the task of 
integrating the Missions with the Maisanta Command and with the representatives of 
each unit.”597 In the same programme, Minister Ramírez publicly reported to 
President Chávez, “We held a special event in which all the national authorities of the 
missions were unified in a command to defend them.”598 
 
One scheme that required particular attention was the Identity Mission (national 
identity cards and electoral registry enrolment programmes), and that scheme was 
accorded special priority. President Chávez insisted that a national identity card 
scheme was an important public policy goal. The issuing of those cards was deemed 
important to ensure that the lower strata of the population, usually without such cards 
and excluded from the electoral register, were recorded and enrolled to vote. He 
denounced the former administration for the corrupt National Identity Registry and 
was adamant about the need to press ahead with trial runs and pilot schemes to speed 
up the scheme. He also assigned responsibility to coordinate the project with the 
Armed Forces to Minister Rafael Ramírez.  
 
 
Financing the ‘missions’ and other government programmes 
 
The ‘missions’, as the flagship programmes of the Chávez administration, needed 
speedy and effective funding. As they were parallel structures, independent or loosely 
attached to the normal public bureaucracy, budget allocation was complicated. 
Normal bureaucratic agencies had absorbed most of the annual budget and the 
rigidities of budget procedures had obstructed resources being made available to boost 
the missions. Minister Rafael Ramírez announced in his first public appearance, after 
taking an oath on TV as member of the ‘Comando Maisanta’, that the government 
was committed to allocating US$ 600 million to the missions.599 
                                                 
597 Hugo Chavez, Alo Presidente 193, 13 June 2004 (Transcripts by Ministry of 
Communication). 
598 As a sample see Datanalisis survey reported in El Nacional, 24 June 2004; Greensberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research reported in El Universal 3 July 2004; and Keller and associates 
reported in El Nacional, 30 July 2004. 
599 Hugo Chavez, ibid.  
 Dester Rodríguez , member of the board of PDVSA and President of its social 
development subsidiary Palmaven, explained, “The annual budget is passed using a 
fixed set of assumptions regarding oil prices, the US dollar-Bolívar exchange rate and 
expected inflation. The budget was calculated cautiously. When oil prices were higher 
than expected, there was room to distribute more fiscal income. Extra oil revenue did 
not affect those budget obligations already set therefore the use by PDVSA for the 
missions or other programmes did not diminish any other governmental or sub-
national units.”600 
 
In regard to the use that PDVSA was to decide for those extra resources he said, “The 
missions had no resources. Therefore, we had to create an office for social 
development within PDVSA. I was a member of the post-strike restructuring team 
and was called on to implement the social development area. We needed to reinforce 
the missions that were targeted on the excluded and most needy part of the 
population.”601 
 
President Chávez was determined to provide extra funding for his flagship 
programmes. Some institutional constraints, however, were interfering with that goal. 
Notably, rules regulating central banking and the way oil exports were managed. The 
need for a swift disposal of extra revenues dictated the Chavez administration next 
steps in altering the pre-existing institutional arrangements. 
 
The rules regulating the functioning of the Central Bank and the legal framework for 
the handling of oil revenues constituted an institutional obstacle to President Chávez’s 
desire to swiftly allocate extra revenues from booming oil exports in 2003. The 
Central Bank of Venezuela had been created in 1939 as a mixed entity (public and 
private). In 1974, the Bank was completely nationalised.602 Accordingly, the Bank’s 
authorities (President and Board) were appointed exclusively by the President of the 
Republic. This presidential prerogative was strengthened further in a reform to the 
Central Bank law that was passed in 1987. This change meant that the President of the 
                                                 
600 Dester Rodríguez , interview by author, Caracas, 12 September 2005. 
601 Dester Rodriguez, ibid. 
602 Official Gazette 30,142, 31 May 1974. 
Bank could be removed by presidential decree (i.e. no legislative approval was 
required). The consequence of the nationalisation of the bank and the change of rules 
over a decade later meant that the Bank’s board was dominated by members of the 
executive branch of government. The board had seven members, one of whom was 
the President of the Bank, and three of whom were cabinet ministers. The 
shareholders’ assembly was configured solely by the Ministry of Finance.603  
 
In 1992, in the midst of the neo-liberal reforms, a new law regulating the Central 
Bank was passed.604 The new law was intended to grant the Central Bank greater 
independence, and to prevent the Bank from financing the government (i.e. financing 
fiscal deficits). New procedures for the President and Board appointments were 
crafted. Congress was given powers to scrutinise nominees and veto powers over 
appointments. The appointment of the Bank President required an affirmative vote by 
two-thirds of the Senate. Similarly, the 1992 law laid out clear objectives for the 
Bank, with regard to monetary stability, and also introduced mechanisms to protect 
the Bank from government pressures to eschew long term stability in favour of short 
term electoral pressures.605  
 
The National Constitution, passed in 1999, further elevated the legal stature of the 
Central Bank. The Bank was given constitutional status, being explicitly recognised 
as an independent agency of the State. Similarly, the Bank’s mandate was included in 
the Constitution. Article 318 of the Constitution reads, “The fundamental objective of 
the Central Bank of Venezuela is to achieve price stability and to preserve the value 
of the currency, both nationally and internationally.”606 Consequently, the National 
Assembly passed a law in 2001 in order to comply with the new constitutional 
mandate. The new law was based on the 1992 version although some changes 
regarding the authority to make appointments were modified. Notoriously, the 
existing qualified congressional majority required for the approval of Board 
appointments was reduced to a simple majority. Similarly, the National Assembly was 
                                                 
603 Official Gazette 3,998 Extraordinary, 21 August 1987. 
604 Official Gazette 35,106, 4 December 1992. 
605 A.Barrios et al., ‘Un estudio sobre la autonomía administrativa del Banco Central de 
Venezuela’, Research Network Working Paper #R-414 (Inter-American Development Bank, 
Washington,DC, 2000). 
606 Official Gazette 5,453 Extraordinary , 24 March 2000. 
made responsible for the direct appointment of two members of the Board. Later in 
2002, a new law was passed to allow the government to collect net profits from the 
Bank twice a year.607 
 
Both the constitutional mandate and the 1992 law, reformed in both 2001 and 2002, 
conferred a legal basis for the Central Bank to act independently from the executive 
branch of government. This legal framework, however, was to be tested when a major 
conflict arose between the Bank and the government. The Central Bank opposed the 
government policy on how to handle the extraordinary oil revenues between 2003-
2005. The institutional framework was to be modified in order to allow Chávez’s 
administration to implement its policy preferences. 
 
 
7.3. Extracting resources from the Central Bank 
 
The Chávez administration’s implementation of its preferences about how to use 
extraordinary oil revenues went through various intermediate steps before 
materialising in the form of the Development Fund. First, President Chávez sought to 
extract resources from the Central Bank, which as a consequence of high oil prices 
had accumulated PDVSA export revenues due to the legal procedures regulating the 
management of oil export revenues. Later, the administration resorted to an ad hoc 
mechanism that allowed President Chávez to dispose of oil revenues directly from the 
oil company PDVSA. Finally, Chávez requested that the legislative branch regularise 
the previous mechanism. The resulting mechanism, the Development Fund, 
established by the National Assembly, permitted the Executive to collect oil revenues 
before they entered the existing taxation-budget procedures, therefore ensuring 
absolute Presidential control over those resources.  
 
Long standing regulations had made it mandatory for the oil companies (even before 
nationalisation in 1975) to sell foreign currency denominated income from oil exports 
to the Central Bank. At the time of nationalisation, PDVSA was exempted from that 
obligation. This exceptional status, however, lasted only a few years and in a 
                                                 
607 These profits were usually the result of the exchange market operations of the Central 
Bank due to its monopoly in administering foreign currency inflow generated by oil exports. 
controversial regulation passed by the executive branch in 1982, PDVSA was forced 
to sell its revenues from oil exports to the Central Bank.608  
 
Figure 7.2 shows the flow of resources from its origins in oil exports to international 
markets until they are converted to public spending. This institutional route confers on 
the Central Bank a type of ‘quasi-monopoly’ as provider of foreign currency to the 
Venezuelan economy.609 This has two effects: first, the Central Bank usually obtains 
significant profits from the foreign exchange market; second, the unsold foreign 
currency is held by the Bank in the form of ‘international reserves’. When crude oil 
prices rise on the volatile international oil market, the accumulation of international 
reserves tends to accelerate, as was the case during 2002-2005 (see Table 7.4).  
 
Chávez’s administration and the Central Bank clashed over both the transferring of 
profits from the foreign exchange market operations to the Treasury, and over how to 
dispose of some of the international reserves.  
 
 
The ‘foreign exchange profits’ case 
 
Conflict over transferring to the government the Central Bank’s profits emerged in 
early 2004. Traditionally, the profit made by the Central Bank was kept by the bank. 
This practice was, however, altered after 1999. Table 7.9 shows how transfers from 
the Central Bank, where the revenues originated from profit made in the exchange 
market, grew steadily after 1999. Although this practice had been occurring since that 
date, the calculus of these transfers became a controversial issue between the 
government and the Central Bank in 2003. This coincided with the conflict about 
President Chávez’s request to use resources from the international reserves held by 
the Central Bank, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
 
                                                 
608 This conflict between PDVSA and the Central Bank and the Executive Branch was 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
609 It is sometimes a monopoly, when exchange controls are imposed by the government as it 
is the case from February 2003. 
Figure 7.2.  Flow ‘Oil exports->Public spending’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Law of the Central Bank of Venezuela, compiled by author 
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 Table 7.9 Central Bank’s transfers to government 
Year Transfers in cash from BCV to 
Treasury in million Bolivars 
 
1999      12.194 (1) 
2000     131.574 
2001     989.870 
2002  1.202.863 
2003  3.045.812 
2004  4.774.377 
2005  1.638.762 (2) 
(1) Amount decreed, no information about payment 
(2) 1st Semester only  
Source: BCV 
 
 
Officials from the Ministry of Finance accused the Central Bank of incorrectly 
calculating the profits made in the exchange market. The Minister of Finance asked 
the bank regulator (Bank Superintendent), the office of which had jurisdiction over 
the Central Bank regarding applied accounting principles, to investigate Central Bank 
calculations.610 On 28 April 2004 the Bank Superintendent, Trino Díaz, announced his 
agency was to supervise the Central Bank.611 Superintendent Díaz declared on 2 May 
2004 that the Central Bank had consistently miscalculated profits from the exchange 
market. In an independent civil action, the office of the Attorney General (Fiscalía de 
la República) began an investigation into Central Bank practices. In addition, 
members of the legislative branch who supported the government’s initiative began to 
consider ways to reform the Central Bank Law.612 As Chávez’s supporters could 
command a majority in the National Assembly this was a credible threat. The 
supervision of the Central Bank by the Bank Regulator continued for months. 
Superintendent Díaz publicly suggested he would take the case to the Supreme Court 
of Justice (TSJ) if the Central Bank continued to refuse to change its accounting 
practices.613 
 
                                                 
610 ‘BCV y Finanzas difieren en cálculos de utilidades’, El Universal, 4 April 2004. 
611 ‘Sudeban fiscalizara al BCV la próxima semana’ El Universal, 29 April 2004; ‘BCV y 
Sudeban están coordinados’ El Universal, 29 April 2004. 
612 ‘BCV cercado’, El Universal, 9 May 2004. 
613 ‘Sudeban reclama al BCV utilidades cambiarias del oro’, El Universal, 9 November 2004. 
In the meantime, the tenures of the president of the Central Bank and of another 
director were to come to an end in January 2005. The requirements for the 
appointment of the President of the Central Bank had been changed in 2001. 
Previously, according to the Central Bank Law enacted in 1992, the President of the 
Central Bank was nominated by the President of the Republic and ratified by two-
thirds of the Senate (when the legislative body was bicameral). In 2001, the law was 
amended to reduce that requirement. The new law stated that the ratification by the 
legislative body required only a bare majority of votes in the National Assembly.  
 
President Chávez made public his intention to nominate a different candidate to the 
sitting President for the new term. He even called on BCV’s President Diego 
Castellanos to resign along with the BCV’s board, because, according to Chávez, the 
Central Bank had continued to refuse to alter its calculations regarding the profits 
from the exchange market. President Chávez said, rather harshly, “Castellanos has 
reached the age of retirement, in the event a judge ordered his imprisonment he would 
be at home. He can resign and give way to someone who wants to serve the country 
because the Central Bank does not belong to its President.”614 A new Central Bank 
President was ratified by the National Assembly on 27 January 2005 by a simple 
majority.615 The BCV’s board, with its new members, approved a rectified transfer to 
the Treasury on 17 February 2005. The calculation for this transfer was extended to 
the previous legal economic term and also included a modified transfer from previous 
miscalculated profits.616 
 
 
The ‘US$ billion of the International Reserves’ case617 
 
President Chávez requested that the Central Bank allocate US$ 1 billion of the 
international reserves for financing the agriculture sector. On 8 November 2003 he 
stated, “We are reaching the level of US$ 21 billion in international reserves. For 
what purpose do we have to hold deposits for US$ 21 billion in American and 
                                                 
614 ‘Chavez insto a renunciar al presidente del BCV’, El Universal, 21 December 2004. 
615 National Assembly. Minutes Ord-07-05 of the session held on the 27 January 2005. 
616 ‘BCV entregara Bs.3,2 billones’, El Universal, 17 February 2005. 
617 This case was known in Venezuela as the ‘millardo’ case. ‘Millardo’ is the term used in 
Spanish for billion. 
European banks of money that belongs to all Venezuelans? What do we get from 
having those deposits? Why can’t we use one billion? That it is what I am asking. 
This money does not belong to the government. This money belongs to the country. 
This money does not belong to the Central Bank either.”618 He added that he had been 
discussing the matter unsuccessfully with the Central Bank for three months and now 
wanted to introduce that discussion in public and hinted he could call a ‘consultative’ 
referendum on the decision.  
 
The Central Bank initially opposed that petition on technical grounds. The technical 
case was based on the fact that it was impossible for the bank to convert the money, 
held in foreign currency, into local currency twice. The international reserves 
accumulation process is normally as follows (see also Figure 7.2): 
1) The oil company PDVSA receive foreign currency as payment for oil exports. 
2) PDVSA is mandated to sell that foreign currency to the Central Bank. 
3) The Central Bank gives PDVSA the equivalent in Bolívar. 
 
The Central Bank argued to the government officials that when the Bank holds 
international reserves, the oil company had already received the equivalent amount in 
Bolívar. Those resources in Bolívar were used mainly to pay for PDVSA domestic 
expenditures and paying taxes to the government. Returning those international 
reserves to the government was comparable to providing the government with 
inflationary financing. Since the constitutional mandate to the Central Bank prevents 
such transfer of funds the Bank was unable to consent to the President’s demands.619  
 
Government civil servants and Central Bank officials met several times to discuss this 
issue. Although the Central Bank’s communiqués were discreet, the dispute was 
bitter. Two directors, Domingo Maza-Zavala and Armando León, went public to 
defend the Central Bank’s autonomy.620 Rafael Quiróz, an advisor to the President of 
the Central Bank, recounted, “Tension with the government was high. There was no 
way that government officials could understand our arguments. In a heated 
                                                 
618 Hugo Chavez, Alo Presidente 171, 9 November 2003, (Transcript by Ministry of 
Communications). 
619 Central Bank of Venezuela, Communiqué, 7 January 2004. 
620 ‘Ataque al BCV es desestabilizador’, El Universal, 10 January 2004; ‘Maza: BCV solo 
puede apoyar al agro con redescuento’, El Universal, 7 January 2004. 
discussion, Central Bank director Maza-Zavala called President Chávez an orphan of 
financial expertise.”621  
 
President Chávez publicly rebuffed those arguments accusing the Central Bank of 
pursuing ‘neo-liberal’ policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
against the public interest. He threatened to intervene with the Bank, as he had done 
with the oil company PDVSA, if the Bank refused to consent to his requirements, or 
to challenge them in the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).622 Additionally, the 
legislative faction that supported the government in the National Assembly swiftly 
introduced the issue in the legislative body. The Permanent Committee of Finance 
exhorted the Central Bank to consent to the presidential request.623  
 
The National Assembly in its session of 8 January 2004 approved (by 85 votes to 37) 
an ‘exhortation’ to the BCV to facilitate US$ 1 billion to finance agricultural 
programmes.624 The National Assembly’s President, Francisco Ameliach publicly 
announced that he intended to introduce, in an extraordinary legislative procedure, a 
reform of the Central Bank Law in order to accommodate the President’s request.625 
Finally, orchestrated street protests added to the pressure on the Central Bank. 
Supporters of the government descended upon the Central Bank headquarters in 
Caracas twice in early January and to the Central Bank Office in Maracaibo on the 15 
January 2004 to protest against the its refusal to grant the US$ 1 billion.  
 
The dispute between the government and the Central Bank, however, did not escalate. 
The Ministry of Finance intervened to reassure the public that the government and the 
Central Bank were negotiating a financing mechanism that would fulfil President 
Chávez’s request for the agricultural sector. The Central Bank offered a compromise 
solution by using monetary regulations to facilitate private and public financing of the 
agricultural sector. On 22 January the Central Bank officially eased the discount 
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requirement for banks lending to agricultural businesses.626 This solution helped avoid 
a public dispute between the Chávez administration and the Central Bank, but only 
temporarily. As the oil price continued to be high, Venezuela continued to obtain 
significant additional revenues for its oil exports. The next section discusses how the 
government modified institutional arrangements to allow it to use its newly acquired 
revenues in its preferred way. 
 
 
7.4 The first Development Fund (Fondespa) 
 
President Chávez insisted on the urgent need to use some of the international reserves 
held by the Central Bank. The Central Bank’s initial solution of facilitating resources, 
by relaxing its monetary regulations, had managed only to partly meet Chávez’s 
demands.  
 
During the conflict between the Central Bank and the government for the use of 
international reserves, however, the Central Bank had relaxed the rules forcing 
PDVSA to sell all its income in foreign currency to the Bank. The 1982 rules allowed 
PDVSA to keep some funds abroad, but only when the Central Bank authorised it. 
Since this regulation was enacted in 1982, PDVSA had maintained such a fund, of up 
to US$ 600 million, for its operating needs. However, the Central Bank Board at its 
meeting held on 29 January 2004, in a split decision authorised PDVSA to set up 
other funds.627  
 
The option of setting up a new fund in US dollars was not adopted until May 2004. 
The Central Bank also suggested an option of modifying the existing Macroeconomic 
Fund. This option, however, was not adopted and the Central Bank opted to ratify the 
option of a PDVSA fund abroad that the oil company could use for investment in 
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social programmes. Central Bank President, Diego Castellanos, sent another letter to 
the National Assembly with that suggestion.628  
 
The suggested modification allowed PDVSA to hold resources of up to US$ 2 billion 
to create a special fund for social development. This decision was not intended to give 
further independence to the oil company, but specifically to allow it to set a fund apart 
from its regular operational fund to allow for the swift financing of government 
projects. When the Central Bank Board first discussed the authorisation, some 
members of the Board proposed that it wait for a feasibility study by the Bank’s 
technical experts. The Minister of Planning, Jorge Giordani, a member of that Board, 
opposed the referral to the Banks technocrats on the grounds that the resources were 
urgently needed. The Central Bank’s president Diego Castellanos supported 
Giordani’s position and the authorisation was passed.629 
 
The government, however, had anticipated the Central Bank’s position. The Central 
Bank’s decision regarding the character of the Fund was stated in loose terms. The 
decision was not clear about whether or not the Fund was to be topped up regularly or 
if it was a one-off authorisation. Later, another member of the Central Bank Board, 
Domingo Maza-Zavala, also made public his disagreement with how the Fund was 
implemented. He said, “Although the creation of the fund is a positive thing, rules are 
needed for how it is going to be administered, who is going to administer it and how 
is going to be supervised. After the Central Bank had deposited US$ 1.1 billion, 
PDVSA has not responded to date to the Bank’s demands.”630  
 
On 14 May 2004, PDVSA’s assembly of shareholders, the main decision making 
authority of the organisation, approved the creation of that Fund, named, ‘Fondo para 
el Desarrollo Económico y Social del País’ (Fondespa).631 President Chávez 
announced on 23 May that the Fund had been created, and was under his direct 
control. He publicly said to his Minister of Planning, Jorge Giordani, that, “This fund 
was born; I had approved it, Jorge. I have my controls that never fail. You know they 
                                                 
628 ‘El directorio del BCV propuso un mecanismo con legalidad opaca’, Victor Salieron, El 
Universal, 10 June 2004. 
629 ‘Tension en Directorio del BCV’, El Universal, 16 June 2004. 
630 ‘Maza Zavala solicita regal para fondo especial’, El Universal, 15 June 2004. 
631 PDVSA website. 
never fail. We have approved this fund to accelerate several programmes that were 
progressing at a pace that we are now redoubling.”632 PDVSA, now authorised by the 
Central Bank, initially set aside US$ 2 billion for Fondespa during the fiscal year of 
2004. 
 
Originally, PDVSA did not set up an internal structure to administer the Fund as the 
immediate use of the Fund was to finance the ‘missions’. Minister Rafael Ramírez 
first announcement regarding the Fondespa was that the Fund was to allocate directly 
US$ 600 million for funding the ‘missions’.633  
 
Six months later it transformed its existing social development subsidiary, Palmaven, 
into a full ‘social development’ subsidiary.634 It used another existing subsidiary, 
Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo (CVP), to administer the rest of the Fund. This 
division complied with the way in which PDVSA treated Fondespa in its balance 
sheet. Part of the resource was treated as expenditures to be administered by 
Palmaven. The other part was assigned to subsidiary CVP and treated as ‘returnable 
investment’.  
 
Palmaven, the social development subsidiary, had originated at a time when foreign 
companies were operating in Venezuela. When oil wells were drilled, the affected 
areas, mainly agricultural areas, received assistance from the foreign companies to 
compensate them for the damage caused by the establishment of oil facilities. Those 
activities carried out by various oil foreign firms were grouped in the Palmaven 
subsidiary after nationalisation in 1975. Palmaven was charged with mitigating 
environmental impact and ensuring technical assistance was provided to the 
agricultural sector.  
 
After the 2002-2003 strike, the corporate objectives of Palmaven were changed, as it 
was reported in PDVSA’s annual report of 2003. Its Annual Report stated, “This 
affiliate has been completely transformed. Its new role is to promote national social 
                                                 
632 Hugo Chavez, Alo Presidente, 192, 23 May 2004 (Transcript by Ministry of 
Communications). 
633 ‘Hay $1,2 Millardos en el Fondo’, El Universal, 4 July 2004. 
634 ‘PDVSA anuncia creacion de filial de desarrollo social’, El Universal, 12 November 2005. 
development through educational, health and job creating initiatives, directed to the 
poorest sectors of Venezuelan society. Its previous activities related to environmental 
services were transferred to the HSE (health, safety and environment) organisations of 
other operating affiliates and the participation of Palmaven in 14 agricultural joint 
ventures are being evaluated in order to be sold or transferred.”635 
 
Palmaven’s new organisational framework was structured to address the needs of the 
missions. The main divisions of Palmaven were: 
- Planning 
- Control of the regions 
- Control of Capital Region 
- Agricultural and energy projects 
- Socio-Educational projects 
- Infrastructure projects 
- Endogenous development projects 
 
Palmaven set an allocation of approximately 40% of Fondespa to fund the missions. 
Table 7.10 shows the 2004 and 2005 allocation of resources.  
 
 
Table 7.10  Fondespa allocation to the missions (US$ million) 
Mission 2004 2005 Total 
 
Misión Ribas 227 213 440 
Misión Vuelvan Caras 157 154 311 
Misión Barrio Adentro 23 173 196 
Misión Identidad 60 0 60 
Misión Sucre 64 0 64 
Misión Mercal 93 295 388 
Misión Núcleos de Desarrollo Endógeno 29 8 37 
Misión Guaicaipuro 0 11 11 
National Asphalt Plan 74 62 136 
Technology resources to Missions 15 0 15 
Other donations (1) 73 6 79 
Total 815 922 1737 
 (1) Including funding a programme called Mission Milagro that covered Cataract surgery in Cuba for Venezuelan 
patients 
Source: Palmaven 
 
                                                 
635 PDVSA Annual Report 2003. Form 20F presented to US Security Exchange Commission. 
 Carlos Mujica, a member of Palmaven’staff, explained how the funding flowed: 
“Palmaven normally opens a trust in a public bank, typically Bandes [Banco Nacional 
de Desarrollo] to make payments to the Foundations responsible for each mission. 
Each mission is independent on how to spend the money transferred to them. 
Monitoring the execution of each mission’s activities is very complicated. Other 
programmes, however, such as the Asphalt Plan which made asphalt available to 
governors and municipalities free of charge is controlled directly by Palmaven. The 
other direct involvement of Palmaven is with the programme for endogenous 
development centres. Palmaven implements them as the President of the Republic 
designates where they are to be built. That is why we created a special division for 
those centres.”636 Figure 7.3 shows the financing scheme adopted by Palmaven to 
support the missions. 
 
 
Figure 7.3  Flow ‘Fondespa’s funds -> Missions and other projects’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Palmaven and CVP 
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Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo (CVP), the PDVSA subsidiary responsible for 
investments and association with third parties, was assigned a new responsibility 
regarding the administration of Fondespa. Specifically, CVP was responsible for 
providing a vehicle to finance social projects other than the ‘missions’. Similarly to 
Palmaven, CVP delivered this financing through Bandes. On 19 May 2004 CVP 
signed a contract with this public bank to act as trustee. Bandes would use CVP’s 
resources to pay for the cost of social programmes and other projects in the area of 
transportation, road infrastructure, agriculture, health and education.637  
 
CVP authorised which programmes or projects are to be financed through Fondespa. 
The decision of which projects receive funding, however, was generally made by the 
President of the Republic directly. The President normally instructed PDVSA which 
projects were eligible. The Ministry of Planning coordinated the evaluation of those 
projects. Table 7.11 shows the distribution of CVP projects, by economic area. Other 
ministries, regional development corporations and governmental agencies acted as 
executing bodies. Franklin Méndez, member of the CVP’s board and Vice President 
of Bandes, commented, “Bandes is responsible for monitoring the execution of the 
projects and to ensure transparency in the use of Fondespa’s resources by the 
executing bodies. CVP, however, makes only selective physical inspections to check 
the advancement of the projects. CVP do not have enough staff to inspect all the 
financed projects.”638  
 
The Chávez administration insisted on allocating Fondespa resources directly, to 
spend the oil windfall. How the fund would be replenished was yet to be defined. In 
August 2004, Chávez announced that Fondespa was to be replenished, as long as the 
resources were used. The Central Bank’s initial authorisation, however, did not 
specify that the fund could be replenished on an ongoing basis.639 BCV’s board 
member, Domingo Maza-Zavala, stated that the authorisation was for only the 
original US$ 2 billion.640 
                                                 
637 PDVSA, Fondo para el Desarrollo Económico y Social del País (Fondespa)’, Report, 31 
August 2005. 
638 Franklin Mendez, interview by author, Caracas, 16 September 2005. 
639 By rotational it was understood that the Fund was going to be replenished on a regular 
basis. 
640 ‘Fondo Social: se repondrá cuando se agote’, El Universal, 14 August 2004. 
Table 7.11  CVP financing for 2004-2005 (US$ million) 
Area CVP funding 
 
Electrical generation and distribution 759 
Transport and road construction  731 
Public Transportation (includes a new 
national airline) 
647 
Endogenous Development, agriculture and 
medium enterprises (includes refurbishing 
a military fort and a cement plant in 
association with an Iranian company ) 
586 
Communications, environment and studies 
(includes a new public TV channel, and 
mining exploration) 
93 
Total 2,816 
Source: CVP 
 
 
The controversy about the character of the Fund lingered for some months. On 23 
November 2004 President Chávez insisted that another US$ 2 billion were to be made 
available to the Fund for the following year.641 In his annual address to the National 
Assembly, Chávez insisted that Fondespa was a ‘rotating’ fund.642 The Central Bank 
never modified its first authorisation or issued a new one. PDVSA, however, 
proceeded to make resources available to the Fund for another US$ 2 billion in 2005 
by loosely interpreting the original authorisation. Fondespa, as a permanent 
mechanism to channel extra oil revenues, was, however, bound to be modified by a 
new institutional arrangement.  
 
 
7.5 The second Development Fund (Fonden) 
 
Since late 2003 President Chávez’s administration had tried to modify the institutional 
arrangement regulating the conversion of oil revenues to public spending. Chávez’s 
demands, however, had been only partially met. As the National Assembly had agreed 
to Chávez’s request, the main institutional obstacle had been the Central Bank. 
Previous regulations gave the Central Bank an institutional shield to prevent the 
                                                 
641 ‘Chávez insiste en que Petróleos de Venezuela aportara otros $2 millardos’, El Universal, 
23 November 2004. 
642 Hugo Chavez’s annual salutation to the National Assembly. National Assembly website 
(www.asambleanacional.gov.ve). 
implementation of different mechanisms for using oil export generated income. Tax 
and budget regulations forced the channelling oil revenues through bureaucratic 
procedures that obstructed the immediate use of oil revenues. The government and the 
Central Bank had been at odds over how to implement a more expeditious mechanism 
for using oil revenues. Both, the so-called ‘Millardo’ case and Fondespa combined to 
heighten the government-BCV tensions.  
 
In both cases, however, an ad hoc solution had been introduced to solve the needs for 
government financing. Chávez and his supporters in the National Assembly, however, 
wanted a more structural change. Discussions over the creation of a new institutional 
arrangement continued alongside the partial implementations of the transferring of the 
Central Bank’s international reserves and Fondespa. This new initiative led to the 
creation of the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo (Fonden). 
 
 
The introduction of ‘Excess International Reserves’  
 
The National Assembly intervened in the conflict between the Central Bank and the 
government as early as January 2004. Chávez’s supporters urged the Central Bank to 
facilitate the partial use of the international reserves, based on the concept of ‘excess 
international reserves’. The discussion about what ‘excess international reserves’ 
meant dominated elite public opinion at a time of extreme political polarisation. The 
opposition to Chávez deemed his proposal unconstitutional, a threat to healthy 
monetary policy and Central Bank independence.643 Chávez and his supporters 
accused opponents of the proposed move as followers of neo-liberal policies, of being 
insensitive to social needs and said that their opinions were lacking technical rigour 
and were politically motivated.644  
 
                                                 
643 See for example Orlando Ochoa, Jose Guerra and Jesus Rojas in ‘Proyecto de Reforma de 
Ley del BCV viola la Constitution’, El Universal, 19 June 2005; AD Party’s president Jesus 
Mendez-Quijada in ‘AD alerta que reforma de Ley del BCV afectara el Situado’, El 
Universal, 21 June 2005; Pedro Palma in ‘Jugando con fuego’, El Universal, 15 November 
2003. 
644 Hugo Chavez, Alo Presidente 176, 28 December 2003 (Transcript by Ministry of 
Communications and Rodrigo Cabezas and Tobias Nobrega in Conference ‘Reservas 
Excedentarias en Venezuela: Una propuesta’ held in the National Assembly , 21 April 2004. 
The main technical objection regarded the mechanism which allowed Venezuela to 
convert its oil revenue in dollars to Bolívar, as discussed earlier (see Figure 7.2). By 
reducing reserves denominated in strong currencies from the Central Bank balance 
sheet, support of the Bolívar was weakened. In defence of the Chávez proposal, the 
President of the Finance Permanent Committee of the National Assembly, Rodrigo 
Cabezas, presented international cases in which an optimal level of reserves could be 
calculated for a specific economy. The main thrust of Cabezas’s thinking was that 
Venezuela had reached the optimal level of reserves, and therefore using that surplus 
would cause no harm to the Central Bank position. Similarly, the Minister of Finance 
Tobias Nobrega defended the introduction of rules defining an ‘optimal level’ of 
international reserves.645  
 
This legislative initiative, however, was put on hold whilst political life focused on 
the recall referendum. Fondespa had provided the government with an express 
mechanism to address its financial needs during 2004.  
 
The creation of a legal device for setting a certain level of international reserves was 
resumed in May 2005. The Solicitor General Marisol Parra proposed a reform to the 
law regulating the Central Bank to limit the constitutional mandate that granted the 
Bank a monopoly in the administration of the international reserves.646 In fact, Article 
318 of the National Constitution states, “…the Central Bank of Venezuela must, 
among others, formulate and execute monetary policy, participate in the design and 
execution of foreign exchange policy, regulate the local currency, credit and interest 
rates, administer international reserves, and any other responsibility established by 
law.”647 Solicitor General Parra suggested that by putting a cap on the level of 
international reserves held by the Central Bank, the constitutional principles were 
preserved.648 This interpretation of the constitutional text assured that the use, for 
other purposes, of the international reserves above that set level was legally feasible. 
 
                                                 
645 Asamblea Nacional, Reservas excedentarias en Venezuela: una propuesta, Proceedings of 
Conference held on 21 April 2004 (Caracas, Asamblea Nacional, 2005). 
646 Marisol Parra, interview in ‘Procuradora propone reformar Ley del BCV’, El Universal, 28 
May 2005. 
647 Official Gazette 5,453, 24 March 2000. 
648 Marisol Parra, ibid. 
Chávez’s supporters in the National Assembly introduced a Bill in June 2005 to 
regulate ‘excess international reserves. On 21 June 2005 the Assembly approved the 
first reading of the reform of the Central Bank of Venezuela law for “the legal order 
in the management of excess international reserves”. The justification for the Bill 
given by the Deputies was that the prevailing system limited the government’s 
capabilities to use the oil rents to boost economic growth.649  
 
The Deputies’ arguments referred to the limits imposed by the Central Bank’s 
demands for a counter value in Bolívar if the government wanted to buy US dollars 
for further use in public spending. This has to be authorised by the annual budget law 
previously passed each fiscal year. This annual budget set a reference price for oil 
exports in which the oil taxes are calculated. When fiscal revenues are positively 
impacted by unexpectedly high prices, prevailing institutional arrangements forced 
the government to wait for the taxation cycle to take place.  
 
Additionally, although this is not mentioned in the Deputies’ proposal, established 
budget procedures also implied automatic transfers to governments at sub-national 
levels (governors and majors). Keeping oil income out of the normal budgetary 
process implied that sub-national levels do not share that extra income.  
 
 
The reform of the Central Bank Law 
 
There are three mandatory budget allocations that are proportional to the size of the 
budget. First, a constitutional grant to sub-national governments (both states and 
municipalities) called ‘Situado Constitucional’. In fact, Article 162 of the Constitution 
states, “The constitutional grant will be equivalent to a maximum of 20% of total 
ordinary fiscal revenues as estimated annually. This allocation is automatically 
calculated as a fixed percentage of the fiscal incomes. It would be distributed between 
the states and the Capital District as follows: 30% of the total grant divided equally 
between each entity and 70% proportionally to the population of each entity. The 
                                                 
649 This is similar to British ‘White papers’; See Asamblea Nacional, ‘Exposición de Motivo 
de la reforma de la ley del BCV para el arreglo jurídico en el manejo de las reserves 
internacionales excedentarias’, 2005. 
states will allocate at least 50% of the received amount to investment. The 
municipalities within each state will receive at least 20% of the constitutional grant 
and other ordinary income of that state. In case of variations in fiscal revenues that 
impose modifications to the national budget, the constitutional grant will be 
proportionally readjusted.”650 
 
Second, a fund called the ‘Decentralisation Fund’ (Fondo Intergubernamental para la 
Descentralización, or Fides) is automatically allocated among states and 
municipalities. This transfer had been established in the early 1990s, when the 
administrative decentralisation of the State was decreed by law.651 Third, a special 
budget appropriation resulted from the application of a law passed in 1996 that 
directly provided for an allocation of part of the taxation to mines and hydrocarbons 
activities. This law, referred to as the ‘special economic allocations to the states’ 
derived from Mines and Hydrocarbons (Ley de asignaciones económicas especiales 
para los Estados derivadas de minas e hidrocarburos, or Laee) was passed on 18 
December 1996.652 This law established a special privilege for those states in which 
oil activities are developed. The so called ‘special allocation’ was a share (30%) of 
the direct taxes generated by mining and oil (hydrocarbons) exploitation as are 
stipulated in the Hydrocarbons and Mines laws. The allocation is in two parts. First, 
70% is assigned to those states with mines and oil facilities (including refineries) and 
secondly, 30% to the remaining states. The two largest oil states are Zulia and 
Monagas. From 2000 to 2004 both states were governed by opponents to the Chávez 
regime.  
 
Table 7.12 shows the significance of the transfers in relation to the national budget. 
Approximately a quarter of ordinary taxes are to be directly transferred to sub-
national governments. When governors and the President belong to the same political 
party or governing coalition the political relevance of those transfers is minor. 
However, when those automatic transfers favour governorships in the hands of 
                                                 
650 Official Gazette 5,453 Extraordinary, 24 March 2000. 
651 See Official Gazette Extraordinary  4,153, 28 December 1989 for ‘Ley Organica de 
Descentralizacion, delimitacion y transferencia de competencies del poder publico’. The 
Descentralization Fund was decreed by the President on the 25 November 1993 and lately 
modified twice (Official Gazette 5,132 Extraordinary, 3 May 1997 and Official Gazette 
37,066, 30 October 2000). 
652 Official Gazette 36,110, 18 December 1996. 
opponents to the President, the latter has an incentive to limit those transfers. 
Although the ‘Chávez coalition’ controlled, from 2000-2004, 15 out of 24 states, the 
opposition controlled some of the most populous ones.653 Table 7.13 shows that the 
mandatory transfers to those nine states controlled by Chávez’s opponents accounted 
for almost 50% of total transfers during the period of 1998-2005. 
 
Establishing funds such as Fondespa, which takes resources away from PDVSA 
before they enter normal budgetary channels, has important implications for sub-
national levels of government. These implications, however, were largely ignored by 
regional political forces. Only opposition parties, such as the AD party, with extended 
regional representation, raised concerns about it.654  
 
 
Table 7.12  Legal transfers as % of fiscal revenues (1998-2005) 
Year % 
 
1998 29 
1999 25 
2000 24 
2001 22 
2002 26 
2003 28 
2004 32 
2005 23 
Average 26.13 
Source: Onapre 
 
 
Table 7.13  Distribution of legal transfer by the states (1998-2005) 
States according to political 
affiliation of Governor 
Share of all Legal 
Transferred (%) 
 
States governed by opponents to 
Chávez (9 out of 24) 
 
49.64 
States governed by Chávez’ 
coalition 
 
51.36 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, CNE, Carter Center 
                                                 
653 States include the Capital District. 
654 Jesus Mendez-Quijada in ‘AD alerta que reforma de Ley del BCV afectara el Situado’, El 
Universal, 21 June 2005. 
Ricardo Sanguino, who was one of the deputies that introduced the reform to the 
Central Bank Law commented, “We wanted to promote efficiency in public spending. 
If you wait for the budget system to work you would always be delayed in 
implementing public programmes. The State bureaucracy is elephantine and it is 
extremely inefficient, especially to implement programmes targeted to people that 
have been excluded in the past by traditional public spending programmes.”655 Dester 
Rodríguez, the PDVSA board member in charge of the social programmes referred in 
a similar way to the normal public bureaucracy: “We need to drive a tractor over it 
and demolish it.” He also suggests that for each Bolívar of nominal public spending 
through budgetary channels only ten cents reach the targeted beneficiary of each 
programme.656 
 
Moreover, Sanguino defended the idea of the Fund for extraordinary oil revenues as a 
mechanism to facilitate the use of those resources for high priority issues such as 
health, education, infrastructure and servicing public debt. He adds, “We are not 
subtracting fiscal income such royalties or other normal taxes. We are not diminishing 
the regions’ share of fiscal revenues. The normal budget is calculated in line with past 
patterns. We are using only the extra oil income to fund productive investment 
separated from the normal bureaucracy.’657  
 
The Central Bank privately raised objections to the transfer of international reserves 
to a special fund.658 The Bank, however, publicly agreed with the creation of a fund. 
Rodrigo Cabezas, President of the Finance Select Committee of the National 
Assembly, said, “The Central Bank has not given its opinion about the transfer to the 
international reserves. We know some of the members of the Board do not agree with 
that because of concerns about monetary policy. The bank suggested a draft for a law 
creating the development fund to the executive branch and to the Assembly. That 
suggestion will be used for drafting the presidential decree creating such a fund.”659 
 
                                                 
655 Ricardo Sanguino, interview by author, Caracas, 6 September 2005. 
656 Dester Rodríguez, interview by author, Caracas, 12 September 2005. 
657 Ricardo Sanguino, ibid. 
658 Rafael Quiróz, interview by author, Caracas, 5 September 2005. 
659 Rodrigo Cabezas in ‘BCV solo propuso el Fonden’, El Universal, 24 June 2005 and in 
‘BCV critico traslado de reservas que ordena el Parlamento’, El Nacional, 8 July 2005. 
The President of BCV, Gastón Parra, publicly pledged support for the creation of 
special development funds, financed by the extraordinary oil revenues. Parra defended 
the constitutional mandate as stipulated in Articles 311 and 314 of the National 
Constitution. He said, “I personally wrote those articles in 1999. Using oil revenues 
for productive spending is compliant with the Constitution.”660  
 
In fact Article 311 of the Constitution states, “Revenues from the exploitation of 
minerals and subsoil wealth will be primarily used to finance productive real 
investment, education and health.” Similarly, Article 314 stipulates that extra-
budgetary spending is allowed only when the Treasury obtains sufficient resources to 
finance that extra spending.661  
 
Opponents of the law in the National Assembly, however, deemed the reform 
unconstitutional because it contradicted the constitutional mandate that confers the 
Central Bank the exclusive administration of the international reserves (Article 318 of 
the National Constitution).662 The proposed reform specifically changed the 
mechanism through which the Central Bank converted oil revenues in US dollars to 
the international reserves. The proposed modification overcame the constitutional 
limitation by considering part of the international reserves as ‘excess’ reserves. In 
fact, the thrust of the reform was the introduction of a legal category called the 
‘adequate level of international reserves’. 
 
On 19 July 2005 the National Assembly passed the reform of the Central Bank law by 
a simple majority vote. Specifically, the ‘adequate level of international reserves’ was 
regulated by four articles: 
 
Article 7: The Central Bank must estimate an adequate level of international reserves. 
 
                                                 
660 Gaston Parra, in a congressional hearing reported in ‘Gaston Parra confia en buena 
utilizacion de los recursos’, El Nacional, 13 July 2005. 
661 Official Gazette 5,453 Extraordinary, 24 March 2000.  
662 Other deputies from the opposition alleged unconstitutionality on the grounds of not 
compliance with constitutional requirements to pass a law, as reported in ‘Asamblea aprobo 
reforma de la Ley del Banco Central’, El Nacional, 20 July 2005. 
Article 21: The board of the Central Bank must carry out a study to estimate that level 
of reserves. 
 
Article 75: The Central Bank must inform the executive branch the level of 
international reserves that is deemed adequate. The Central Bank must include the 
study in which it sets that level as part of the input for the elaboration, each year, of 
the national budget and in the annual accord on economic policy stipulated in the 
Article 320 of the National Constitution.  
 
Article 114: The Central Bank must establish a unique methodology based on the 
structural characteristics of the Venezuelan economy. In the event of the Central Bank 
not agreeing to that unique method, it must submit the analysed proposals to the 
Finance Select Committee of the National Assembly to adjudicate. 
 
Similarly, the previous obligation of PDVSA to sell all dollar income obtained from 
crude oil and other hydrocarbon exports to the Central Bank was relaxed. Before this 
relaxation, PDVSA was required to maintain reserves in foreign currency only for 
operational needs, and up to a maximum established by the Central Bank. That limit 
had been set at US$ 600 million until 2004, when the Central Bank had authorised the 
creation of Fondespa, as discussed earlier.  
 
The reformed law established a new regime. First, PDVSA was to be forced to sell to 
the Central Bank only the equivalent in US dollars of the operating budget in 
Venezuela and the fiscal commitments fixed for PDVSA in the annual budget. 
Second, similarly to the previous regime, PDVSA could hold foreign reserves to a 
maximum authorised by the Central Bank for its operating needs abroad. Third, the 
remaining foreign reserves obtained from PDVSA exports would be transferred to the 
Fund that was to be established by the executive branch.  
 
The reformed Central Bank law mandated that the fund could provide financing only 
for, “Investment in the real economy, in education and health, in the enhancement of 
the public debt and attending special and strategic situations.”663 Finally, the law also 
                                                 
663 Official Gazette 38,232, 20 July 2005. 
set up a unique transfer of foreign reserves for US$ 6 billion. Additionally, Article 8 
of the reform stipulated that the transferred resources could “be held by the Fund only 
in foreign currency”.664  
 
The fund received, therefore, an initial endowment that corresponded to the 
controversial use of the Central Bank’s international reserves, much debated since 
President Chávez asked the Bank for such a transfer in November 2003. President 
Chávez expressed his satisfaction: “We finally won this battle,” he said, referring to 
the long controversy between the executive branch and the Central Bank, finally 
resolved by the intervention of the legislative branch.665 Chávez promptly proceeded 
to implement the so-called National Development Fund. 
 
 
The National Development Fund (Fonden) 
 
On 29 August 2005, Presidential Decree 3,854 created the National Development 
Fund, Fonden, and provided an initial endowment of US$ 6 billion.666 The fund was 
created as a public company under the administrative direction of the Ministry of 
Finance. The company’s objectives largely reflected the legal mandate outlined in the 
Central Bank Law which addressed the purpose of the fund (Article 1). The 
governance structure of Fonden consisted of an Executive Board and an Operating 
Committee (Article 4). The whole Board was appointed by the President of the 
Republic. It included as members the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum, the Ministry of Planning and two other directors (Article 5). The 
Operating Committee is a three-member body responsible for its operations. Its 
members included an Executive Secretary and two specialised managers (Article 6). 
 
The Fund was authorised to pay sovereign public debt but was prevented from issuing 
debt instruments (Articles 7 and 9). Article 8 authorised the Fund to allocate resources 
to solve “extraordinary situations arising from natural catastrophes or public 
disasters”. The reformed Central Bank law imposed a constraint that could conflict 
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665 Hugo Chavez, ‘Chavez: ganamos la batalla del BCV’, El Nacional, 21 July 2005. 
666 Official Gazette 38,261, 30 August 2005. 
with the new regulation. That law demanded that spending could be only in foreign 
currency, at least for the initial endowment as originated in the transfer of 
international reserves. The mandate to allocate resources, “in investment in the real 
economy, in education and health, in the enhancement of the public debt and 
attending special and strategic situations” was not further regulated.  
 
Similarly, the replenishment mechanism was not clear in the reformed law. It was not 
explicitly set and rather depends on interpretation. It depends upon the Central Bank’s 
definition of a methodology to set the level of international reserves beyond which 
foreign reserves are transferred to Fonden. Enid Blanco, staff member of the Central 
Bank, commented, “Some of the regulations regarding Fonden are not yet clear, 
especially the replenishment of the fund. The Bank’s board is just discussing the 
methodology to set the optimal level of reserves. It is all uncertain at the moment.”667 
 
The fund began its formal operations in September 2005. The Central Bank 
transferred the approved US$ 6 billion in various instalments. President Chávez 
officially launched Fonden on 23 September 2005, approving the first allocation of 
approximately US$ 400 million for various infrastructure projects shown in Table 
7.14. 
 
 
Table 7.14  Fonden’s initial allocation 
Allocated to project  US$ million 
 
Greater Caracas transport system (including subway)        196.90 
City of Valencia subway system            6.45 
National rail network        192.59 
Electricity generation plant            8.13 
Total        404.07 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 
Fonden’s initial rules, as set out in the Presidential Decree, did not address a 
suggestion made by the Finance Select Committee of the National Assembly when the 
Central Bank reform was passed. The Committee suggested, in its report, “To 
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incorporate in the decree creating Fonden a mechanism that allows federal entities 
participation in the financing programmes of the fund, through proposing strategic 
investment projects for the regions.”668  
 
Similarly, the presidential decree ignored another of the Committee’s 
recommendations, of forcing Fonden to report its activities quarterly to the National 
Assembly. No reporting obligations were set in the decree. The functioning of Fonden 
since decreed in September 2005 has not been formally regulated by either 
Presidential decree or legislative measures.  
 
 
Summary of operations of the Development Funds 
 
Both the first development fund (Fondespa) and its replacement (Fonden) have, 
together, managed a significant portion of the extraordinary oil revenues obtained 
from the high prices of oil during 2003-2005.669 Deposits to both funds have not been 
regulated by any pre-established mechanism. The executive branch has exerted its 
discretion in calculating deposits to the Funds, including the determination of the 
excess international reserves of the Central Bank that have been transferred to these 
two funds. Table 7.15 shows deposits to both funds. 
 
Similarly, the allocation of the resources in both funds has obeyed completely the 
discretion of the President. Allocation corresponding to the first development fund 
was discussed earlier. Regarding the second fund (Fonden), allocation is determined 
by President Chávez. In his weekly TV programme, President Chávez, addressing 
members of his cabinet, said, “I want to receive a list of projects, Ministry by 
Ministry, that are in the budget. If a Minister considers that a project that is in the 
budget already does not have sufficient resources, you have to tell me to create a first 
list of projects. A second list, I would say, would be of short term projects. I mean 
projects that can begin soon. This, in order for me to make, with my team, a list of 
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669 US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a cycle of high prices in the international oil 
market that have lasted until the second quarter of 2006, when this chapter was written. 
projects, to estimate up to what limit we can support those projects.”670 Table 7.16 
shows how resources in Fonden have been allocated since the initial allocation, shown 
in Table 7.14, in September 2005.  
 
 
Table 7.15  Deposits to the development funds 2004-2006 (US$ million) 
Fund/source Source Deposit 
 
Fondespa (2004) PDVSA 2,000 
Fondespa (2005) PDVSA 2,000 
Fonden (initial endowment in September 2005) Central Bank 
(international reserves) 
6,000 
Fonden (oil exports September 2005-May 2006) PDVSA 7,175 
Fonden (oil exports and excess international reserves) 
estimated for May-December 2006 
PDVSA and 
Central Bank  
5,000 
Total Deposits to the development funds  22,175 
Comparison to:   
As % of Average Annual National Budget (2004-2006): 63%  
As % of Total Value of Oil Exports (2004-2006*): 18.4% 
 
 
(*) Oil Exports for 2006 are an estimated based on production level and prices as for May 2006 reported in Opec 
Bulletin May/June 2006. 
Source: Palmaven, CVP, BCV, Ministry of Finance, Opec. 
 
 
Table 7.16  Fonden’s allocation (September 2005-June 2006) 
Allocated to project Us$ million 
 
Environment        34.12 
Defence       200.00 
Energy and Oil    1,685.60 
Mining       131.43 
Infrastructure    1,820.72 
Reduction of Public Debt    1,000.00 
Agriculture and land reform       218.00 
Public housing       226.00 
Steel mill    1,837.00 
Aluminium plant       210.00 
Timber        687.00 
Mission Barrio Adentro (phase III)       449.00 
Cement Plant (joint venture with Iran)       221.00 
Social security Fund    1,000.00 
Total    9,719.87 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Annual Report 2005); Transcripts of ‘Alo Presidente’ by Minci; Deputy Rodrigo 
Cabezas (President of Finance Select Committee of the National Assembly). 
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From an accumulated total in the Fund by May 2006 of US$ 13,175 million, US$ 
10,123 million have been allocated to diverse projects, including funds for reducing 
the total public debt in foreign currency and the seed capital for a new fund for social 
security. Together with the Fondespa’s allocations and the initial Fonden’s allocation, 
the Developments Funds have assigned 85% of the US$ 17,175 million collected by 
those funds from 2004 to May 2006. These collected revenues have represented 63% 
of the average annual national budget (for those years) and 18.4% of the value of oil 
exports for the same period. 
 
The allocation of the Development Funds resources seems to respond to varied policy 
goals. Some of the allocation (23.03%) is reminiscent of past policies of promoting 
State-led industrial development, as is the case of the steel, aluminium and other 
mining projects. The energy and oil sector obtained 16.71% as well. Another 
important area is infrastructure, receiving 24.72% of the allocated resources. 
Redistribution policies obtained a significant portion of the Funds (21.71%). The 
remnant (13.83%) went to various projects including public debt reduction, defence, a 
TV station, land reform and public housing.671 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown how the Chávez’s administration reacted to a new oil prices 
boom. This reaction resembles previous experiences. It responded by establishing new 
rules, new organisations and new procedures to suit the President’s preferred policies. 
Extra oil revenues were handled by a combination of ad hoc mechanisms and 
modified institutions to allow highly centralised decision making, and in this case, 
rapid access to extra revenues. By altering pre-existing rules that required those 
resources be shared with sub-national levels of government and to avoid budgetary 
procedures, new rules were passed to allow President Chávez to dispose of those 
resources without any legal or procedural constraints.  
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Chávez’s administration seems to have responded to three considerations. First, an 
ideological stance that saw matters such as Central Bank independence and 
conservative monetary policy as neo-liberal approaches that were contrary to its 
perception of the public interest. Second, the government was under immediate 
pressure to legitimise itself among its main political constituencies in a time of severe 
political polarisation and electoral challenge. Finally, the government recognised the 
limitations of the public bureaucracy, and deemed these inefficient structures limiting 
effective governmental action and public service delivery.  
 
The new institutions, however, did not address weaknesses in public delivery 
mechanisms. They merely allowed established procedures to be circumvented. They 
did not replace established procedures and practices. Existing bureaucratic ‘habits’ 
had been, previously, obstacles to the State ‘profiting’ from extraordinary oil 
revenues. The creation of parallel structures, even if they were well targeted to the 
government’s most urgent needs, risked obscuring public policy setting, decision 
making and, even if weak, the institutionalisation of public finance procedures. The 
conflict, discussed in this chapter, between the Central Bank and the government 
shows that Venezuelan Presidents tend to prevail even over relatively well established 
institutions. The events discussed in this chapter demonstrate how the ‘checks and 
balances’ – the constitutional mechanisms and other State entities – could not 
constrain the dominance of the executive branch in its determination to administer, in 
the short run, the country’s rich endowment of oil rents. 
 
 
 Chapter 8 
 
Institutional façade, back-door politicisation 
 
In 1974, when the international price of oil jumped to an unprecedented level and 
Venezuelans were planning to nationalise their oil industry, there was little basis for 
doubting a favourable road to development. A rich endowment and a relatively stable 
institutional platform at the political level certainly supported such an expectation. 
Three decades later, Venezuela’s underachievement invites reflection about possible 
explanations for that unfulfilled promise. The point of departure of this research has 
been oil institutions. The primary objective of the research has been to revisit those 
‘rules of the game’ directly affecting the relationship between the Venezuelan State 
and its oil wealth. By examining oil, the thesis has focused on the core of the 
Venezuelan economy, the main source of fiscal revenues and the single most 
determining variable of Venezuelan political economy.  
 
At a macro level, the observable facts are that institutional arrangements have 
continuously failed to fulfil their intended purposes. This first hypothesis was that oil 
institutions were worthy of scrutiny. The purpose of the research has been to identify 
possible explanations for their malfunctioning, and therefore to identify the nature and 
extent of their contribution to the whole story of failure. The findings of the seven 
preceding chapters, however, point in a slightly different direction. Rules of the game 
as they were designed and formalised in each period and in each matter under scrutiny 
did not exhibit any inherently unworkable feature that could not have been put right 
by relatively competent management and committed policy makers.  
 
This thesis reveals, instead, an entrenched pattern of politicisation in each matter and 
in each period under scrutiny that prevented the institutionalisation of all 
arrangements attempted along the way. The story revealed across this research is 
analogous to that of the alcoholic who keeps on trying new therapies but ends up on 
each occasion visiting the pub again. Different institutional arrangements end up 
being distorted, ignored or simply replaced. Venezuelan policy makers, the evidence 
of this thesis confirms, constantly solve policy issues by enacting new laws, new 
regulations and new procedures but not tackling the underlying problems. 
 
Moreover, in the case of oil management (both the state-owned oil company and oil 
revenues), policy makers seem to maintain a double stance. On the one hand, they 
produce an institutional framework that reveals their understanding of what needs to 
be done to manage the oil wealth, to avoid collateral negative effects and to curtail 
threats that could diminish the positive effects of oil to the economy. On the other 
hand, once an ‘institutional façade’ has been built they proceed to deform that 
arrangement. They usually obtained that outcome by means of three avenues: first, by 
a highly discretional interpretation of its regulations but still within the limits of the 
law; or second, by simply ignoring its mandates and usually getting away with it in 
the absence of effective mechanisms of enforcement; or third, by replacing the 
established arrangements by ones that suit the needs of the moment. A further cycle of 
maintaining an ‘institutional façade’ with back-door politicisation is then initiated for 
another round. 
 
 
Politicisation ‘à la Chalmers’ and more  
 
When Chalmers refers to the politicised state he asserts that “effective influence will 
bypass rules and procedures and they will be altered frequently to accommodate new 
patterns of power”.672 In the cases studied in this research, bypassing and alteration of 
rules did not necessarily respond to changes in power, although they frequently did 
so, but they also responded to changes in conditions within one administration. 
President Perez’s administration created the Investment Fund in 1974 and as early as 
1976 they ignored some of its regulations. President Chavez’s new Constitution in 
1999 elevated the Stabilisation Fund to constitutional status only to overlook it two 
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Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh 
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years later. On both occasions, the original measure was taken free from pressing 
circumstances such as conditionality from a multinational financial organisation or 
any other imposed conditions. In both cases the initial measure adopted seemed to 
indicate a genuine belief in its pertinence.  
 
Chalmers alerted that “the action that is finally taken must be justified in terms of its 
political consequences for shaping society and the political process itself”.673 The 
Venezuelan cases show, again, that actions taken were not necessarily even justified 
on the grounds of a grand and larger goal. Although sometimes this was the case, such 
as President Chavez’s justification for depleting the Stabilisation Fund in 2003 or the 
implicit acceptance by President Caldera of the PDVSA technocracy’s actions in the 
mid-1990s, it was, by no means, the rule. ‘Rules of the game’ were so frequently 
bypassed and altered that it is difficult to argue that larger stability or system-survival 
objectives were always in place across three decades.  
 
Chalmers’s politicisation model can be developed in the Venezuelan case here. 
Chalmers’s notion of a constant influx of different actors, arenas and decision-rules at 
the policy level is certainly observed in the conduct of oil policy across the span of 
time studied. An influential Minister could skew policy to his preferences, as the 
cases of Minister of Energy Calderón-Berti or Minister (and also President of the 
Central Bank) Díaz-Bruzual illustrate. On other occasions, two strong and well 
positioned bureaucrats either within the technocracy or within the governing party 
clashed with each other and required the President to arbitrate between them. This 
was the case with both Ministers Hernández and Armas and also with PDVSA’s 
Presidents Alfonzo-Ravard and Sosa-Pietri. In certain instances, a politically 
proactive and determined PDVSA President could bypass the influence of a weak 
Minister as the case of Luis Giusti and Edwin Arrieta exemplifies. Chalmers’s claim 
of ‘everything is possible’ is completely justified in these cases. Any pattern of policy 
making influence was possible.674 What was constant was the deinstitutionalisation of 
the PDVSA-government relationship despite the numerous exercises of specifying 
each actor’s role.  
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Similar varied patterns are shown with respect to the use of oil revenues. Different 
forms of institutionalising the oil money funds were attempted. The Investment Fund 
in the 1970s was equipped with a bureaucracy anew, well trained personnel, imported 
know-how from renowned technical organisations and well established procedures. 
The Stabilisation Fund in the 1990s was established with a neutral formula, attached 
to the well respected Central Bank bureaucracy and finally, elevated to the highest 
possible legal order (i.e. the Constitution). Decentralisation in the late 1980s made 
States and Municipalities direct stakeholders in fiscal revenues such as those provided 
by oil income. Chavez’s development funds first used PDVSA as the delivery agency 
and later created an autonomous, highly centralised body. Save the latest incarnation 
of the Development Fund created only in 2005, therefore too early to judge, all 
institutional forms did not survive long. They failed to collect oil revenues in a 
systematic way and, when they managed to collect a certain amount of revenues, they 
did not succeed in redirecting them to their purposes.  
 
Various enforcers, the technically-minded bureaucracy, the autonomous Central 
Bank, the States and Municipalities and the usual constitutional enforcers (i.e. the 
legislative branch, the judiciary and Comptroller General), all failed to ensure the 
survival of many of the rules. Moreover, the legislature often coalesced with the 
executive branch to modify or ultimately eliminate unwanted and restraining rules. On 
the few occasions when the legislature stood for the existing rules, there was an 
opposition-controlled Congress obstructing the government during election time, only 
to make a U-turn when they returned to power.  
 
The only pattern that emerged from the different attempts at institutionalisation is that 
the President wielded exceptional power to influence the outcome of those 
arrangements. Not surprisingly, when Presidents were in a precarious situation during 
1992-1998, the oil policy making role, the arena and the decision making shifted to 
the technocrats in PDVSA. In the absence of broader institutionalised channels less 
dependent on the fortune of one actor, the shifting of power was a likely outcome. 
PDVSA, at that juncture, assumed an unprecedented policy and political role.  
 
Politicisation a la Chalmers can even be developed further. Not only could rules and 
procedures be accommodated at any time or in any arena, and actors and decision 
making shifted with similar ease, but the Venezuelan case shows that PDVSA could 
also play a plainly political role, as was first demonstrated with the incipient signs of 
PDVSA meddling in the electoral campaign in 1998 and secondly, and more 
significantly, with the top managers’ rebellion in 2002-2004.  
 
The latter case also reveals how widespread politicisation had pervaded Venezuelan 
society. It was a well trained technocracy, brought up in the highly institutionalised 
corporate environment (to a large extent inherited from the Anglo-Saxon corporate 
mentality during the oil exploitation by foreign companies) that did not hesitate to use 
the company for purely political aims. The ‘meritocratic’ state (PDVSA) that had 
been living within the ‘politicised’ State for decades became equally politicised after a 
conflict that, ironically, began when the oil technocracy protested the interference of 
politicians with the meritocratic system of the company.  
 
Yet it can also be argued that it was the absence of legitimised institutional channels 
in which to resolve a broader political conflict that led a large group within 
Venezuelan society, represented by the oil technocracy, to improvise a political arena 
and to assume an improvised political role to force a political outcome. Whatever 
calculations, however, prevailed in the managing of the oil conflicts in 2002-2003, the 
engulfing of the oil company in the political arena only amounted to new precedents 
in the politicisation of the Venezuelan State.  
 
Another facet of politicisation revealed in this study of Venezuela’s post-oil 
nationalisation is the role of the legislative branch. Chalmers refers to the idea that in 
an institutionalised regime public policy is more of a ‘post-political’ process derived 
from a “formally constituted authority”.675 As the Venezuelan constitutional order is 
theoretically built upon the traditional principle of the ‘separation of powers’ it was to 
be expected that the legislative branch would have played a significant role in policy 
making. The legislative arena had therefore to be the place where different interests in 
society, in this case oil, could ‘institutionally’ be aggregated. The empirical evidence 
shown in this research reveals that this was seldom the case. 
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The legislative branch, in many instances, just delegated its constitutional 
prerogatives to the Executive. The mechanism of ‘enabling laws’ served to grant 
legality to the fact that the President was often in a position where he could give 
himself a blank cheque. Many rules of the game for the State-oil wealth relationship 
were written by an ‘enabled’ President profiting from that delegated freedom and 
prioritising his short term interests. The rewriting of rules was continuously facilitated 
by this expeditious legal process because all presidents, except Luis Herrera, enjoyed 
such a prerogative.  
 
 
Politicisation and lack of regulative capacity 
 
Politicisation often resulted from a dynamic consistently revealed by this research. 
The State neglected the Weberian character of the bureaucracy or simply did not build 
a regulative capacity that could deal with problems in a merit-based fashion. When 
the State tried to implement certain policies, or simply correct certain courses of 
action, it had to resort to the enactment of administrative orders as the only tool that 
could stimulate bureaucratic performance.  
 
Orphaned of technical expertise, successive governments persisted in rewriting rules 
in the expectation that this hierarchical mechanism was sufficient for achieving the 
objective. The case of the Ministry of Energy illustrates this dynamic. As its 
regulative capacities swiftly faded after nationalisation in 1975, the Ministry, 
therefore the Executive, was left with only its legal prerogative of writing rules, 
demanding routinised paperwork, or simply resorting to the ‘reward or punish’ 
mechanism of appointing top officials to fulfil its regulatory role. The latter 
mechanism contributed to further politicisation since appointments became based 
more on personal loyalties and less on technical abilities.676  
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The neglect of the regulative capacities of the Ministry of Energy left the State in a 
weak position to deal with the principal-agent problem. As Bernard Mommer, long 
standing observer of Venezuelan oil and one of the most influential policy makers in 
the Chavista regime, reflected, the fact that the State held 100% ownership in PDVSA 
did not guarantee its control of the company.677 To compensate for this weak position 
the State had to resort to, in addition to the mechanisms already described, ad hoc 
procedures, temporary external consultative commissions and other parallel 
instruments. These unstructured mechanisms generated, again, more politicisation as 
they were only loosely, at best, regulated by any formal procedure. 
 
On the other hand, having some regulative capacity, however, did not guarantee the 
institutionalisation of oil policy matters either. The effort of building a technically 
minded and Weberian-like bureaucracy, as was the case with the Investment Fund in 
the 1970s, did not prevent the bypassing of the agency and the uncontrolled 
competition for influence over its decisions between other ministers and governmental 
officials. The creation, during President Herrera’s administration (1979-1984) of an 
‘ad hoc’ group chaired by the Minister of Interior deciding over a steel mill project is 
a case in point.  
 
President Chavez showed similar disregard for existing, well established 
bureaucracies. His handling of a dispute with the Central Bank over the use of 
international reserves and the establishing of a Fund with PDVSA’s foreign reserves 
held by the Bank in 2003 is again a case in point. The Central Bank, supposedly 
independent, was overruled by the Executive after a ferocious campaign initiated by 
the President himself. These cases reinforce the notion that ‘everything was possible’. 
Having relatively well established bureaucracies or lacking them led equally to 
politicisation. 
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Politicisation: is it necessarily a bad thing? 
 
It is pertinent at this point to ask two questions. First, did this ingrained process of 
politicisation in the conduct of the State-oil wealth relationship as above imply a 
negative outcome? Second, if that was the case, why not before nationalisation?  
 
The continuous process of ‘back-door politicisation’ overwhelmed the 
institutionalisation that was sought. It is necessary here to maintain the definition of 
institutions as the codified rules constructed by society to govern actors’ behaviour, 
and reject the loose notion that institutions are, at the end of the day, the observable 
regularities in such behaviour. This later notion would suggest, in this case, that 
‘everything is possible’ would have been the ultimate ‘rule of the game’. Adopting 
such a notion would render any institutional analysis futile. It would also overlook the 
lessons that the Venezuelan case studied here offers. Assuming that institutions are 
the ‘natural’ course of action adopted by actors would preclude from policy makers 
the tools that institutional design, reform and other forms of statecraft entail. 
 
The constant attempt to adopt an institutionalised framework to regulate the 
Venezuelan State’s relationship with its oil wealth responded not only to the mandate 
of providing a legal structure, ingrained in Venezuela’s Roman law tradition, but also 
to real problems that adopting an ‘everything is possible’ stance would not have 
resolved. As was pointed out earlier, Venezuelan policy makers had a good 
understanding of the collateral effects that oil wealth confers. The need to tackle those 
effects was continuously manifested in their search for the ‘codified rules’ that would 
correct them. 
 
Two new major problems have threatened the relationship between the Venezuelan 
State and its oil wealth since 1974. Nationalisation of the oil company brought the 
principal-agent problem to the core of oil policy. Before nationalisation, oil policy 
needed mainly to seek the best distribution of rents for the Venezuelan State. 
Obtaining the largest possible share of the rents from the foreign operators required 
dealing with the oil business only after organisational, technical and financial 
decisions had been taken. The State then simply collected its share of the surplus 
created in that process. The profit-maximising motif of the foreign firms assured that 
that surplus was the best that could be obtained from the business. The problem for 
the Venezuelan State was to assure it had access to that surplus.  
 
Oil nationalisation, instead, translated this whole set of decisions to within the State. 
In this business-like setting, owners delegate such decisions to managers. This 
delegation meant, in this case for the Venezuelan State, the need to align its perceived 
‘public interest’ to the interests of the PDVSA technocracy.  
 
The solution of this principal-agent problem required a new institutional framework. 
Leaving the relation of the State (the principal) with the technocracy (the agent) 
unattended was obviously not a policy option. The evidence of this research, however, 
suggests that this framework was never institutionalised. The uncertainty brought 
about by this disinstitutionalised relationship has had a demonstrable effect on 
business performance.678 
 
Secondly, 1973 marked a turning point in the behaviour of oil prices in the 
international market. Prices have followed a more volatile pattern since then. 
Increased volatility has also been accompanied by the occurrence of accentuated 
peaks such as the one observed in 1973-1974, 1980-1981 and more recently in 2003-
2005. These uncontrolled events intensified in the Venezuelan economy a tendency to 
experience boom and bust cycles. Volatility in fiscal income was, however, not a new 
phenomenon for the Venezuelan State, and is not even oil-specific,679 but it has 
certainly been exacerbated since the gigantic leap in oil prices in the early 1970s. 
Tackling irresponsible spending behaviour during booms and instability in oil fiscal 
income required, once more, the imposition of some rules to curb the common 
tendency of rulers for short sighted spending and to minimise the effects of the 
random-like behaviour of oil prices. Yet again, the option of leaving these aspects of 
the State-oil wealth relationship to their own devices was not a policy option. 
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Roman Cardenas, implemented a short-lived ‘stabilisation fund’. Prior to the discovery of oil, 
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cocoa. 
Institutions, such as those discussed in this thesis, were intended to induce behaviour 
unlikely to emanate from a rules-free approach. Politicisation, as it has been 
manifested throughout the cases studied here, has meant that the ills associated with 
oil wealth could not be prevented or ameliorated through the institutions designed for 
that purpose. Successive ‘rules of the game’ introduced throughout these decades, 
taken individually, were not intrinsically flawed or unfeasible. It was, however, the 
reluctance to conform to them that explains its inefficacy. Rules, in the end, cannot 
make themselves be obeyed. Moreover, the delusion caused by the continuous 
rewriting of rules, what I have called here the ‘institutional façade’, has helped to 
perpetuate the neglect of those collateral negative effects that prevent Venezuelans 
from fully profiting from oil wealth.  
 
 
Lessons for institutional designers 
 
The empirical evidence here casts some significant clouds over institutional designers, 
reformers and the like. As enforcement of rules is the clear prerequisite of any 
effective set of institutions, institutional designers seek to create mechanisms that 
improve the likelihood of compliance by actors, if not of self enforcement. Elevating 
a norm to the constitutional level; involving a bureaucratic, Weberian-like body which 
makes actions difficult to overrule; providing a form of exact calculation that narrows 
the discretion in applying a certain rule, are all tools that institutional designers resort 
to for maximising the likelihood of compliance. These tools, when used in the 
Venezuelan case, all failed to produce such effects.  
 
The recurring pattern of politicisation rivalled and thwarted any attempt at 
institutionalising certain desirable behaviours, be it saving oil money, preventing oil 
technocracy pursuing private interests or preventing the government drying out 
PDVSA for short run gains at the expense of long term growth. An institutional 
blueprint based on mechanisms for correcting oil-related problems was clearly not 
enough. A deep rooted tendency for failing to notice the very same rules that had been 
agreed suggests that there is a broader dimension that needs to be taken into account 
for creating more efficient institutions. 
 
The rather optimistic view of rational-choice institutionalists (i.e. that in the long run 
institutions are chosen favouring efficiency gains for a society) would suggest that 
Venezuelans would learn from experiences such as those described in this research. 
There is a vast literature on the beneficial effect of institutions on growth.680 Although 
there is not complete agreement on which precise type of institutional settings are 
functional for growth, few would dispute that the ‘rule of law’ as a meta-institution is 
of critical importance. However, the ‘rule of law’ understood, following the cases 
analysed here, as having an ‘institutional façade’ that is continuously refashioned to 
suit ‘temporary situations or individual interests’ is not a sufficient condition to 
guarantee long term growth.  
 
On the other hand, historical institutionalism, would suggest that patterns of 
behaviour, such as those observed in this research, respond to long accumulated 
qualities ingrained in society and difficult to modify in the short run (i.e. the ‘path 
dependency’ argument). Moreover, such qualities commonly respond to historical 
factors sometimes labelled as ‘cultural beliefs or values’, which are not only beyond 
the scope of this research, but are extremely difficult to connect empirically to any 
particular form of aggregated behaviour. The latter limitation, however, should not 
obscure the fact that such factors are certainly worth exploring given their high 
potential for explanatory power. 
 
Notwithstanding this caveat, the evidence of this thesis reveals an across-regime 
pattern of politicisation that, in this particular case, limits the way in which 
Venezuelans might benefit from their oil wealth. As long as the experience of oil 
management can be extrapolated from broader characteristics of Venezuelan political 
economy, the same lessons could be linked to broader issues such as development or 
democratic consolidation. The aim of this research is to facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the politicisation that has occurred in Venezuelan political economy 
at critical points in the relationship between the State and the oil sector across three 
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decades. These insights contribute, in turn, to a better understanding of contemporary 
Venezuelan problems. 
Appendix  A 
 
Methodology 
 
 
This research was originally conceived as an exercise in institutional analysis. It set 
out to investigate the origin, implementation and performance of formal rules 
developed by the Venezuelan State to deal with its oil wealth. The initial hypothesis 
was that these ‘oil institutions’ have failed to fulfil their purposes. This argument was 
derived from two sources. First, from the general observation of the collapse of 
several institutional forms established for different aspects of the relationship between 
the State and the oil sector. Secondly, from the abundant analysis by Venezuelan 
scholars and local commentators of the systemic failures of both the political and the 
economic systems.  
 
This ‘institutional analysis’ approach required a research method that would enable an 
inquiry on those lines. ‘Institutional analysis’ as such is a rather broad field. Research 
under the loose label of ‘institutional analysis’ or the so-called ‘new intuitionalism’ in 
its rational-choice, historical, and sociological variants have not followed a unique 
method of inquiry. Moreover, there are two distinct variants in the type of analysis 
conducted under that label. First, some studies, typically in the comparative politics or 
rational-choice school, take institutions as a given and seek to analyse the effect of a 
particular institution or set of institutions in particular outcomes of interest for each 
study. Second, the most ‘historical’ variant treats institutions within a broader context 
in which their relationship to outcomes is more complex. Institutions in this context, 
shape behaviour but at the same time are shaped by the broader circumstances present 
in the context in which they operate. 
 
The first approach can usually be undertaken by quantitative methods or by tools such 
as game theory. These studies work well in such settings were sufficient statistical 
data is available or where the conduct of political and economic affairs is highly 
structured and abundant information can be collected in a systematic way. The second 
approach tends to rely on more varied sources of data. It requires the exploration of 
detailed factual information and, crucially, an examination of the historical context, 
the surrounding circumstances and the micro motives in which choices are made by 
relevant actors. This line of inquiry needs to extract important information beyond the 
usual data available in public statistics and records. This is normally achieved by 
methods such as elite interviewing.  
 
In the context of Venezuela and in the cases of interest for this research, elite 
interviewing was deemed particularly appropriate because statistics and public 
records are notably of poor quality. Elite interviewing, nonetheless, has been 
complemented by document and statistical analysis and surveying of the secondary 
literature available for all relevant matters related to the cases researched here. These 
combined methods have helped to build what Bates et al. called ‘analytic narrative’.681 
This approach has allowed me to take advantage of, using their words, the “rich, 
qualitative, and descriptive materials that narratives offer”,682 and, from a focus on 
various theoretical constructs such as Chalmers’s actors, arenas and decision-rules or 
Ostrom’s action arena, action situation and actors683, to account for particular events. 
In addition, the built narrative was supplement by quantitative information to help 
qualify outcomes, therefore assessing the performance of the analysed ‘rules of the 
game’.  
 
 
Fieldwork  
 
Fieldwork was spread over three years. Although some interviews were made in 
London, as some former senior officials became available for interviewing, the main 
thrust of the fieldwork was conducted in Caracas in six parts. First, I conducted some 
exploratory interviews while I was visiting the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de 
                                                 
681 R.H.Bates et al., Analytic narratives (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998). 
682 R.H.Bates et al., ibid., p.12. 
683 Elinor Ostrom, ‘In A method of Institutional analysis’, in F.Kaufmann (ed.) Guidance, 
Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1985); Elinor Ostrom, 
‘An agenda for the study of institutions’, Public Choice 48, 1986; Elinor Ostrom, Roy 
Gardner and James Walker, Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool resources in Rules, 
Games and Common-Pool resources  (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
Administración (IESA) in the first semester of 2002. In this phase of the research I 
made use of two cases (the stabilisation fund and the new hydrocarbon law) to explore 
what depth of information might be obtained. This initial effort was followed by four 
fieldtrips, organised and distributed across two years: 
- February-March 2003 dealing with the case of the Investment Fund (FIV). 
- July-August 2003 dealing mainly with PDVSA-government relationships in 
the 1990s and supplementing the research on the Stabilisation Fund conducted 
in 2002. 
- February-March 2004 dealing with the case of the Ministry of Energy. 
- July-August 2004 dealing with the case of the PDVSA strikes of 2002 and 
2003. 
Finally, in July 2005, my supervisor, George Philip, and I agreed that including recent 
events related to the handling by the Chavez administration of the oil prices boom in 
2003-2004 would benefit the research. Accordingly, an extra field trip was undertaken 
in August-September 2005 for research into this latter topic.  
 
 
Interviews  
 
The first batch of interviews (during the exploratory period in the first semester 2002) 
followed a semi-structured approach. I prepared a guide for each interview based on 
pre-prepared questions that I had drawn from preliminary research on each topic to be 
addressed. I soon learnt that former senior Venezuelan officials were very open to 
discuss issues as long as they felt relatively free from a strict format. The semi-
structured approach enabled them to elaborate on their answers in a way that solicited 
additional information. When they answered the question loosely posed following the 
prepared guide they tended to answer shortly and then expanding on issues they 
brought up by themselves. 
 
This first experience led me to organise the following rounds of interviews as follows: 
First, I conducted documentary research on each case or topic based on available 
episodic and running records such as annual reports, the official record held in 
Venezuela (Official Gazette), pamphlets or other written material and, crucially, mass 
media material. This latter research was mainly conducted through the internet in 
three main sources: websites of El Universal and El Nacional and the site called 
Venezuela Analítica. This preparation allowed me to lay down the main facts related 
to each topic. I then prepared a guide for interviewing rather based on events I wanted 
to cover than on specific questions. 
 
Second, once this advance preparation was made I contacted the potential 
interviewees to request an interview. Initial contacts were made either by telephone 
calls or, at the request of the interviewee (or, usually, his/her secretary) through a 
formal letter or electronic mail. In both cases I emphasised the fact I was visiting the 
country for a short period (generally, a month) and that the research was solely for 
academic purposes. In a great majority of cases the response was supportive and 
interviews were fixed in either their offices or their homes.  
 
Third, interviews were conducted following the prepared guide. I particularly made a 
point of not asking for their opinions either in general or about the events covered, 
although many interviewees offered them voluntarily. In each interview, I initially 
talked about the ground rules such as emphasising the strict academic nature of my 
interest, his/her agreement to be recorded and/or cited in the text and the time 
available for the interview (in all previous communication I asked for 30 to 45 
minutes). I only briefly introduced my own research, always in very broad terms and 
never advancing any particular hypothesis. I emphasised, however, my interest in the 
particular case or events intended to be covered during the interview. 
 
In the great majority of the cases, interviews extended for longer than the time I had 
asked for. Almost all interviews lasted between one and two hours, except for few 
interviews that were conducted via telephone. The guide was used only to assure 
covering all the events and main issues related to each case. I initiated each block of 
the conversation within the interview by bringing a particular fact or an open ended 
question. Two examples illustrate this approach: 
 
1. To Luis Hinestrosa, General Manager of FIV in the early 1980s. 
 
Could you describe for me the decision making process when you decided to 
allocate funds for a particular project? 
 2. To Deputy Ricardo Sanguino, member of the Permanent Finance Committee 
of the National Assembly in 2005. 
 
How were the deliberations of the Committee when you approved the Central 
Bank Reform in June 2005? 
 
The open ended questions enabled interviewees to expand on their answers. I probed 
responses further around issues I had previously researched and which I felt needed to 
be clarified. For example: 
 
To Alvaro Silva-Calderón, after he referred to the consensual nature of the debate of 
the Hydrocarbon Law. 
 
Guicaipuro Lameda had made public a rather different view based on his participation 
in the Commission that prepared the Hydrocarbon Law in 2002. What is your view of 
that? 
 
In general, interviews were left uninterrupted to allow interviewees to expand on their 
answers. For most interviews this tactic worked well as respondents usually gave 
abundant details about the events being discussed. I discouraged them, though, to give 
their personal opinions about general matters such as economic crises, the collapse of 
old political elites, politics in Chavez’s times. In such cases, I immediately raised 
another issues related to the events in which I was interested. 
 
Some general trends emerged:  
 
First, the older the issue being discussed, the franker and longer were the responses. 
Similarly, some interviews were turned down in the more recent issues (i.e. officials 
in the Chavista regime were not available). This latter case was, however, relatively 
minor and the information was collected through alternative sources. 
 
Second, after an initial relatively formal or aloof start many interviewees became very 
friendly and relaxed in their responses (I noticed the turning point when, for example, 
they turned to address me in a more colloquial way that generally included a switch 
from using the ‘usted’-form of address to the ‘tu’one). 684  
 
Third, in many cases they were willing to help me through either providing written 
material not generally publicly available or, significantly, by contacting colleagues or 
fellow ex-senior officials to arrange an interview for me. In one case, ex-President of 
the Republic Luis Herrera, although very cordially, refused to answer specific 
questions and rather referred me to one of his former cabinet ministers.  
 
Four, interviewees were in general not opposed to being cited, but on many occasions 
during the course of the interview they asked not to be quoted on a particular 
comment. A majority of interviews were recorded, again following the trend that the 
older the issue, the more open to talk they were. 
 
 
Sample 
 
The sampling followed a straightforward procedure. I listed all the main actors such 
as the ministers and other top officials (such as deputy ministers) responsible for the 
issues covered in each particular case, Presidents or influential members of 
Congressional committees. In the case of the Ministry of Energy and the National Tax 
Agency (Seniat), they requested interviews be directed to the section dealing with 
public affairs. They subsequently suggested which officials were available for 
interview. 
 
In the case of the oil company PDVSA, I selected at least one President and one 
member of the Board in each of the periods into which I divided my research on the 
company. Mid-ranked company officials were selected following personal contacts 
that could help to get access to them as the company had a well known unspoken rule 
of not being very accessible to the public. The sample corresponding to the last 
fieldtrip (August-September 2005) related to the Development Fund (Fondespa) all 
                                                 
684 Unlike in English, for example, in Spanish you can use two verbal forms to refer to the 
other person. First, the rather formal ‘Usted’ as in ‘Usted podra ver esto en…’ or second, the 
more informal ‘tu’ as in ‘Tu podras ver esto en…’.  
interviews were agreed through direct contact with the offices responsible for ‘Social 
Programmes’ within the company. 
 
The Investment Fund (FIV) 
Aquiles Viloria – Deputy Minister (General Manager FIV) 
Carmelo Lauria – Minister of Industry, Presidency’s Chief Staff 
Carlos Rafael Silva – Minister-President FIV 
Constantino Quero-Morales – Minister-President of FIV 
Gumersindo Rodriguez – Minister of Planning 
Heberto Urdaneta – Minister-President FIV 
Hernan Luis Soriano – Minister-President FIV 
Julian Villalba – Minister-President FIV 
Leopoldo Díaz-Bruzual – Minister- President FIV 
Luis Hinestrosa – Deputy Minister (General Manager FIV) 
 
Stabilisation Fund (FIEM) 
Antonio Casas-González – President of Central Bank 
Carlos Hernández-Delfino – Staff Central Bank 
Francisco Rodriguez – Director OAEF, National Assemby (former Congress)  
Gustavo García – Director OAEF, National Congress 
Miguel Rodríguez – Minister of Planning 
Pedro Rosas-Bravo – Minister of Finance 
Ricardo Hausmann – Minister of Planning 
Teodoro Petkoff – Minister of Planning 
 
Development Funds (Fondespa and Fonden) 
Carlos Mujica – Staff PDVSA (Palmaven) 
Dester Rodríguez – Board of PDVSA  
Enid Blanco – Staff Central Bank 
Frank Salcedo – Staff PDVSA (CVP) 
Franklin Méndez – Staff PDVSA (CVP) 
Rafael Quiroz – Staff Central Bank 
Ricardo Sanguino – Deputy, National Assembly 
 
PDVSA 
Alberto Quiros-Corradi – Member of the Board 
Ali Rodríguez – President  
Alonso Guerrero – Oil opening (Pérez Companc) 
Arévalo Guzman-Reyes – Member of the Board 
Andrés Sosa-Pietri – President  
Bernard Mommer – Member of the Board 
Edelmira Duran – Seniat 
Elio Contreras – Staff 
Federico Araujo – External legal advisor 
Francisco Monaldi – Oil finance expert 
Guaicaipuro Lameda – President 
Hugo Hernández-Rafalli – Member of the Board 
Jorge Baralt – Information Technology Staff 
Jose Gregorio Morales – Chief Financial Officer 
Juan C. Garanton – External legal advisor 
Liliana Blanco – Staff 
Luis Giusti – President 
Mercedes Navarro – Staff 
Oscar Veracoechea – Staff 
Oscar Murillo – Chief Legal Officer 
Pablo Reimpell – Member of the Board 
Rafael Garrido – Staff 
Ramon Espinasa – Chief Economist 
Victor Ramos – Staff 
 
Ministry of Energy 
Alirio Parra – Minister 
Alvaro Silva-Calderón – Minister 
Bernardo Alvarez – Deputy Minister 
Celestino Armas – Minister 
Heliodoro Quintero – Staff 
Manuel Da Silva – Staff 
Rafael Guevara – Deputy Minister 
Rayza Pradet – Staff 
Ricardo Corrie – Staff 
 
General (across cases) 
Alfredo Toro-Hardy – Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
Janet Kelly – Academic and member of Presidential Commission for Dialogue 
Jorge Olavarria – Historian and Congressman 
José Andrés Octavio – Comptroller General 
José Vicente Rangel – Vice-President of the Republic 
Luis Herrera Campins – President of the Republic 
Paulina Gamus – Congresswoman and leader of AD 
Pedro Palma – Economist, Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce 
Ramon J. Velásquez – President of the Republic 
Tomas Carrillo-Batalla – Historian and Minister of Finance 
 
All interviews were conducted in Spanish. I personally made the transcripts of all of 
the recorded interviews in English although not in full. I also translated into English 
all the quotes shown in the text. 
 
 
Document research 
 
Venezuelan public records are, to a large extent, not systematically kept except for the 
so-called ‘Official Gazette’ which is published regularly and available online since 
2001 via the website of the Supreme Court (www.tsj.gov.ve). All laws and 
presidential decrees are published in the Official Gazette. Congress’s records are 
irregular although some were available, such as Minutes of Congressional debates and 
the legislative agenda accessible online (www.asambleanacional.gov.ve). Some 
documents, such as internal ‘white papers’ were provided by some of the interviewees 
out of their kindness. Transcripts of President Chavez’s weekly television programme 
‘Alo, Presidente’ are available online (www.minci.gov.ve). They are a useful source 
of ‘official’ information normally not available through other governmental sources. I 
made extensive use of these sources.  
 
Oil statistics were usually well-kept by the Ministry of Energy. They used to publish a 
statistical compendium entitled ‘PODE’ that contained detailed information about the 
oil sector. In recent years, the PODE has not been regularly published. The latest 
edition published in 2005 contains abundant information based on external sources 
such as Opec, an indication that this source is no longer kept as it was in the past. I 
relied enormously on a database kindly facilitated by Dr.Bernard Mommer in which 
he compiled PODE’s data for about six decades. 
 
The oil company PDVSA reports to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
annually. Although lately there have been delays in such reporting the SEC’s reports 
were a useful source of information. I also have access to a statistical compendium 
that is circulated internally and was facilitated in 2004 by a PDVSA staff member, 
Elio Contreras. Mr Contreras pointed out that this information had been previously 
classified as ‘confidential’ but that this was no longer the case. 
 
The other internal source of statistical information, well regarded by academics and 
analysts, is the statistical series of the Central Bank. Most of this information is 
available online (www.bcv.org.ve). I made extensive use of this source. The National 
Budget Office (Onapre) provided some information regarding the national budget, 
partially available online (www.onapre.gov.ve). The Electoral National Council 
(CNE) provided information about election results and the composition of Congress. 
Both PDVSA and FIV’s annual reports provide financial information about these two 
bodies. Statistics compiled by Asdrúbal Baptista in his book (“Bases Cuantitativas de 
la Economía Venezolana 1830-1995”) supplemented my statistical research. 
 
International sources complement the lack of internal information in many cases. Oil 
statistics contained in Opec’s annual statistical bulletins were very useful. They were 
downloaded from its website (www.opec.org). The statistics on governments’ 
finances kept by the International Monetary Fund were useful as well. Figures 
provided by the US Department of Labor regarding inflation were used to estimate 
real values in US$. 
 
Finally, I made extensive use of the running records provided by mass media, 
especially two nationwide and well known newspapers El Universal and El Nacional. 
Most of the information from these two sources was gathered from their websites 
www.eud.com and www.el-nacional.com using their search engines. A third source of 
online information was the online journal entitled ‘Venezuela Analítica’ 
(www.analitica.com). These sources were particularly useful for compiling the events 
related to the topics researched in this thesis. Information from these websites was 
very useful regarding first, events such as the approval by Congress of a particular 
law or measure decreed by the President and, second, public announcements by 
government officials. Open-ed and other opinion pieces were discarded from the 
results of those online search engines.  
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Appendix C 
Major shifts in rules of the game since nationalisation in 1975 
Date Regulating… Reverting/Eliminating 
 
1976 Deposits rules to the Investment Fund were 
changed to reduce contributions to the 
Fund.  
Original formula for deposits and 
permitted areas for investment were 
distorted. 
1976 Taxation to PDVSA (stringent measures in 
matters such as liquidation, rates, prices). 
Reinforcement of tax system 
applying to foreign firms. 
December 
1976 
Delimitation of roles of the Ministry of 
Energy and PDVSA. Presidential 
Memorandum. 
Although retained main roles of the 
Ministry, implicitly gave PDVSA an 
equal status vis-à-vis its watchdog & 
a pseudo-legal way to bypass the 
Ministry. 
December 
1976 
Ministry of Energy was merged with 
Electrical area of Ministry of Industry. 
Departments regulating the oil 
industry were reduced or diminished 
in the hierarchy. 
August 
1979 
Reform of PDVSA’ s statutes. Financial and 
administrative independence dented. 
Board’s appointment and duration was 
changed. 
Increase power of the Ministry. 
Board’s reforms deemed to follow 
‘entrepreneurial’ interests of Ministry 
Calderón Berti. Rule of ‘no political 
considerations’ into PDVSA senior 
management was broken. 
December 
1980 
Deposits rules to the Investment Fund were 
changed to further reduce contributions to 
the Fund. 
Contributions to the Fund reduced to 
only 5% (originally 50%) of oil 
receipts. 
September 
1982 
PDVSA’s foreign reserves were translated 
to Central Bank. 
Financial independence agreed in 
1975 was broken. 
1983 Congress (dominated by AD) objected to 
association with foreign capital firm ‘Veba 
Oil’ in Germany favoured by PDVSA and 
the government of President Herrera of 
Copei (who opposed Art.5 during the 
nationalisation debate). 
Attempt to annul first-time 
application of Art.5 of nationalisation 
law (regulating private capital 
participation). 
1984 Congress (still dominated by AD) passed a 
watered down resolution objecting to the 
way the deal with Veba Oil was made. The 
new government of President Lusinchi 
(AD) did not object to the deal. 
Rule of keeping PDVSA issues out 
of electioneering was broken. 
1991 Permanent Energy Committee of Senate 
(controlled by AD) authorised auctioning of 
some oil fields. 
Application of Article 5 of 
Nationalisation Law is again subject 
to ‘discretion’. 
August 
1991 
Ministry of Energy produced a Directive 
with instructions to PDVSA on several 
administrative issues. 
Attempt to improve the diminished 
role of the Ministry since 
modifications in 1976. 
 Date Regulating… Reverting/Eliminating 
 
September 
1991 
President Perez modified the Ministry’s 
directive of August 1991 conceding to 
PDVSA’s pressures. 
The attempt to improve role of the 
Ministry is watered down. 
1991 President Perez’s administration proposed 
to Congress a bill for a Stabilisation Fund. 
Congress did not approve it. 
Attempt to separate oil revenues 
obtained in times of high prices for 
stabilisation purposes. 
June 1993 Taxation to PDVSA is modified by 
eliminating the Fiscal Exports Values. 
Eliminated a rule that traditionally 
granted the government a great deal 
of discretion in taxing PDVSA. 
September 
1993 
Congress (votes of AD and Copei) approved 
strategic associations with private capital to 
exploit Orinoco Belt heavy oil, based on a 
Supreme Court ruling (1991) that re-
interpreted Article 5 of Nationalisation Law. 
Discretion in application of Article 5 
of Nationalisation Law is extended. 
July 1995 Congress (votes of AD and Copei) approved 
guidelines for associations with private 
capital to exploit conventional oil fields. 
Later, Congress also approved individual 
contracts. 
Discretion in application of Article 5 
of Nationalisation Law is further 
extended. 
June 1996 Congress passed an ‘accord’ limiting the 
privatisation drive of PDVSA. Similarly, 
Congress approved a watered down 
privatisation law regulating retail petrol 
distribution. 
Attempt to limit the participation of 
private capital allowed since 1993. 
November 
1998 
President Caldera (enabled by Congress) 
passed a law establishing the Stabilisation 
Fund. 
Mandatory separation of oil revenues 
in times of high oil prices into a fund 
for later use in times of low prices. 
May 1999 President Chavez modified Stabilisation 
Fund Law. Rules for deposits were 
modified and use of withdrawals was also 
made more specific but withdrawals were 
made more discretionary (by President). 
Regulation of deposits in the Fund 
were weakened (i.e. less money was 
to be saved). Fund’s rules were made 
more subject to discretion. 
December 
1999 
The new Constitution (Article 321) ordered 
the establishment of a stabilisation fund. 
Reinforce the legal status of the 
Stabilisation Fund. 
December 
1999 
The new Constitution (Article 303) 
mandated that the State not sell shares in 
PDVSA. 
Reverted any privatisation attempt of 
PDVSA. 
October 
2001 
President Chavez (enabled by National 
Assembly) decreed a modification of 
Stabilisation Fund’s Law establishing a 
special regime (with immediate effect) 
annulling deposit’s requirements and easing 
withdrawals requirements. 
  
Special regime for 2001 to 2007. In 
particular, no deposits were required 
until 2003. 
November 
2001 
President Chavez (enabled by National 
Assembly) decreed a new Hydrocarbon 
Law. 
New law reinforced role of the 
Ministry, reverted PDVSA’s low 
fiscal contribution by modifying tax 
regime, and reverted 1990’s oil 
opening although allowed private 
participation in the business on better 
terms than the Nationalisation Law. 
 Date Regulating… Reverting/Eliminating 
 
October 
2002 
National Assembly extended special regime 
for the Stabilisation Fund to 2008. 
Immediate effects of the Stabilisation 
Fund Law again postponed.  
December 
2002 
National Assembly modified Stabilisation 
Fund Law to ease requirement for 
withdrawals. 
Withdrawals requirements removed 
in practice. 
March 
2003 
National Assembly modified Stabilisation 
Fund Law to eliminate requirement for 
withdrawals. 
Last requirements for withdrawals 
were eliminated. 
2001-2003 Funds were depleted. Some withdrawals 
were challenged but Supreme Court 
dismissed the legal challenge. 
Rules (even those that permitted 
discretionary interpretation) were 
ignored. 
November 
2003 
National Assembly created a new 
Stabilisation Fund replacing the old one. 
Requirements for deposit and 
withdrawals were weakened in 
comparison with original law (1998). 
January 
2004 
National Assembly exhorted the Central 
Bank to facilitate resources to the 
government. 
Central Bank independence rule is 
dented. 
January 
2004 
Central Bank eased regulations (dated from 
1982) regarding PDVSA reserves in US$ 
held in the Bank. This allowed the creation 
of Fondespa within PDVSA. 
Rules requiring that Funds be used 
for PDVSA operating needs are 
weakened facilitating the use for 
different purposes. PDVSA later 
used this discretion to set up the first 
development fund. 
December 
2004 
President Chavez decreed the fusion of roles 
of Minister of Energy and President of 
PDVSA. 
Reverted old separation of roles. 
January 
2005 
President Chavez decreed the de-merger of 
the Ministry of Energy. 
Mining sector is passed to Ministry 
of Industry (it does not affect 
PDVSA). 
July 2005 National Assembly modified Central Bank 
Law introducing a new concept of ‘Excess 
international reserves’. 
Excess reserves not to be held by 
Central Bank but transferred to the 
Development Funds. 
August 
2005 
President Chavez decreed a new 
Development Fund to be formed from 
excess international reserves held by 
Central Bank and regular PDVSA 
contributions.  
The new Fund allowed the Executive 
to dispose oil revenues directly 
outside budget procedures (including 
mandatory sharing of part of those 
resources with States and 
Municipalities). 
October 
2005 
National Assembly modified the 
Stabilisation Fund Law created in 2003. 
Formula for accumulation in the fund 
was totally modified. The new 
formula completely distorted concept 
of stabilisation. Central Bank was 
removed from any involvement with 
the Fund. 
March 
2006 
National Assembly approved new 
guidelines for associations (mixed 
enterprises or joint ventures) to replace 
1990s oil opening contracts. 
Modified the contractual regime 
granted to private capital associations 
during oil opening in the 1990s. 
 
 
